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This study addresses transnational organised crime and illicit financial flows in 
Nigeria, West Africa and the Global North (i.e. Europe). Based on extensive 
documentary analysis and expert interviews conducted in the four countries (i.e. 
Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and the Gambia). It reveals the contemporary changes 
of organised crime in a global context. Having outlined the dynamics of global 
transnational organised crime, the study examines three specific organised crime 
groups in Nigeria. These are; human trafficking; drug trafficking and advance fee 
fraud (AFF) cybercrime related. Having considered the phenomenon of organised 
crime and its contemporary problems in Nigeria, the study turns to an evaluation 
of the regime against money laundering from a global perspective. It assesses 
some relevant global initiatives and instruments which combat the proceeds of 
organised crime in West Africa and Nigeria.  
The study introduces the conceptual frameworks using the rational choice theory 
to ‘frame’ organised crime offenders from Nigeria and the author uses Value, 
Accessability and Transaction (VAT) Model to explain the routine activities of the 
rational criminal actors from Nigeria before considering the anti-money laundering 
framework (i.e. the Financial Action Task Force 40 Recommendations) as the 
instruments to decrease the risk of organised crime financial transactions within 
the global jurisdictions.  
The exploration of cybernetics in this study offers a scientific model called Anti-
Money Laundering Transaction Validation Model with aim of providing a solution 
which strengthens the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering (AML, 
hereinafter) regimes in Nigeria, developing economies and globally.  
Finally, the thesis concludes that those international initiatives, recommendations 
and the instruments of soft-laws from developed countries to combat the illicit 
financial flows of organised crime in developing economies cannot be effective 
without providing solutions to the impediments affecting the curbing of illicit 
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Introduction of the Thesis 
Organised Crime (hereinafter, OC) in Africa, particularly Nigeria began in 1870 
when the  abolitionist movement against human slavery from the  coast of Africa 
achieved the ban on slave trade and the practice of slavery in European States 
and the United States of America (Picarelli, 2009). Inspite of this ban, the slave 
trade continued after the 1870s with a record number of human beings being 
smuggled from their countries of origin to destination countries by African and 
European criminal networks operating during this era (Picarelli, 2009). Today, the 
contemporary commodities dealt with by organised crime groups are increasingly 
‘fashionable’. Initially, services obtained through human exploitation were the 
norm. Later, narcotics drug became the most popular commodity of organised 
crime groups.  In the 1990s, the commodities of organised crime in Nigeria 
extended beyond trading in illicit goods and services to trade in ‘greed’ and the 
direct theft of identities and financial information of victims using tricks and 
information and communication technology (ICT) to profit from crime.  
 
Although organised crime trading has developed to a greater extent and its 
development has associated characteristics and peculiarities that threaten and 
disrupt global development. Firstly, organised crime development disrupts the 
global criminal justice system. Secondly, it creates illegitimate financial flows that 
affect the integrity of financial institutions. Thirdly, it jeopardises legitimate 
investments when criminal funds are competing with investment opportunities that 
exist in the global states. Fourthly, it threatens international trade when criminals 
secure unfair advantage within the global trade system over the legitimate 
international business traders. Finally, it disrupts the effectiveness and functioning 
of institutional frameworks responsible for the fight against serious crime within the 
global jurisdictions.  
 
The purpose of this study therefore, is to explore the phenomenon of organised 
crime and financial flows associated with it. Furthermore, it will focus on three 
specific organised crime trades in Nigeria. These are: human trafficking; drug 
trafficking, and advance fee fraud (hereinafter, AFF). The study will also explore 
various international instruments and recommendations adopted to curb the 






This chapter sets out the overall framework for this study. It will discuss the central 
theme of this thesis and examine and provide an elucidated overview of the 
chapters’ structure within the main body of this thesis. It will move up a gear to 
explore the methodology used before concluding with research ethics for this work. 
 
1.1    Central Theme of the Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge   
The study is separated into three inter-related parts. The first part examines the 
concepts and phenomenon of transnational organised crime in context. This is 
essential in order to examine the history, characteristics, models and nature of 
organised crime. Also, it evaluates the impact of major transnational organised 
crime in Nigeria and the roles and the schemes adopted by the Nigerian organised 
crime offenders will be highlighted. The second part deliberates on the 
international regime against money laundering and the conceptual framework that 
groups organised crime and money laundering together. In achieving this, two 
models were invented.  
 
The first model adopts the acronym VAT, which mean Value, Access and 
Transaction and is used to explain the rational choice decision modelling of the 
Nigerian organised crime offenders when committing crime within global 
jurisdictions. The second model employs the scientific way of validating the 
authenticity of transactions under the regime of anti-money laundering, including 
the transactions of organised crime groups (hereinafter, OCGs).  It further 
considers case studies which help explain how organised crime groups structure 
and launder the proceeds of crime and further suggests key indicators and ‘red 
flags’ that can help competent authorities (hereinafter, CAs) to combat them.  
 
The final part evaluates the impediments which militate against the success of 
winning the ‘war’ against organised crime. It is against this backdrop that the study 
makes policy recommendations towards combating organised crime’s financial 
flows. The final chapter in this part discusses how the lack of data integrity in 
Nigeria further impedes the collaboration needed for intelligence sharing for the 
purpose of countering the illicit financial flows of the OCGs and other related 
serious crime in Nigeria.  
 
Although there appears to be in existence a body of literature that examines 





work, much of that literature is based upon the general occurrence of organised 
crime and is limited in scope, i.e. the appreciation of the schemes and true value 
of organised crime’s financial flows within the West African region and Nigeria. 
The research also differs from existing literature in its ability to evaluate the 
financial flows from criminal activities such as human trafficking, drug trafficking 
and advance fee fraud. Moreover, existing literature on organised crime does not 
address these three specific organised crimes in Nigeria together as an academic 
package. The fieldwork conducted during this research adds further originality 
through the consultation of a range of experts whose qualitative views on the 
occurrence and trends of organised crime and its financial flows in West Africa 
and Nigeria are presented. It is against this backdrop that a new model to combat 
organised crime financial flows in Nigeria and globally is presented by the author 
towards the second part of this thesis.        
 
1.2    Thesis Outline 
This thesis begins with an introductory chapter that sets out the structure for this 
study. The section on research methodology and ethics is followed by Chapter 2, 
“organised crime: concepts, characteristics and types”, which first summarises the 
literature on organised crime, definitions and characteristics. An evaluation is then 
made of the contemporary changes that have occurred in the characteristics of 
organised crime.  
Additionally, Chapter 2 examines the types of transnational organised crime in a 
global context and explores their total estimated illicit market value. Chapter 3 
focuses on specific organised crime groups in Nigeria. These include human 
trafficking, drug trafficking and advance fee fraud cybercrime and their evaluation 
will highlight the phenomenon of organised crime in Nigeria and contemporary 
problems which are a direct consequence of organised criminal activity. Also in 
this chapter, the roles and schemes of Nigerian organised crime actors in the 
globalisation of crime will be examined. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the regime against money laundering. It summarises the 
literature on existing initiatives and instruments which combat the movement of 
monies and assets which are the proceeds of the crime in West Africa and Nigeria. 
Next, it discusses the anti-money laundering regime and elucidates the definitions 
and different stages of money laundering. Following this, there is an examination 





communities. The global initiatives in the combat of money laundering are 
discussed under the United Nations Conventions against Organised Crime and 
other related serious crime. Additionally, this chapter evaluates the Council of 
Europe Convention on OC, the European Money Laundering Directive and the 
Commonwealth Strategies against money laundering. The chapter then concludes 
with a discussion of the roles played by the global standard setters and specialised 
institutions in combating money laundering.  
 
Chapter 5 evaluates the conceptual frameworks of this thesis, and is divided into 
three parts. The first part discusses organised crime using the rational choice 
theory. It presumes that the lack of legitimate economic opportunities fuel the illicit 
activities of the Nigerian organised criminal offenders. The second part discusses 
how to decrease the risks of organised criminal transactions by adopting an anti-
money laundering framework to counter them. The third part explores cybernetics, 
as a means or option that provides a scientific model with the objective of providing 
a solution which strengthens the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering 
regimes in West Africa and Nigeria. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses organised crime financial flows in Nigeria. It deploys a case 
study approach which highlights a number of red flag indicators which competent 
authorities curbing organised crime in Nigeria and global jurisdictions could look 
out for. This chapter also explores the role of specialised agencies responsible for 
the fight against organised crime in Nigeria, particularly in relation to drug 
trafficking, human trafficking and advance fee fraud (AFF), i.e. the Nigeria version 
of cybercrime. Chapter 7 evaluates the impediments standing in the way of 
attempts to curb OCG’s illicit financial flows and suggests possible policies.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the collaboration mechanism that exists in Nigeria using anti-
money laundering statutory reporting. The discussion of this chapter investigates 
the reliability and integrity of data used to counter proceeds of OCGs in Nigeria. 
The role of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) as the focal agency that 
coordinates anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria is explored. This chapter also 
evaluates the collaboration impact of the anti-money laundering data and 
intelligence reports to combat proceeds of organised crime groups in Nigeria. The 
chapter concludes by offering some recommendations on how to improve the 






The final chapter, i.e. Chapter 9 summarises the analyses and findings of the 
preceding chapters and highlights possible limitations of this study which could 
potentially create further avenues for future research. It will also provide a final 
critical examination of the central thesis by way of conclusion.  
 
1.3   Methodology 
The research methodology adopted was qualitative analysis. This was applied 
through the use and analysis of documents and expert interviews. Each of these 
two approaches will be discussed in turn. The chapter will conclude with the 
underlying ethical issues of this research. The fieldwork for the research was 
conducted in the capitals and cities of four countries in the West African (WA) 
region with its focus on Nigeria. The National Crime Agency of the United Kingdom 
provided the author with funding to carry out fieldwork exercises in Lagos (Nigeria), 
Accra (Ghana), Dakar (Senegal) and Banjul (The Gambia). These countries were 
selected in order to appraise the impact of regional integration on the fight against 
organised crime and money laundering within the West African region, and Nigeria 
in particular. In these capitals and cities, local and supranational experts, law 
enforcement officers, government employees, financial regulators and non-
financial regulators were interviewed and relevant data were provided to the 
researcher during the fieldwork. 
 
1.3.1   Research Objectives and Questions  
The research project focused on Nigeria, and aims at following and analysing 
money trails within Nigeria, and the West Africa region, and to and from the Global 
North (in the Europe), where the main markets are located for drug trafficking,  
human trafficking, and AFF. This is the first step towards analysing the instruments 
(model) to intercept the financial flows of OC that are developed and used in 
Nigeria itself, the United Kingdom and other European States and agencies, in 
combating Nigerian organised crime actors.  
 
Research Objectives 
The main aims and objectives of this research include the following: 
- To explore the forms, types and criminal business models (‘scripts’) of 





States) for three types of transnational organised crime: drug trafficking, 
advance fee fraud and human trafficking.  
- To analyse the international responses to the financial flows of and from 
organised crime, and the respective institutions and mechanisms.  
- To conduct a typological study of the financial flows of these three types of 
transnational organised crime. 
- To assess the effectiveness of institutions and mechanisms in Nigeria, to 
identify weaknesses and strengths.  
- To make policy recommendations as to the improvement of instruments 
and mechanisms to combat the illicit financial flows of OC in Nigeria and 
the West African region.  
 
Research Questions  
Question 1: How are the three types of OC operated in and outside of Nigeria?  
Question 2: What types of financial flows are linked to the mode of operation of 
each type of organised crime, and how is the movement of funds organised 
and executed between North and South, within the region and in Nigeria itself. 
How are these flows linked, which main actors are involved in different types of 
financial transactions?    
Question 3: Which international instruments are currently used in Nigeria to 
intercept these financial flows and transactions of the Nigerian transnational 
organised crime?  
Question 4: What are the challenges militating success of anti-money 
laundering regime in Nigeria? 
Question 5: How do different agencies and reporting institutions cooperate in 
sharing intelligence reports to intercept the financial flows of organised crime 
groups in Nigeria?  
 
1.3.2   Documentary Analysis 
During this phase, national and international reports on transnational organised 
crime and money laundering in Nigeria and the West African region were analysed. 
Documentary analysis was also conducted on documents such as: policy 
documents, legal documents on anti-money laundering and organised crime, 
Procedural documents of Agencies and Stakeholders, Treaties and Conventions. 





responsible for the implementation of anti-money laundering frameworks in the 
West African region and Nigeria in particular. 
 
The thematic topics which the documentary analysis highlights include the 
following: 
 
- organised crime conceptualization, characteristics and types; 
- organised crime illicit financial flows and business; 
- money laundering concepts and stages; 
- the basic principles of the anti-money laundering (AML) regime; 
- development of national strategies and the establishment of both 
international and regional co-operation in Nigeria; 
- the institutional framework, regulatory framework, the legal framework and 
the formation and roles of national agencies for the effective 
implementation of the Nigerian AML regime; and 
- the importance of AML data integrity and national initiatives on the fight 
against money laundering and organised crime. 
 
Types of Documents 
The researcher obtained a number of documents prior to the commencement of 
the fieldwork, after which, further documents were provided by the supranational 
institutions during the fieldwork. These Institutions are; Inter-Governmental Action 
Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Senegal. At the GIABA Secretariat in 
Senegal, the author was given copies of: the GIABA mutual evaluation reports on 
anti-money laundering regime for Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and The Gambia. 
Mutual evaluation report is the process by which a country is evaluated by a team 
of experts delegated by standard setters using a standard questionnaire coupled 
with pre-set list of issues to determine the level of compliance of a particular 
country with anti-money laundering standards (World Bank & International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), 2006); the GIABA secretariat’s analysis and follow-up of the 
mutual evaluation report; the international standards on combating money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism & proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the Financial Action Task Force (hereinafter, FATF) 40 
Recommendations (FATF, 2013); the GIABA annual reports (GIABA, 2011-2013); 





by offenders to launder the illicit funds generated from their criminal activities) by 
GIABA on illicit financial flows in West Africa which were provided to the 
researcher during the fieldwork in Senegal. Typologies report on the laundering of 
the proceeds of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in 
West Africa as well as on cash transactions and cash couriers in West Africa. 
GIABA typologies report on tax crimes and money laundering in West Africa, tax 
fraud and money laundering in West Africa – Human and economic development 
perspective, and typologies of money laundering through the real estate sector in 
West Africa. The UNODC office in Senegal also provided the researcher with the 
following documents: Transnational organised crime in West Africa: A threat 
assessment (2013); The World Drug Report (2012); and Organised Crime and 
Instability in Central Africa: A Threat Assessment. 
 
The second group of documents analysed by the researcher were those obtained 
from the national agencies in Nigeria. The Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) provided its special edition magazines, titled “Zero Tolerance 
to Economic and Financial Crimes” (EFCC, 2013) and statistical record of assets 
forfeited on interim and final orders from 2003 to 2013. These statistics show 
records of proceeds of crime forfeited by the offenders to the Commission (EFCC, 
2013). Additionally, the values of intercepted cash and currencies by the 
Commission at the airport from 2003 to 2013 were also provided by the 
Commission.  
The National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other related matters 
(NAPTIP), provided the researcher with the following statistical evidence: A 
summary of convictions between 2004 to March, 2013; Statistical information on 
reported, investigated and convicted cases in 2012; Statistical data on victims 
between 2005 to 2008; and Annual reports of the agency for 2009/2010 and 
2010/2011. Additionally, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) 
provided the researcher with their Annual reports of 2008, 2010 and 2011; the 
national drug control master plan and a course manual on financial and money 
laundering investigation compiled for the agency. The Nigerian Financial 
Intelligence Unit provided their 2013 progress report to the researcher. This 
progress report contained statistics on statutory reportable transactions of money 
laundering in Nigeria from 2010 to 2012.  
 
Finally, other documents analysed included: The Progress Report 2011 of the 





Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), Ghana provided the researcher with statistics 
of Nigerian nationals involved in money laundering cases in Ghana as well as a 
soft copy of a document containing relevant laws on anti-money laundering regime 
of Ghana.  
 
1.3.3   Expert Interviews  
Experts from various national agencies and supranational institutions responsible 
for curbing the threats of organised crime and money laundering in West Africa, 
and Nigeria in particular were interviewed. The decision to conduct an expert 
interview was taken because the research interests focuses on the analysis of a 
specific configuration of knowledge and practical consequences that requires the 
knowledge of experts (Littig, 2011). Deeke (195:7-8 cited in Flick, 2009: 165) 
defines an expert as those persons with particular competent authorities in their 
field of work or in a certain matter of facts. 
 
Therefore, expert interviews are aimed at seeking information from an individual 
as a result or their specialist knowledge and experiences which result from the 
actions, responsibilities, obligations of the specific functional status within an 
organisation/institution” (Littig, 2011). Meuser and Nagel (2005) refer to an expert 
as a person who is responsible for the development, implementation or control of 
solutions, strategies and policies. The implementation of control and strategies in 
this thesis include the national strategies adopted in countries of interest to dry-
out the illicit financial flows of organised crime. Thus the researcher submits that 
an expert is a person who has privileged access to information and knowledge of 
the implementation of these strategies and frameworks.  
 
1.3.4   Expert Interview Sample  
A total of 29 experts (26 men and 3 women) from 14 different institutions and 
organisations were interviewed. All respondents were very experienced within 
their various areas of expertise. The rankings of the expert respondents were as 
follows: eleven were of director’s level; six were heads of departments or unit 
heads; four were anti-money laundering financial analysts; two were law-
enforcement investigators; and three were anti-money laundering compliance 
officers. All the respondents had been working in their respective positions for a 





The sample selected by the researcher was drawn from the following institutions 
and agencies: Five representatives of law enforcement agencies, which are: The 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in 
Persons and Other Related Matters, (NAPTIP), Ghana Police, and National Crime 
Agency (NCA) of the UK.  Also  two representatives from supranational institutes, 
such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Senegal and 
Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA). Third is one representative of the financial regulator, which is the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN).  
 
Another category is one representative of non-financial system regulator - Special 
Control Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML). Next, are four representatives 
of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) - Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), 
Ghana Financial Intelligence Centre (GFIC), National Financial 
Intelligence Processing Unit – “CENTIF” of Senegal and Financial Intelligence 
Unit of The Gambia. The last is one representative of the private sector - The 
Committee of Chief Compliance Officers of Banks in Nigeria (COCCOBIN). 
 
The researcher’s  choice of selection of these experts stems from the fact that 
these national agencies and supranational institutions are amongst the core 
competent authorities responsible for curbing the threat of organised crime and 
money laundering in the selected countries of interest and globally.     
 
Access to the Interview Experts  
The researcher gained access to these experts via the following ways. First, an 
initial approach was made through email and telephone contact.  Participants were 
recruited through emails, telephone appointments and law-enforcement 
networking in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and The Gambia.  
 
It is important to highlight that the researcher has previously worked with various 
anti-money laundering (AML) experts in Nigeria, having been previously employed 
by the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) as a Senior AML Compliance Analyst from 2004 to 2011. 
During this period, the researcher was privileged to interact with various anti-





previous capacity in Nigeria, and as a result had substantially broad background 
knowledge in the mechanisms of anti-money laundering regimes.  
 
The EFCC interviews in Nigeria were conducted first, after which the expert 
respondents in EFCC referred the reseracher to their counterpart law-enforcement 
officers for further interviews. In three cases, the experts at EFCC made telephone 
calls on behalf of the reseracher and secured interviews in other agencies. Next, 
the National Crime Agency of the UK and Inter-Governmental Action Group 
against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) in Senegal facilitated the 
interviews in Ghana, Senegal and The Gambia. Also, in some instances, 
snowballing or third party or ‘‘gatekeeper’’ recruitment was used. This was done 
in two ways: (a) The researcher asked the interviewee to recommend another 
person to whom the researcher’s name and contact to this person and contact 
details were provided. This individual was then kindly asked to contact the 
researcher. (b) The researcher then asked the interviewee to seek permission 
from the recommended person to have their contact details forwarded to the 
researcher. 
 
Selection of Experts 
The selection of experts was dependent on their core functions and mandates of 
both national agencies and supranational institutions responsible for curbing 
organised crime and money laundering in West Africa and Nigeria in particular. 
The selection procedure for these experts varied from one institutional agency to 
another depending on the relevance of their knowledge to this study. The selected 
experts consisted of: nine law enforcement experts, nine financial intelligence 
analysts, five supranational experts, four regulators, and two compliance officers 
of banks. 
 
The justification for having a higher numbers of participants consisting of law 
enforcement officers and financial intelligence analysts was due to the fact that, 
law enforcement officers are responsible for three generic but associated 
organised crimes (human trafficking, drug trafficking and cybercrime) in West 
Africa and Nigeria in particular. Additionally, the selected financial analysts 
specialised in different types of anti-money laundering roles and compliance 
analyses of the reporting institution [(the financial institutions (FIs), non-financial 





(DNFBPs)] in West Africa and Nigeria, in particular. As a result of this, the expert 
opinions and views of these individuals were of huge significance.          
 
Anonymity 
The respondents in these expert interviews agreed to participate on condition of 
anonymity. Each interview was given a code so that the transcription notes could 
not be linked to the names of the respondent experts. Thus, the respondents of 
this study cannot be linked to their quotes. The names of the sources are not 
disclosed but codes are also used to secure their anonymity as agreed in the 
consent form and participant information sheet (see the attached consent form 
and participant information sheet in the Appendix A).  
 
1.3.5   Interview Schedule  
The researcher adopted semi-structured interviews in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal 
and The Gambia. In the interview schedule, some of the questions remained the 
same for certain experts while other experts were asked different questions 
depending on their expertise. The interview schedule was designed such that 
where there were inconsistencies between one source and another, additional 
questions were asked by the researcher.  
 
The theme of the interviews is centred on: new trends and changes in the nature 
of organised crime; the international, regional and national collaboration in the fight 
against organised crime and money laundering; the various roles of the agencies 
in the fight against organised crime and money laundering; the national strategies 
adopted by agencies to dry-out illicit flows of organised crime; the role of regional 
standard setters in the fight against organised crime and money laundering; the 
effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria; the role of the 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in receipt, analysis, and dissemination of 
intelligence reports on the suspicious transactions and activities of organised 
crime offenders in Nigeria. Also, the implications of mutual evaluation reports of 
anti-money laundering regime in West African member states; the technology and 
software for monitoring the money trail of organised crime offenders; the available 
feedback mechanism among the actionable agencies on the fight against 
organised crime and money laundering; and the successes and failure of national 
strategy on the fight against money laundering and organised crime were all 





The questions asked were precise, open and provided the experts the opportunity 
to expand or elaborate in their responses and to discuss freely with the researcher 
any suggested solutions to address any issues of concern that were raised.  The 
list of some the interview questions are included in the Appendix A of this thesis. 
 
Pilot interviews were not conducted before the fieldwork of study.  
The researcher conducted 29 interviews in total in the selected interview sample 
i.e. Twenty-one in Nigeria, two in Ghana; five in Senegal, and one in The Gambia. 
It is important to mention that 28 out of the 29 interviews conducted in Nigeria, 
Ghana, Senegal and the Gambia, were convened in the offices of the respondents 
and 1 of the interviewed was conducted in a relaxed venue outside the office of 
one of the experts in Senegal. The length of each interview ranged between one 
hour to one and a half hours per expert.  
 
The official language of Senegal is French.  Thus the researcher had to translate 
a participant information sheet and the consent form from English to French. This 
service was provided by the Bilingual Secretary of the Director of Research of the 
Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa 
(GIABA), Senegal.  These were translated following a request by the respondent 
at the National Financial Intelligence Processing Unit – CENTIF of Senegal.  The 
formal interview for this respondent was conducted in the English language two 
days after the translation in Senegal.    
 
Interview notes were taken by the researcher for all the 29 conducted interviews 
in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and The Gambia. 
 
1.3.6    Data Analysis 
The researcher used a general qualitative data analysis methodology suggested 
by Creswell (2009). Creswell (2009) suggests certain procedures and tasks to be 
performed in achieving effective data validation accuracy, which are the following: 
interviews transcription, reading through the data, generating codes and themes, 
and interpreting the meaning of the codes.  
 
With reference to the interview transcription, all the 29 interviews were manually 
typed from the interviews notes to convert hand-written notes to a text format using 





Next, in reading through the data, upon completion of the interview transcription, 
the researcher conducted a strategic reading of the manually typed data. This was 
done to enable the researcher develop an in-depth knowledge of what the data 
would look like and to provide a general information of the fieldwork data gathered. 
An interpretation of this data provided the researcher with the platform from which 
codes and themes for this research were formed. 
 
In generating codes and themes for this research, the researcher highlighted 
thematic segments of the data following a thorough read through. The researcher 
also achieved the coding process through segmentation of data using codes and 
categories (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The researcher also labelled segments 
uniquely with terms to differentiate them from the general data. The coding 
process of this study was manually generated using markers and post-its. Further 
classification levels of data were applied in this study based on the similarity of 
context and different levels of abstraction (Rossman & Rallis cited in Creswell 
2009). The categorisations of codes were further classified into themes and sub-
codes depending on the level of abstractions and similarity in contexts. The 
categories with the highest level of abstractions are referred to as the themes of 
the thesis, while the categories with the lowest level of abstraction (but with 
similarity in context) are referred to as sub-codes for the purpose of the data 
analysis process used for this study. 
 
Following the interpretation of the themes and the sub-codes generated for this 
study, the researcher evaluated the meaning of codes and themes of the experts’ 
interviews with the relevant academic research documentary analysis of the 
official documents collected from the selected countries during the fieldwork. It is 
against this backdrop that the researcher compares the results of these 
interpretations with the research objectives and literature collected during 













1.3.7   Research Ethics   
The main ethical issues of this study are centred on confidentiality and the security 
of participants and the information that they provide. This issue was addressed by 
anonymising all data sources and their identities of individuals were not revealed. 
Data were secured against unauthorised access. Only the researcher had access 
to the data.  
 
There is no known ethical review procedure in Nigeria. However, the researcher 
followed the robust and systematic ethical review policy and procedures that exist 
in the United Kingdom. The same applies to Ghana, Senegal, and the Gambia. 
 
Participants were asked to sign a consent form. They also had the opportunity to: 
read the information relating to the research; ask the researcher any questions; 
withdraw from the study at any time; and withdraw their consent for the information 
to be used after the interview should they wish. The researcher also informed the 
participants that: all possible measures had been taken to ensure their 
confidentiality; names and places were anonymised and their responses could not 
be traced to them in notes, reports of interviews and any other material.  
The participants were also asked whether they consent to the researcher using 
anonymised quotes in the publication of the research; understand the research 
and the exact nature of their participation; and understood the measures to be 
used to ensure confidentiality. 
The researcher ensured the confidentiality and security of personal data as follows:  
 
a) All research data was stored under lock and key at the storage facility provided 
by the University of Leeds School of Law;  
b) Flash-drive and laptop were pass-worded and encrypted;  
c) Addresses were stored separately from any other materials and consent forms;  
d) All addresses were destroyed after the interviews;  
e) Interview sites were anonymised; 








































 Organised crime: Concepts, Characteristics and Types 
Transnational organised crime is of great concern globally and particularly in 
Nigeria. In Nigeria perpetrators create illegal economies and move the proceeds 
of crime from the United Kingdom and European states back home or vice-versa. 
This chapter explores the conceptual development of the framework for analysing 
Organised and Transnational Organised Crime (OC, TOC), respectively.  
It will look into the definition of the terms and their classification under both social 
science and institutional. It will then move forward to explore the contemporary 
definition of the terms. Thereafter, will be focussed on the contemporary changes 
in the nature of organised crime following from which the characteristics of 
organised crime will be examined. This chapter will conclude with an investigation 
of TOC and the specific demand and supply structure of illicit commodities in 
different illegal markets and the global illicit flow of goods, natural resources, 
people and the financial assets attached to these flows in the globalisation of crime. 
 
2.1   Defining Organised Crime  
The development of organised crime as a theoretical concept has resulted in more 
than 150 definitions as suggested on the website ‘‘Organised Crime Research’’ by 
Von Lampe.  
Until now, there appears to be no generally accepted definition for the term 
organised crime (http://www.organised-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm, emphasis added).  
 
Edwards and Levi (2008:364) argue that ‘the problem of organised crime is the 
concept of ‘organised crime’ itself. Official conceptions of this problem have been 
pre-occupied with asking if ‘it’ has been organised in particular ways that pose 
external threats to otherwise legitimate political economies.’  
This has contributed to the disagreement between official/legal and scholarly 
concepts of which groups constitute organised crime (Bassiouni, 1990:18). It is 
against this backdrop that this chapter focuses on both the social sciences and 
institutional definitions (such as those from the United Nations and European 
Union) of organised crime.  
The development of the definition of organised crime is presented using the 
research of Von Lampe’s collections on the definitions of organised crime, a 





2.1.1   The Social Sciences Definitions 
Longo (2010) argues that ‘the search for a theoretical definition of organised crime 
by social sciences gave rise to different approaches to this topic’. These 
approaches are: the organisational theory approach; the ‘‘patron/client’’ model; the 
objectives driven approach and the social network and system theory approach. 
This is a rough categorisation, which is helpful in identifying the frameworks of 
these definitions. 
 
Organised Crime as an Organisation 
The first approach uses organisational theory to define organised crime. This 
approach suggests that ‘‘the most primary distinguishing component of organised 
crime is found within the term itself, mainly, organisation ...Interaction is a key 
concept here, as an aggregation of individuals performing a criminal act in the 
presence of one another would not, in itself, constitute an organised act. 
Organisation, then, is the basic distinguishing element between organised and 
other types of crime’’ (Albini, 1971: 35).  Albini (1971) thus defines organised crime 
as any criminal activity involving two or more individuals specialising or not, in 
certain type of crime; furthermore, it encompasses some form of social structure, 
leadership, and utilising certain modes of operation, through which the ultimate 
purpose of the organisation is achieved. Reuter (1983:175) defines organised 
crime as “organisations that have durability, hierarchy and involvement in a 
multiplicity of criminal activities”. 
 
According to Abadinsky (1994:6) organised crime is a ‘‘non-ideological enterprise, 
involving a number of persons in close social interaction organised on a 
hierarchical basis, with at least three levels/ranks, for securing profit and power by 
engaging in illegal and legal activities’’. This definition postulates that the positions 
are hierarchically based and functional specialisations are rationally assigned 
according to skill. Chow, (2003: 473) refers to OC as a ‘‘group of persons or entities 
acting in concert to engage in criminal conduct within an overall organisational 
structure and under the direction of an individual or group of individuals’’. Falcone 
(2005:187) defines the term as ‘‘an illegal pattern of activity conducted by a 
consortium of people and/or organisations, acting in concert, to carry out fraud, 






For these authors, organised criminal activities constitute a classical 
organisational model in their mode of operations (Longo, 2010; Abadinsky, 1994). 
This conceptualisation emphasises the associative dimension as the main 
characteristic of this kind of illicit activity (Longo, 2010). This implies that organised 
criminal groups are rather permanent with a well-defined organisational structure, 
and capable of competing within the external environment in which they operate 
(Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), 2009). The organisational 
characteristics include the degree of: formalisation, hierarchy, differentiation and 
flexibility of their operations, which thereby differentiates organised crime from 
other criminal activities committed by single individuals (Longo, 2010).  
 
Therefore the thesis submitted that organised crime derived its definition from the 
term ‘organisational theory’, the first model of which the crime was first operated 
by the organised crime groups of the Mafia syndicates.  
 
Organised Crime as a Patron-Client Model 
The ‘‘patron-client’’ model emphasises the bonds that tie the OC group together. 
This involves demonstrations of loyalty and trust to each other in the perpetration 
of serious crime (Mallory, 2007). The patron, who is considered as “the boss” 
provides aid and protection for the client (the follower in crime), while in return the 
clients show their appreciation by performing duties that are ordered by the patron 
(Mallory, 2007). Clients also receive protection, business contracts, and so forth 
as compensation for their loyalty to the patron (Mallory, 2007). 
 
Scott (1972;1981) suggests that the typical American Mafia Family 
patrimonial/patron-client network include: The boss (paterfamilias) who is the 
patron of an underboss (sottocapo); the counsellor/advisor (consigliere) who is the 
special adviser to the boss; the captains (capiregime) who are clients of the 
boss/patron as well as patrons to their own ‘‘clients’’; the members or soldiers 
(soldati) who are clients of the captains; and other non-OC affiliated clients of the 
boss/patron. This model is less centralised and the patron has less control over 
the clients as compared to the OC group model that is based on classical 
organisation and bureaucratic structure (Abadinsky, 2007). This provides the 
advantage of more flexibility to the group when the leader is incapacitated, since 






Patron-client relationships are mainly confined to territories (Mallory, 2007). 
According to Byrne (2007) ‘criminal activities within a patron’s geographic territory 
that are not under his “patronage” are referred to as “outlaw” operations’.  In such 
cases, patrons will not intervene to assist “outlaw” criminals who are arrested. 
They will “outlaw” criminal activities that conflict with those under their patronage 
by arranging (through the passage of discreet information) police raids and often 
unleashing violent acts against “outlaw” criminals.  
They may also force independent operators to share their criminal activities (pay 
tribute) to receive “protection” from police raids or being victimised by violence. 
 
The professional criminals not affiliated to the OC group often pay financial tribute 
to an OC patron as concrete recognition of the patron’s power, to show respect in 
order to secure vital information and assistance from the patron for the successful 
running of their criminal operations (Byrne 2007). 
 
Organised Crime as Defined by its Objectives   
This approach moves away from the analysis of the structure of the group to the 
analysis of the objectives of organised crime. The following (Briggs, 2010; Longo, 
2010; Hess, 2009; Andersen and Taylor, 2007; Desroches, 2007; Beirne and 
Meserschmidt, 2006; Zaluar, 2001; Fijnaut et al., 1998; Bossard, 1990; Block, 
1983) have identified the objectives of organised crime as: the provision of illegal 
goods and services to others; acquiring power in the territory where they operate; 
continuity and expansion of the criminal organisation; maximising illicit profits, and 
proceeds from crime. OC is seen as an ‘‘organisation’’, ‘’that has been rationally 
designed to maximise profits by performing illegal services and providing 
forbidden products demanded by the members of the broader society in which 
they live’’ (Cressey, 1969: 72). 
 
Ponsaers et al. (2008: 647) posit that OC is ‘‘where two or more people 
systematically offer services or manufactured goods in a manner or benefit in 
activity which is prohibited by the criminal law of the nation state where at least 
part of that activity occurs. In terms of the informal economy, these services may 
be an intrinsic part of the informal economic activity (for example, selling drugs, 
selling counterfeit goods, running a brothel or paying bribes to politicians), or they 
may be ancillary services, which are not in their nature illegal (informal banking, 





Paoli (2002) argues that the objective of the mafia type OC group is not exclusively 
engaging in the supply of illegal commodities and services. Moreover, ‘‘these 
groups pre-existed the formation and expansion of modern illegal markets’’ (Paoli 
2001:63). They actively contribute to non-economic roles such as protection from 
threats by others and themselves (protection rackets), or supply of votes in 
elections, among others (Paoli, 2001 cited in Longo, 2010).  Finckenauer (2005) 
also argues that the objectives of the mafia’s OC include participation in the 
legitimate economy by assumed quasi-governmental roles. This implies that mafia 
OC group in this position may act as a kind of legitimate authority.  
 
Organised Crime as Social Networks and Systems  
Social network and systems theory focus on the relevance of relationships that 
link people in the OC structure, thus the networks, its objectives and relationship 
are defined as a ‘social system’ (Mcillwain 1999:303). 
Organised crime is thus seen as a social system that is ‘‘composed of relationships 
binding professional criminals, politicians, law enforcers, and various 
entrepreneurs’’ (Block, 1983:vii). The organised criminal, by definition, occupies a 
position in a social system (Cressey, 1969:72). Other definitions focus on the flow 
of action in these networks.  
Wodiwiss and Beare (2003:4) define organised crime as systematic illegal activity 
for power or profit. Beirne and Meserschmidt, (2006:160) define organised crime 
as ‘‘syndicates - associations of individuals such as business people, police, 
politicians, and criminals - formed to conduct specific illegal enterprises for the 
purpose of making profit’’.  
 
Conklin (2007:315) defines organised crime ‘‘as syndicated crime, the violation of 
the law on a large-scale basis by on-going, tightly structured groups devoted to 
the pursuit of profit through criminal means’’. It is important to note that syndicates 
comprise of groups of individuals who are not directly involved in the criminal 
activity. 
 
Bruno (1993:70) has suggested that the term OC should be substituted with the 
term criminal system. In doing this, Scarpinato (1996 cited in Longo, 2010: 4) 
defines OC as a ‘‘complex system, made up of connections of criminal power sub-
systems, able to elaborate long-term global strategies and to react to the changes 





organisations whose existence has continuity over time and across different 
criminal activities, and they use systematic violence and corruption to facilitate 
their criminal activities.  
 
It is against this backdrop of complex activities, structures and objectives of OC 
groups that Finckenauer (2005:81-82) argues for a broader definition of organised 
crime. His definition is not limited to the provision of illegal goods and services to 
others in the broader society. Rather, he argues that OC groups are made of 
sophisticated networks with structural nodes and of a certain size. These 
characteristics enhance the continuity of the criminal networks in the globalisation 
of crime.  
 
2.1.2   The Institutional Definition 
Institutional definitions of organised crime are definitions that arise as a result of 
the need to develop national and international instruments to curb the local and 
global threats constituted by internal and cross-border activities of organised crime 
groups. The United Nations and European Union are pioneers of these definitions.  
 
In 1975, the United Nations declared that "Organised crime is understood to be the 
large-scale and complex criminal activity carried out by groups of persons, 
however loosely or tightly organised, for the enrichment of those participating and 
at the expense of the community and its members. It is frequently accomplished 
through ruthless disregard of any law, including offences against the person, and 
frequently in connection with political corruption’’ (United Nations 1975:8). 
Thereafter, in 1990, it was added by UN, that the operations of OC often involve 
offences against the person, including threats, intimidation and physical violence 
(United Nations 1990, 5).  
 
In order to find a suitable definition for an organised crime group, the UN 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime in 2000 defined it ‘‘as a 
structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crime(s) or offence(s) 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain directly or 






This was followed in 2002 by the Council of Europe, which defined OC as any 
‘‘illegal activities carried out by structured groups of three or more persons existing 
for a prolonged period of time and having the aim of committing serious crimes 
through concerted action by using intimidation, violence, corruption or other 
means in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’’ 
(Council of Europe, 2002: 6). Interpol suggests that OC is any group ‘‘having a 
corporate structure whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal 
activities, often surviving on fear and corruption’’ (Interpol citied in Bresler 
1993:319). 
 
2.1.3 Common Ground and Critique of Definitions of Organised Crime 
Most definitions include the following: use of extreme violence; corruption of public 
officials, including law enforcement and judicial officers; penetration of legitimate 
economy (e.g. through money laundering); and interference in the political process 
(Van Dijk, 2008:146; Levi, 2002; Kenney & Finckenhauer, 1995). Levi (2002) 
suggests that these elements are used as operational definitions by Interpol and 
others law-enforcement agencies (cited in Van Dijk, 2008:146) and also 
incorporated in national anti-mafia laws such as the United States and Italy (Fijnat 
& Paoli, 2004 cited in Van Dijk, 2008).  
 
The social science definitions have the following consensus: that OC is an 
organisation or network of criminal associates that venture into illicit and/or licit 
activities in the territories where they operate. The illicit activities include the 
provisions of illegal goods and services, and the protection and securing the 
continuity of their organisation through corruption and threats of violence. In 
ensuring their existence and securing the criminal networks, they also provide 
votes in elections for politicians in the territories where they operate. The symbiotic 
relationship between the OC groups and state actors is the guarantee of risk 
reduction in the perpetration of the OC crime. In some instances, the OC groups 
are permitted to maintain ‘’political power’’. Longo (2010) argues that in Italy, 
Turkey and China, OC groups control specific territories in these countries. 
 
The two leading institutions (the United Nations and the European Union) use both 
the structure and the activities of the OC group to describe organised crime. The 





is that both use the structure, the objective and the activities of the OC group in 
conceptualising organised crime.   
Critics argue that organised crime is itself a concept whose definition has always 
been problematic (Levi, 2008). Longo (2010) posits that ‘organised crime is a very 
complex phenomenon: it affects the social, economic, political and cultural sphere 
and the attempts to conceptualise it gave rise to a very controversial debate’. The 
definition of organised crime poses series of problems for criminology (Van Dijk, 
2008:147). Furthermore, the term organised crime is faced with several problems 
of conceptualisation (Edwards and Levi, 2008). Levi (2007) in particular 
recognises the effects of the impact and magnitude of the crime, and the overlap 
between a range of different offences. 
 
2.2   Contemporary Changes and Characteristics of Organised Crime  
This section will consider the major changes and characteristics of contemporary 
organised crime. It will explore the emergence of new structures, specialisation, 
the international dimension of organised crime, the use of violence, the use of 
corruption, counter-measures in the commission of the crime, and the use of 
legitimate business in the perpetration of organised crime.  
 
In order to understand the characteristics of contemporary organised crime, there 
are key thematic questions that need to be addressed. These are: What are the 
tasks of organised crime? How do these tasks result in certain characteristics? Are 
the tasks driven by cross-border activities and international collaboration of the 
criminal groups? 
 
2.2.1   Transnational Dimension  
Globalisation and technological changes coupled with fast movements of people, 
goods, and information has encouraged the OC networks to internationalise their 
operations throughout the globe (Bjelopera and Finklea, 2012).  
 
According to Karstedt (2012a: 344), ‘‘global interconnectedness exposes people, 
criminal justice systems, and governments to crime problems and pressures. The 
global illicit economy links illegal production with illegal markets, and organised 
crime groups in the global North and global South’’. It is no doubt that illicit flow of 
goods and services of demand markets are situated in the global North. ‘‘The 





illicit goods and services and most illicit flows (income from crime) emanate from 
major economic powers’’ (Karsdet, 2012:344). Consequently, the offenders in the 
global South channel the supplies of their illicit goods and services to the rich 
countries located in the global North where they generate more value as income 
from crime as compared to the proceeds of crime in the global South.  
 
Globalisation of crime requires the collaboration of foreign partners at both 
destination and countries of origin. Transnational OC groups are defined by the 
collaboration between non-indigenous (not having nationality, origin or ethnicity of 
a country where the OC operates) groups or between an indigenous (having 
nationality, origin or ethnicity of a country where the OC operates) and non-
indigenous group, or an international operation carried out directly by an OC group 
[Organised Crime Assessment Report (OCTA), 2006].  
 
The transnational dimension of the crime is of great concern to the international 
community (OCTA, 2011). In addition, it has contributed to the creation of an illicit 
global economic order by OC groups (Grogger & Sonstelie, 1996). For instance, 
lack of social-economic opportunities in some of the developing countries in the 
global South including Nigeria, prevents citizens there from contributing to the 
legitimate economy. Therefore, many offenders in the global South tend to benefit 
from the crime opportunities available in the global North in Europe and United 
States (US). Offenders of crime are located in one country, targets in others, and 
yet the proceeds of the crime are collected in an entirely different jurisdiction (Zook, 
2007; Ultrascan 2010).  
 
Globalisation offers new opportunities and shifts markets and routes to other 
countries.  When the illicit drug market in the United States (US) became less 
profitable, due to extensive law-enforcement efforts that clamped-down on the 
operations of the OC groups within the US market (Paoli, 2003:11), the OC groups 
in the region shifted their operation to the EU markets with the use of transit 
countries such as Nigeria (UNODC, 2010). It is submitted that today, OC activities 
constitute a major threat to European states (OCTA, 2011; UNODC, 2010). 
 
2.2.2   Structure and Networks 
A major change that has been observed is the change from hierarchically 





loosely organised criminal groups that commit serious transnational crime in illicit 
markets (Paoli, 2007; Van Dijk, 2008).  
 
In 2001, the European Commission suggested that traditional hierarchical 
structures were being replaced by loose networks of criminals (UNODC, 2010). 
The United Nations High-Level Panel 2004 also postulated that organised crime 
is increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than more formal 
hierarchies (UNODC, 2010). The fluid networks are decentralised and more 
flexible, which includes the operation of intermediaries that operate across many 
borders and provide different services to many OC groups for a fee on a temporary 
basis (Naím, 2005).   
 
The EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (2013) also argued that organised 
crime is becoming increasingly diverse and dynamically organised in structural 
terms, evolving towards loose networks. The most notable state of change of 
organised crime in the world is that of the notorious and powerful Cali and Medellin 
groups of Colombia that are now restructured and being supervised by more 
flexible and sophisticated cocaine trafficking organisations (Van Dijk, 2008). The 
current pattern appears to show that the structures of OC groups in the world are 
now changing.  
 
Initially OC structures were based on organisations, and then moved on to criminal 
networks, and finally to the individual ‘organised criminal’ (OCTA, 2006). Many 
studies have suggested very flexible and fluid patterns of associations amongst 
criminal actors (UNODC, 2010; OCTA, 2006:12). Morselli (2009:71) suggests that 
networked structures prevent and protect TOC perpetrators from being 
investigated and prosecuted by law-enforcement agencies. Law-enforcement 
efforts against OC groups such as Colombian drug-trafficking organisations with 
hierarchical models may have contributed to the adaptation of networks (Decker 
& Chapman, 2008:34-36). Subsequently, many OC groups seem to have moved 
away from the complex hierarchical organisational structure to a more 
decentralised and flexible network.  
 
Notwithstanding this evolution, the traditional structure of organised crime 
involving hierarchies, behavioural codes and initiations rituals like that of Cosa 
Nostra still exist (Paoli, 2001; Bjelopera and Finklea, 2012). In Italy, Russia, and 





Gonzalez-Ruiz, 2001). In Bulgaria and Albania, in Eastern Europe, the existing 
criminal groups operate their criminal networks in certain areas of the country 
(Bezlov, 2005 cited in Van Dijk, 2008:147). ‘‘The human trafficking cartel in 
mainland China is also controlled by medium-sized locally active groups, which do 
not qualify to be classified under the traditional concept of the highly organised 
group’’ (Zhang & Chin, 2001 cited in Van Dijk, 2008:148).  
 
In Nigeria, women perpetrators (Siegel and de Blank, 2010), mainly from Edo 
State in the country, also dominate human trafficking for the purpose of 
commercial sex exploitation in Europe (UNODC, 2005). These are pioneer 
individuals who exclude outsiders from the trade and keep the schemes of 
trafficking among their informal networks of kin and associates (UNODC, 2005). 
Organised crime in Nigeria is highly flexible and consists of ad hoc project teams 
who just join for their operations on a one-off basis (Van Dijk, 2008:148; UNODC, 
2005; Shaw, 2002).  
 
Fundamental to the success of the Nigerian drug trafficking actors is their highly 
flexible mode of operation. Whereby criminal actors are constantly forming and re-
forming their business relationships from among a wide pool of acquaintances 
(Ellis, 2009:185). These days, ‘‘OC actors with common objectives no longer 
operate in isolation, and this creates a powerful convergence of criminal intentions 
and resources’’ (OCTA, 2007: 9). For instance, the potential of OC actors in the 
EU is highly influenced by its connections with external perpetrators (OCTA, 2006; 
UNODC, 2002). Major Dutch OC actors had long had connection with non-EU 
offenders from Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (Ellis, 2009:191).   
 
OCTA (2007:9-10) suggests four types of the contemporary OC groups, which 
include the following: oriented clusters, cell-like criminal groups, intermediary 
groups, and loose networks.   
Oriented clusters are defined as an association of different organised crime groups 
with a common governing centre or overseeing body, which has great diversity 
and flexibility in its operations (UNODC, 2002). These OC group structures are led 
or, at least, coordinated by a common centre, which is the strongest OC group in 
the clusters (OCTA, 2007). This combines the strengths of both hierarchies and 
networks, in order to achieve a high level of effectiveness, diversification and 
specialisation of operations (OCTA, 2007). UNODC (2002) argues that ‘the degree 





OC group is relatively high’. The leaders of the dominant groups mostly determine 
the strategic objectives and policies of their activities (OCTA, 2007).   
 
Cell-like criminal groups are defined as criminal networks that operate in multiple 
jurisdictions and act as ‘cell components’ of the criminal networks. The ‘cell 
components’ are the networks of offenders that form the transnational criminal 
group (OCTA, 2010).  
For instance, non-EU cell-like criminal group such as Lebanese smugglers, Soviet 
criminals, Nigerian and South American drug-traffickers are among the external 
actors in EU drug markets (UNODC, 2005: 48). These groups carry out a major 
part of their criminal activities within the EU, whilst their leadership is located 
outside in their countries of origin (OCTA, 2006).  
 
Intermediary offenders are ‘networks of intermediaries that operate across many 
borders and provide different services. Some are permanently linked and others 
vary in their composition, activities, and geographical scope depending on markets 
and circumstances’ (Naím, 2005:219-220). These are small criminal networks with 
their own separate identity and autonomy. They mostly facilitate the operations of 
OC groups based on agreed upon fees. In Nigeria, in some cases, the couriers 
are ‘holiday makers’ or ‘international students’, who are frequently recruited by 
Nigerian drug dealers, who usually carry small parcels of drugs in return for cash 
payment upon delivery in the European drug market (National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), 2009).  
The loose networks structure is a type that is very common in West Africa and 
Nigeria in particular (UNODC, 2005). Shaw (2002) refers to these networks as 
‘‘disorganised organised crime’’, because they operate with low profile and consist 
of ad-hoc offenders. For instance, the Nigerian drug actors constantly build their 
networks and their business relationships from among a wide pool of 
acquaintances in a form of ad-hoc project teams (Ellis, 2009:185). The members 
keep a very low profile in order to shield the networks from law-enforcement 
agencies (UNODC, 2005, OCTA, 2007). Law-enforcement agencies are unlikely 
to identify the illegal activities of such a group because of the loose or often 
temporary alliances or associations, which are tied to specific ‘projects’ (UNODC, 
2002). In these cases ‘individuals or small groups of people are best described as 







2.2.3   Specialisation    
Specialisation is a fundamental characteristic of the structure of OC groups (OCTA, 
2009). This implies specialist functions in order to improve their activities, increase 
offenders’ professionalism and decrease the chances of detection, prosecution 
and conviction by law-enforcement agencies (OCTA, 2006:13). The globalisation 
of crime requires actors with different skill-sets for the expansion of criminal 
networks and running successful money laundering schemes. The special skills of 
the actors may include, for example, finance, accountancy, information technology 
(Edwards and Levi, 2008), or those with access to particular goods and service, 
such as firearms or false passports, and those willing to carry out specific tasks, 
such as violence or debt collecting (OCTA, 2006). OCTA (2006) further identifies 
two categories: firstly, OC groups that on a one-off basis or periodically in return 
for cash payments engage low-level actors; and secondly, professional criminals 
who provide their services on a continuous basis.  
 
Drug-trafficking in and through Nigeria is an example of OC group specialisation 
in the globalisation of crime. One example is that:  
Drug dealers from the source country where the drug is cultivated, sell and agree 
to conceal the drugs for onward delivery via exportation to the transit country 
(Nigeria). The clearing agent in the Nigerian seaport cooperates with the OC group 
for the clearing of the illicit product at the port of entry, without its declaration. The 
Nigerian-based drug dealers take over the imported drugs from the source country 
from his foreign partners via the clearing agent at the seaport. The so-called 
middlemen or ‘‘striker’’ (Ellis, 2009) organises all logistics for the smuggling of the 
drugs to the consuming countries in Europe and the US. These logistics include 
the recruitment of the drug couriers who agree to traffic the drugs from Nigeria to 
various destinations of the illicit drug markets for a fixed fee on a one-off basis. 
European and American-based couriers in the consuming countries where the 
drug is trafficked to, are connected to the local drug distribution chain in Europe 
and America. They are also involved in the illegal transfer of funds to Nigeria from 
consuming countries after the sales of drugs are completed (NDLEA, 2009:20).  
 
2.2.4   Use of Legitimate Business Structures  
Edwards and Levi (2008) note that organised crime groups always establish 
legitimate businesses as ‘‘fronts’’ or as vehicles for illicit activities. The OC groups 





2007): to facilitate criminal activities; to launder money and to reinvest the 
proceeds of crime. 
 
The OC actors set up and run legitimate businesses, such as import and transport 
businesses. This type of legal activity has a direct connection with the type of crime 
and the operational activities of the OC group (OCTA, 2006). Thus, illicit 
commodities are concealed in imported goods for shipment to the port of entry. 
For example in Nigeria in 2011, in an on-going investigation by the Nigerian drug 
police {National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)} a large quantity of high-
grade cocaine was seized at the Tin Can Island Port, Lagos, Nigeria. The drug 
was packed in 150 square parcels inside 38 cartons of floor tiles that originated 
from Bolivia. The legal import business of the OC group concealed the illicit 
commodity in legal goods. The total weight of the narcotics drug was 167kg with 
an estimated street value of $10.6 million dollars (N1.6 billion naira). The OC group 
then colluded with a clearing agent in the Nigerian port for the clearance of the 
floor tiles. This was a professional clearing agent licensed by The Nigerian Port 
Authority (NPA) to operate in Nigerian ports. The clearing agent has to declare 
any illegal content found in consignments from other countries. However, probably 
as a result of corruption and collusion, the agent did not disclose the illicit content 
of this consignment and the container was cleared from the Nigeria seaport. When 
the illicit drugs were intercepted, the NDLEA also arrested the colluding clearing 
agent alongside the OC actors (NDLEA, 2011). 
 
If these narcotics drug consignment had not been intercepted and seized by the 
Nigerian authorities, the OC group would likely have trafficked the drug to the illicit 
markets in Europe (NDLEA, 2011). This would have been followed by re-investing 
the proceeds from the sales of the drugs destined for the European market back 
into the importation of valuables and assets from the destination country. Such 
legal enterprises are typically cars exporting businesses to Nigeria, which are run 
by Nigerians in the destination country. Others are holiday resorts and real estate 
for commercial purposes. The drug actors can also reinvest the proceeds of their 
crime into the expansion of their ‘front’ businesses. This will give the OC group a 
competitive advantage over the genuine business group in the global economy, 
as the OC group would then be capable of selling legitimate products below the 
market value in the quest to integrate the illicit proceeds back into the legitimate 
economy. ‘This re-investment of illegally acquired assets in the legitimate 





hide the illicit origins of funds (money-laundering schemes)’ (Van Dijk, 2008:161). 
The OC group can then engage the services of professionals, such as lawyers, 
financial advisors, real estate agents, property developers, accountants and tax 
consultants in order to channel the proceeds into the legal economy.  
 
2.2.5   Counter-measures  
In order to avoid detection, prosecution and confiscation of illicit assets, OC actors 
have developed a variety of counter-measures. These include the use of violence, 
intimidation and corruption (Edwards and Levi, 2008:371; OCTA, 2006:16).   
 
OC crime groups use violence and intimidation to enforce collaboration and 
secrecy, and they try to influence group members and witnesses by intimidation 
and corruption. They stimulate the cooperation and protection of law enforcement 
personnel, politicians and professionals through bribes.  
Furthermore, they choose countries, environments, as well as institutions for their 
transactions, where such transactions can be sufficiently covered and shielded.  
For instance in Nigeria, identification of criminal networks is difficult. Criminal 
groups use pseudo-names for front men, complex networks of companies and 
traditional languages and idioms for communication during their operations to 
prevent communication interception of the LEAs (OCTA, 2006). They may use 
legal alternatives and exploit differences between national jurisdictions and 
problems of transnational cooperation of law enforcement. OC group use 
particular counter strategies. Two strategies are most important and they are seen 
as correlates of organised crime (Van Dijk, 2008): violence and corruption. 
 
2.2.6   Violence 
Violence or the threat of the use of violence is a typical strategy used by a number 
of organised crime activities (Kelly, Chin and Schatzberg, 1994:28). Racketeering 
is related to violence while transnational cybercrime does not require violence or 
threat to exploit their victims (Blanco Hache and Ryder, 2011). Traffickers use 
sexual violence to intimidate their victims and their families, in the country of origin 
as well as in the destination country. Such ‘‘coercive control’’ of women and girls 
is the strategy adopted by the traffickers of human beings, not physical injury but 
rather gender-based subjugation (Stark, 2000). 
Furthermore, violence is frequently used to create ‘order’ within OC groups as well 





generates violence because it has no way of resolving disputes except by mutual 
consent or settling of scores’’ (Gonzalez-Ruiz, 2001). Coercion and violence are 
necessary if conflicts over territories or markets cannot be settled peacefully (Kelly, 
Chin and Schatzberg, 1994:28). As the business of OC groups is illegal they 
cannot seek redress from the legal system, and use the non-violent coercive 
forces of judicial order, injunction, judgments and sentence for dispute 
management when the need arises. Consequently, they use force to resolve 
disputes within the daily running of their operations (Kelly, Chin and Schatzberg, 
1994:29). According to Abadinsky (2010:4), violence ‘‘is a readily available and a 
routinely accepted resource’’ used by the OC group to secure their illegal dealings 
and to pursue the goals of their organisation.  
 
2.2.7   Corruption  
In order to protect the illegal businesses of the criminal organisation, the OC 
groups seek the collaboration and collusion of the police, prosecutors, and judges 
(Malttz, 1994). Edwards and Levi (2008:371) suggest that corruption implies 
‘misusing entrusted power for private gain in lowering the risks of commissioning 
serious crimes and/or as criminal activity in itself for financial gain’. There is no 
difference between public (corruption of public servants, i.e. law enforcement 
officers and political post holders) and private (bankers, lawyers, accountants and 
other private sector employees) corrupt offenders, as both use their positions of 
authority to exchange their illegal services for OC groups for favours and money  
(Kelly, Chin and Schatzberg, 1994:27).  
 
Corruption of non-governmental professionals is important to protect the OC 
activities from being exposed. This is particularly applicable to financial 
transactions, where mostly non-governmental actors are involved. Bank officials 
may shield the proceeds of OC groups by failing to report suspicious transactions 
of high-risk customers, as required by law. Airport staff may assist in the passage 
of trafficked victims without authentic travel documents. Lawyers and accountants 
facilitate investment opportunities for OC groups in order to legitimise the proceeds 
of crime in the society where they live. Customs officers at seaports collude with 
the criminal actors by facilitating the clearance of their illicit commodities at the 
ports of entry. Bribes and corruption create strong links and obligations and bind 






Corruption of police and the criminal justice system in many ways ensures the 
continuity of organised crime ‘businesses’ in many countries. For instance, in the 
UK, the Home Office affirmed the existence of corrupt behaviour of police officers 
in UK and Wales (Miller, 2003:7). The study revealed that in 2000, 52 police 
officers were involved in extensive corruption with criminal groups, such as 
disclosure of information for reward, inappropriate association with criminal groups, 
obtaining sexual favours by exploitation and the use of their position to obtain 
favours and payment (Miller, 2003).  
 
2.3   Transnational Organised Crime 
This section will explore the major types of transnational organised crime around 
the world and the interaction of demand and supply markets. It will further 
investigate the estimated market value for the illicit commodities on a global 
context. 
 
There is no doubt that the ‘‘recent changes in the global economy and in 
international political alignments have greatly benefited the criminal underworld’’ 
(Viano, Magalanes and Bridel, 2003:3). The evolution of global interdependence 
and interconnectedness through flows of goods, people, and communication has 
led to the production and enhancement of transnational organised crime (Karstedt, 
2012a: 343; Sassen, 2007: 5). ‘‘Money, goods and people have circulated with a 
rapidity and facility that were once unthinkable…. Whether in the developed or 
developing world, the scope of action of criminal organisations and their range of 
capabilities are undergoing a profound change’’ (Violante, 2000:X). Transnational 
organised crime was seen as overtaking growth in the legal global economy 
(Karstedt, 2012a: 342). It is against this backdrop that this chapter explores the 
most common of transnational crimes. For each of these their characteristics will 
be included: the countries of origin, destination and transit, estimates of illicit flows 
of good, services and financing (UNODC, 2010). The following types of 
transnational organised crime will be included: first, trafficking of human beings; 
second, all types of trafficking in illicit goods like drugs, counterfeit products and 
illicit trafficking in human organs; third, all types of illicit trading of goods, such as 
environmental resources (timber, wildlife and fish; minerals, such as gold and 






2.3.1    Human Trafficking and Smuggling 
The United Nations (UN) Palermo Protocol defines trafficking as “the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs” (UN Protocol Article 3a of 2000). Futter (2006) 
accordingly defines trafficking in persons as the transfer of persons by fraudulent 
means for the purpose of exploitation.  
It is estimated that more than 2.4 million people are being illegally trafficked at any 
given time (UNODC, 2011). This figure includes, around 10,000 to 15,000 children 
that are trafficked from West Africa to work on the cocoa plantations in Côte 
d’lvoire (Zavis, 2001).  
 
Migrant smuggling, on the other hand, is the ‘‘act of gaining illegal entry of a person 
into a state, of which the person is not a national or permanent resident, for 
financial or other material benefit’’ (UN Protocol Article 3, 2000: 2). About 30 million 
undocumented migrants are estimated globally (Graycar, 1999).  
 
Figure 2.1: Origins of Trafficked Victims Detected in West and Central 
Europe, 2005-2006 (%) 
 
Source: UNODC-UN.GIFT data (2010); own illustration 
 
Even if smuggling is set apart from trafficking, it also involves huge dangers for 
the immigrants, extortionate payments and subsequent debts to the smugglers, 





























In 2010, victims of human trafficking from 127 countries were detected globally 
(UNODC, 2010). It is also estimated that two-thirds of the victims reported were 
women, and 79 percent of the victims were subject to sexual exploitation (UNODC, 
2010). The European Union has the most reliable data on human trafficking victims 
for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Figure 2.1 shows the country of 
origin: 51 percent of victims of human trafficking detected in Europe in 2005-2006 
were from the Balkans or former Soviet Union, mostly from Romania, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova. This is attributed 
to the general immigration from Eastern to Western Europe after the Cold War 
(UNODC, 2010).  
 
Table 2.1: Top 10 most frequently Cited Countries of Origin, Transit, and 
Destination of Trafficked Persons (2002) 
Ranking Main Countries  
of Origin 
Main Transit Countries Main Destination 
Countries 
1 Russian Federation Albania Belgium 
2 Ukraine Bulgaria Germany 
3 Thailand Hungary Greece 
4 Nigeria Poland Italy 
5  Republic of Moldova Italy The Netherlands 
6 Romania Thailand Israel 
7 Albania  Turkey 
8 China  Japan 
9 Belarus  Thailand 
10 Bulgaria  United Sates 
Sources: Van Dijk, (2008:171) 
 
However, by 2006 to 2007 Nigerians ranked first in the Netherlands as the most 





2010:51). The EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment Report (OCTA, 2009:21) 
suggests that Nigerians were the second most active OC groups involved in 
trafficking human beings into European states in 2009. 
The flow of trafficked persons is difficult to estimate (Haken, 2011: 8). However, 
the most commonly listed countries of origin of individuals trafficked to European 
countries include the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Thailand, 
Nigeria, Romania, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Albania, China, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Morocco, Myanmar, and Vietnam (Van Dijk, 2008; UNODC, 2010: 17). The flows 
between countries like the UAE and African or Asian countries are hardly known.  
 
Table 2.1 shows the main destinations of victims of human trafficking. These were 
mainly the developed countries in the global North, and the first five destination 
countries were Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, mainly 
Western European countries (Van Dijk, 2008:171). However, no systematic 
pattern can be detected. Presumably, the OC groups involved in human trafficking 
and smuggling of persons have established specific routes, and have conquered 
specific markets, where they have established collaborative ties with other OC 
groups.  
 
2.3.2   Trafficking in Illicit Goods  
The second category of transnational organised crime considered in this section 
is trading in illicit goods, which is further categorised into three main types: drug 
trafficking, counterfeit products and illicit trafficking in human organs. 
 
Drug Trafficking  
The World Drug Report estimated that, in 2009, between 149 and 272 million 
people, of the population aged 15-64, used illicit substances at least once in the 
previous year, (UNODC, 2011). Around half of these are estimated to have been 
users of drugs during the assessment period. The number of problem drug users 
was estimated between 25 to 39 million and almost 200,000 of them die annually 









Table 2.2: Annual Prevalence of Drug Use at the Global Level, by Illicit Drug 
Category, 2009-2010 
 
Illicit drug category Percentage (%) of population between age 15-64  
Cannabis 2.8 to 4.5 
Amphetamines 0.3 to 1.3 
Ecstasy-group 0.2 to 0.6 
Cocaine 0.3 to 0.5 
Opioids 0.5 to 0.8 
Of which opiates 0.3 to 0.3 
          Source: UNODC, 2011 
 
Table 2.2 shows the prevalence of drug use globally. Cannabis was the most 
widely used illicit drug, which accounted for around 125 to 203 million consumers 
and an annual prevalence rate of 2.8 percent to 4.5 percent in 2009.  
ATS (amphetamine-type stimulants; mainly methamphetamine, amphetamine and 
ecstasy), opioids (including opium, heroin and prescription opioids) and cocaine 
followed respectively in terms of the annual prevalence of the global illicit drug 
consumption for 2009.  
 
Drug trafficking involves the cultivation, manufacturing, distribution and sale of 
narcotic substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws (UNODC, 2010). 
Drug trafficking is presumably the largest transnational organised crime and one 
of the most lucrative ‘businesses’ worldwide with a high level of profits for OC 
groups.   
 
Figure 2.2: Global Cocaine flows, 2008 
                                






In 2007 and 2008, an estimated 16 to 17 million people used cocaine worldwide 
(UNODC, 2010). America accounted for more than 40 percent of the global 
cocaine consumption, equivalent to 470 tons within that period. The 27 European 
Union and 4 European Free Trade Association countries consumed an estimated 
quarter of the total consumption within that period. The illicit market value of 
cocaine was estimated at $88 billion in 2008 (UNODC, 2010).  
 
As Figure 2.2 shows, the trade takes two major routes. Cocaine is typically 
transported from Colombia to Europe by sea, through Spain and Portugal in the 
South or through the Netherlands and Belgium in the North to the European 
markets (UNODIC Wold Drug Report, 2010:83). The second route goes through 
Mexico to the Canadian and the US markets. However, recently Nigeria, Guinean 
Conakry and Ghana are used as transit countries to transport cocaine to the UK 
and European states by air (UNODC, 2005, UNODC, 2011).   
 
According to UNODC (2010), the world heroin consumption was put at 340 tons. 
If seizures are included this would represent an annual flow of 430-450 tons. 
Myanmar and the People's Democratic Republic of Laos contributed an estimated 
50 tons of opium with the rest, some 380 tons of heroin and morphine, produced 
nearly exclusively in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010). While approximately 5 tons are 
consumed and seized in Afghanistan, the remaining amount is trafficked 
worldwide via routes flowing into and through the countries neighbouring 
Afghanistan (UNODC, 2010). The main heroin trafficking routes are the Balkans 
and northern routes linking Afghanistan to the Russian Federation and Western 
Europe markets (UNODC, 2010). This route connects the Islamic republic of Iran 
through Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across South-East Europe to the 
Western European market (UNODC, 2010).  
 
The northern route goes in through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (or Uzbekistan or 
Turkmenistan) to Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation’’ (UNODC, 2012).  
Bulk heroin seizures that were intercepted reached a record level of 73.7 metric 
tons in 2008. The Near and Middle East and South-West Asia accounted for 39 
percent of those seizures. Some 24 percent of the seizures were recorded in 
South-East Europe, while West and Central Europe accounted for the remaining 
10 percent (UNODC, 2010).  According to the UNODC, ‘‘the global increase in 
heroin seizures over the period 2006-2008 was driven mainly by continued 





countries accounted for more than half of global heroin seizures and registered, 
for the third consecutive year, the highest and second highest seizures worldwide, 
respectively’’ (UNODC, 2012). 
 
Counterfeit Products Trafficking  
According to UNODC (2010), ‘‘product counterfeiting is a form of consumer fraud: 
a product is sold, purporting to be something that it is not. This is different from the 
crime of copyright violation, which involves the unauthorized transfer of licensed 
material, such as the sharing of music or video files electronically’’. The 
classification of counterfeit products trafficking includes the following: counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals; counterfeit electronics; and counterfeit consumer goods (Haken, 
2011; UNODC, 2010). 
 
Imitation products need to look like the original (Haken, 2011). For instance in the 
Chinese wholesale markets, counterfeit goods are categorised according to the 
degree of resemblance to the original product (UNODC, 2010). Counterfeit goods 
are sold mainly through parallel markets mostly in the developing countries 
(UNODC, 2010), as well as by vendors in tourist centres in Europe.  
Counterfeit pharmaceutical products are sold where systematic testing is not 
common as in Africa and other developing countries, and health systems are not 
well developed (Taylor et al, 2001). 
 
Figure 2.3: Counterfeit Incidents Detected by the Pharmaceutical Security 
Institute per Region, 2008 (%) 
             























The Figure 2.3 shows that the consumption of counterfeit drugs is a particular 
problem for countries in Southern Asia, and Latin America. High quality medicines 
are too expensive for most of the population of these regions (Pierre, Winner and 
Cook, 2009; UNODC, 2010). However, these drugs are often diluted or do not 
include any of the active substances. While counterfeits of luxury products mainly 
harm the producer of these goods, counterfeit medicines pose a real danger to 
victimised customers.  
 
However, Europe is the third biggest market, where counterfeit medicines are 
often distributed via the Internet. 
 
European tourist centres offer other market for counterfeit products, which are sold 
for a low price to tourists. Accordingly, huge amounts of counterfeit products are 
imported into the EU, and often, illegal immigrants are the vendors. Some tourist 
centres like Venice or Barcelona make tourists pay high fines for buying such 
goods, and police target vendors in the streets.  
 
Figure 2.4: Counterfeit Seizures Made at the European Borders by Product 
Types (Number of Incidents), 2008 
                       
   Sources: UNODC, 2010 
 
France as a producer of luxury goods is particularly affected.  Union des 
Fabricants (2003) blames ‘‘international entrepreneurs’’ of highly connected 
organised networks of counterfeit products. The products are smuggled across 
several borders before its arrival at the destination countries where counterfeit 
products are also sold at the price of the originals (Union des Fabricants, 2003: 7-
10).  Accordingly French officials argue that, “counterfeiting has become one of 
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the main sources of support for serious criminal activities and one of the most 
significant threats to consumer safety”. These activities are operated from Taiwan 
and Malaysia by organised criminal gangs (International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition, 2003).   
  
The categories of counterfeit products seized at the European borders in 2008 
included food, cigarettes, computer equipment, CDs, DVDs, cassettes, toys and 
games, medicine, electrical equipment, jewellery and watches, cosmetics, clothing, 
accessories, shoes and other valuable products. The largest proportions are being 
attributed to clothing accessories at 57 percent, and shoes and jewellery with 10 
percent. This is mainly targeted at tourist markets (see Figure 2.4). The World 
Customs Organisation (2008) stated that counterfeit products were circulated 
among 140 countries of the world in 2008. China and India are the major producers 
of counterfeit medicine (Haken 2011; UNODC, 2010).  
 
Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs 
The high demand for organ donors in developed countries with a decrease in 
supply has fuelled the threat of illicit trafficking in human organs. In 2008, about 
30,000 transplant operations were performed in the US, with over 100,000 people 
remaining on the waiting lists. ‘Because the organ supply cannot meet the rising 
demand, a global market in organs has grown and flourished’ (The Economist, 9 
Oct 2009). 
 
Trafficking in human organs is an organised crime with two main types of 
transactions. The traffickers either force or deceive the victims into providing their 
organs or the victims formally or informally agree to sell an organ. However, in 
these transactions traffickers often refuse to pay for the organ or the victims are 
paid less than the promised price (Glaser, 2005). Besides these transactions 
victims incur huge health hazards in the countries with less than developed health 
systems. In this illicit trade, state actors and professionals can be complicit. China 
is believed to be a state actor in illegal organ harvesting (Gilbert, 2006). Human 
rights activists have frequently reported that Chinese doctors systematically 
remove kidneys, corneal tissue, liver tissue, and heart valves from executed 
prisoners in exchange for up-to $30,000 on the illegal market (Glaser, 2005). The 
origins of illicit transnational organ trafficking have mainly been China, India, Egypt, 





Hughes, 2005: 26). The recipient countries include the United States, Canada, 
Japan, Italy, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Oman.  Thus, as so much other 
illicit human organ trading occurs, it is submitted that the flows of human organs 
frequently goes from the global South and poor countries to the rich countries in 
the global North.   
 
2.3.3   Other Types of Illicit Trading of Goods  
The third type of transnational crime comprises other illicit trading of goods, which 
includes: illicit trading in environmental resources, cultural resources and arms.   
 
Environmental resource trafficking 
Environmental resource trafficking refers to the theft and smuggling of a country’s 
natural resource assets, and environmental crime (UNODC, 2010). This includes: 
wildlife and endangered species, illicit fish trading, illicit timber trade and trafficking; 
further, illegal trade in minerals, in particular, diamonds and other gemstones, gold 
and other precious metals and crude oil.  
 
Environmental resource trafficking is a major problem in developing countries due 
to the fact that many developing countries lack the capacity to develop a robust 
regulatory framework against the exploitation of these resources and to enforce 
compliance (UNODC, 2010). Often, government officials collude in violating laws 
and regulations with international companies.  
 
The trafficking of endangered species from Africa and South-East Asia to Asia and 
Europe has been attributed to widespread poverty in the region and a high demand 
for the highly priced exotic animals at the global market (UNODC, 2010). This 
includes the illegal trade in valuable parts of these animals, which are hunted and 
killed e.g. the tusks of elephants or rhinos. Nijmam (2010) suggests that around 
90 percent of the rhino population has been killed since 1970, with only about 
16,000 remaining in 2010.  
 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2006), “fish piracy or illegal fishing activity, depletes global fish stocks 
and undermines efforts to ensure continued, renewable stocks for the future. It 
also damages the economic and social welfare of those involved in legal fishing, 





efforts, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing continues to thrive 
worldwide”. 
 
Illegal trading in timber has emerged as a major transnational crime in the global 
sphere (UNODC, 2010). The American Forest & Paper Association, Seneca Creek 
Associates, and Wood Resources International defined illegal timber trading as 
the harvesting, transporting, buying and selling of timber in violation of national 
legislation (Wood Resources International LLC, 2009). The illegal trade in timber 
in particular threatens rainforests in the global South, the environment and 
livelihood of endangered species and indigenous populations. Deforestation also 
poses a threat to the global climate. Harvesting and trading in timber is therefore 
regulated nationally and increasingly internationally. Both levels of regulations 
have entailed illegal trading and trafficking, in which TOC group are involved 
(UNODC, 2010).  In 2008, 40 percent of wood-based products imported into the 
European Union were illegally harvested and trafficked from South-East Asia 
(UNODC, 2010). According to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the major 
source countries of illicit timber were Indonesia (WWF, 2008), China and Vietnam 
(UNODC, 2010). 
 
The history of illicit trade in mineral resources, particularly gold trading goes as far 
back as World War II, when Hitler’s army looted gold across Europe (Naylor, 
1996:193), and used it for buying raw materials for the war effort. The 
contemporary illegal gold trade is driven by two factors: Firstly, governments 
illegally trade their gold assets to reduce the effect of economic sanctions: Iraq 
and Libya presently have illegally traded their gold to undercut the effects of 
international sanctions (Naylor, 1996). Secondly, the illegal mining of gold 
generates income in ‘‘conflict gold’’ countries such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) (Cuvelier, 2011). Insurgence groups’ use illegally mined gold in 
illegal weapons trading, in order to finance the war. This also applies to trafficking 
in ‘‘diamond wars’’ (Le Billon, 2008). Rough diamonds, are used by rebel 
movements and their allies to finance conflict and civil war to undermine the 
government in developing African countries (Passas & Jones, 2006). The 
international community tried in 2003 with the Kimberly Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS) to curb trading of conflict diamonds (Haken, 2011). 
 
The use of diamonds to fund rebel movements has affected Angola, Sierra Leone, 





2006; Le Billon, 2008, Lacina and Gleditsch, 2004). The global production of 
diamonds is often centred in the same or neighbouring countries where the conflict 
takes place like Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Namibia, South Africa, Canada, 
Brazil, and Venezuela (Center for the Study of Civil War 2006). Traders in cities 
such as Antwerp, Mumbai, Tel Aviv, New York, and Johannesburg collude in the 
illegal trade (Passas & Jones, 2006). Therefore, there is interconnectedness 
between legal and illegal trade. Illicit diamonds are covered-up in the legal 
diamond market, i.e. diamonds are smuggled from DRC into the Central Africa 
Republic (CAR), where the illicit diamonds are made legal in the process of 
exporting them (Smillie et al., 2000). 
 
Illicit oil trade syndicates are highly international (UNODC, 2005). This illicit trading 
ranges from products smuggling (Greenless, 2009), illegitimate removal of crude 
oil in excess of the licensing right (BBC News, 27 July 2008 cited in Haken, 2011), 
to oil bunkering (UNODC, 2005). The illegal trading and smuggling of oil products 
occurs when subsidized fuel is purchased in one country and smuggled to another 
country in an attempt to sell it at the higher price in the country where the subsidy 
does not exist (Haken, 2011). This creates artificial pricing and unbalances 
legitimate markets in both countries, and in particular creates shortages in 
subsidised markets.  
 
The illegitimate removal of crude oil, in excess of licensing rights is prominent in 
Saudi Arabia, Russia, Nigeria, Angola, and Iraq (Baker, 2005:167). The illegal 
removal of crude products above the licensing right often involves the cooperation 
of corrupt government and oil company employees. 
 ‘Oil bunkering’ is the process of shipping oil illegally (UNODC, 2005). This is 
predominantly common in Morocco, Venezuela, Lebanon, France, Russia, and 
Nigeria (UNODC, 2005). Bunkering is linked to other organised criminal activities 
such as drug trafficking and arms trafficking (BBC News, 27 July 2008). Proceeds 
from oil bunkering are used to finance militants operations in Nigeria and Iraq, and 
drug cartels in Mexico (Haken, 2011). Asuni (2009) therefore suggests that ‘‘oil 
bunkering thrives in a climate of instability, conflict, and political chaos’’, where 
militant groups are operating in ethnic conflicts. Stolen oil from Nigeria is, usually, 
transported by small barges to tankers ‘‘out of sight of the authorities’’ (Asuni, 
2009).  The oil is offered in exchange for cash or weapons and then transferred to 
refineries along the West African coast (Houreld, 2004). The refined product is 





or by mixing it with other products that have a certificate of origin (Baer, 2007; 
Haken, 2011). In Nigeria for instance, the estimate of stolen crude oil ranges from 
70,000 to 500,000 barrels annually, with an estimated market value of $5 billion 
every year (BBC News, 27 July 2008). 
 
Illicit Trade in Cultural Resources 
Illegal trade in cultural resources is a transnational crime with flows from the global 
South to the global North. Wallerstein (1990) argued that ‘culture is the 
battleground of the world system’. Presently antiques and cultural artefacts are 
guarded by the countries, from which they originate (Haken, 2011). In addition, 
many countries wish to ‘repatriate’ their artefacts that during colonial times were 
claimed and shipped by the colonising powers in the global North (BBC News, 12 
May 2000). In addition, antiques are requested back by the countries of origin. 
National law and international law regulate the trade in cultural artefacts (Haken, 
2011). Countries also ratified treaties to prevent the entry of their cultural heritage 
into illicit global markets. Such instruments include: the 1970 UN convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Cultural Property, and the convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
Times of Armed Conflict (Braman, 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, the lack of harmonization of national laws offers opportunities to 
traffickers in those jurisdictions with insufficient regulation and oversight (Prott, 
1997 cited in Braman, 2008). This provides opportunities for wealthy collectors in 
developed countries to buy from OC networks in the illicit global market (Laurence, 
2008). Switzerland in Europe and Hong Kong in Asia serve as transfer hubs where 
art and cultural heritage from other countries are bought and stored, to cover their 
illegal sources. They are subsequently sold on the legal international market 
(Regazzoni, 2002 cited in Braman, 2008; Napack, 1999). 
 
Illicit Arms Trading 
The production and trading of arms is highly regulated by the international 
community. In particular, sales and shipment of arms of all kinds into zones of 
conflict is prohibited and/or highly restricted and regulated. Consequently, with an 
increasing number of inter-state conflict and insurgent groups, in particularly in 
Africa and Latin America, the illegal trade in arms is thriving. Often however, 





large military equipment. Furthermore, the illegal manufacturing and exportation 
of illicit firearms in some West Africa countries has contributed immensely to 
several civil wars in the region (UNODC, 2005). 
    
Stohl (2005 cited in Haken, 2011) suggests that small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) are considered as any weapons that can be carried by one or two people, 
mounted on a vehicle, or concealed within a pack animal during transportation of 
goods. Haken (2011) in his report on ‘‘transnational crime in the developing world’’ 
also suggested that SALW categories range from machine guns to stinger missiles 
and include rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. Furthermore, firearms are 
durable goods (UNODC, 2010), which can last indefinitely and can be transferred 
from one person to another, from country to country and generation to generation; 
consequently, the supply tends to increase.  
The trafficking of small arms and light weapons, results in about 3000 deaths every 
day globally (UNODC, 2010). Arms trafficking is closely related to other OC 
activities. OC actors in Mexico rely on sophisticated firearms to enforce and 
maintain their illicit narcotics operations (Project Gunrunner Fact Sheet, 
September 2008). The Niger Delta militants in Nigeria depend on the use of 
machine guns and firearms for their oil bunkering activities and the kidnapping of 
foreign oil-workers.  
 
2.3.4   Cybercrime  
Cybercrime developed with the technology of the Internet. The word ‘‘cyber’’ is 
used to describe the virtual environment associated with the Internet (Hunton, 
2009:529). The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Treaty refers to cybercrime as 
offences ranging from criminal activities against data to content and copyright 
infringement (Krone, 2005 cited in Blanco, Hache and Ryder, 2011). The UN (1995) 
manual on the prevention and control of computer related crime defines 
cybercrime as fraud, forgery and unauthorised access.  
 
The UN’s Tenth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders 
classified cybercrime into two categories (UN, 2000 cited in Blanco Hache and 
Ryder, 2011). The first of these includes any illegal behaviour involved in the 
electronic operations of computer security and data processing. The second 
includes any illegal behaviour committed by means of, or in relation to, a computer 





distributing information. The Fraud Advisory Panel (2009) suggests that the term 
cybercrime is used for all types of frauds that are attempted or committed by the 
use of computers and/or the Internet. Cybercrimes include offences against 
computer data and systems (such as ‘‘hacking’’), computer-related forgery and 
fraud (such as ‘‘phishing’’), content offences (such as disseminating child 
pornography), and copyright offences (such as the dissemination of pirated 
content) (UNODC, 2010; Gordon & Ford, 2006; Chawki, 2005; Wilson, 2008).  
‘Phishing’ is also termed identity fraud (Epstein and Brown, 2008). The offenders 
pose as financial institutions, and persuade their victims change or disclose their 
passwords and related information (Gonsalves, 2006).    
 
In sum, cybercrime includes pornography and paedophilia, the distribution of hate 
speech, and all type of frauds, which are committed through information 
technology. Cybercrime is therefore of a non-violent nature (Blanco Hache and 
Ryder, 2011). Finklea (2010) suggests that the most common form of consumer 
fraud today is identity-related.  
Grabosky & Walkley (2007:361) argue that most computer crime should be 
excluded from the domain of white-collar crime, as the employment status of the 
offender was irrelevant to the commission of the crime. Ultrascan (2010) suggests 
that over 300,000 Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) organised perpetrators exist globally. 
According to Glickman (2005) Nigerians are particularly organised in crime 
networks involved in AFF. 
 
The use of the Internet and the continuing growth of electronic commerce offer 
enormous crime opportunities to organised crime offenders in cyberspace 
(Williams, 2002). The Internet provides opportunities for a broad range of crimes 
as outlined above, one example being AFF.  Advance Fee Fraud offenders 
commenced with the use of fax and postage of scam letters to their targets around 
the world in the 1980’s (Simon, 2009). Today, they use emails to target their 
victims. Networks are located in the global South and easily target victims in the 
global North. OC actors from multiple jurisdictions are now acting in networks to 
exploit their transnational targets without the need of moving any material from 









2.4   Estimated Market Value of Illicit Global Transnational Flows   
All trade, legal as well as illegal, produces financial flows. The international 
community has recognised the significant effects of such flows for OC groups and 
their trades and on the global economy. Curbing and intercepting financial flows 
is therefore as important, if not more important than intercepting the flows of the 
goods. A first step in this endeavour is the estimation of the size of these financial 
flows. Consequently, huge efforts have gone into such estimates, however, these 
are rough and often exaggerated (UNODC, 2010, Karstedt, 2012a). Table 1.3 
gives an overview of the amount illicit proceeds, as gauged from a range of reports 
and publications. The largest and most lucrative illicit business is the drug trade, 
followed by illicit products trafficking and cybercrime. The less lucrative trade of 
the OC groups according to Table 1.3 is the illicit trade in human organs, followed 
by illegal arms trafficking.   
 
The International Labour Organisation (2009) estimates that at least 2,450,000 
persons are currently being exploited as victims of human trafficking with a global 
economic value of US$32 billion annually (see also Cullen-DuPont, 2009). The 
proceeds of prostitution are estimated at $6 billion in annual profits in Germany 
alone of which a considerable part is from trafficked victims (Schelzig, 2002). 
Interpol estimates that in Europe, each trafficked victim generates between 
$75,000 and $250,000 as annual proceeds, while the investment in each victim 
can be as low as $1,500 (Malarek, 2004 cited in Lusk and Lucas, 2009).   
 
Reuter and Franz (2009) estimate that the global market value of illicit drugs is 
between $45 and $280 billion, while a UN report puts it at about $210 billion 
(UNODC, 2011). The estimated value of the European cocaine market was 
estimated at $33 billion while that of the North American market was estimated at 
$37 billion in the ‘World Drug Report’ (UNODC, 2011). The estimated gross profit 
of drug traffickers from South and Central America and the Caribbean to North 
America, Europe and Africa was estimated at $84 billion in 2009 (UNODC, 2011).  
 
The global commercial loss to counterfeiting was estimated at about $250 billion 
a year by the Global Financial Integrity, in their report on Transnational Crime in 
the Developing World by Haken (2011: 56). The illicit market value of kidney 
transplants is estimated at between $514 million to $1 billion annually (Newsweek, 





(Fabregas, 2007; Haken, 2011). The combination of these two markets, alone is 
between $600 million to $1 billion annually. The report by Small Arms Survey on 
‘‘Weapons and Markets’’ (2009), estimates that about 900 million small arms and 
light weapons (SALW) are in circulation globally, valued at $1.58 billion in 2006. 
The illicit market value was estimated at 10 percent - 20 percent of the authorised 
and circulated SALW amounting to about $170-$320 million per year (UNODC, 
2010). 
 
   Table 2.3: Estimated Illicit Market Value of transnational crime  
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Environmental, mineral and cultural resources trafficking include wildlife, fish, 
timber, minerals (gold, diamond and crude oil), art and cultural property. The 
organisation, TRAFFIC Europe in 2005 estimated that the total legal trade in 
wildlife elephants, tigers, and rhinos was worth $22.8 billion (Engler, Maylynn & 
Rob, 2007). Colombo (2003) put it at $25 billion annually. The illegal trade in 
wildlife is estimated to be about one-third of the legal trade, which puts it in the 
range of $7.6 and $8.3 billion (Colombo, 2003 cited in Haken, 2011). Illegal fishing 
S/N  Transnational Crime  The annually Illicit proceeds for 
laundering  
1  Human trafficking  
  
$32 billion  
 
2 Drug trafficking $280 billion 
3  Cybercrime  $114 billion 
4  Counterfeit products trafficking $250 billion  
5  Environmental resources trafficking 
- Wildlife 
- Timber 
- Illicit fish trading  
- The illicit trade in diamonds 
- Illicit gold trading  
Total 
 
$7.6 to $8.3 billion 
$7 billion  
$10 to $23 billion 
$1.4 billion 
$2.3 billion 
28.3 to 41 billion 
6 Illicit trade of art and cultural property $6 to 8 billion 
7 Arms trafficking  $170-$320million 
8 Illicit oil trade & bunkering $10.8 billion 
9 The illicit trade in human organ $600 million to $1 billion 





is said to represent a global loss of up to $10 to $23 billion annually (Stølsvik, 2010 
cited in Haken, 2011). According to Haken (2011), global timber production was 
valued at $701.7 billion in 2009 and the illicit timber trading was put at an estimate 
of 1 percent of the global timber trade, which puts it at about $7 billion in 2009. 
 
 UNODC (2010) suggests that illegal gold mining and trade out of Democratic 
Republic of Congo is estimated at $1.24 billion annually. The illegal mining of gold 
in Peru amounts to an estimated value of $5.6 billion. The loss to illicit gold mining 
and trading is set at $4 billion annually, with Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, Costa 
Rica and the Philippines not included (Haken, 2011). 
 
The Report of the Panel of Experts by the UN (2000) in relation to Sierra Leone 
suggested that at about 20 percent of the global trade in rough diamonds was 
illegal. Haken (2011) suggests that at that time the world’s rough diamond 
production was estimated at $6.8 billion, while the illicit trade was estimated at 
$1.4 billion (UN Security Council, 2000).  
 
The losses, due to the illicit trade in crude oil products was estimated at circa $862 
million in Indonesia in 2005 (Greenless, 2009). In Sweden a destination country, 
it was estimated at between $7 and $8.4 million in 2004 (EUbusiness, 2004) cited 
in Haken (2011). In Nigeria, the losses, due to the illicit trading in crude oil was 
estimated at $5 billion annually (BBC News, 27 July 2008). The global market 
value of illicit oil trade was approximately 183 million barrels per year (Baker, 2005), 
and was valued, using the average oil price of the weekly world crude oil prices of 
$58.16 per barrel from January 2003 through July 2010 (Haken, 2011). This 
resulted in $10.8 billion between 2003 and 2010.   
 
The International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United 
Nations Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC) puts the annual estimates of illicit 
art and cultural property at around $6 to 8 billion (Idris, Manar, Manon, Jacqui & 
Massimiliano, 2010).   
 
The Norton Study (http://www.symantec.com/) calculated the cost of global 
cybercrime at $114 billion annually in 2011. The Identity Fraud Steering 
Committee (2010) estimated that identity fraud cost the UK economy about £1.2 
billion a year. The Report on Identity Theft (UNODC, 2010) estimated the total 





global loss caused by Nigerian 419 Advance Free Fraud was about $41 billion in 
total, and $9.3 billion in 2009. OCTA (2011:23) estimates that organised crime 
actors of credit and debit card fraud received more than 1.5 billion Euros from their 
victims in European states in 2009. 
 
2.5   Conclusion  
Whilst there have been many developments in the theoretical frameworks related 
to organised crime in transnational crime discourse, these have tended to originate 
from social scientists and institutional frameworks. The social sciences definition 
reveals the models and perspectives of organised crime. The term organised 
crime is derived from the organisational model. This relates to the first model of 
organised crime, in which the crime was operated by Mafia syndicates. Other 
models of organised crime are the patron-client and objective models. The patron 
client model explores the loyalty between the ‘patron’ and their ‘clients’ in the 
commission of crime. The objective model focused on all sought of benefits and 
gains derived from criminal activities. The social networks and system organised 
crime approach reveals the relationships that bind organised criminal offenders 
and state actors together. The collaboration of state actors with organised crime 
groups may take place through the agency of politicians, law enforcers, 
institutional stakeholders and other legitimate entrepreneurs.  
 
The institutional definitions originated from supranational and national institutions 
that are authorities competent in curbing the menace of organised crime at both 
national and international levels. While social definitions adopted models of 
organised crime, the institutional definitions originated from supranational 
institutions charters and their conventions.   
 
The contemporary changes and characteristics of organised crime are dynamic. 
The characteristic of organised crime includes transnational dimension. This 
creates serious threats that impede good governance and economic development 
from one global jurisdiction to another. The structure and networks approach 
suggests the modalities in which organised crime tasks are being ordered and 
performed within states from a global perspective. In the structured organised 
crime groups, members perform specialised roles to attain the objectives of the 
criminal group, while the networks approach leverages clusters, cell-like groups, 





business of organised crime is conducted using legitimate business structures. 
This approach is preferred in order to hide illegitimate commodities amongst the 
permitted and legitimate international commodities. The overriding characteristics 
of organised crime that protect the illicit goods and services of the criminal groups 
are the counter measures and violence used when those goods and services are 
threatened. Organised crime offenders are engaged in corruption to secure 
business continuity and competitive advantage. The paramount objective of 
organised crime adapts corruption to achieve the maximisation of the proceeds of 
crime in the environment where they operate.      
 
Furthermore, there are numerous illicit commodities of organised crime groups 
within the international arena. The classification of the illicit commodities in this 
chapter suggested four categories. Trafficking in human beings is the first. The 
second category evaluates all forms of trafficking in illicit goods such as drugs, 
counterfeit commodities and illicit trafficking in human organs. The third category 
posited all other types of illicit trading in goods such as environmental resources 
(timber, wildlife and fish; minerals, such as gold and diamonds), cultural resources 
and arms. The fourth and final category is cybercrime. The next chapter will 
broaden discussion on the roles and the schemes of Nigerian organised crime 
actors in the business of specific transnational crime from the Global South 






















Organised Crime in Nigeria: History and Contemporary 
Problems 
This chapter examines the phenomenon of organised crime (OC) in Nigeria, 
following the evaluation of the global dynamics of transnational organised crime in 
the Chapter 2. It will examine the historical origins of Nigeria’s organised crime, 
and explore the patterns and trends of three specific organised crime types in 
Nigeria. The focus here will be to address the most prominent and presumably 
pervasive forms of organised criminal activity in Nigeria, namely human trafficking, 
drug trafficking, and Advance Fee Fraud. It will analyse the origins and the 
destinations of these specific illicit commodities as it relates to Nigeria’s 
transnational organised crime (TOC). In doing this, it will reveal the role and 
schemes of Nigerian OC groups in the distribution of the illicit commodities from 
the global South to the global North. This will set the scene for the analysis, of the 
illicit financial flows of business transactions from organised crime groups in 
Nigeria, as well as provide an overview on the operation of organised crime in 
Nigeria. This chapter explores and seeks to provide answers to the questions: 
“What are the major transnational organised crimes in Nigeria? Who are the 
Nigerian actors and what are the schemes of their operations?” 
 
3.1   History of Organised Crime in Nigeria  
The history of transnational crime in Nigeria pre-dates Nigerian independence i.e. 
(1960). This can be traced back to ancient traditional long-distance commerce and 
slave trades activity along the West African Atlantic coast (Friman, 2009). This 
facilitated the historical background of organised crime in Africa during this era. It 
has been estimated that 3.77 million slaves were trafficked from Africa to America 
between 1500 and 1760 as a result of the activities of major colonial powers such 
as the United Kingdom, France, Holland, Spain and Portugal while establishing 
colonies in America (Eltis, 2000).  
In the late 1700s, trade in persons was a global phenomenon. The norm of this 
trade was that some African tribes had kept other tribes as slaves and as such the 
Europeans offenders believed that slavery was a cultural way of life in Africa 






Suzanne Miers (2003:1-2) argued that abolitionist critique and the criminalisation 
process of slave trade commenced in the late 1700s. The abolitionist’s strategy 
showed how the African slaves were being treated in the Americas by the colonists, 
as compared with other Europeans in their countries, who remained unaware of 
the agonistic situation of those slaves in the Americas (Drescher, 1986). However, 
because of the continued campaign of the abolitionist movement, the public in 
European states saw slavery and the slave trade as crimes against humanity and 
violation of their own moral character (Miers, 2003). Every European state and the 
United States had banned the slave trade and the practice of slavery by 1870 
(Picarelli, 2009). States deployed naval forces to the coast of Africa to combat 
slavery, which included anti-slavery patrols and fights against human trading as 
part of their foreign policy (Lloyd, 1968 cited in Picarelli, 2009). 
 
This chapter suggests that human trafficking is the oldest organised crime in Africa 
in general and Nigeria in particular. Evidence of this, is revealed by the 
circumstances behind the enabling norms of the slave trade before 1700, and after 
the criminalisation of the trade in human beings by 1870 in Europe and the United 
States. This crime continued because of the manipulation of European syndicates 
(UNODC, 2005) and the cooperation of greedy African slave suppliers, due to their 
urge to benefit from the opportunity of the emerging market of cheap labour to 
meet the demand of Industrial Revolution in Europe and North America in the 
1900s. Traders in human beings met these demands and improved the ‘global 
market’ condition by increasingly becoming involved in smuggling and 
circumventing the State’s regulations and policies. ‘Smuggling helped to maintain 
the supply of slaves after the ban on the slave trade that defined the century’ 
(Picarrelli, 2009). 
 
The next section will examine human trafficking in Nigeria. It will seek to identify 
the roles of the offenders of traffickers in persons. Having considered the offenders 
role, it will turn to examine the schemes of the actors in the perpetration of 
organised crime in Nigeria. It will conclude with the contemporary problem of 
human trafficking in Nigeria. 
 
3.2   Human Trafficking Context in Nigeria  
In the illicit market, people are cheaper and can be more easily trafficked than 





encourage the trafficker to continue in their illicit dealings (Elabor-Idemuda, 2003). 
The majority of trafficked persons around the world are women and children of low 
socio-economic status that are moved from developing to affluent countries in 
search of a better life (International Human Right Law Institute of DePaul 
University, 2001).  
 
Nonetheless, poverty alone cannot explain the trend in Nigeria because it is not 
the poorest country in West Africa and indeed in Africa as a whole (Dave-Odogie, 
2008: 68). According to Dave-Odogie, ‘‘in Edo State from where the contemporary 
trend in human trafficking started, it is alleged that business transactions existed 
between the natives and Italians when the Nigerian economy was more robust. 
These Nigerians visited Italy to buy shoes, gold and clothing to sell in Nigeria. 
However when the sex business became more lucrative in Italy, coupled with the 
worsening economic situation in Nigeria, the women shifted to the sex business 
and involved their relations in it, and with time involved more people as the 
business began to boom. This explains why as of now, over 80 percent of 
trafficked persons for prostitution to Europe especially Italy come from Edo state” 
(2008: 68). 
 
According to (Elabor-Idemudia, 2003) human trafficking went international in 
Nigeria in 1983, when the military government took-over power forcefully from the 
then civilian government under the President Shehu Shagari. The first deportation 
of large trafficked victims from Europe, including girls and women was recorded in 
1995 (Osakwe et al, 1995). 
 
Nigeria has been described as a country of origin, transit and destination for traffic 
in persons (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO), 2006). The trafficking phenomenon of people in Nigeria is categorised 
into two major types, internal trafficking and cross-border trafficking (UNESCO, 
2006).  
Internal trafficking of people from rural communities to major cities for exploitative 
domestic work, scavenging, begging and prostitution is the dynamics of internal 
trafficking in Nigeria (UNESCO, 2006: 22; Dave-Odogie, 2008). The rural 
communities where people are trafficked from include; Oyo, Osun and Ogun State 
in the South-West; Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa State in the South-South; 





Belt, and the destination cities include Abuja, Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Kano, 
Kaduna, Calabar and Port Harcourt (UNESCO, 2006).  According to UNODC 
(2006: 29), roughly 83 percent of recruited child victims in Nigeria are from Akwa 
Ibom state.  
 
In cross-border trafficking, victims from Nigeria are trafficked to countries within 
the West African region, such as Cote d’lvôire, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, 
Cameroon, Gabon, Benin Republic, Libya, Algeria and Morocco (Dave-Odogie, 
2008). Foreign children originating from Benin and Togo are also trafficked to 
Nigeria, with an estimate of 90 percent of the victims coming from Benin alone 
(UNODC, 2006). In addition, foreign women from Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and 
the Philippines were reported as being trafficked to Nigeria from their countries 
(Okojie, 2004).  
 
With regard to women and young girls trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation 
to Europe, an estimate of 94 percent of the victims are from Edo State (Okoije, 
2004 cited in UNODC, 2006:30). The common destinations of trafficked victims to 
European States are Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany and the 
United Kingdom (UNODC, 2010, UNESCO, 2006: 22; Eseadi et al, 2015). 
 
Table 3.1: Details of Trafficked Victims Rescued in Nigeria from January 
2004 – August 2011 
  
YEAR TOTAL MALE FEMALE 1-17 
YRS 
18-27 YRS 28 YRS AND 
ABOVE 
JAN-DEC. 2004 73 15 58 38 29 6 
JAN-DEC. 2005 341 61 280 191 125 25 
JAN-DEC. 2006 363 40 323 178 180 5 
JAN-DEC. 2007 1004 330 674 462 498 44 
JAN-DEC. 2008 1269 333 936 628 562 79 
JAN-DEC. 2009 1250 419 831 540 573 137 
JAN-DEC. 2010 1047 220 827 540 467 40 
JAN-AUG. 2011 328 97 231 225 96 7 
GRAND TOTAL 5675 1515 4160 2802 2530 343 
Source: National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other 





Siegel and de Blank (2010) argued that most of the victims of human trafficking in 
the Netherlands were born in Nigeria. One study also affirmed that 66 cases of 
human trafficking identified in the UK within 1995-2000 originated from Nigeria 
(Somerster, 2001 cited in, Melrose & Barrett, 2006). The German government 
(2000) said that not less than 60 percent of foreign trafficked prostitutes in 
Germany originated from Africa with the majority coming from Nigeria. Italian and 
Nigerian authorities in 2000 estimated that there are between 10,000-15,000 
Nigerians involved in the prostitution business in Italy. In the (UNODC, 2010) 
report, Nigeria led the league of the most detected nationalities of foreign victims 
of human trafficking in the Netherlands from 2006-2007 and second most detected 
foreign victims in 2008. 
 
Data from the Counselling & Rehabilitation Department of National Agency for the 
Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters, (NAPTIP), the agency 
responsible for the fight against traffic in persons in Nigeria suggests that from 
2004 to August 2011, a total number of 5,675 victims were rehabilitated (NAPTIP, 
2012). The rehabilitated data for this period reveals the demographic information 
of the victims. This information suggested that 1,515 were male while 4,160 were 
female. This data is evidence that human trafficking is synonymous to trafficking 
in women in Nigeria. 
 
The most vulnerable among the victims were young girls from Nigeria. This group, 
with the age bracket of 1-17 years accounted for 2,802 rehabilitated victims within 
the period and 2,530 victims were between the ages of 18-27 years with only 343 
over 28 years of age (see also Table 6.4 on age distribution of rescued victims in 
Nigeria in 2012 and 2013 in Chapter 6). 
 
Victims were trafficked from Nigeria to European States by road, sea and air 
(Okojie et al. 2003). UNESCO (2006) posits that transportation of victims from 
Nigeria to Europe by road is very common nowadays. “Until two years ago they 
used to come to Europe by aeroplane, now they come by land, by foot and by car, 
going through various countries like Morocco and Gibraltar they arrive in Spain; 
then by train they reach Italy or other European countries” (Father Don Orestse 
Benzi, 2001 cited in UNESCO, 2006).  
Okojie, Okojie, Egbafona, Vincent-Osaghae and Kalu (2003: 47) postulated that 
for the land routes in Nigeria, ‘‘the exit points are Lagos and Katsina/Borno. Victims 





D’Ivoire to Mali/Niger to Algeria, Morocco or Libya. The Katsina/Borno route 
involves a long journey to the Northern State of Katsina/Borno where victims exit 
directly into Niger Republic from where they move on through the desert to Algeria, 
Morocco or Libya. From any of the North African countries victims go by air to 
either France or directly to Italy or any other European country. The only sea route 
is from Morocco to Spain by boat’’.  
 
By sea, the traffickers use boats or canoes to transfer the victims from Nigeria, 
Benin Republic and Togo to countries in central Africa such as Cameroon, Garbon, 
Guinea and Equatorial Guinea and from there to a final destination in European 
states (International Labour Organisation/International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour (ILO/IPEC), 2001).  
 
Transportation by air is increasingly difficult and less used by the Nigerian 
traffickers these days because of the newly introduced biometrics international 
passport by the Nigerian Immigration Services. This new passport includes 
biometrics features such as finger printing as unique personal security on the 
Nigerian international passport. This has made it difficult for the traffickers to forge 
the current international passport in Nigeria. However, traffickers still use this 
means to smuggle victims without being caught (UNESCO, 2006: 27). The main 
airports used by the traffickers are the Malam Aminu Kano International Airport in 
Kano and Muritala Muhammad International Airport in Lagos, Nigeria. 
 
3.2.1   The Contemporary Challenges of Human Trafficking In Nigeria 
The contemporary challenges of human trafficking in Nigeria are heightened by 
some of the following factors: the lack of a social welfare system for Nigerian 
citizens; the social and cultural inequality of women; the high profit-low risk 
situation for the criminal groups in the country; the continuous growth of the sex 
industry in the global North; the porosity of borders and the corruption of law-
enforcement agencies. 
 
The Lack of a Social Welfare System 
Consequent to the economic policies of privatization in Nigeria, many services that 
were either supported or supplied by the State (such as good health, education, 
and social welfare) are now being transferred to private hands, and those that are 





want the best for their children, who have to now pay exorbitant amounts to receive 
these services from the private sectors, whose primary objective is to maximize 
profit. Cwikel, Chudakova, Paikin, Agmon, & Belmaker’s (2004), following 
interviews with some trafficked women abroad, have suggested that such women 
entered into a trafficking contract in order to finance health care services for family 
members, which are now expensive, or for their own university education both 
services that were once provided by the government but have now been 
transferred to the private sector. 
 
Social and Cultural Inequality of Women 
The social and cultural inequality of women, which leads to an economic 
dependence on their fathers, husbands and other male relatives is a major 
challenge of trafficked persons in Nigeria. This has led women and girls in most 
African countries to become vulnerable to family abuse and violence, including 
total neglect, as they are often viewed as commodities to be bought and sold 
(Elabor-Idemudia, 2003). Women’s bodies are perceived as sexual (commodities) 
objects for sale (Long, 2004).  
Sexual abuse of children has encouraged the traffickers to exploit young women 
therefore making them vulnerable, and they were forced to work as prostitutes 
(United Nations Children’s Fund, 2003; Widom and Kuhns, 1996). 
 
High Profit - Low Risk 
FitzGibbon, (2003) suggests that high profit-low risk is one of the major 
motivational factors that encourage traffickers to dwell in the illicit trafficking of 
people. It was estimated that human trafficking in Europe, for the purpose of 
commercial prostitution, earned the traffickers between $20,000 and $50,000 per 
victim. The IOM also estimated that trafficking of young women from Ethiopia 
earned the trafficker about $800 per person in outright sales. The low risk here is 
that African traffickers face a lesser risk of arrest, because of the systemic 
corruption in most African countries. The criminal justice systems do not generally 
work and the criminals in human trafficking have exploited the subsequent lack of 








The Continuous Growth of the Sex Industry in the Global North 
The Dutch government legalised and licensed 2000 brothels registering prostitutes 
- women and girls in them (Louis, 1999; LifeSiteNews.com, 1999 cited in Leidholdt, 
2004: 170). Most of these women and girls are from developing countries including 
Nigeria. After the legalization of prostitution in the Netherlands, brothel owners 
began to recruit women into the prostitution business, with the use of the 
government sponsored job centres for unemployed workers (Leidholdt, 2004).  
The sex industry became more globalized with the recruitment and transportation 
being conducted in large and more sophisticated trafficking networks, which also 
included the use of the internet for promoting the international sex business 
(Hughes, 2001, 2004; Jeffreys, 2002; Von Struensee, 2002; Cwikel & Hoban, 
2005). In addition, an increase in the sex demand by males at the destination of 
trafficked victims is also a major contributing factor to the menace of human 
trafficking in Nigeria.  Raymond (2001:2) suggests that ‘‘the way in which sex has 
been tolerated as a male right in a commodity culture is all part of this demand’’ 
(Raymond, 2001:2, cited in Batros, 2004). 
 
The Porosity of Borders and the Corruption of Law Enforcement Agencies: 
UNODC (2005) posits that porous borders and corrupt immigration officers in 
Nigeria and at the transit countries fuelled the problem of human trafficking in the 
country.  Evidence of corruption within the law-enforcement agencies in the 
country could be found in the arrest of a former Nigerian police officer, caught in 
Guinea with 33 young women within the ages of 18-20 (Odunuga, 2001). 
 
All these factors facilitate the following contemporary problems of human 
trafficking in Nigeria: First, an increase in the growth of internal trafficking, second, 
baby ‘harvesting’ and third, the situation that victims change their status to become 
offenders after the repayment of their debt of bondage at the destination countries.  
 
The rapid growth of baby ‘harvesting’ is a contemporary challenge of human 
trafficking in Nigeria. ‘‘ In States like Abia, Ebonyi and Lagos, many cases have 
been reported about clinics, doctors, nurses and orphanages who help pregnant 
teenagers and other women who do not want to keep their babies after birth. They 
care for these women during pregnancy and provide money and shelter. Upon 
delivery the babies are sold to couples that pay a premium for the babies of their 





their claims on the babies or swearing oaths of secrecy’’ (UNESCO, 2006: 31, The 
Guardian 2011). The price of the unborn baby boy and baby girl is around US 
$3875 and US $3100 respectively (UNESCO, 2006: 31). The difference in price 
also highlights the inequality between the genders. 
Apart from external trafficking, that involves the movement of victims from the 
country of origin (Nigeria) to the destination countries in the global North (Western 
Europe), contemporary studies of human trafficking in Nigeria have revealed that, 
there is an increased threat of internal trafficking of children and young women 
from one part of the country to the other for domestic servitude or prostitution. The 
internet publication of Agbu, posits that an “International Labour Organization (ILO) 
study estimated that there are around 15 million children engaged in child Labour 
activities in Nigeria. These children could easily be forced into child prostitution or 
trafficked externally. According to NAPTIP, almost every state has a variant of 
child trafficking”. 
 
Another contemporary trend has been reported to exist in Europe concerning the 
victims of trafficking in persons for commercial sex exploitation. Whereas many 
young Nigerian women victims labour for their ‘madam’ with predicaments that 
range from deceit, abuse, violence, debt bondage, deprivation of freedom of 
movement, to the loss of dignity, in forced prostitution, many choose the option of 
continuing in the illicit profession in order to earn the respect of, and gain financial 
reward from the ‘madam’. This is probably the completion of the crime circle of 
human trafficking for the purpose of commercial sex exploitation, in which a victim 
changes their status to become an offender. The motivation behind this newly 
acquired status is that large amounts of money could be earned by the young 
women after having paid off their debt (Agustin 2007; Long 2004; Skilbrei and Tveit 
2008; Siegel 2007). 
 
3.2.2   The Major Actors of Human Trafficking Business in Nigeria 
Human trafficking actors in Nigeria can be classified as follows: The Nigerian 
‘madam’ (madam refers to the female ring leader in a human trafficking business) 
- at the country of destination (European States), the Nigerian ‘madam’ – as the 
native perpetrator, in the country of origin, the trafficking facilitators, the users of 
the trafficked persons, and other perpetrators (Elabor-Idemudia, 2003; UNESCO, 






The Nigerian ‘Madam’ - at the Country of Destination  
Unlike other organised crimes, such as drug trafficking, illicit arms dealings, and 
advanced fee fraud, where the major perpetrators of the crime are men. Women 
offenders from Nigeria controlled some criminal networks on human trafficking for 
sexual exploitations in Europe, and this is mainly associated with women offenders 
from Benin City in Edo State, Nigeria. According to Van Dijk (2002) in his study on 
human trafficking and prostitution in the Netherlands between the period of 1997-
2000, it was revealed that a quarter of all offenders were women including the 
Nigerian offenders.  
 
The feminist ethnographical study of Patience Elabor-Idemudia (2003) on 
migration, trafficking and the African women in Nigeria, during the period of 1999-
2001 showed the role played by the Nigerian ‘Madam’ as the beneficiaries of the 
criminal proceeds accrued from the exploitation of the trafficked victims. Recently, 
in the study of Siegel & de Blank, the Women who Traffic Women: the Role of 
Women in Human Trafficking Networks - Dutch cases, it was revealed that the 
‘Nigerian madam remains in Nigeria to recruit potential trafficking victims to be 
trafficked to Italy, France and the Netherlands while the role of the madams who 
settled in Europe is to maximize the proceeds of the crime’ (Siegel & de Blank 
2010). It is very important to mention here, the popular adage in Nigeria that says 
‘what a man can do, a woman can even do it better,’ which characterizes the role 
of the Nigerian women as ring leaders and organisers of trafficking in persons for 
the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation in Europe and other countries of 
destinations.  
 
Nigerian ‘Madam’ - as the Native Perpetrator 
Siegel & de Blank (2010) in their study, ‘Women Who Traffic Women’, also 
exposed the role of local women who do not have to travel abroad for the 
acquisition of illicit proceeds of trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation to be 
paid into her bank accounts in Nigeria. She will recruit and traffic victims from 
Nigeria to her co-partners in crime in Italy, the Netherlands, and France, whose 
objectives are to maximize proceeds of the crime for their fair share. This is further 
re-stated in the study of Monzini (2000), where a local madam resold no less than 








This is the intermediary between the family of the victim and the main madam in 
the European destination country. UNESCO (2003) posits that the trafficker 
facilitator ‘‘is the link between supply and demand, on the one hand increasing 
supply through the recruitment, deception, transportation and exploitation process, 
and on the other hand boosting demand by providing easy access to the trafficked 
persons’’. The trafficker facilitator provides the logistics for the main madam and 
the crime organizer for a fee (Siegel and de Blank, 2010). The role of the crime 
facilitator may range from adoption and trafficking of the victim from the country of 
origin and sale into prostitution at the destination country. The traffickers are also 
referred to as ‘couriers’.  
 
The traffickers usually recruit victims from their families and acquaintances in a 
deceitful and fraudulent way. An individual agent or group of recruiters facilitate 
this for the traffickers (Okojie et al., 2003). The human courier will arrange for the 
required travelling documents and transportation of the victims at the country of 
origin. Additionally, the courier ensures that the victim signs a contract agreement 
and swears an oath in front of a spiritual shrine before embarking to the trafficked 
destination (Okojie et al., 2003; Elabor-Idemudia 2003). This may include taking 
some bodily items from the victim such as blood from the victim’s body, hair from 
their head, armpit, and private parts, as well as threats to the victim’s life, that bad 
things will happen to her should she choose to report to the police at the country 
of destination. Elabor-Idemudia (2003) posits that the victim is also threatened that 
she may go mad if she breaks the oath.  
 
Figure 3.1: Numbers of Suspected Traffickers in Nigeria from August 2004 - 
August 2011 
           






From 2004 to 2011, the estimated number of the suspected traffickers according 
to the Nigerian anti- human trafficking angency was 531 in Figure 3.1  
 
The Users of Trafficked Persons 
According to UNESCO (2006), the users are ‘‘at the end of a long chain. They can 
be either the users of sex workers or the heads of farms or shops needing access 
to cheap labour. Sometimes, prospective employers of trafficked persons directly 
approach the agents who negotiate with the trafficked persons or their relatives’’. 
They do not see themselves as part of the criminal network, even though they are 
the consumers of the illicit ‘‘commodity’’ and the engine in the machinery of 
exploitation (UNICEF, 2003:9).   
 
Other Perpetrators  
These include the following: 
- the transporters, who are involved in the trans-border trafficking 
manipulation (UNESCO,2006); 
- the agents and group of recruiters at the country of origin where victims 
were recruited (Okojie et al., 2003); 
- the native doctors - during the course of threatening and initiation into the 
sex business, they use rituals and voodoo-dolls in oath-making (Siegel and 
de Blank, 2010). The empirical studies of Elabor-Idemudia (2003) also 
explains the role of African native doctors in the ritual ceremonies 
conducted for trafficked victims after their recruitments; 
- the corrupt law-enforcement officers at the border towns are another group 
that are involved in the trafficking of people in the region of West Africa 
(UNESCO, 2006: 24);  
- the lawyers that are involved with the drafting of the agreements between 
the madam and the victims (Elabor-Idemudia, 2003); 
- the trolleys, which refers to girls who act as guides in the destination 
countries (Siegel and de Blank, 2010); and 









3.2.3   The Human Trafficking Scheme in Nigeria 
The Human trafficking scheme in Nigeria can be better understood through the 
roles of the actors in the transnational trafficking process. This is driven by the 
supply and demand principle of Adam Smith (1776). The supply of the illicit 
commodity of traffic in persons usually fluctuates as a result of the law-
enforcement efforts in both the countries of destination and origin, to combat the 
global threat posed by traffickers to those countries. In order to stabilise the forces 
of the demand and the supply of the traffic in persons at the illicit market, the 
smuggling of victims now prevail. As transportation of goods is important in the 
supply of legitimate commodities, so also is the transportation of trafficked victims 
who are smuggled and transported from country of origin to destination country.  
 
Therefore, for a proper elucidation on how trafficking in persons is conducted at 
the illicit global market, this section explores the scheme used by the traffickers at 
the country of origin where trafficked persons are recruited. This is the supply end 
of trafficked victims, and it will consider various recruitment strategies adopted by 
the offenders at this stage. The next stage will investigate the role of the 
‘middlemen’, the trafficking facilitators, who usually smuggle victims from their 
country of origin to the final destination. This is the destination where they are 
being received by the main trafficking offender, the distributor of the illicit 
commodities to the illicit users, whose main strategy is characterised by an 
exploitation scheme. 
 
Figure 3.2: Scheme of Traffic in Persons in Nigeria 
 






The recruitment and supply phase is the first stage of the human trafficking 
scheme. This stage seeks to examine: the mode of contact with the victims, the 
place of recruitment, and the recruiters of the victims. 
 
Box 3.1: The Nigerian Human Trafficking Madam      
The Nigerian madam A, herself active as a prostitute, led a small network. She 
recruited girls in Nigeria and arranged their trip to the Netherlands. She was 
assisted by some Nigerian men, ‘trolleys’, who accompanied the girls. In the 
Netherlands the girls were received by white men, who took them to madam.  Later 
they were put to work in window prostitution. A Dutch driver brought them to and 
from their work. The girls were required to pay A ‘contribution money’ as 
repayment for their debts. As a guarantee, the girls had to undergo some kind of 
voodoo ritual (‘ogun’), and their passports were taken away. Sometimes the 
madam herself collected the girls’ incomes, but usually she left it to others. One of 
the girls explained:’’ ‘A is a real madam, you can tell from the way she talks and 
behaves, and from the clothes she wears. 
Source: Siegel and Blank (2010: 444) 
 
According to the report ‘‘Field Survey in Edo State, Nigeria -Trafficking of Nigerian 
Girls to Italy’’, the most commonly used mode of contacting the victims is by word 
of mouth mainly through their family members and acquaintances (Okojie et al. 
2003: 43). They also suggested that other modes of recruitment such as audio-
cassettes and letters purportedly written by acquaintances and family members 
already in destination countries are used to recruit victims from the country of 
origin. Victims are also recruited through artistes in the musical industry and sports 
personnel and are then trafficked abroad. 
 
The initial recruitment of victims mainly begins in their familiar territory such as 
home or market place. Subsequently, the recruiter may invite the victim to hotels, 
bars, and restaurants in order to finalise the trafficking trip to the destination 
countries (Okojie et al. 2003). The success stories of the recruiters and the 
promise of finding suitable and decent jobs abroad for the victims are the major 
deceptive schemes adopted at this stage (Choo et al. 2010; Elabor-Idemudia, 
2003; Siegel & de Blank, 2010). These jobs range from, housekeeping or nannies 





hairstyle), working in factories, farms, industries and restaurants (Okojie at al. 
2003: 45). 
 
The recruiter of the victim may be an individual agent of the main trafficker at the 
destination country or a group of recruiters engaged by the criminal network for 
this task (Siegel & de Blank, 2010). The recruiters of the trafficking actor usually 
approach the family members with the notion to convince them to send their young 
relative abroad to greener pastures (Elabor-Idemudia, 2003). Sometimes, 
offenders from the destination countries travel to Nigeria to interview the victims 
personally before handing them over to their agents to finalise their travel 
arrangements (Okojie at al. 2003: 44). Many victims at the destination countries 
also play the role of recruiters in an attempt to pay off their own debts (Siegel, 
2007 cited in Oude Breuil, Siegel, van Reenen, Beijer and Roos, 2011: 41).  
 
Furthermore, when the recruitment is finalised, the recruiters usually enter into 
agreements with the victims to ensure that they pay back the money expended on 
their counterfeited documents and their trip expenses to the destination countries 
(Choo at all. 2010; Okojie et al. 2003: 56; Elabor-Idemudia, 2003; Siegel & de 
Blank, 2010). The guarantee for redeeming these agreements is in the form of 
swearing an oath before a ‘traditional priest’. (Elabor-Idemudia, 2003: 109-110).  
 
The oath is usually taken before the priest of the shrine with items such as, blood 
from the victims’ body, submitted finger nails and pubic hair, and victims’ 
underwear, all these bodily items are used for a voodoo ritual (‘ogun’) as ‘collateral’ 
to secure some ‘contribution money’ as repayment of their debts (Siegel & de 
Blank, 2010: 444, Okojie, 2003: 56). According to Okojie at al. (2003), ‘one victim 
was made to swear that if she reneges on the agreement she would run mad’.  
However, a ‘lucky’ victim may be asked to sign an agreement before a clergyman 
or a lawyer by the ‘madam’ (Okojie, et al., 2003). 
 
Thereafter, the agents then arrange for counterfeit documentation such as 
passports or other fraudulent documents to be made to obtain visas for the victim 
to travel abroad (Choo et al., 2010: 172). Okojie et al, (2003: 46) posit that most 
of the trafficked victims in their survey, travelled with false travelling documents 
bearing the nationality of other countries, such as Benin Republic, Togo, Senegal 





such as sport utility vehicles (SUVs) such as Jeeps are used to convey victims to 
their destination. 
 
The second stage of the scheme involves the transportation and smuggling of the 
victims. The ‘middlemen’ offenders mostly engaged in this task are also known as 
traffickers’ facilitators. They are young men frequently described as trolleys or 
‘dago’ (Siegel and de Blank, 2010; Okojie et al., 2003: 44). They usually travel with 
the victim to the destination countries in the European states. If the security checks 
at the airport are such that it is difficult to take a direct flight, the trolleys will usually 
switch the route from travelling by air from Lagos Airport, in Nigeria, to travel by 
land to Ghana or Abidjan from where they go by air to France or Italy (Okojie et 
al., 2003: 47). Alternatively, they may travel by land from Lagos, Nigeria via Benin 
Republic on to Mali and by air from there to the destination country.  
 
Furthermore, when the victims are to be transported by land through the desert, 
they are usually accompanied by Arab escorts (truck drivers), who know their way 
through the desert (Okojie et al., 2003). In this case the victims and traffickers exit 
from Lagos-Nigeria, via Benin republic, Togo, Ghana, Cote D’lvoire to Mali/Niger 
to Algeria, Morocco or Libya and from there to the destination country. The second 
available route is from Katsina/Borno-Nigeria to Niger Republic to Algeria, 
Morocco or Libya. Normally, victims exit from any of the Northern African countries 
by train or air to France, or by sea from Morocco to Spain (Okojie et al., 2003).   
 
The final stage of the scheme operates at the destination country in Europe where 
the victims are received by ‘‘madam’s boys’’ or madam’s black boys’’ (Carling 2005 
cited in Siegel and de Blank, 2010: 444). These are young Nigerian men who are 
usually companions to the madam or ‘‘contract husbands’’. They run errands for 
the madam and sometimes they collect the victims from the train stations and 
airports on their arrival in Europe (Okojie et al., 2003: 44).   
The exploitation of the victims is the final stage of the human trafficking scheme. 
During this phase, the ring leader of the trafficking network, at the destination 
countries exploit the victims and generate profits by forcing them into bonded 
labour and by demanding the repayment of the expenses spent on their 
transportation from their country of origin to the destination countries in Europe 
(Aronowitz, 2002: 261). Pannell (2001 cited in Melrose and Barrett, 2006: 119) 
suggests that upon arrival in Europe, the amount of ‘debt’ owed by victims can be 





The first step of the exploitation phase is the confiscation of the travelling 
documents (international passports and air tickets) of the victims by the trafficking 
network (Barrett, 2006: 119). This puts the victims in a vulnerable position, where 
they become solely dependent on their traffickers at the destination countries, 
because of their immigration status (Okojie et al., 2003: 53). Melrose and Barrett 
suggest that ‘many of the young girls are too terrified to go to the authorities to ask 
for help and believe that the police and authorities will do little to help them’ (2006: 
119). They often believe that the authorities will punish them for their immigration 
status. According to Watson and Silkstone (2006: 117), police and immigration 
officials treat trafficking victims as illegal immigrants, subject to deportation. 
 
Therefore they are left with one only option, to follow the instructions of the 
traffickers when being forced to engage in prostitution, marital exploitation and 
abuse of migrant women for marriage, sweatshop labour and in domestic work 
(Corrin, 2005: 551). They are also subjected to physical violence should they 
refuse to comply with the instructions of the trafficking network at the destination 
country (Okojie et al., 2003). 
 
The perpetrator then buy the victims’ scanty blouses, short skirts, hand bags, and 
wigs, with the instructions to join their predecessors on the street, and at times the 
victim could be hired out by the madam to perform pornographic films (Okojie et 
al., 2003: 54-55). In addition, the perpetrators ensure that the victims’ movement 
are monitored and their freedom of communication restricted. ‘Any communication 
with relations is done in the presence of the madam to ensure that the victim does 
not say anything adverse about the real situation in which she has found herself’ 
(Okojie, et al., 2003: 54). Furthermore, the madam then frequently rotates the 
victims from one location to another in Europe to prevent detection by Law 
Enforcement agents (Choo et al., 2010: 178). 
 
According to (Melrose and Barrett 2006: 119), traffickers ‘made up to £500 per day 
from each of their victims. However, ‘the madam takes all the money earned by 
the victim and records the amount, this goes towards paying her “debt”. 
Deductions are made for accommodation, food, cosmetics, and any other 
expenses. The girls, therefore, have very little money to spend on themselves or 






The next section will explore the drug trafficking in the context of Nigeria. It will 
also consider the role and the schemes of drug trafficking offenders in the county 
and conclude with the contemporary challenges of drug trafficking in Nigeria.  
 
3.3   Drug Trafficking Context in Nigeria 
Illicit drug trafficking is a big problem globally and Nigeria in particular. The 
cultivation, production, consumption and exportation of cannabis, otherwise 
known as Indian hemp, and to a limited extent the use of addictive substances, 
are the most prominent drug problems in the country (NDLEA, 2009).  
However, with regards to dealing in narcotic substances such as cocaine and 
heroin, Nigeria is being exploited as a major transit route to Europe and the United 
States (Ellis, 2009). The UNODC (2010) estimation suggests that around a quarter 
of Europe’s annual consumption of 135 to 145 tonnes of cocaine, valued around 
$1.8 billion are currently transited via West Africa.  
The historical research of Ellis (2009) on West Africa’s International drug Trade 
suggests that, in 1952 the US government documented the smuggling of heroin 
via Nigeria and Ghana. This was transported by a Lebanese syndicate from Beirut 
to New York via Kano-Nigeria and Accra-Ghana through drug couriers on 
commercial flights (Keeler, 1952 cited in Ellis). 
 
The large-scale dealing of West Africans in the cocaine and heroin trafficking is 
said to have started when West African students studying in Europe and North 
America failed to receive payments of their study grants from their respective 
governments as a result of political corruption. Hence, many of these students 
were recruited by drug trafficking networks to serve as drug couriers trafficking 
drugs to/from Nigeria to Europe and Americas to save money for their tuition fees 
(UNODC, Dakar, 2-3 April 2004; Ellis, 2009).  
 
In 1982, the US embassy in Lagos stated that: ‘Nigerians played a significant role 
in the marketing of narcotics and dangerous drugs in the United States’ (Daily 
Times, December 10, 1984 cited in Ellis, 2009). That year the US government 
arrested 21 Nigerians for drug smuggling and narcotic offences. A similar trend 
also emerged in Europe in 1983, when the West German Interior Ministry 
reportedly stated that a ship from Nigeria carrying cocaine, heroin, and marijuana 






The director of West Germany’s customs service stated that Nigeria was one of 
the top six importers of cocaine to his country (George Wolt, 1984 cited in Ellis, 
2009). According to Ellis by 1985, as a result of the rapid involvement of Nigerians 
in drug trafficking to Europe, UK customs agents adopted a new strategy of 
systematic searching, and strip-searching of Nigerians entering the United 
Kingdom (2009). Within this period, some 2000 Nigerians were reported to be 
serving varying jail terms for drug offences abroad (New Nigeria, 13 May 1988).   
 
Jonas Okwara (1990) reported that the US authorities arrested 851 Nigerians for 
drug offences between 1984 and 1989 and also stated that 55 percent of the 
heroin arriving at New York’s J F Kennedy airport was smuggled by Nigerians. 
Segun Babatope, (1992) the then Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of 
External Affairs said Nigerians offenders were arrested in Pakistan, India, Saudi 
Arabia, and Thailand for drug smuggling (see also Ellis, 2009). By 2005, the South 
African Police revealed that Nigerian traffickers dominated his country and they 
were said to be one of the most dangerous organised crime gangs in the country 
(Ellis, 2009). 
 
The US government described Nigeria as ‘the hub of African narcotics trafficking’, 
noting also the ‘traffickers’ expansion of bulk shipments into Nigeria’s neighbours’ 
(USIS, 1998, cited in Ellis, 2009). Kostakos and Antonopoulos (2010) argued that 
the growth of the European drug market is as a result of significant law 
enforcement efforts in combating drug traffickers by the US government, which 
contributed to the establishment of smuggling channels to the European continent. 
UNODC (2010) also suggests that interdiction efforts pushed drug trafficking to 
even more vulnerable routes by disrupting original transit zone as revealed in the 
story of West Africa between 2004 and 2008. 
 
These factors have induced most of the South American drug traders to shift their 
marketing strategies to Europe, making use of West Africa’s vulnerabilities, factors 
which include but are not limited to her political environment and the existence of 
the well-developed smuggling networks of the West African drug actors. The 
integration and abolition of borders in European states in the 1990s accelerated 
the internationalization of the illicit drug market (Paoli, 2004). This facilitated the 
relocation of many cocaine traders from Latin America to the West African region; 






The argument here is that the drug actors of Latin America formed an alliance with 
their counterparts in West Africa to benefit from the emerging drug markets in 
Europe, through the use of effective collaboration strategies. They shared 
‘business’ intelligence within the regions to facilitate the normalities of their illicit 
drug smuggling, creating a new ‘world order’ of a globalised threat. This is as many 
countries of the world have refused to embrace regional collaborations on the fight 
against illicit drug trafficking as result of corruption, jurisdictional rivalries, national 
security and political ego. 
 
Nowadays, many countries around the world see the issue of intelligence sharing 
for the purpose of combating organised crime as national security (NFIU Analyst 
06). Their belief is that powerful standard setters of the world might clamp down 
on them when the country is being frequently used as a transit nation (NFIU 
Analyst 06). This may also be one of the major reasons why the study of 
criminology lacks adequate databases for the study of organised crime, thus 
limiting the scope of threat management in transnational organised crime (Van 
Dijk, 2008). 
 
The bureaucratic tendency within collaborative efforts among countries of the 
world is overwhelming (Ribadu, 2010). This includes official intelligence requests 
in an agreed format by the party countries; the usual briefings at federal executive 
meetings; deliberation by houses of assembly, various levels of committee 
meetings and the final approval of the presidents before bilateral or memoranda 
of understanding are signed at the ‘champagne’ bilateral ceremony venue among 
diplomats of the involved nations (NFIU Analyst 03, emphasis added). However, 
drug actors only need to put a phone call through and arrange for a small meeting 
in a hotel or nightclub (using organised crime networks and systems) within a very 
short time period, and cooperation among illicit drug actors commence 
immediately without any bureaucratic ceremonies (See Chapter 2). 
 
The illicit drug market is a source of revenue for drug actors in any given country. 
Pearson and Hobbs (2001) classified drug markets into four categories; importers, 
wholesalers, middle-market brokers, and retail dealers. Lupton et al (2002) 
suggested two types of drug markets in terms of their neighbourhood operations 
(central place markets and local markets), and Edmunds, Hough, and Urquia 
(1996) suggested two major market operations at the local level (open and closed). 





actors, involved in drug smuggling (trading charities, mutual societies, sideliners, 
criminal diversifiers, opportunistic irregulars, retail specialists, and state sponsored 
traders).  
 
Dorn, Levi and King (2005) considered the motivational factors behind drug 
smuggling (political, financial and risk). Bennett and Holloway (2007) argued that 
typologies provided on drug markets do not provide the whole picture of the drug 
market, because little is known about the application of these typologies. It was 
further argued that methods of drug trafficking employed by the actors differ from 
location to location (Brookman, Bennett and Maguire, 2004). In some locations, 
many complex layers of manipulation exist (Pearson and Hobbs, 2001). Therefore, 
an adequate understanding of the roles played by the market actors is very 
important to the understanding of the global drug market.    
 
The UNODC (2005) argues that going by the names of people arrested and tried 
for drug trafficking in both Nigeria and abroad, the evidence from the Nigerian Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) records show that they are predominantly 
from the Igbo-speaking areas i.e. the South-East and the Yorubas from the South-
West and the Southern minority groups in Nigeria. 
 
3.3.1   The Contemporary Problems of Illicit Drugs in Nigeria 
In order to understand the contemporary problems of drug trafficking in Nigeria, 
this study evaluates the numerous challenges highlighted by the National Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency in Nigeria in its 2009 Annual Report and its many recent 
press releases on drug trafficking in Nigeria. 
 
Illicit Use of Drugs among Young People 
The Illicit use of drugs is a problem and of great concern among the youth, mostly 
males living in urban environments in many developing countries of the world 
including Nigeria (UNODC, 2012: 4; NDLEA Press release, 14/6/2012). According 
to the Chairman/Chief Executive of NDELA, ‘‘the young people are more at risk of 
drug abuse and trafficking today. This is because they are adventurous and would 
always seek to experiment with ‘new’ things which their peers introduce to them” 
(2012). Some drug users in Northern Nigeria have continued to slide into the 
abuse of substances, such as tippex, gasoline, lizard excreta, zakami – a wild 





– a concoction of unimaginable chemical substances in North Central Nigeria. All 
these substances are not currently criminalised in Nigeria, since they were 
excluded from the UN list of narcotics substances. 
 
Table 3.2: Statistics of drug seizure in Nigeria from 2006 to March 2012 




Other psychotropic substances  9,128.744 
Total 1,310,860.348 
 Source: NDLEA Press release, 14/06/2012   
 
Cultivation of Cannabis in Large-scale Farms in Nigeria 
Cultivation of cannabis is a major drug threat in Nigeria as compared to cocaine 
and heroin. Farmlands of cannabis were discovered in large sizes in hitherto 
unimaginable parts of the country (NDLEA, 20009:20). For instance, in 2009 the 
Nigeria drug agency destroyed 1.5 hectares of cannabis farms located in Katsina 
State, 21.8 hectares in Kwara State, and also uncovered sizeable cannabis farms 
in Adamawa and Kebbi States (NDLEA, 2009; NDLEA Press release, 14/6/2012).    
 
Cannabis farmers in Nigeria have resorted to violence to protect their farms and 
warehouses from being destroyed by the Nigerian drug police. In 2008, two agents 
of the agency were killed in Abi, the Ndokwa West Local Government Area of Delta 
State during the course of an official drug operation, by cannabis farmers in that 
area (NDELA, 2009). 
 
Emergence of the Clandestine Illicit Drug Laboratory in Nigeria  
One of the cotemporary problems of drug trafficking in Nigeria is the advent of illicit 
clandestine laboratories for large-scale production of methamphetamine in the 
country. The first illicit drug laboratory with a production capacity of 20 to 50 
kilograms per cycle similar to that of a large production centre found in Mexico 
was detected in Nigeria in 2011 (NDLEA Press release, 21/07/2012). Also in 2012, 
three Bolivians Yerko Artunduaga Dorado, 19 years old; Ruben Ticona Jorge, 21 
years old; and Hugo Chavez Moreno, 39 years old, and one Nigerian 23-year-old 





for the illicit production of Methamphetamine at the satellite town, Lagos (NDLEA 
Press Release, 02/22/2012). The Chairman of NDLEA stated that the ugly 
development has led to the recruitment of youths in smuggling the drugs across 
the borders. The NDLEA Report posits that “the environmental pollution, gullible 
and unemployed youths are being used to smuggle these drugs to countries with 
high demand. Several methamphetamine traffickers have been caught at the 
airports and land borders” (2012). 
 
An Increase in the Bulk Shipment of Drugs from Source Countries to Nigeria 
The bulk importation and shipment of narcotic drugs to Nigerian seaports from the 
source countries where these drugs are cultivated is a contemporary challenge for 
the law-enforcement agencies in Nigeria. A large shipment of 110kg of cocaine 
was intercepted on January 13 2011 in Tin Can Island port, Lagos. A few days 
later, the same criminal group also concealed 167kg of cocaine in 38 cartons of 
floor tiles in a 20-foot container both of which originated from Bolivia. 
 
In the case of heroin, the Nigerian drug Agency also intercepted a large shipment 
of 130kg in a 40-foot container on board the vessel, MV Montenegro which 
originated from the Republic of Iran in 2010. The drugs were concealed amongst 
auto spare parts, and the street market value was put at $9.9 million USD (NDLEA 
Press release, 26/11/2010). In addition, in 2012 the collaborating efforts of The 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), now known as National Crime Agency 
(NCA) in the UK and the Nigeria Drug Agency resulted in the successful 
interception of 113.4kg of heroin, which originated from Pakistan into the country 
through Tin Can Island Port, Lagos – Nigeria. 
 
Corruption among the Officers of the Nigerian Drug Agency  
A major impediment of drug enforcement in Nigeria is corruption among the 
officers of the Nigeria Drug Agency (NDLEA, 2009: 26-27). This official publication 
posits that ‘‘corrupt practice by drug law enforcement officers, includes poor 
remuneration and absence of a good reward system, social tolerance, weak anti-
corruption legislation controls and prolonged stays in a particular duty post. It is 
important to state that drug enforcement officers are indeed aware of the street 
value of the drugs that they seize every day; where these drugs are sold and the 
people who sell them. The only thing they require to become rich is to cross the 





always ready to bribe the poorly remunerated drug agent in Nigeria (NDLEA, 2009: 
27). 
 
The Use of Minors and Aged Parents 
Children or minors are considered or seen to be innocent and consequently attract 
little or no suspicion as air travellers. The drug traffickers know this fact and are 
always willing to use this lapse against the immigration and customs officers. The 
drug couriers travel with minors and deliberately conceal the illicit drugs in the 
minors’ luggage. This allows them to beat the security check of customs officers 
at many airports, since the attention of the customs officers are not always on the 
so-called innocent minors. In 2002, a twelve year-old Nigerian minor, a boy with 
US citizenship, was arrested at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport with 87 
condoms of heroin in his luggage. NDLEA (2011) apprehended a 59 year-old 
grandmother at the Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA), Lagos. The 
suspect was about to export 1.5kg of a powdery substance that tested positive as 
cocaine. She was arrested during the screening of British Airways passengers to 
London Heathrow Airport with the drugs neatly hidden in the sides of her luggage. 
She had been promised the sum of five thousand pounds on her arrival in the UK. 
 
International Student Couriers 
The use of Nigerian students’ studying abroad as couriers is one of the frequently 
applied schemes by the drug traffickers in Nigeria. To study abroad is very 
expensive, especially in the US and the UK. This is mainly due to the exchange 
rates of dollars and pound sterling. This mostly affects Nigerian students who are 
self-sponsored. The student without scholarship support can be easily recruited 
as a courier by a drug striker (See Section 3.3.2 for the definition of drug striker) 
to transport drugs for a drug baron. NDLEA Airport Commander, Alhaji Hamza 
Umar revealed the name of a student suspect, Agunenye Chinagorom Capito, 29 
(student) who was caught with 200 grams of methamphetamines during the 
screening of Air Emirate passengers to Malaysia. He tested positive for drug 
ingestion with the aid of scanning machines.  
 
The Vanguard paper illustrates an account of personal experience of one Nigerian 
international student’s courier as thus: “I am a student of English Language. I came 





offered to reward me if I smuggle drugs to Malaysia. He said that the drug would 
be properly packed in a bag. If not for the arresting officer, I did not even know that 
the drug was inside the metal handles of the bag. They just told me that the drug 
was inside the bag and that I will get three thousand dollars ($3000) upon delivery. 
I was given the bag containing some foodstuff and they wished me good luck. I 
needed the money and did not really consider the capital punishment side of the 
deal” (May 27, 2011). 
 
3.3.2   The Major Actors of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Nigeria 
In understanding the global drug market, the roles of Nigerian actors cannot be 
downplayed. For the purpose of elucidation, the following actors are considered in 
the development of the Nigerian illicit drug market; the drug barons (drug dealer), 
the striker (drug intermediary), and the courier. 
 
Drug Barons 
According to a Nigerian drug-police officer (Ellis, 2009), the drug baron is 
considered to be operating at the upper-level in illicit drug distribution. Pearson 
and Hobbs (2001) observed that very little research on this subject exists. The 
major delimitation of this kind of study is that illicit commodities cannot be traded 
openly in the street to the public like other normal commodities that are available 
on the open market (Lupton et al., 2002). Kostakos and Antonopoulos (2010) 
argued that cocaine is consumed by the more affluent and “respectable” parts of 
the Greek population through the discreet supply of the merchandise. 
 
Therefore, the only available source of explanation is the structural logistics of the 
Nigerian ‘barons’ as described by the law enforcement agencies, combating illicit 
drug trafficking in Nigeria (Ellis, 2009). According to an interview of a senior 
Nigerian drug law-enforcement officer, a Nigerian drug baron needs at least three 
assets. First, he or she must have the ability to buy the drug cheaply at the source.  
To do this, the Nigerian baron travels to the producer countries in South America 
and South-East Asia to buy drugs (Ellis, 2009). There is also a large Nigerian 
community in Mumbai, in the Indian subcontinent (Time out Mumbai 2, July-August 
2006). There is a small community of Nigerians living in Afghanistan (Ellis, 2009). 
A drug baron who lives in a producer country builds excellent local contacts, and 
is well connected to buy heroin or cocaine in large quantities at source, and can 





In 2003, around 330 Nigerians were said to be in prison for drug related offences 
in Thailand alone (Guardian, 29 March, 2003). It was suggested that West African 
gangs also played a part in heroin distribution in the United Kingdom (Dorn, Levi, 
& King, 2005). 
 
The second requirement for a drug baron is a good network and criminal 
cooperation in the consuming country, North America in the case of heroin, or 
Europe in the case of cocaine. Millions of Nigerians live in Europe and North 
America and, this is believed to have facilitated the logistics of the baron’s dealings 
in those countries (Ellis, 2009). This makes it difficult for law-enforcement officers 
in the receiving countries to detect and investigate the activities of the operations 
of drug barons among them.  
 
Thirdly, a drug baron needs substantial capital to finance the operations of the 
trafficking business. Ellis’ study revealed that most drug barons in Nigeria were 
once successful drug traffickers who had previously made two or more illicit 
transactions abroad (2009). This enabled them to have the financial capacity to 
support their trafficking business, and the financing of the smooth running of their 
ad hoc drug team, a project coordinated by ‘the striker’. 
 
The Striker 
A ‘striker’ is the person who bridges the gap between the baron and the courier in 
the drug smuggling business. The word ‘striker’ is not only limited to the drug 
business alone in Nigeria, but also to a range of other criminal groups (Ellis, 2009). 
The work of a striker is to organise all the necessary logistics required for the 
smuggling of the drugs to the consuming countries. A striker is usually an 
experienced former courier, who has worked drugs in various routes and markets. 
 
Ellis (2009) suggests that the Nigerian drug trafficking striker usually performs the 
following roles in the criminal network: 
 
- To consult for many barons as self-employed on a fee basis;  
- To provide adequate training for the couriers on the routes, the schemes, 
and typology studies analysis;  
- To coordinate the travelling logistics of the courier including the perfection 





- To ensure that nothing goes wrong between him, the courier, and the baron. 
In doing this, he takes couriers to spiritualists to swear deadly oaths, and; 
- To apply adequate knowledge of the drug business ranging from the 
methodology of drug concealment and packaging of drugs. 
 
Drug Couriers 
The couriers recruited by strikers, usually carry smaller quantities of drugs in their 
luggage, or in some cases ingest the drugs after they are properly packed in 
condoms. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency in Nigeria (2007) 
postulated that no less than 69 percent of the couriers that were arrested between 
January 2006 and 5 March 2007, were so-called ‘swallowers’, who had ingested 
condoms filled with hard drugs (Ellis, 2009), and only 31 percent had packed them 
in their luggage. 
 
Figure 3.3: Airlines Used by Couriers Arrested at Murtala Mohammed 
International Airport, Lagos, Nigeria, 2009 
                   
Source: NDELEA 2009 Annual Report 
 
The NDLEA Annual Report (2009), classified Nigerian couriers into four major 
categories, which include:  
 
- Home-based Couriers: These couriers are largely resident in Nigeria and 
rarely travel to the source countries. They rely mostly on the dealers based 
in the source countries for their supply. They lack either the connections or 





- West African Couriers: These couriers traffic drugs within the West African 
sub-region. They constitute themselves into small networks interlinked with 
the main networks that source for the drugs. They are mostly involved in 
cannabis trafficking and occasionally in psychotropic substances. 
- Source Countries Couriers/Dealers: These are largely connected to local 
networks in the source countries and procure drugs for other couriers either 
based in West Africa or at the relay points.  
- Overseas-based Couriers: These couriers are mainly based in the host 
countries. They are connected to the local drug distribution chains in 
Europe and America. They have extensive insights into the local drug 
trafficking operators. They are also involved in the illegal transfer of funds 
to Nigeria. 
 
Figure 3.3 indicates that KLM Airline was the most frequently used airline by the 
couriers arrested in 2009 by the Nigerian drug-police, with the highest frequency 
of 36.91 percent. This further explained the development of the new illicit drug 
market in Western Europe. KLM flights are one of the most popular airline in the 
Western Europe, high frequency usage of the air company by the Nigerian couriers 
explained the contemporary development of illicit drug market in Western Europe 
(NDLEA, 2009). 
 
Figure 3.4: Destination of Drug Couriers arrested at Murtala Mohammed 
International Airport, Lagos – Nigeria for 2009 
 
Source: NDELEA 2009 Annual Report 
 
The above figure indicates that the destinations of couriers were mostly Germany, 





highest arrest of 43 couriers with frequency of 28.48 percent stand for the couriers 
arrested in Nigeria upon their arrival from the source countries where narcotic drugs 
were produced and cultivated. 
 
Western Europe became more lucrative for the global illicit trading of cocaine from 
the South to the North as a result of the effective law-enforcement effort in curbing 
this threat in the US. Figure 3.4 revealed that the Nigerian drug police arrested 23 
couriers whose country of destination was Germany, 21 to Italy, 15 to the 
Netherlands, and only 2 couriers were arrested with links to US destinations in 
2009. That same year the US government deported 62 Nigerians for drug related 
offences from the United States, Germany deported 2, Italy deported 9 and none 
were deported from the Netherlands. 
 
Table 3.3: Countries of Deportation of Drug Courier in Nigeria, 2009 








1. USA 62 10. UK 2 
2. Italy 9 11. Australia 1 
3. France 9 12. Belgium 1 
4. Spain 5 13. Canada 1 
5. Afghanistan 3 14. Cape Verde 1 
6. Brazil 2 15. China 1 
7. Germany 2 16. Gabon 1 
8. Thailand 2 17. Liberia 1 
9. Trinidad & 
Tobago 
2 18. Pakistan 1 
Source: NDLEA 2009 Annual Report 
 
In 2009, the major perpetrators of illicit drug trafficking from the South to the North, 
in Nigeria, were male. Males accounted for 83.18 percent against their female 








3.3.3 Scheme of Drug Trafficking Business in Nigeria 
The criminal business model of a typical drug trafficking network in Nigeria can be 
explained with the roles played by the offenders located in the three major 
countries of concern. The countries of concern include the source country, where 
the narcotics drugs are cultivated, the transit country and the consuming country.  
 
The source countries for cocaine are Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru and 
Bolivia from the South American region. Heroin is smuggled to Nigeria from Asia, 
mainly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Thailand and Myanmar (Inter-Governmental 
Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), 2010:17). 
 
The major actors of the illicit drug syndicate at the source country are mainly 
famers who frequently cultivate the illegal narcotics, and the drug dealers located 
in these countries of cultivation. For instance, estimated production of opium by 
Asian farmers increased from 4,700 tons in 2010 to 7,000 tons in 2011 as a result 
of high demand of this illicit good on the illicit market (the supply and consuming 
market) (UNODC, 2012:26). 
 
Nigeria is the transit country where the drug is trafficked from, to other major 
markets located in European states (UNODC, 2010). 
The narcotics ‘merchant’ from the source countries also referred to as the 
procurement syndicate, are usually trusted by the local drug baron in Nigeria 
(GIABA, 2010:17), Merchants from South America often procure and smuggle 
large quantities of drugs from the farmers, which are then shipped to their West 
African networks including Nigeria (Paul, Schaefer & Clarke, 2011) 
 
These drugs are always concealed in imported goods such as building materials 
and other goods items from the source countries. In 2011, the Nigeria drug police 
intercepted and seized 167kg worth of cocaine in a Lagos seaport. This drug was 
concealed in the 150 square parcels packed inside 38 cartons of floor tiles, which 










Figure 3.5: Illicit Supply and Demand markets of Narcotic Drugs  
                  
Source: Author’s own source 
 
However, in the case of heroin, large quantities are smuggled by air to Nigeria, 
using human carry, luggage, and cargo (GIABA, 2010:17). In 2012 the ‘‘sniffer 
dogs of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency recorded their first major 
seizure of narcotics this year. Anti-narcotic agents had placed the consignment on 
surveillance following the alert signal of the sniffer dogs. The operation led to the 
ultimate abandonment of 16 kilogrammes of high grade heroin by a suspected 
drug syndicate at the National Aviation Handling Company (NAHCO) shed at the 
Murtala Mohammed International Airport (MMIA) Lagos’’ (NDLEA, 2012).  
 
It is very likely that criminal networks avoid direct shipment or the air cargo of 
narcotic drugs from the source countries to the consuming markets in the 
European States because stringent border control exists. The major motivational 
factors for the movement of drugs through West Africa to Europe might be as a 
result of weaknesses, such as the lack of manpower, technological and other 
resources coupled with the porosity of borders in the West African region and 
Nigeria in particular (Wyler and Cook, 2011; NDLEA, 2009: 19). The country is 
then preferred as a transit country and the hub for drug trafficking from the region 
to European States (Ellis, 2009). 
 
Following any successful large shipment and clearance of bulk narcotics drug from 
the country of cultivation in the Nigerian seaports or the Airports, the drug dealer 





drugs are mostly concealed in warehouses or inside wardrobes by the Nigeria 
drug baron (GIABA, 2010: 20).    
The baron then engages the service of an experienced ‘striker’, who is the 
middleman who usually puts in place all the required logistics for the transportation 
of the drugs from the transit country (Nigeria) to the consuming country in Europe. 
The striker always disguises the identity of the drug baron to the other actors of 
the network in Nigeria, and organises the recruitment of the couriers as well as 
arranges the travel documents for the couriers.  
 
The striker’s favourite recruits are international students, holidaymakers, Nigerians 
with EU nationality or other nationalities from developed countries. The recruits of 
strikers mostly do not know where the striker conceals the drug. The scheme of 
the striker is characterised by trickery and persuasion. In addition, the striker 
always assures the courier that they will not be caught. The most distinctive trick 
of the striker is to ensure that many couriers board the same flight, so that if one 
of them is caught at the Airport others can go freely undetected (UNODC, 2005), 
as the attention of the law-enforcement officers are directed on the arrested courier.  
 
The most important actors in the transit country (Nigeria) are the drug couriers. 
They are very important to the network because without them the illicit 
commodities cannot be smuggled to the final market where the consumers are 
located. They are frequently arrested at airports while carrying the drugs in their 
body, through ingestion, and their luggage for onward distribution at the 
consuming countries located in Europe.  The couriers that carry drugs in within 
their digestive system are referred to as ‘‘swallowers’’ by the Nigerian drugs police. 
Chepesiut (1999: 159) posits that the Nigerian ‘‘swallowers put the drugs in 
condoms, which are often wrapped in carbon paper or black electric tape, making 
it difficult to spot the drugs in an x-ray machine because the carbon looks like any 
other body part’’.  Subsequently, the courier offenders from Nigeria will then deliver 
the illicit goods to the overseas distributors who sell them at the demand market 
located in Europe.       
 
 3.4   Nigerian ‘419’ Advance Fee Fraud Transnational Crime  
This section will explore the Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud transnational crime. It 





in the Nigeria AFF criminal network. Having considered that, it will enumerate the 
contemporary problems of the Nigeria AFF transnational crime. 
 
The ‘419’ designation refers to a section of the Nigerian Criminal Code that 
criminalised the act of obtaining something under false pretence (Law of the 
Federation, 1999). The Nigerian community usually refers to the perpetrators of 
this crime as ‘419’.  Blommaert and Omoniyi (2006: 574) posit that ‘‘the general 
pattern of the direction of 419 emails is a South to North run: the message is 
oriented towards a particular kind of subject in affluent societies: someone greedy 
enough to give in to the temptation of earning millions with an email reply’’. 
However, the largest Nigerian AFF crime on record was a South on South run of 
US$242 million from a bank named Banco Noroeste in Sao Paolo, (Brazil 
Blommaert and Omoniyi, 2006: 574). 
 
According to Tanfa, (2006:10) ‘Advance Fee Fraud is defined as an upfront 
payment, by a victim to a fraudster, to allow him to take part in a much larger 
financial transaction, which he believes will either bring him profit or will result in 
credit being extended to him’’. In this case, the victim is asked to pay an advance 
fee of some sort as ‘‘transfer tax’’, ‘‘performance bond’’ or ‘‘money to buy 
chemicals’’, ‘‘processing fee’’, bribe, or other cost. (Zook, 2007: 66; Tanfa, 2006). 
If the victim pays the advance fee, there often arise many ‘‘complications’’, which 
require even more advance payments, until the victim either quits or runs out of 
funds (The 419 coalition, 2003 cited in Tanfa, 2003).   
 
Abati, (2002:4) postulates that the offenders of AFF belong to an underground 
network that is characterised by the corruptive influence of both private (bank 
officials) and public officials (the police). AFF offenders are well organised and 
they operate as a network, both nationally and internationally, the national 
networks operate with government officials, law enforcement agents and 
businessmen (Tanfa, 2006: 111). In the search for profitable criminal ventures, 
many AFF perpetrators diversify their activities by combining AFF with drugs 
importation and distribution, acceptance of counterfeit currency, prostitution and 
use of illegal immigrants as drug couriers (National Criminal Intelligence Service, 
UK, 2003 cited in Tanfa, 2006:110).  
Bergiel, Bergiel, and Balsmeier (2008:135) suggested that AFF in Nigeria became 
noticeable in the mid-1980s when there was a sudden fall in the global oil price, 





to survive. Thereafter, the Nigerian government agreed with the devaluation policy 
of the Naira, the local currency, suggested by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which facilitated the internationalisation of crime (Simon, 2009). Prior to the 
devaluation, the Naira had a stronger value than the US dollar and most fraudsters 
were committing the crime mainly in Nigeria.  
 
Consequently, Nigerian fraudsters became international since a few US dollars, 
Pounds Sterling and Euros could be exchanged for a large number of naira. This 
was attributed as the beginning of large-scale dealings in AFF in the country. The 
famous anti-corruption top ranking officer in Nigeria, Nuhu Ribadu also said that 
AFF started during the Second Republic of 1979-83 (Smith, 2007, cited in Ellis, 
2009).  
 
Internet use today has made it easy to defraud millions of potential victims globally 
with AFF unsolicited emails (Bergiel, Bergiel, and Balsmeier 2008). The 
combination of the very low distribution costs of scam letters, to access an 
enormous audience globally is one of the major reasons for the success of the 
crime in recent times (Leyden, 2003). This has lowered barriers between places 
and allowed offenders to easily send text, voice, and video messages around the 
globe (Zook, 2007). 
 
The phenomenon of the crime in recent times has assumed new criminal 
dimensions with thousands of young people operating from cyber-cafés in Nigeria 
(Abubakar, 2009). The flamboyant display of wealth by AFF perpetrators has also 
resulted in the encouragement of this crime among the young, poor and 
unemployed youth who are extremely desperate to share in this illicit wealth (Atta-
Asamoah, 2009). 
 
3.4.1    Contemporary Problem of ‘419’ Advance Fee Fraud 
Even though AFF constitutes a major threat from the South to the North, there 
appears to be less empirical studies on the operation of Nigerian AFF offenders. 
However, the Netherlands based financial investigation company, Ultrascan 
Advance Global Investigations, suggests the following contemporary problems of 






The AFF offenders account for the largest number of transnational organised 
crime groups in the world. The annual growth of the offenders is a 5% increase 
per year with over 300,000 individual offenders in the globalisation of crime 
(Ultrascan, 2009). 
 
AFF operators are moving their operations from the global North to the global 
South. For instance, in India, China, Vietnam and South Korea, victims are falling 
to similar fraud schemes experienced by their counterparts in the UK, Europe and 
Americas during the last decades. Many Indians are victims of Internet low-end 
job and student visa frauds. Chinese are victims of the AFF lottery fraud (ibid, 
2009:13).  
 
AFF ‘businesses’ became a global enterprise for the recruitment of the money 
mule over the Internet. A money mule is someone who allows his or her personal 
account to be used for the transfer of illegal funds for a small commission. Money 
mules recruited over the Internet funnelled back the income from crime to the AFF 
offender through money transfer agents (Addis, 2009). The recruitment of money 
mules usually come as designation of someone to serve as company’s agent or a 
freelance job agent, whose duty it is to collect payment on-behalf of the companies 
and then send the payment back via alternative remittance system of payment to 
the principal company (Ultrascan, 2009).  In recent times, the recruited AFF money 
mules’ networks also facilitate the collection and transfer of proceeds of other 
organised crime from the global North to the global South.  
 
The vulnerability of the money transfer agents, the proceeds of AFF offenders are 
re-directed through the vulnerable sector of alternative remittance system of 
payment to avoid detection, arrest, prosecution and conviction. For instance in 
October 10, 2009, MoneyGram was fined the sum of USD$18 million by Federal 
Trade Commission of the US (FTC) for the abuse of its transfer licence for the 
vulnerability to launder the proceeds of AFF offenders in a fraudulent 
telemarketers to deceive U.S. consumers out of tens of millions of dollars (FTC, 
2009). 
 
In addition, a contemporary increase of fraudulent web sites is a major problem 
posed by the operations of the AFF offender. In 2007, an average of 1,500 fake 
company websites was registered per week, making the total number of fake 





times a minimum of 15,000 fake company websites were registered weekly the 
AFF offenders in 2009 (Ultrascan, 2009: 15).  
 
3.4.2   The Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud Transnational Crime Actors 
According to Ultrascan (2010), AFF perpetrators have the highest number of illicit 
organised actors, with over 300,000 globally with an annual growth rate of 5 
percent and a significant number of money transfer agencies abroad are operated 
by AFF criminal organisation.  
 
The recent research of Atta-Asamoah (2009), “Understanding the West African 
cybercrime process” further categorised Nigerian AFF into two principal 
generations; the first- and second generations.  
 
First-generation offenders believe they are involved in the trade of ‘greed’ 
(Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006; Atta-Asamoah, 2009). The ability of the victims to 
accept the proposal of the criminal networks is the fundamental principle towards 
the success of the first-generation offenders. Thus making the victims’ ‘will’ the 
normative, with the internet as a ‘marketplace’ for selling and buying of this greed. 
This generation does not require having adequate knowledge of the use of 
computers and the internet, with only an email account required to harvest millions 
of victims email address online and thereafter the sending to his/her victims of 
numerous unsolicited spam massages (Raz, 2009). Nonetheless, the first-
generation offender is characterised by obtaining by false pretence (Law of the 
Federation, 1999).  
 
Tanfa (2006: 110-111) suggests the following as the main player of the criminal 
network in the first generation Nigeria AFF group: a ‘‘qualifier’’ also known as a 
‘‘dialer’’, a ‘‘fronter’’, a ‘‘reloader’’, a ‘‘closer’’, a ‘‘no saler’’, and a ‘‘takeover’’. 
A ‘‘qualifier’’ is the member of the network, who identifies victims on the lead lists. 
The ‘‘qualifier’’ provides the network with the information of victims who have lost 
substantial amounts of money or the targets who have the potential to fall victim 
to the scam. In doing this, the ‘‘qualifier’’ also makes exploratory contacts. A 
‘‘fronter’’ makes the initial sale, by attempting to build a relationship with the target, 
ranging from friendship and business to social relationships. This is usually the 
profiling offender. The, ‘‘fronter’’ then passes the victim’s profile to a ‘‘reloader’’ 





perpetrator who usually completes the fraud. The next actor is the ‘‘no saler’’, who 
is the network member that usually solicits targets that respond to the unsolicited 
mail with a ‘‘no’’ response. The final actor of the network is called the ‘‘takeover’’ 
who is the person who steps in if the deal becomes suspicious to the target. Often, 
the ‘‘takeover’’ redeems the deal by introducing a more superior trick in order to 
get the victim back on track (Tanfa, 2006: 111). 
 
The second-generation offenders apply the use of information technology skills to 
perpetrate the crime, rather than sending emails to a target from a scammer’s 
inbox, as the case maybe in the first-generation. This offender uses online 
schemes known as phishing. This means obtaining something of value from a 
person by deception through the use of fictitious websites, which results in the 
identity theft of the targets without their knowledge (Atta-Asamoah, 2009: 109; 
Addis, 2009). The use of information technology by second-generation AFF 
offenders, has limited role actors. In this case only two offenders complete the illicit 
task of the AFF scheme. The main AFF actor of this scheme is the phisher, and 
the money mule in the country where the victim is located is the secondary 
offender. The offenders’ crime facilitators are the webpage designers and the 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) (Addis, 2009). 
 
Figure 3.6: Numbers of Active Scam Organisations of Nigeria AFF in the 
most Affected 10 European States in 2005-2009 
                             







The AFF transnational network is designed in such a way that the victims are 
located in one country, the actors are located in another, and the proceeds of the 
crime are collected in a different country (Zook, 2007; Ultrascan 2010). This makes 
investigation and prosecution of the crime difficult for law-enforcement agencies. 
The ‘419’ advance free fraud schemes always involves at least two or more 
countries (Ulrascan, 2006). The chapter 6 of this thesis also elaborate on the 
perspective of organised crime financial flows in Nigeria. 
 
Despite the fact that the Nigerian AFF scam constitutes major threats from the 
South to North (UNODC, 2010), there appears to be no centralized database of 
‘419’ spam activities for the control of this menace. The only comprehensive data 
source is that from the Netherlands based fraud investigation company known as 
‘Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations’ (Ultrascan AGI, 2010). The Ultrascan 
database provides a listing by country of active organisations of ‘419’ scams. From 
this data, this study, selected the top 10 active Nigerian ‘419’ AFF scam rings in 
the European States, including the UK. 
 
Figure 3.7: Individual Resident Actors of Nigeria AFF in the 10 most 
Affected European Sates in 2005-2009 
                  





Spain had the highest number, with 72 Nigerian ‘419’ AFF resident scams 
organisations within the period of 2009, followed by United Kingdom with the total 
number of 62 scams organisations, with percentage growth of 45.8 and 29 of 
newly detected scam organisations from 2008 and 2009 respectively. Belgium and 
Switzerland host the least resident scams organisation between 2005 and 2009 in 
the selected data of the distribution of top 10 transnational active scam 
organisations of Nigeria AFF across the European States between 2005-2009. 
 
With regards to the individual actors involved in the Nigerian ‘419’ AFF scams, 
Figure 3.7 illustrates that the UK has the highest active members of 1,511 and a 
52.5 percentage growth of newly detected members in 2009. This is followed by 
Spain with 1,456 active members in 2009 and a percentage growth of 16.4 percent 
of newly detected members in that year. Portugal had the least resident actors of 
63 members with percentage growth of 26.9 percent of newly detected members 
in 2009, followed by Switzerland with 151 members, and a percentage growth of 
46.3 percent. 
 
As a result of the lack of documentation, it is not entirely clear what the growth of 
‘419’ activities are in Nigeria. Ultrascan identified Nigeria as a centre of AFF 
activities, but it is not included in the data because ‘in Nigeria there are too many 
419 rings and 419ers to enumerate and qualify losses to victims worldwide’ 
(Ultrascan, 2010). 
 
3.4.3   The Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud Scheme 
There are two separate schemes used by Nigerian AFF offenders in the 
perpetration of this transnational crime. The scheme of the ‘first-generation’ is 
different from that of ‘second-generation’. The first-generation focus mainly on 
assuming a genuine and authentic tone in order to convince their targets in the 
‘internet-market’ place where ‘greed’ is being transacted (Atta-Asamoah, 200: 
109), with the second-generation offenders employing the use of information 
technology skills, which reduces the number of specialised actors by ensuring 









The ‘First-generation’ AFF Criminal Business Model  
Atta-Asamoah (2009: 108-112) posits that a typical AFF first generation internet 
fraud scheme involved three stages. The first stage is the scouting and harvesting, 
the second stage is relationship building and the third stage is operational stage. 
 
The first stage of the AFF scheme involves the scouting for the e-mails of the 
targets. According to Oyesanya (2004:5), this can be done manually or by 
automation with the use of email extractor software to create a list of email 
addresses of the targets. Additionally, the perpetrators also buy bulk e-mail 
addresses from internet based e-mail address resellers (Tanfa, 2006: 125). After 
the scouting and harvesting of target e-mails, the offender then makes the first 







Many recipients of the unsolicited e-mail usually treat the email as junk and do not 
normally respond to them. 1-2 percent of the unsolicited e-mail by the AFF 
offender, however, receives the attention of targets (Bergiel, Bergiel, and 
Balsmeier, 2008: 135; Atta-Asamoah, 2009: 111; Dyrud, 2005). This means that if 
the offender sends ten thousand (10,000) unsolicited emails to the targets, about 
100-200 targets will respond to the call of the AFF offender. 
No AFF criminal network will be successful, without the collaboration of a victim 
(Tanfa, 2006: 126). If the target complies by replying to the unsolicited e-mail of 
the AFF perpetrator, then that takes the offender to the second stage of the 
scheme. This stage involves the building of a relationship and the profiling of the 
target by the offender. This is the most sensitive stage of the scheme, since any 
suspicion of the offender by the target may disconnect the completion of the 
criminal business cycle. This therefore requires an experienced member of the 
network to perform the role in this stage. 
 
A positive response describes the response of a target who perceives the 
unsolicited e-mail as an opportunity for a financial fortune and a non-juicy 
response is discarded in stage 2. 
 
The operational stage is the final phase of first generation Nigeria AFF offenders, 
during which the offender proposes an idea involving a transfer of fees or goods 
(Atta-Asamoah, 2009: 112). The AFF offender proposes a new idea if the target is 
not interested in the initial one that was presented. If, however, the target indicates 
interest, an experienced AFF perpetrator maintains dialogue cautiously at this 
stage and may even provide documents to validate the fraud (Oyesanya, 2002: 8). 
These documents are either forged Nigerian institutional forms or actual 
documents obtained through corruption, from compromised officials of authentic 
Nigerian government institutions (Tanfa, 2008:127).  
 
If the target is convinced by the documents’ verification, the offender quickly 
proceeds to ask for the transfer of an advance fee to be paid as a bribe, bank 
commission, legal fee, etc. to facilitate the transfer of the imaginary fortune from 
Nigeria to the target location. If the target transfers the required fees, the offender 
will double-check the profile of the target to ascertain whether the victim has 
capability and willingness to pay more (Profile 2, figure 3.8).  
If the result of the profiling is no, then the victim is discarded and the 





positive, the target may then be required to forward personal information such as 
bank accounts, passport copies via email or through international mail carriers etc. 
(Tanfa, 2006). This is a new scheme for obtaining an additional transfer fee from 
the target. 
 
Generally, the operational stage usually discontinued whenever the victim is either 
unable to transfer additional funds or becomes suspicious of the financial loss. The 
AFF offender may also sell the e-mail address of the target to a more superior AFF 
group in a new scheme, which is directed at trying to recover the defrauded funds 
of the victim. This is an advance extension of the Nigeria AFF first generation 
criminal network scheme (Tanfa, 2006:128). 
 
The ‘Second-generation’ AFF Criminal Business Model 
The main scheme of the Nigerian second generation AFF offender is called 
phishing. Phishing is obtaining something of value from a person by deception 
(Addis, 2009:31). He also suggests that it is usually aimed at the financial 
institutions and payment service companies that operate online banking.  
 
The typical life cycle of the phishing schemes of Nigerian second-generation 
transnational offenders consist of eight major stages (Figure 3.9): a list of 
harvested email addresses, a phishing template e-mail letter, a bulk e-mailing 
service, a fictitious website also referred to as the scam-page, a website-hosting 
service, the acquisition of bank customers’ identity, the transfer of money from 
































Source: Author’s own source 
 
The first stage of the second-generation AFF scam process involves searching for 
a pool of e-mail addresses. Some of the sources of targets e-mail addresses 
included the following (Atta-Asamoah, 2009: 109-110): 
 
- Domain contact points, this usually has three contact points, the 
administration, billing and technical contact points. These contact points 
include a contacts points registry that contains the addresses of the contact 
persons from where AFF offenders usually harvest the email addresses of 
targets 
- Online chat rooms, AFF offenders usually join these numerous dating sites 





- Circulation of hoax mails, which are messages forwarded to the reader 
requesting them to forward the message to as many people as possible 
and to copy the worded mail to a given e-mail address  
- Profile and e-mail addresses posted on webpage 
- White and yellow pages on the internet. 
 
Text Box 3.2: AFF offender’s phishing letter  
From: "ebusinessgroup@a-zbank.com" <ebusinessgroup@a-zbank.com> 
To: emmysotande@yahoo.com 
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2012 3:30 PM 
Subject: Internet Banking : Customer Update 
A-Z Bank 
 
We are writing to let you know that so many incorrect password has been entered in your 
Internet banking account, so we will like you to login to your account to confirm your 
identity. 
 
You now need to verify your identity following the link below: 
Log In To Verify Your Customer Identity 
 
 





     A-Z Bank apologizes for all inconviences arising from this Notice.  
     Thank you for using A-Z Bankk ! 
    Copyright© 2011 – A-Z Bank. All rights reserved.  
 
  Information on protecting yourself from fraud, please review the Security Tips in our 
Security Center. 
Source: emmysotande@yahoo.com (junk mail, 26 January 2012)  
 
After a substantial number of e-mail addresses of potential targets have been 
successfully harvested by the AFF offender, there is then the creation of a fictitious 
scam page, which requires the services of a web-designer. A web-designer is an 








Figure 3.10: Fictitious Online Form on a Scam Webpage 
  A-Z Bank  






This site ensures that all information sent to us via the World Wide Web are encrypted.  
 You can confirm the information provided by our certificate issuer by clicking on the padlock icon on your 
 address bar. 






















This involves the re-designing of a copy of an already existing bank’s website page, 
mostly the online banking webpage, in order to fraudulently receive the bank 
 Confirm Your Banking Records  
  





 Transaction Password* 
 
 
 Confirm Transaction Password* 
 
 
 E-Mail*  
 
 
 E-Mail Password*  
 
 
 Mobile Number*  
 
 
                                                      
 










customer’s details in the offender’s computer backend (Addis, 2009: 33). Most 
offenders tend to falsify popular banks so that they can have sufficient targets from 
their harvested e-mail lists.  
 
The AFF offender then scouts for a very convincing bank letter to be distributed to 
the bank’s customers. The content of the letter always requests that the bank’s 
customer to provide information about their online banking or makes a request for 
them to upgrade their online banking services. They may also instruct the 
customer to change his password, claiming that an unauthorised fraudster is 
attempting to login to the customer’s account with several attempts. Thereafter, 
the letter will conclude by asking the customer to click the web link so that 
customer’ details can verified.  
 
When a scam letter is ready a fictitious webpage (scam page) is designed (Figure 
3.10). The offender then seeks the services of the Internet service provider (ISP) 
for the hosting of the phishing site. This is the most sensitive stage of all, as any 
mistake in the turnaround time can result in suspicion from the bank, the legitimate 
owner of the site (Moore and Clayton, 2008).   
 
In order to facilitate the turnaround time, the AFF offender then engages in the use 
of bulk e-mail software. This is to speed-up the dissemination process of the so-
called online profile verification request. Thereafter, asking the unlucky bank 
customers within the pool of the harvested email list to verify their account 
information or to change their online password. The offender hides under the 
pretence that an unauthorised intruder has frequently tried to gain access to their 
online account. 
 
3.5   Conclusion 
The relationship between the colonial masters (from the Global North in European 
states or the United Kingdom) with their colonised states in the West African region 
has a direct correlation with modern international trade patterns with West African 
countries. A unique relationship also occurs in the interactions of organised crime 
actors from the Global North to the Global South. The historical background of 
organised crime in Nigeria is traced to the abolition of the slave trade along the 
West African Atlantic coast in 1870.  Therefore, the oldest organised crime in the 





in this chapter how the slave trade continued in the West African coastal regions 
through smuggling due to the greed of African slave suppliers in the region and 
their counterpart offenders in Europe, who strived to meet the high demand for 
slaves in Europe and the United States after the abolition of the slave trade. In this 
context, the chapter evaluates the phenomenon of three major organised crimes 
in Nigeria, which are: human trafficking; drug trafficking and advance fee fraud. 
The contemporary trends and patterns of these crimes revealed the roles and 
schemes of the actors in the globalisation of crime.  
 
In human trafficking, low socio-economic status victims from Nigeria are trafficked 
to Europe by road, sea and air with high profit and low risk to the organised crime 
actors in the Global South. The scheme of trafficking in persons in Nigeria is 
illustrated with criminal activities that exist in the supply end at the country of origin. 
The schemes of the middlemen actors and trafficking facilitators were also 
exposed in this chapter. Additionally, at the demand end in Europe, the Madam, 
the ring leader in the destination country, capitalises on debt bondage to maximise 
the proceeds of crime originated from the Global North. In the same vein, in drug 
trafficking, the phenomenon of source country, transit country and consuming 
country was adopted to illustrate how drug markets operate in the ‘dark-side’ of 
globalisation. Furthermore, the recent trends in advance fee fraud suggested that 
the older generation of offenders adopted more defined organisational structures 
and roles than those of the newer generation of offenders. Whilst the old 
generation offenders profiting from trade in ‘greed’ originated from their victims in 
Europe and United States, the new generation of offenders have used information 
technology to manipulate identifiable information from their victims with the aim of 
profiting from identity theft when collaborating with loose networks of offenders 
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The Regime against Money Laundering 
This chapter will look into definitions and context of money laundering (ML). These 
definitions will be categorised into both institutional and scholarly definitions of the 
term money laundering. It will also appraise the magnitude of the global problem 
of illicit financial flows. Following on from this, this chapter will evaluate the variety 
of global initiatives that exist to curb the problem of money laundering. These 
initiatives are demonstrated by the Regional and National governments in their 
anti-money laundering (AML) regime strategies and programs. It will finally 
evaluate the roles of the global and regional standard setters in combating money 
laundering. This evaluation will include the mandates of specialised supranational 
institutions collaborating with the global and regional standards setters in the fight 
against money laundering from the global South to the global North.    
 
4.1   Money Laundering Definitions and Context 
It has been suggested that the term ‘money laundering’ originated from Al Capone 
in Chicago and practices of the New York Mafia in the 1920s (John-Lea, 2005). 
John Lea (2005) postulates that the scam set up of a Chinese laundering scheme, 
passed the disguised illicit profits of criminal activities to the organised criminal 
groups by shielding the crime away from the profits. 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed extensively the various types of transnational 
organised crimes (TOC) that are underlying offences to money laundering and 
also indicates their estimated market values. Money laundering is a “derivative 
offence”, which is linked with other forms of criminal conduct (Podgor, 2006), 
especially the illicit transactions and financial flows of organised crime groups.  
The conceptualisation of the term money laundering is complex and esoteric. This 
is because the offence of money laundering is considered a secondary crime. For 
instance, before money laundering would occur, there must be a primarily serious 
“uncommon” crime committed by the offender/s. Typical examples of underlying 
offences giving rise to money laundering include drug trafficking and human 
trafficking. This is also referred to as “predicate offences” to money laundering 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). These kinds of offenses are not categorised 
as a common crime and they are labeled as “uncommon” and/or “non-





context of money laundering refers to the “process by which any types of illegal 
proceeds are disguised to conceal their illicit origins” (Schott, 2006 cited in Rocha, 
2011). 
 
4.1.1   What is Money Laundering? 
This section will look at the various definitions of the term money laundering and 
it will further categorise its definitions within the Institutional and Social Science 
context. Following on from this, there will be a scholarly critique of the concept of 
money laundering in Chapter 5.  
 
Institutional Definition of Money Laundering 
The first institutional definition of money laundering originated from the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, the Vienna Convention (1988). It defines money laundering as:  
“…the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from any [drug trafficking] offense or offenses or from an act of participation in 
such offense or offenses, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission 
of such an offense or offenses to evade the legal consequences of his actions; 
The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from an offense or offenses or from an act of participation in 
such an offense or offenses, and;  The acquisition, possession or use of property, 
knowing at the time of receipt that such property was derived from an offense or 
offenses or from an act of participation in such offense or offenses” (Schott, 2006: 
I-2&3).  
 
 The Vienna Convention limits the predicate offences of money laundering to drug 
trafficking alone, therefore, other serious offences such as: Trafficking in human 
beings and migrant smuggling; Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation 
of children; Illicit arms trafficking; Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; 
Corruption and bribery; Fraud; Terrorism, including terrorist financing and other 
serious crimes that are not drug trafficking are not covered under this convention 
(Schott, 2006). The shortfall of this convention is exposed through the 
displacement in the investigation, prosecution, seizure and confiscation of the illicit 





trafficking within that period.  Thus, the organised criminal groups move their 
criminal activities to other serious crimes where proceeds were not regulated and 
criminalised with this convention as a money laundering offence. This affects the 
global criminal justice system and the quest to follow the money trail of other 
related serious transnational crime committed by the offenders during this era.  
 
In 1990, Article 1(c) of the Council of Europe Convention gave a clearer and 
detailed definition of money laundering as: 
“…the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such 
activity; the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of 
participation in such activity; participation in, association to commit, attempts to 
commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the  commission of any of 
the actions mentioned in the foregoing indents.” 
Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of the above-mentioned 
activities may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. It also posits that 
money laundering “shall be regarded as such even where the activities which 
generated the property to be laundered were carried out in the territory of another 
member state or in that of a third country.” 
 
Another definition by international institutions is that of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that 
defined money laundering as “the process by which a person conceals or 
disguises the identity or the origin of illegally obtained proceeds so that they 
appear to have originated from legitimate sources”. Furthermore, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) defines money laundering as “the goal of a large 
number of criminal acts is to generate profit for the individual or group that carries 
out the act. Money laundering is the processing of these criminal proceeds to 
disguise their illegal origin” (Carvalho, 2011). 
 
In enjoying the “fruit” of crime, the criminals need to hide and disguise the true 
origin and ownership of the proceeds of their criminal involvements. The purpose 
for doing this is to avoid prosecution, conviction and confiscation of their ill-gotten 
wealth.This definition explores the act and the goal of the commission of a crime, 





of one offender. It involves communication and role-playing of numerous offenders. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis explained in detail the characteristics, roles and acts of 
organised criminal groups in the globalisation of crime.  
 
Consequently, the role players may include that of: a banker, who circumvents all 
rules and standards of compliance requirements of anti-money laundering regime 
applicable to the banking institution by circumventing the reporting of money 
laundering transactions and suspicious activities of the offenders to the competent 
authorities; an accountant or a lawyer who plays the role of gate-keepers, by using 
their firms as a front and vehicle for conveying the proceeds of crime and to shield 
away the offender from the crime, while acting for their clients, and; the lawyer 
may play an additional role of a real estate agent by transforming the profits of 
crime into investments in landed properties and other valuables assets. This role 
playing prevents the suspicions of the competent authorities being aroused 
sufficiently enough to give rise to an investigation of organised criminal groups and 
their associates. 
 
This explains the criminal acts of role playing in a typical money laundering 
scheme, whilst the objective is to maximise the ‘fruit’ of the crime among the 
network of players.  
 
Social Sciences Definitions of Money Laundering 
One of the social sciences definitions of the term money laundering describe it as 
profits generated from “unlawful” and “lawful” activities, which include: corruption, 
drug trafficking, extortion, fraud, terrorism, vice and tax evasion, violation of 
exchange controls on lawful commence (Levi, 1996:3).  
The aim of these activities is the conversion of criminal proceeds to a form that 
allows the offender unencumbered spending and investment of the ill-gotten funds 
(Levi & Rueter, 2006:290). In Jack, Levi, Naylor, and Williams (2007), money 
laundering shields the evidence of perpetrator of the offence and prevents 
suspicion of the investigation action and/or activities of the law enforcement 
agencies on the offender. In the words of Chong and López-de-Silanes, “the forms 
may vary, but illegal activities that act as feeders to money laundering have always 






Graycar and Grabosky (1996) presents the term money laundering’ as the 
“process by which the proceeds of crime (‘dirty money’) are put through a series 
of transactions which disguise their illicit origins, and make them appear to have 
come from a legitimate source (‘clean money’)”. This definition uses transactions 
and origins to describe the term money laundering. For instance, organised 
criminal groups might consider investing illicit funds into legitimate businesses; this 
will involve engaging in a series of transactions in genuine enterprises, the 
offender might also consider buying a bank as the case was in that of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) (Levi, 1996; Schott, 2006).  
The origins that attract such transactions are those high-risk jurisdictions where 
dirty monies are ‘washed’ and made clean for reintroduction back into the 
legitimate economy. The quest to shield illicit origins away from the profit of crime 
is the justification for transaction dealings between the actors of underworld and 
upper-world in the society where they operate.    
 
According to Masciandaro (2007) “money laundering is an autonomous criminal 
economic activity whose essential function lies in the transformation of liquidity of 
illicit origin, or potential purchasing power, into actual purchasing power usable for 
consumption, saving, investment or reinvestment”. Later, Van Dijk (2008) posits 
that it is the method in which the “successful” organised crime groups reinvest 
excess profits of their criminal activities in the legitimate economy. He further 
argued that the context of money laundering forces a criminal group to engage in 
financial operations that can help to hide the illicit origin of funds. In doing this, 
criminals may avoid the use of financial systems while manipulating their ill-gotten 
financial flows due to the existence of stringent controls and mechanisms to flag 
up illicit transactions of organised criminal group in those banks. On this basis, 
criminals choose to launder the proceeds of crime through an underground 
economy and trust-based banking systems that leave no trace of a money trail or 
their criminal activities (Van Dijk, 2008: 161, emphasis added).  
The overall conclusion of the social sciences definitions is that money laundering 
is the counter measure adopted by the criminal organisations or individual 
offenders to shield away the proceeds of crime, which is the illicit earnings 
generated from both unlawful and lawful activities, from detection and prosecution 
of the competent authorities in the quest to profit from the rewards and ‘fruits’ of 







4.1.2   Money Laundering Stages 
There is no specific way of laundering illicit funds (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2006). Nonetheless, the major concern of any criminal group is how to convert the 
illicit profits generated from criminal activities into legitimate earnings.  The 
methods for the conversion may range from the buying and reselling of real estate, 
or luxury commodities, that would entail passing illicit funds through a complex 
web of both local and international legitimate businesses and “shell” companies 
(FATF, 2012; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).  For instance, traffickers in 
human beings and migrant smugglers need to ensure that cash transactions of 
their illicit activities find their way into financial and non-financial systems.  
 
Regardless of the crime, a complete money laundering transaction is often 
analysed in three stages. The organised criminal groups resort to placement, 
layering, and integrations in the process of converting illicit profits into legitimate 
‘incomes’ (Schneider, 2010; Schott, 2006). 
 
Placement 
In stage one, which is known as placement, illicit profits are placed into the 
legitimate economy with the means of physical infiltration of cash into financial and 
non-financial systems (Schneider, 2010). The launderer inserts the “dirty” money 
into a legitimate financial or designated non-financial institution, in order to 
legitimise the proceeds of illegal activities so that the money is turned into “clean” 
money (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2007; emphasis added). 
This is the riskiest stage of the laundering process as it allows dirty money into the 
financial or designated non-financial institutions. The World Bank also posits that 
placement involves the separation of illicit funds from their illegal sources through 
injection of illegal funds into financial system or carriage of illicit cash proceeds 
across the borders (2009:5).  
It is against this backdrop that the Commonwealth Secretariat (2006) postulates 
that placement is the “physical disposal of cash proceeds derived from illegal 
activities.” The aim of the launderer is to remove ill-gotten cash from the location 
of acquisition so as to avoid detection by the authorities, whom are responsible for 
following the money trails of the organised criminal groups.  
 
In achieving this stage, the offenders may deposit criminal revenues into a 





deposits could be structured in such a way as to avoid reporting thresholds, since 
the offender is aware of the regulatory requirements of the financial and non-
financial institutions to report transactions of a particular threshold, known as 
currency transaction reports (CTRs), to Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). 
For example, in Nigeria, currency regulations do not apply to savings or deposits 
below the threshold of $10,000 or its equivalents in local currency. The offender 
therefore, injects and structures their large cash transactions below the CTRs 
threshold, by splitting the lodgment of cash into multiple transactions of numerous 
deposits below this threshold. These deposits may be banked or saved into 
different banks in different locations and/or different bank accounts with different 
names of account holders.  
This creates gaps for the law-enforcement agencies and Financial Intelligence 
Units when following the suspicious money trails of the offenders during the 
investigation.  
Furthermore, indirect placement outside the financial institutions can also be 
accomplished by buying expensive assets, such as antiques, cars, jewellery and 
other valuable items with illicit cash payments (Schott, 2006; The World Bank, 
2009). These valuables can be resold during an integration process without 
creating suspicion on the proceeds of crime.  
The incomes generated from them will now look as though they are proceeds from 
sales of assets and not proceeds from criminal activities when being taken to the 
financial institutions for lodgments. Additionally, the illicit profits can also be taken 
across the national and international borders without declaring the ill-gotten money 
to the customs authorities during their routine border checks.  
 
Finally, the offender may also achieved placement of illicit funds by establishing a 
cash intensive business, such as fast-food/eat-out shop or supermarket. Setting-
up of such outfit proffer the launderer with an opportunity of a front company that 
serves as a ‘vehicle’ convening the illicit profits and the proceeds of ‘licit’ 
investment into the legitimate economy. This clarifies the reason why “the three 
basic steps may occur as separate and distinct phases. They may also occur 
simultaneously or, more commonly, they may overlap” (Commonwealth 









In stage two, the illicit gains are injected into the financial and non-financial 
institutions by the money laundering offenders and converted into multiple layers 
of complex transactions (Schott, 2006). This further shields away the proceeds of 
crime from their illegal source.  The process separates the profits of crime from 
their source when the offender creates ‘complex layers’ of financial flows to 
disguise the audit trails and provide cover for the offender (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2006:9; Sharman & Chaikin 2009).  
Layering involves sending the money through various financial transactions to 
change its form and make it difficult to follow the money trail. This is the most 
complex stage in any laundering scheme, and it is all about making the original 
dirty money as hard to trace as possible. 
 
At this stage, ‘transaction intensity and transaction speed’ is higher using complex 
electronic transfers payment systems (Schneider, 2010). It was also argued by 
Schneider that inadequate collaboration efforts of the criminal justice systems in 
the global jurisdictions also played a major facilitating role in the layering stage. 
Layering of an offender’s criminal proceeds may consist of (Schott, 2006:I-8): 
several bank-to-bank transfers; the use of several shell companies across the 
globe; conversion and movement of securities or insurance contracts to other 
institutions; wire transfers between different accounts in different names in 
different countries; purchasing of other easily transferable investments 
instruments and selling them through another company; buying and selling of 
precious metal, or valuable assets; making deposits and withdrawals to continually 
vary the amount of money in the accounts; purchasing high-value items (boats, 
houses, cars etc.) to change the form of the money. 
 
Integration 
In stage three, the final process of laundering, the offender is re-introduced to 
transferred illicit profits in the legitimate economy (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2006; The World Bank, 2009; Sharman & Chaikin 2009; Schneider, 2010). The 
Funds then appears to come from legal transactions. The objective of the illicit 
integration of funds is to allow the offenders to utilize the ‘fruits’ of crime without 
creating suspicion that may warrant investigation activities and prosecution of the 





For effective integration to take place, the launderer could then set up a cash-
intensive business such as a restaurant where the illegal funds could be injected 
into the business and reappear as fictitious profits or loan repayment. Or even set 
up a web of front companies with fictitious import/export businesses using false 
invoicing and fictitious transactions to integrate the funds as normal earnings of 
trade (see Chapter 6). It was presumed that the best method to integrate illicit 
profits of organised crime group is to own a bank (Gold & Levi, 1994:3; Text Box 
4.1). This gives the organised crime group the opportunity to have control over the 
board and management of a bank.   
 
Text Box 4.1: Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI): A case study 
of money laundering scheme 
    The story of BCCI is one of complex criminality whereby bankers used their own bank to launder 
money. BCCI was founded in the early 1970s as the first multinational bank for the Third World. Its 
corporate structure was designed from the beginning to avoid effective banking regulation and 
supervision. The bank was first registered in Luxembourg and then in Grand Cayman, both jurisdictions 
with strong bank secrecy traditions. Further, BCCI established the headquarters of its operation in 
England. The fragmentation of the corporate structure contributed to the difficulty in supervision. Similar 
patterns of compartmentalization could also be found in its auditing practices and in the strict practice 
of watertight Chinese walls separating the various operations of BCCI. This deliberately evasive 
structure of BCCI allowed it to engage in dubious operations ranging from covering the bank’s losses, 
embezzlement, and personal enrichment of the staff, moving money secretly, fraud, and money 
laundering. To achieve its purposes, BCCI relied on various methods, including mirror-image trading, 
front men, and off-balance sheet accounting techniques. In 1988 the bank was indicted for drug money 
laundering, and several BCCI bankers were convicted in 1990 on counts of laundering drug proceeds. 
This was the beginning of the demise of BCCI. 
     The role of BCCI in the laundering of the corruption proceeds of Manuel Noriega, the former 
president of Panama, provides an example of its laundering activities. Appropriating the funds of the 
Panama National Guard for his personal use, Noriega deposited $23 million in BCCI accounts in 
Luxembourg and London between 1982 and 1986. In 1986, Noriega, with the help of BCCI, started a 
laundering operation aimed at obscuring the paper trail linking Noriega to the embezzled funds. To 
achieve that, the money was transferred from the various accounts held by Noriega in BCCI to the 
accounts of the Banco Nacionalede Panama at the Union Bank of Switzerland in Zurich and the 
Deutsche Sudamerikanische Bank in Hamburg, Germany. All the transfers were done in the name of      
Finley International, a company chaired and directed by Mr. Akbar, who happened to also be the 
president of Capcom, a commodities future company closely linked to BCCI. While the accounts were 
nominally held by the Banco Nacionalede Panama, they were in reality opened and controlled by 





consolidated into a single account held by the Banco Nacional de Panama at the Middle East Bank in 
London and then transferred to the accounts of “Finley’s International Ltd.” in the same bank. At last, 
Finley instructed the Middle East Bank to transfer $20.5 million to Capcom where the money was 
credited to two coded customer accounts managed by Capcom and for which Mr. Akbar possessed 
power of attorney. Another $2.6 million was paid to a coded account at the Trade and Development 
Bank in Geneva. All the transfers described above were portrayed as legitimate business transactions 
involving business capital, payments of fees, and bank deposits. This complex operation resulted in 
giving the funds legitimate appearance and obscuring the audit trail that linked them to Noriega. (This 
account is based on the Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations– United States Senate by 
Senator John Kerry and Senator Hank Brown in December 1992.) 
Source: Schott, 2009:6-7 
The BCCI case in the text box 4.1 illustrates how criminals can use the financial 
system to advance and integrate their illicit income generated from criminal 
activities where laws are lax. This means when a bank is being bought by criminal 
groups, laundering of funds will be seen as a usual way to integrate and shield the 
proceeds of crime. The consequential effect of this is financial system instability 
within the national economy of the bank location. Additionally, the depositors may 
lose their funds to the criminal group; unemployment and loss of investments by 
legitimate investors if a bank or another financial institution is closed down by 
authorities because of a high volume of seized or confiscated deposits of dirty 
money, or because sanctions are applied against the financial institution due to 
the commitment of money laundering. 
 
In a nutshell, Integration is the provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally 
derived wealth. According to Commonwealth Secretariat (2006:9) “If the layering 
process has succeeded, integration schemes place the laundered proceeds back 
into the economy in such a way that they re-enter the financial system and appear 
to be normal business funds”.  
 
4.2   Magnitude of the Global Problem of Money Laundering 
It was postulated that, without robust international, regional and national 
coordination on the efforts to combat money laundering, there would be less 
progress on the war against criminal organisations and their illicit profits which is 






Furthermore, criminal organizations and their associates in crime have no interest 
in documenting the activities of their illicit financial flows in the globalization of 
crime (Schott, 2006). The clandestine nature of the crime makes it difficult to 
assess the volume of the threat of money laundering and its economic 
repercussions to the global development (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2007). 
This has resulted in controversial debates between the anti-money laundering 
(AML) experts and the social scientists, in determining what the global estimate of 
money laundering is (Schott, 2006: I-2&3; Levi, 2004; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; 
Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2007; Schneider, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the international standard setters on anti-money laundering have not 
“invested in converting the image of speculation into approaching scientific insight 
into the phenomenon of money laundering and organized crime” (Schneider, 
2010:6; Halliday, Levi, and Peter Reuter, 2014). Nonetheless, the vulnerabilities 
of money laundering are witnesses in all aspects of global economy, these include 
vulnerability of: Financial Institutions (FIs); Designated Non-Financial Businesses 
and Professions (DNFBPs), (the lawyers, accountants, real-estate dealers in 
particular); Money Service Businesses (MSBs); stock and capital market 
businesses; insurance sector; non-profit organizations; cash couriers; trade and 
commerce; underground economy; and the political space depleted by the Political 
Exposed Persons (PEPs) (FATF, 2013).  
 
The global displacement on the fight against money laundering is determined by the 
“attractiveness index” of Walker; where he postulates a range of factors that provide 
opportunities to the organised criminal groups in the manipulation of their complex illicit 
financial flows that result in these vulnerabilities in the global economy (Walker, 2007 
cited Schneider, 2010). This “attractiveness index” includes the role of: government 
towards curbing crime; corruption; conflict and war region; distance for trade flows; 
common language and colonial links; per capital income; borders (Walker and Unger, 
2009:830-834); tax haven countries; and underground economy (Author’s own 
contribution). 
 
According to Walker and Unger (2009) the political will of a particular country determines 
the attractiveness of that country to money launderers. A country without a political will 
to fight crime combined with bribery and corruption is a critical gateway in facilitating 
money laundering efforts to be successful (Schott, 2006). That is to say, the highest 





since the corrupt leaders are vulnerable and interested in the laundering of their own 
national loots generated from that country. And if the corruption perception of a country 
is at a minimal level, the country will be less attractive to organised crime offenders and 
money-launderer.  
 
Table 4.1: Global Flows from Illicit Activities worldwide, years 2000/2001 







Drugs 120 11% 200 12.5% 
 




3 0.2% 3 0.2% 
 
Human trafficking 12 1.1% 15 0.9% 
 
Illegal arms trade 6 2.0% 10 0.6% 
 
Smuggling 60 5.6% 100 6.3% 
 
Racketeering 50 4.7% 100 6.3% 
 
Crime subtotal 331 31.2% 549 34.3% 
 




300 28.3% 500 31.2% 
 
Fake transactions 200 18.9% 250 15.6% 
Corruption  30 
 




700 66.0% 1,000 62.5% 
 




Source: Capitalism’s Athilles Heel, Baker 2005. Based on a review of studies 






Additionally, the prevalence of money laundering in any country generates additional 
criminal activities. Walker’s model estimate reveals that corruption funds account for 
some 3 to 5 percent of global dirty money (2005). 
 
Countries with robust and stringent anti-money laundering laws face a lesser risk of their 
monetary circulations being invaded with the illicit financial flows of organised criminal 
groups as compared to countries with weak and lax anti-money laundering laws coupled 
with high level of political, public and private sector corruption. The criminally generated 
money is about 31.2 to 34.3 percent of the global illicit flows (Baker, 2005).  In the same 
vein, conflict and war threatened regions of the world would experience a higher flow of 
organised crime groups’ proceeds as compared with those in times of peace and 
tranquility.    
 
Additionally, even though physical distance is not important for money flows, since 
money is not goods that require transportation cost, money can be easily sent via 
internet and wire transfer, thus moving money faster than high speed train or supersonic 
aircraft. Therefore, the role of cultural distance, international trade, language and 
colonial links, play a major part in the attractiveness of the offender from one particular 
global jurisdiction to another (Walker and Unger, 2009). In Table 4.1, the Baker’s 
calculation reveals that trade based and commercial money laundering related crimes 
account for around 66 percent of ill-gotten funds, which may include the illicit financial 
flows banked in tax haven jurisdictions and undisclosed illicit financial flows in the 
underground global economy.  
 
Finally, another “attractiveness index” of money laundering is the per capital income of 
a country.  Walker’s model postulates that dirty money from the poorer countries attracts 
the richer countries in the global north.  Baker (2005) rightly put it that the global estimate 
of illicit money flow range between US$ 1.0 and 1.6 trillion annually. Half of this fund, 
estimated at US$ 500 to 800 billion originated from the developing and transitional 
economics and end-up in major international banking centers of developed economics 
(Baker, 2005). The opportunities provided by various “attractiveness index” of money 
laundering pose a greater threat and danger to the global development and in particular, 
developing countries.  
 
According to Schott (2006), the adverse implications of money laundering on developing 
countries include the following:  the criminal activities are intense and profitable due to 





system; the lax enforcement of the AML regime, limits foreign investments and 
international grants and assistance for a particular jurisdiction; the reputational risk is 
potential for the financial institutions, this harms the integrity and the stability of the 
financial system in developing countries; the economy and private sector is 
compromised, since legitimate enterprises have to compete with ‘shell’ and front 
companies of organised criminals, the main objective of which to shield and protect illicit 
funds and not to make profits from legitimate enterprises. Therefore, products 
purchased with illicit funds can be resold below the cost price in the global economy by 
the offenders in order to expedite the quest to legitimise ill-gotten funds of their criminal 
activities, and; the money launderer within developing jurisdictions are capable of 
jeopardizing privatization, since they can outbid legitimate purchasers by acquiring 
formerly owned State enterprise with their ill-gotten funds. 
 It is against this backdrop, that the international community comes up with various 
global initiatives to combat money laundering and proceeds of organised crime. This 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3    Global Initiatives for Combating Money Laundering 
In an attempt to protect national, regional and the global economy from the threats of 
money launderers and organised criminal groups, the international community rose on 
their feet to put mechanisms and strategies in place to curb the menace of illicit financial 
flows and money laundering activities of transnational organised crime groups. 
According to Commonwealth Secretariat (2006), international action to control the threat 
of money laundering started in the late 1980s. Previously, criminals adapted money 
laundering methods and techniques as a counter measure to shield their illicit proceeds 
of crime from the intervention of competent authorities in the various jurisdictions where 
they operated.  
 
Amongst notable global initiatives that will be discussed in this thesis the following are 
included: the Vienna Convention; the Palermo Convention; the Council of Europe 
Convention; the European Money Laundering Directive; Commonwealth Strategies 
against Money Laundering; Financial Action Task Force roles in combating money 









4.3.1 The Vienna Convention 
The Vienna Convention was the first initiative in combating money laundering in the 
international arena. In late 1988, the United Nations held a conference for the adoption 
of a convention against illicit traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The 
Vienna Convention became operational in 1990, and ratifying countries were obliged to 
domesticate and implement the following principles of the convention (Schott, 2006): (i) 
to criminalise drug trafficking and associated money laundering; (ii) to enact measures 
for the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking; and (iii), to empower the courts 
to order that bank, financial or commercial records are made available to enforcement 
agencies, regardless of bank secrecy laws.  
 
Before this time, the illicit profit from drug trafficking was not criminalised. Therefore, the 
offenders in drug trafficking “smiled their ways” to their banks, depositing and making 
withdrawals accumulated from their drug businesses.  As a matter of fact, organised 
criminal groups at that time, re-invested part of their ill-gotten profits in the governance 
and economy of many global states were they operate. For instance, the Cabinet Office, 
UK suggested that in the United States, “investigation revealed that the Mafia controlled 
a number of the City’s principal industries and that criminal prosecutions had done little 
to force those industries from the Mafia’s grip” (2000). 
 
The introduction of this initiative offer strategies and controls to the global states to 
separate the illicit profit and investments of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
of organised criminal groups from that of legitimate business opportunities in the global 
economy. According to the UK Cabinet Office, “in the 1990s, a new strategy was 
implemented using the support and co-operation of every level of government – 
including review and analysis of the public and private construction process and 
systematic attack against the Mafia’s corrupt control of unions, construction firms, 
suppliers and vendors through corruption monitors and financial investigators. The 
strategy had the effect of liberating legitimate businesses. For example, the annual 
waste collection bill of the New York Postal Service was reduced from $2.5 million to 










4.3.2   The Palermo Convention 
The next initiative arises from the Palermo Convention of the United Nations against 
Transnational Organized Crime, which was held in Palermo in 2000. This initiative was 
a follow-up to the Vienna Convention (The World Bank, 2009). The Vienna Convention 
only criminalised drug trafficking related crime as the underlying offence to money 
laundering.  
Therefore, there was prosecution deficit on other serious crime, since they were not 
criminalised by the Vienna Convention. The organised criminal groups at that time, 
consequently, focused their criminal intentions on other serious transnational crimes 
that were not criminalised by Vienna Convention in the quest to maximise illicit profits 
during this criminalisation dispensation. 
The localisation and full implementation of the Palermo Convention within the UN 
member States commenced on 29 September 2003, “having been signed by 147 
countries and ratified by 82 countries” (Schott, 2006: III-4). The Convention advises all 
participant countries to implement a local law within their individual jurisdictions that 
would cover a wide range of underlying offences to money laundering.  
The core deliverable of this convention includes the following (Article 6 & 7 of the 
Palermo Convention cited in Schott, 2006): 
 
- “to criminalize money laundering and include all serious crimes as predicate 
offenses of money laundering, whether committed in or outside of the country, 
and permit the required criminal knowledge or intent to be inferred from objective 
facts; 
- to establish regulatory regimes to deter and detect all forms of money 
laundering, including customer identification, record-keeping and reporting of 
suspicious transactions; 
- to authorize the cooperation and exchange of information among administrative, 
regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities, both domestically and 
internationally, and consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to 
collect, analyze and disseminate information; and 










4.3.3   The Council of Europe Convention 
In 1990, the Council of Europe also adopted another Convention on laundering, search, 
seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime. According to Commonwealth 
Secretariat (2006), the Council recognises that criminal groups do not specialise in a 
specific crime, therefore the criminalisation by this Convention goes beyond that of the 
Vienna Convention which was limited to drug trafficking alone. The Council advises the 
European Union member States which ratified the Convention to apply the instrument 
on investigation of money laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds 
of all serious crime in their jurisdictions.  
 
The thematic focus of the Convention includes the following: 
 
Article 3 (1) on confiscation measures provides that: 
 
The Convention compels “each party to adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds or property, 
the value of which corresponds to such proceeds and laundered property of all serious 
crimes”. 
 
Article 4 on investigative and provisional measures compels that: 
 
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
enable it to identify, trace, freeze or seize rapidly property which is liable to confiscation 
pursuant to Article 3, in order to particularly facilitate the enforcement of a later 
confiscation.” 
 
Article 5 on freezing, seizure and confiscation states that “each Party shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the measures to 
freeze, seize and confiscate also encompass: (a) the property into which the proceeds 
have been transformed or converted; (b) property acquired from legitimate sources, if 
proceeds have been intermingled, in whole or in part, with such property, up to the 
assessed value of the intermingled proceeds; (c) income or other benefits derived from 
proceeds, from property into which proceeds of crime have been transformed or 
converted or from property with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled, up to 
the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds, in the same manner and to the same 





Article 6 on management of frozen or seized property provides that: 
 
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
ensure proper management of frozen or seized property in accordance with Articles 4 
and 5 of this Convention.” 
 
Article 7 (1) & (2) on investigative powers and techniques, provides that “each Party 
shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its 
courts or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records 
be made available or be seized in order to carry out the actions referred to in Articles 3, 
4 and 5. A Party shall not decline to act under the provisions of this article on the grounds 
of bank secrecy.” Whilst (2) provides that “without prejudice to paragraph 1, each Party 
shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to enable it to: 
 
a. determine whether a natural or legal person is a holder or beneficial owner of 
one or more accounts, of whatever nature, in any bank located in its territory 
and, if so obtain all of the details of the identified accounts; 
b. obtain the particulars of specified bank accounts and of banking operations 
which have been carried out during a specified period through one or more 
specified accounts, including the particulars of any sending or recipient account; 
c. monitor, during a specified period, the banking operations that are being carried 
out through one or more identified accounts; and, 
d. ensure that banks do not disclose to the bank customer concerned or to other 
third persons that information has been sought or obtained in accordance with 
sub-paragraphs a, b, or c, or that an investigation is being carried out. 
 
“Parties shall consider extending this provision to accounts held in non-bank financial 
institutions.” 
 
4.3.4   The European Money Laundering Directive 
The most recent directive on money laundering control is the Fourth Directive of the 
European Parliament on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose 
of money laundering (European Commission, 2015). The objectives of this Directive are 
centered on ensuring a robust internal market “by reducing complexity across borders, 
to safeguard the interests of society from criminality and terrorist acts, to safeguard the 





environment and, to contribute to financial stability by protecting the soundness, proper 
functioning and integrity of the financial system” (European Commission, 2015). 
 
The 2015 Directive improves upon the existing situation after the implementations of the 
previous three directives (the first, second, and third Directives). The areas of 
improvements include the following: 
 
- “The scope of gambling was broadened beyond casinos to include the gambling 
sector; 
- The currency transaction thresholds for traders in goods was reduced from 
€15,000 to €7,500 per transaction; 
- The administrative sanctions were strengthen by introducing minimum principal 
based rules; 
- The collection and reporting of statistical data were reinforced to ensure data 
comparability; 
- The Directive introduced provisions to clarify the need for data protection on the 
interaction between anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing; 
- The inclusion of explicit reference to tax crimes as a predicate offence to money 
laundering; 
- Companies are required to hold and report information on their beneficial owners 
and to maintain identification of beneficial owners within the range of 25% 
shareholdings of the companies; 
- The anti-money laundering rules were reinforced to apply to supervision of 
companies within home and host countries; 
- The introduction of a new compliance requirements to strengthen cross-border 
intelligence sharing among the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs); 
- Member States are required to conduct a country-wide risk assessment on their 
anti-money laundering vulnerabilities and to conduct enhanced due diligence on 
high risk transactions; 
- The equivalence of third country regimes and the removal of “white list” process; 
- The Directive introduced a risk-sensitive approach to the supervision of anti-
money laundering reporting entities; 
- The introduction of sensitive requirements to apply on domestic Political 








4.3.5   The Commonwealth Strategies against Money Laundering 
The Commonwealth strategies to combat money laundering were introduced in 1993 
after the drafting of the Commonwealth Model Law for member states by its Secretariat 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).  
The Commonwealth Secretariat is responsible for drafting legal cooperation among its 
member states (Schott, 2006).  It is in this vein, that the Commonwealth reviewed the 
legal framework of its member states in ensuring their compliance with international 
initiatives to combat illicit proceeds of organised criminal group (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2006).   
The Secretariat also developed and published the Guidance Notes for Combating 
Money Laundering in the Financial Sector for its member states in 1996 (Schott, 2006).  
This guidance notes were domesticated by member states in their legal framework to 
combat money laundering within their various jurisdictions. In 2006, the Commonwealth 
Secretariat published a more comprehensive publication that contained the 
compendium of all international conventions and best practices to dry out the illicit 
financial flows of organised crime offenders, money laundering and terrorist financing. 
This book titled “Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A Model of Best 
Practice for Financial Sector, the Professions and Other Designated Business”, has 
been recognised by the anti-money laundering experts as one of the leading 
publications for the purpose of combating money laundering (The World Bank, 2009).     
 
4.4 The Global Standard Setters and Specialised Institutions in Combating Money 
Laundering 
This section evaluates the roles of the main global standard setters in combating money 
laundering within the international community. The main one being the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF). Then it will shift to look at the mandates of the regional collaborators 
in controlling and regulating the threats of the money laundering at regional level. 
Furthermore, it will evaluate the functioning of the major key international specialized 
institutions collaborating with the global and national standards setter to secure financial 
integrity and global economy.        
 
4.4.1   Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The frontier global standard setter for the fight against money laundering is the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). The FATF was 
established in 1989 by the G7 (Campbell & Campbell, 2015). The mandate of FATF is 





operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and the 
financing of proliferation, and other related threats to the integrity of the international 
financial system. In collaboration with other international stakeholders, the FATF also 
works to identify national-level vulnerabilities with the aim of protecting the international 
financial system from misuse” (FATF, 2012). 
 
The comprehensive framework, which countries should adapt to, towards the combat of 
money laundering is contained in the FATF 40 Recommendations (FATF, 2012). The 
FATF recommendations are of international standard which countries should implement 
to curb money laundering in their jurisdictions. The components of this standard are: to 
identify the risk, and develop policies and domestic coordination; to pursue money 
laundering; to apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated 
sectors; to establish power and responsibilities for the competent authorities (e.g. 
investigative, law enforcement and supervisory authorities) and other institutional 
measures; to enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership 
information of legal persons and arrangements; and to facilitate international 
cooperation (FATF, 2012). The descriptive analysis of the FATF recommendations will 
be further discussed in the latter part of this chapter.  
 
Furthermore, the FATF achieves its mandates by performing four key functions, which 
includes: standards setting; ensuring implementation and compliance with standards 
among its member countries; study techniques and typologies (methods) of money 
laundering, and; conducting outreach activities that aim to globalise anti-money 
laundering standards and practices. 
 
Standard Setting 
In 1990, the first anti-money laundering recommendations of the FATF were drawn up 
to combat the abuse of financial systems from the laundering activities of organised 
criminal groups that were dealing in drugs (The World Bank, 2009). This action was 
necessitated to enable the FATF to implement the objectives of the Vienna Convention 
of 1988 that criminalised drug trafficking as an underlying offence for money laundering. 
In 1996 the recommendations were revised to include evolving money laundering trends 
and techniques and to broaden their scope to cover other serious crime (FATF, 2012). 
Furthermore, in 2001 the FATF expanded its recommendations to include issues 
relating to terrorist financing and terrorist organization. This resulted in the creation of 





The latest revised recommendations of the FATF came out in 2012, where the FATF 
integrates the risks based approach into its standards and all member countries were 
to focus attention on areas where risks were higher and to adopt appropriate measures 
to mitigate those risks in their jurisdictions. The newly revised recommendations also 
include the standard to combat the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (FATF, 2012). 
 
Ensuring Compliance 
The FATF uses two types of internal review mechanisms to achieve member countries’ 
compliance with anti-money laundering standards. 
The first compliance mechanism is a self-assessment exercise that enables countries 
to fill a questionnaire designed by FATF on an annual basis (The World Bank, 2009:25). 
Consequently, the FATF secretariat then uses the answers provided in this self-
assessment questionnaire to compile the rating report, which shows the successes or 
failures of country’s compliance towards the implementation of these standards. The 
second mechanism for ensuring compliance is the mutual evaluation process in which 
a country is being evaluated by a team of experts delegated by FATF using a standard 
questionnaire coupled with a pre-set list of issues to determine the level of compliance 
by the country with the FATF standards (Schott, 2006). The outcomes of these two 
evaluations are discussed at the FATF plenary session after which the assessed 
countries are compelled to take measures towards correcting the shortcomings in their 
anti-money laundering regimes.   
 
Conducting Money Laundering Typologies (Methods) Studies  
Typologies are the methods or ways in which money can be laundered by criminal 
groups. For example, small insignificant amounts of cash deposits can be lodged in 
bank accounts in multiple transactions. The frequency of these transactions may range 
between 20 to 30 multiple transactions. This is carried out by the offenders, to avoid 
reaching reportable thresholds of the country’s regime. Therefore, the offender then 
chooses to break large amount of cash transactions into smaller units of cash deposits. 
These pools of multiple transactions of proceeds of crime will form large sums of funds 
capable of purchasing valuable assets such as automobiles, antiques, and jewellery 
(Schott, 2006). This method in which smaller units of cash is being deposited using 
multiple but different transactions at the bank to form huge amounts of cash balances 






The typologies studies are the third core function of the FATF and it is being performed 
by the FATF multi-disciplinary groups of experts who deliberate in various working 
groups at its plenary meetings on an annual basis (The World Bank, 2009; Schott, 2006). 
The experts usually pool together the information on new trends and methods adopted 
by the offenders engaged in money laundering within its member states. The 
intelligence gathered from this information is shared among member states to provide 
counter-measures in curbing the menace of money laundering in their jurisdictions 
(GIABA, 2013b). Notwithstanding this, the FATF secretariat usually comes up with new 
indicators of money laundering methods to guide the stakeholders on how to detect new 
trends and contemporary money laundering issues.  The information on typologies 




Furthermore, the FATF has responsibility to reach-out to the stakeholders whenever   
new indicators and trends on money laundering are discovered by them (Schott, 2006). 
For instance the FATF representatives could attend meetings of financial institutions or 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) to share with them the 
threats, schemes, trends and new techniques used by the money-launderers.  The 
feedback from such meetings can provide necessary counter-measures and strategies 
to curb this crime in a globally (GIABA, 2012b).   
 
4.4.2   The United Nations (UN)  
The first supranational organisation that embarked on the fight against money 
laundering on the international arena is the UN (United Nations, 2000b; The World Bank, 
2009). The reason being that, the UN as an international organisation has the highest 
number of member states as compared with other supranational bodies throughout the 
world (Schott, 2006:III-2). Therefore, there is a need for the UN to protect the economic 
stability of its member states and to secure the integrity of member states' financial 
systems from becoming vulnerable to criminal groups and organisations as well as 
money launderers. It is in this vein, that the member states of the UN delegate their 
authority to the UN Security Council to regulate and provide oversight functions on 
issues which threaten the economic stability and national security of member states. 
Consequent to this, the UN Security Council has the authority to bind all member 
countries through a Security Council Resolution (Schott, 2006: III-2; Vlcek, 2011; FATF, 





In order to curb the menace of money laundering within member states, the UN has 
dedicated a programme to fight money laundering within member states, which is known 
as the Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML), and its headquarters is 
located in Vienna and Austria, as a specialised unit of the United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC). The UN Global Programme against Money Laundering’s (GPML) 
objective is to provide research and technical assistance for the UN member states as 
follows (GPML, 2004 cited in Schott, 2006): 
 
- “to raise the awareness level of the threats of money laundering among key 
institutions and persons in UN member states; 
- to assist in creation and development of institutional frameworks, in particular 
providing technical assistance for financial intelligence units to curb money 
laundering among its member states; 
- to assist in creating legal frameworks by supporting model legislations for both 
common and civil law member countries;  
- to provide capacity building for legal, judicial, law enforcement agencies, 
regulators and the private financial sectors; 
- to promote a regional approach to addressing problems of money laundering 
and other related threats of member states; 
- to develop and maintain strategic relationships with other competent 
organisations; and 
- to maintain a database of information and undertake analysis of key information 
for the achievement of its mandates”. 
 
4.4.3   The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
The World Bank and IMF incorporated the FATF recommendations into their standards 
and codes list of their operations in 2002 after their Boards’ approval (The World Bank, 
2009:30).  
Consequently, the World Bank and IMF included these recommendations in their 
assessment frameworks to prevent the menace of money laundering within the global 
financial system (The World Bank, 2009; FATF, 2012). It is against this backdrop that 
the Bank and the IMF have continued to provide capacity building and technical support 
for their member states to help build the implementation and compliance requirements 






For instance, in 2007, the World Bank provided comprehensive training for the 
competent agencies responsible for the fight against money laundering in Nigeria. 
Additionally, from 2010 to 2014, the IMF provided independent technical assistance to 
Nigeria to help review its AML frameworks before the mutual evaluation of the FATF 
(CBN Regulator 2). The IMF and the World Bank officials serve as the major assessors 
of the FATF’s Mutual Evaluation of countries’ compliance to the anti-money laundering 
regimes (Halliday, Levi & Reuter, 2014). The Bank and the IMF also provide technical 
assistance for countries to help support their AML evaluations and required training for 
their independent assessors (Halliday, Levi & Reuter, 2014).    
 
4.4.4   The Basel Committee Statement 
The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices was 
established in 1974 by 10 Nations banking regulatory authorities (The World Bank, 
2009). This Committee comprises of the central bank governors of those nations (Vlcek, 
2011; The World Bank, 2009). The Committee is responsible for the creation of 
supervisory standards, guidelines and recommendations of best practices for its 
members to adopt for the enhancement their banks’ integrity (FATF, 2012). The 
Committee adopted a statement of best practices on money laundering in 1988 and this 
was incorporated into the ethical standards of professional conduct which banks should 
comply with (Alexander, 2000; Schott, 2006). The Committee advises that banks should 
monitor the deposits originated from proceeds of crime and must cooperate with their 
local law enforcement agencies in fighting money laundering (Schott, 2006). 
 
Amongst the standards produced by this Committee for the banks are the General 
Guide to Account Opening and Customer Identification and Customer Due Diligence for 
Banks (FATF, 2012). These guidelines compel banks to know their customers and to 
disapprove transactions of customers whose identification documentations are deficient 
(Schott, 2006; Vlcek, 2011).    
 
4.4.5   The Egmont Group 
In 1995, 13 Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) came together to establish the Egmont 
Group. The Egmont Group has evolved over the years and as at 2015 comprised 151 
member FIUs (http://www.egmontgroup.org/about). The FIUs are the governmental 
agencies responsible for the collection, analyses and dissemination of financial 
intelligence reports on the money laundering offenders to the various competent 





among global states (The Egmont Group, 2012). The group highlights the conditions 
and principles which its members must adhere to in exchanging information between 
Financial Intelligence Units for the investigation of money laundering cases. The 
objectives of this group are to improve international collaboration and intelligence 
sharing among the FIU members registered with this Group (The World Bank, 2009).    
 
The Egmont Group support its members’ FIU as follows (The Egmont Group, 2012): 
Expanding and systematizing international cooperation in the reciprocal exchange of 
information; Increasing the effectiveness of FIUs by offering training and promoting 
personnel exchanges to improve the expertise and capabilities of personnel employed 
by FIUs; Fostering better and secure communication among FIUs through the 
application of technology, such as the Egmont Secure Web (ESW), this secure website  
is not made available to the public for information sharing (The World Bank, 2009); 
Fostering increased coordination and support among the operational divisions of 
member FIUs; Promoting the operational autonomy of FIUs, and; Promoting the 
establishment of FIUs in conjunction with jurisdictions with an AML/CFT program in 
place, or in areas with a program in the early stages of development. 
 
It also has five Working Groups that meet periodically, working together to accomplish 
“its mission of development, cooperation, and sharing of expertise” within its members’ 
FIU (The Egmont Group, 2012). The first is the Information Technology (IT) Working 
Group, which gives technical advice to newly established and existing FIUs on designs 
and deployments of relevant technology and software that can aid the analysis of data 
for intelligence sharing of their members. Second is the Legal Working Group (LWG) 
which reviews the candidacy of potential members and handles all legal aspects and 
matters of principle within Egmont, including cooperation between FIUs (Egmont Group, 
201). Third is the Operational Working Group, which brings FIUs together on typologies 
development and other strategic programme, which include long term projects of its 
members. The fourth is the Outreach Working Group that creates a global network of 
FIUs. This Working Group is responsible for the identification of suitable FIUs for 
candidature and ensuring them meeting up with the Egmont Group standards (The 
Egmont Group, 2012). The fifth and the final Working Group is the Training Working 
Group that identifies training needs, capacity building and opportunities for FIUs and 
their personnel, and conducts training seminars for Egmont members as well as for non-







4.4.6   The FATF-Style Regional Initiatives  
The FATF-Style Regional Bodies are strategic platforms engaged in ensuring the 
implementation of FATF’s recommendations to combat money laundering within their 
respective regions (Schott, 2006: IV-1). The FATF-Style Regional Bodies that are 
currently working with FATF are (FATF, 2012; The World Bank; 2009):  
 
- Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) based in Sydney, Australia;  
- Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) based in Trinidad and Tobago; 
- Eurasian Group (EAG) based in Moscow, Russia; 
- Eastern & Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) based in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; 
- Latin America Anti-Money Laundering Group (GAFILAT) [formerly South 
American Anti-Money Laundering Group (GAFISUD)] based in Bueno Aires, 
Argentina; 
- West Africa Money Laundering Group (GIABA) based in Dakar, Senegal; 
- Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) based 
in Bahrain; 
- Council of Europe Anti-Money Laundering Group (MONEYVAL) based in 
Strasbourg, France (Council of Europe). 
 
In the West African region for instance, the FATF Style Regional Body is the Inter-
Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) based 
in Dakar, Senegal, and its objectives are implied in the word 'FATF style' which means 
that it function like the FATF (GIABA, 2015).  
 
The only difference is that, the FATF has a global mandate to curb money laundering 
while the Regional Style Bodies encourage and supervise the implementation of the 
FATF's Recommendations within their member states (GIABA, 2012). They provide 
technical assistance to member states on their specific circumstances and help to 
develop their anti-money laundering regimes (GIABA, 2013). They also provide annual 
typology reports to member states to enlighten them about current trends, techniques 
and other contemporary issues of money laundering within their regions (GIABA, 2010; 
Schott, 2006). 
 
They assist member states to administer their various mutual evaluations of their 





on a scale of Largely Compliance (LC), Compliance (C), Partial Compliance (PC) and 
Non-Compliance (NC) (GIABA, 2014). These compliance ratings help determine the 
strengths and weaknesses of the member states' anti-money laundering regime. 
Consequent to the completion of the mutual evaluation reports by the regional 
assessors, the results of the mutual evaluation are shared with member states in 
ensuring further follow-up to improve on their areas of weaknesses and to maintain their 
prospects in the case of being largely compliant to the anti-money laundering regime 
(GIABA, 2011).        
 
4.5   Conclusion  
In order to have a complete in-depth understanding about the regime against 
money laundering, this chapter explored the definitions and context of money 
laundering. The term money laundering explains how offenders will disguise the 
proceeds originated from criminal activities in the quest to disassociate the identity 
and illicit origin of the funds from the predicate or underlying offences of the crime. 
The stages of money laundering explained the processes of making ‘dirty’ money 
(illegally obtain proceeds) looks legitimate within the environments where 
criminals operate. These stages are categorised into three areas. The first stage 
of the process is called ‘placement’, this involved infiltration of the proceeds of 
crime into the economy in order to make them look legitimate. The second stage 
is ‘layering’, at this level illegal gains are injected into complex layers of 
transactions within financial institutions (FIs) or designated non-financial 
businesses and professions (DNFBPs), so as to shield away the ‘fruit’ of crime 
from their illegal origin. The final stage ‘integrates’ the proceeds of crime into the 
legitimate economy. At this stage, offenders convert the proceeds of crime into 
lucrative investments that further generate legitimate incomes as future savings, 
for instance, offenders may earn rent from a property acquired with the proceeds 
of crime. The magnitude of the global problem of proceeds of organised crime 
witness numerous vulnerabilities amongst the global jurisdictions, these 
susceptibilities were charted in this chapter. 
 
The anti-money regimes suggested the initiatives and instruments applied within 
the global states in addressing the threats and proceeds have originated from the 
operation and commission of all serious crime. These proceeds of serious crime 
include that of organised crime groups. The first global instrument combating the 





and related crimes as underlying offences to money laundering. The 
implementation of the Vienna Convention witnesses operational impediments to 
combat other serious crime that are not drug trafficking related offences in the late 
1990s. Therefore, the United Nations in 2000 initiates a further instrument called 
the Palermo Convention on Transnational Organized Crime to address the 
loophole for combating serious crime within a global context. Other initiatives and 
instruments that were extensively discussed in this chapter are the Council of 
Europe Convention, the European Money Laundering Directive, and the 
Commonwealth Strategies against Money Laundering. The implementations of 
these initiatives are coordinated and supervised by the global standard setters and 
specialised institution mandated to curb money laundering amongst international 
communities. The Financial Action task Force (FATF) is the leading standard 
setter for regulating and combating the menace of proceeds originated from 
organised crime and other serious crime within global jurisdictions. The chapter 
concluded by exploring the regime of anti-money laundering legislation in Nigeria. 
The next chapter is the conceptual framework for this thesis. The chapter uses the 
theoretical framework of rational choice theory and the anti-money laundering 

























Framing Organised Crime in Nigeria: Rational Choice 
Theory and Anti-Money Laundering Framework 
The conceptual framework adopted in this thesis comprises the rational choice 
approach and the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Framework. The rational choice 
theory of this thesis seeks to evaluate law-violating behaviour of the organised 
criminal offender when conducting illicit transactions and financial flows in the 
international arena. On the other hand, the AML framework seeks to provide a 
mechanism for combating illicit transactions and businesses of organised crime 
within the global states, West Africa and Nigeria in particular. The concept of 
cybernetics in relation to the design of an AML Transaction Validation Model was 
also explored. This AML Transaction Validation Model seeks to adopt a scientific 
approach in validating the customer identification procedure within the financial 
institutions and other reporting institutions of AML regimes in order to achieve 
effective implementations and better compliance requirements for the reporting 
institutions within the regimes. This model also provides the mechanism to follow 
the money trail of the illicit flows that may originate from the vulnerabilities of these 
reporting institutions. Additionally, the law enforcement agencies and other 
competent authorities can tap into this AML Transaction Validation model to drive-
out the ill-gotten funds within the regimes of AML. The model also enhances the 
concept of financial system integrity, since only validated and authenticated 
transactions can pass through the core banking processes of the financial 
institutions (hereinafter, FIs) and other financial institutions (OFIs) using the AML 
Transaction Validation Model. Additionally, the AML Transaction Validation model 
will increase the risk of committing identity theft by the cybercrime offender who 
usually steals the financial information of the banks’ customer. This will be 
analysed in the body of this chapter. 
 
5.1   Rational Choice Theory  
The rational choice perspective on criminal behaviour can locate criminological 
findings within a framework particularly suitable for possible policies (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2008; Mckenzie and Tullock, 1984; Mehlkop and Graeff, 2010). It has been 
suggested that criminality is the consequence of rational actors’ and active 
decisions concerning the costs and benefits of crime (Becker, 1968; Mehlkop and 






Clarke (1997:9-10) assumes that for offenders ‘‘crime is purposive behaviour 
designed to meet their commonplace needs for such things as money, status, sex, 
excitement, and that meeting these needs” involves “making (sometimes quite 
rudimentary) decisions and choices, constrained as they are by limits of time and 
ability and the availability of relevant information’’.  
 
Rational choice theory describes law-violating behaviour as an event that occurs 
when an offender decides to risk violating the law, which is predicated upon the 
search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain to achieve social opportunities such 
as physical well-being or social recognition (Siegel, 1992:131; Hayward, 2007; 
Mehlkop and Graeff, 2010). Bentham ([1789] 1948) posits that nature has placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is 
for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we 
shall do’. In rational choice theories of crime, pleasures are all proceeds from crime, 
and pain the possible consequences of being punished.  
 
Historically, the rational choice theory is located in the classical school (this one of 
the theoretical school of taught in criminology) of Jeremy Bentham ([1789] 1982) 
and Cesare Beccaria ([1764] 1963). The main arguments of their theories are 
(Keel & McKernan, 1997): 
 
- “Human beings are rational actors;  
- rationality involves an end/means calculation;  
- people (freely) choose behaviour, both conforming and deviant, based on 
their rational calculations; 
- the central element of calculation involves a cost benefit analysis: Pleasure 
versus Pain [or hedonistic calculus]; 
- choice, with all other conditions equal, will be directed towards the 
maximization of individual pleasure;  
- choice can be controlled through the perception and understanding of the 
potential pain or punishment that will follow an act judged to be in violation 
of the social good, the social contract;  
- the state is responsible for maintaining order and preserving the common 






- the swiftness, severity, and certainty of punishment are the key elements 
in understanding a law’s capacity to control human behaviour”.   
     
           5.1.1 Limitations of Rational Choice Theory 
Building universal theory for crimes evaluation can be very difficult from the 
criminological point of view. In addition, Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is 
constructed in a way whereby the action of the offender towards crime is 
considered to be chosen behaviour, both conforming and deviant, based on their 
rational calculations involving a cost benefit analysis: Pleasure versus Pain. 
Notwithstanding this principle, the rationalist concept of action of the offender 
cannot be applied universally in understanding crime (Hodgson, 2012). The RCT 
failed to account for historical, cultural and institutional specificities of crime, which 
analysed and included belief of a certain behavioural action as against the cost of 
the action itself (Kosesther, 1959; Hodgson, 2001). Therefore, cost benefit of a 
certain criminal action is not always instrumental when self-interest is the driver 
and motivational factor for committing crime (Boudon, 1998). These limitations 
made the application of RCT difficult in criminology.  
Nevertheless, in the situation whereby the offender would have to incur cost for 
the perpetration of a crime, such as buying illicit drugs in the production countries 
and trafficking them for profit in the consuming countries, in the case of drug 
trafficking and other related illicit trafficking ‘businesses’ identified in this thesis, 
the application of RCT is very relevant in evaluating these crimes. The cost 
implications for the procurement of illicit products in relation to the risk of being 
caught or loss of illicit investments when illicit products are confiscated versus the 
benefit derived when illicit products are successfully smuggled and translated into 
illicit proceeds of crime within the global market is the reason why the researcher 
explored RCT as an alternative to other craniological theories.        
  
5.2   Business Opportunities Decision Modelling: The Nigerian Organised 
Crime   Offenders 
Organised crime (OC) actors in Nigeria are like ‘‘normal’’ businessmen in making 
decisions. In the legal economy, actors seek business opportunities, weigh risks, 
and strive to advance their business. Likewise in the illegal business, offenders 
explore crime opportunities, weigh risks and decide on committing a crime. 





OC offenders and the implications of their illicit financial flows from a rational 
choice perspective, this research suggests three key concepts: Value, 
Accessability and Transaction (VAT) to describe the business opportunities and 
decision-making processes in transnational organised crime in Nigeria.   
    
 Figure 5.1: VAT Concepts 
                         
Source: Author’s own concept 
 
5.2.1   Value 
The first phase in the decision-making of the Nigeria OC offender involves the 
determination of the value of the criminal opportunities available in the global 
South (Nigeria) and the global North (European states). The rudimentary decisions 
here focus on the gains or benefits of the crime vis-a-vis the costs of being caught 
and loss of goods and money.  At this phase, the OC offender would ask the 
following questions: What is the value of the crime to be committed? What 
consequences are involved when caught? How large are the proceeds of crime 
when not caught? And concludes with an assessment of whether the crime is 
worth committing. 
In many crimes, the valuation of targets is a complicated matter (Yar, 2005). 
However, an offender will only be interested in valuable targets (Felson and Clarke, 
1998). These targets will vary in accordance with the social and economic value 
of particular goods at a particular time (Felson, 1998:55). The reduction in the 
economic value of the illicit drug market in the US has resulted into the reaction 
decision of the Nigerian drug traffickers to focus their attention in the newly 





and transactions into Europe markets will be explores in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
This new market is capable of offering valuable targets for Nigerian actors 
(UNODC, 2010). This is what Webster called ‘Information Economy’ (2002) in his 
Theories of the information society. In the recruitment of a drug courier for instance, 
the drug dealers will target strangers, holiday-makers by tricking them into acting 
as a courier, fellow countrymen who have resident permits from European or North 
American Countries, or Nigerians who possess foreign passports (Ellis, 2009). 
These are valuable targets to drug dealers who frequently trick for a fee to the 
courier to transport the illicit product to the European market. In the case of cyber-
scammers, their valuable targets are those people who responded to their ‘call’ 
after receiving an unsolicited email or those people who frequently used their credit 
or debit card on the phishing websites. Marilyn Dyrud (2005) put the estimate of 
valued targets on Nigerian email scam at 1-2 percent of the unsolicited emails sent 
by the scammers to their targets. Therefore, for every 1000 unsolicited emails sent 
out; at least a scammer would obtain 10 valuable target replies. In the oil bunkering 
(see detail discussion on oil bunkering in Chapter 2) the target of the offenders 
ranges from object and persons, which includes: hostage-taking of foreign oil 
workers for valuable ransom (Ebienfa, 2011) and the pillaging of oil pipelines for 
value (BBC News 27 July, 2008). 
 
For instance, the global market value of illicit flows of people, goods and financial 
assets of an organised crime group are worth the following: 
 
- Drug trafficking - $210 billion in 2011 (UNODC); 
- Human trafficking - $ 32 billion in 2009 (ILO, 2009); 
- Advance fee fraud - $ 9.3 billion in 2009 (Ultrascan, 2009).  
- In the assessment of the value of the illicit business, the following facts will 
be taken into account by Nigerian OC offenders: 
- In illicit drug  trafficking , the value of narcotic drugs are far higher in Europe 
and American markets; 
- In human trafficking, children and young girls from the global South are 
more valuable assets  to traffickers; 
- In Advance Fee Fraud, identity information from the targets in the global 








5.2.2   Accessability   
Felson (1998; 58) posits that the term “access” refers to the ‘ability of an offender 
to get to the target and then get away from the scene of a crime’. However, in the 
distribution of transnational crime in Nigeria, accessibility to the target is far beyond 
the crime scene. This access denotes globalisation of crime; new route, new 
market, new customers, access to information and technology.  
 
It is no doubt that globalisation offers many crime opportunities to the offenders. 
When the illicit drug market in the US became difficult and less profitable, there 
was an immediate shift of the illicit drug market from US to the Europeans states 
(UNODC, 2005). Globalisation has not only facilitated the interactions of legitimate 
actors, but it also grants crime opportunities to the illegal actors to contribute their 
stake in the ‘global development’. They do this by creating ‘illicit order’ to access 
their targets from the global south down to the global north.  
Additionally, the combination of extremely low distribution cost of scam information 
on the internet is facilitated by the accessibility of the targets (Leyden, 2003). The 
Advance Fee Fraud scam actors exemplifies the challenge offered by the internet 
to the dominance of states by allowing individuals and movements to create social 
space that transcends borders, as a normative of accessibility of the targets by the 
offenders in the development of routine activity approach of crime opportunity 
(Zook, 2007; apophasis added).  
 
In the second phase of this decision-making, the OC offender seeks to analyse 
the access to the targets and goods. The main questions in this phase include: 
How can the crime opportunities target be accessed? How difficult is it to achieve 
access? What can be done to solve the difficulties of access? How large is the risk 
of access? 
Notwithstanding the high risk of accessing the major illicit market in the global 
North, the OC offenders in Nigeria usually explore new ways of reducing the risks 
encountered during this phase.  Usually, the OC offenders achieve their access in 
the following ways: 
 
- Illicit  drug  trafficking: access to new drug routes in the consuming markets 
and access to the producing markets; 
- Human trafficking: access to poor children and young girls from the global 





access to legalised markets for prostitution in Europe and bribery of law-
enforcement agents (UNODC, 2005) ; 
- Advance Fee Fraud: the use of a variety of software to access targets on-
line without being detected during the process e.g. e-mail harvesters are 
used to extract e-mail addresses from targets without their knowledge and 
provides access to the money mules. A money mule is someone who 
allows his or her personal account to be used for the transfer of illegal funds 
for a small commission in the country where the targets are located. 
 
5.2.3  Transaction  
In the third phase of the decision-making process the OC offender seeks to assess 
and manage the risks of conducting the illicit business after gaining access to 
targets in both the commodity and consuming market. In the case of advance fee 
fraud, transactions are conducted via cyberspace through the internet.  
This involves the movement of illicit flows of funds related to both the business 
and proceeds of crime. For instance in drug trafficking: 
 
- Using financial institutions to channel the financial flows of drug 
procurement at source country, while using shell companies as a cover for 
illegal business (GIABA 2010a); 
- Concealment of bulk purchased drugs from source country in Bolivia  in 
the importation of a floor tiles consignment to Nigeria (NDLEA, 2011); 
- Recruitment and remuneration of drug couriers to smuggle the drugs to the 
consumer markets in Europe (NDLEA, 2011), and; 
- Using the proceeds of crime to purchase goods in Europe and selling the 
goods in Nigeria to legitimise the proceeds of crime.   
 
For a successful transaction to occur, the OC offenders need to assess and 
manage three major transactional risk elements, which include the following: 
transaction risks at the supply market; transaction risks at transit point; and 
transaction risks at the demand market. 
 
Managing the Risk in the Supply Market by the Organised Crime Offender 
The illicit commodity and the transaction need to be covered up in such a way that 
they will not be detected by law-enforcement agencies (LEAs) at the source 





and other imported goods from the source countries. This will prevent and secure 
the illicit goods and investments from being seized at both supply market and 
transit point. In managing this risk, the OC offenders may establish a legitimate 
business to serve as a front business for illegal goods (Schott, 2006). 
Subsequently, offenders will use vulnerable financial institutions to channel the 
financial flows and goods through the front enterprise. Products of illegal business 
can then be concealed within the products of the legitimate enterprise in the source 
country where both legal and illegal businesses were supplied.  For instance, 
drugs can be concealed in the floor tiles originating in a source country where the 
drug is produced. The financial transaction of a floor tiles enterprise is legal. 
However the financial flows attached to it by far exceed the value of the legal goods, 
and need be diverted through money laundering. 
 
Managing the Risk in the Transit Country (Nigeria) 
The illicit commodity in the transit country in Nigeria has to enter the county legally 
through customs. Normally, Nigerian Customs Service is required to conduct 100 
percent inspections on all imported goods to Nigeria. Managing the risk of 100 
percent inspection at the Nigeria seaport requires the collaboration of a corrupt 
senior law-enforcement officer who can give a directive to waive a 100 percent 
inspection of the goods imported by the OC offenders in Nigeria. The offender can 
then secure the illicit goods by paying bribes to the poorly remunerated low ranking 
officers of the customs service. 
 
 
Managing the Risk while Trafficking the Goods to the Demand Markets 
In order to bring the illicit commodities to the demand market, OC offenders 
disperse the risk by recruiting many drug couriers in the case of drug trafficking to 
embark on the same flight so that if some of them are arrested others will go 
undetected (UNODC, 2005). This risk is managed by drug courier specialists who 
recruit drug couriers from international students studying at demand markets, 
holiday-makers traveling to demand markets and the Nigerian individual with EU 
nationality or other nationality from other countries that have access to demand 
markets (NDLEA, 2009). The drug couriers manage the risk of distribution by 





drug or carrying them in their luggage via international borders to the demand 
markets located in the Europe (Ellis, 2009).      
 
This technique also applies at the destination country with a larger number of 
retailers carrying smaller amount of goods and money in managing this risk. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis elucidates further the normative of the risk management 
by the OC offender and their associates at demand markets located in Europe and 
America.  
 
Managing the Risk of Proceeds of Crime  
The proceeds of crime as generated in the destination countries have to be 
disguised and channelled back to the offender. In order to prevent the risk of loss 
of profit accrued from crime by the Nigeria OC offenders, foreign partners may be 
used to divert the profit of crime into the procurement of legitimate goods at the 
site country in Europe.  The legitimately imported goods can be sold below the 
cost price in Nigeria and the income from crime is re-integrated into the legal 
economy, e.g. importing of luxury cars from Europe and selling them in Nigeria 
(NDLEA, 2013). The Chapter 6 will further explore how the financial flows of OCGs 
are linked to the mode of operation of each specific type of organised crime 
evaluated in this research.  
 
5.3   Increasing the Risks of Organised Crime Transactions: Anti-Money   
Laundering Framework 
Any enhancement of the risks of transactions will increase the value of goods. 
Therefore law enforcement has a paradox effect. It increases the prospective 
value and therefore the incentive to commit the crime. In order to increase the 
detection of the transactions and to intercept the financial flows of the illegal 
business of OC group in West African and Nigeria in particular, Anti-money 
laundering (AML) framework must be applied to curb the menace of illicit financial 
follows. 
 
The FATF 40 Recommendations constitute the framework that countries should 
implement to increase the risk of committing organised crime and money 
laundering within the global communities, West Africa and Nigeria in particular. 
The components of the AML framework include (FATF, 2012:7): 





- to pursue money laundering and other related serious crime; 
- to apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated 
sectors;  
- to establish power and responsibilities for the competent authorities (e.g., 
investigative, law enforcement and supervisory authorities) and other 
institutional measures; and 
- to facilitate international cooperation”.    
 
The above elements of the AML framework of the FATF will be discussed in turn 
in this section to reflect how it increased the risk of organised crime transactions 
and business in general, and Nigeria in particular.  
 
5.3.1 AML Policies and Domestic Coordination to Combat the Organised 
Crime Risks 
For all countries to curb transactional risks of the organised crime group and that 
of other related serious crime, the FATF Recommendation 1 posits that all 
countries should identify, assess and mitigate risks of money laundering 
transactions on countries’ risk perspective (GIABA, 2015). 
 
Section 3(4) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (As Amended) is the 
interpretation of this recommendation in Nigeria. It illustrates that financial 
institutions (hereinafter, FIs) and designated non- financial institutions (DNFIs) 
shall take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate the risks where higher risks 
are identified; shall use simplified discretion where lower risks are identified but 
simplified measures shall not apply in the instances of suspicion of money 
laundering of lower risk transactions; and shall conduct customer due diligence in 
the case of cross-border correspondent banking and other similar relationships for 
the purpose of compliance with these recommendations. Conducting a risk based 
approach on the transactions of organised crime give countries a better 
perspective on how to manage those transactions. Countries resources can also 
be allocated judiciously to transactions that come with high risk.   
 
In achieving Recommendation 1, Recommendation 2 of the FATF posits that 
countries should designate a competent authority to monitor this task. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria is the frontier institution responsible for the issuance of regulations 





(Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), 2013). Section 4 to 6 of the CBN regulation 
compels the financial institutions to formulate and implement internal controls and 
procedures to prevent money laundering offenders from using financial institutions 
to launder the illicit income of their criminal activities (FRN, 2013). Therefore, 
financial institutions are expected to apply a risk based approach by identifying 
and managing their products and service risks in line with FATF recommendation 
1 (FATF, 2013) to prevent them from being vulnerable to the illicit transactions of 
organised crime group.  
 
5.3.2 Pursuing Illicit Flows of Organised Crime and Other Related Serious 
Crimes 
The first step in pursuing the illicit flows of organised crime group is that countries 
should apply the crime money laundering to all serious offences, including 
organised crime transactions (Schott, 2006; The World Bank, 2009; FATF, 
2012:R3). This criminalisation must be applied to all individuals and legal persons. 
It should also include other determining appropriate serious crimes on a country 
bases. These serious crimes must be criminalised in addition to illicit trade in drugs 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).  
 
For instance, the Nigerian content of serious crimes is referred to as an unlawful 
act in section 15 (6) of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (As Amended) 
and the following unlawful acts were criminalised by this act in line with FATF 
recommendation 3: participation in an organised criminal group; racketeering; 
terrorism; terrorist financing; trafficking in persons; smuggling of migrant; sexual 
exploitation; sexual exploitation of children; illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances; illicit arms trafficking; illicit trafficking in stolen goods; 
corruption; bribery; fraud; counterfeiting currency; counterfeiting and piracy of 
products; environmental crime; murder; grievous bodily injury; kidnapping; 
hostage taking; robbery or theft; smuggling (including in relation to customs and 
excise duties and taxes); tax crime (related to direct and indirect taxes); extortion; 
forgery; piracy; insider trading and market manipulation; or any other criminal act 
specified in the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 (As Amended) or any 
other law in Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria, has criminalised and labelled relevant OC businesses and other related 





broader list of crime than that suggested by the FATF. Nonetheless, organised 
criminal activities still persist in the country. Ratifications of standards may not 
really express the commitment to tackle crime in many countries with a high level 
of corruption at the top of affairs (Van Dijk, 2008:188). The criminalisation and 
labelling regime can only be effective in countries where the political will and good 
governance exist. Countries that lack the political will and good governance will 
only criminalise the underlying offences to money laundering on a face value. 
Bringing criminals to book against these unlawful acts will be very difficult if the 
political leaderships of such countries are perceived to be corrupt. This act 
liberalised the risk of committing organised crime in many developing countries.      
 
The second step to combat illicit transactions of organised crime groups is that all 
countries should put in place a legal framework that will achieve effective 
confiscation of proceeds of crimes within their jurisdiction. The confiscation regime, 
should consider “non-conviction based confiscation” (FATF, 2013:4). It pains OC 
offenders when the profit from crime is being taken away from them (World Bank, 
2009). Therefore an effective confiscation framework of anti-money regimes will 
increase the risk of committing the crime to the offenders and reduced the risk of 
transactions monitoring of organised crime business by competent authorities in 
the global states. This means that countries should demonstrate the ability to 
confiscate any proceeds of offenders that lack lawful origin of such property 
(GIABA, 2015). This framework stresses that countries should put in place an 
authority to (FATF, 2013:R4 p12): “(a) identify, trace and evaluate property that is 
subject to confiscation; (b) carry out provisional measures, such as freezing and 
seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of such property; (c) take steps 
that will prevent or avoid actions that prejudice the country’s ability to freeze or 
seize or recover property that is subject to confiscation; and (d) take any 
appropriate investigative measures”. 
 
In Nigeria, there appears to be a gap under this framework. The Money Laundering 
(Prohibition) Act, 2011 (As Amended) in Nigeria is not extensive enough to drive 
a robust confiscation regime for the country (GIABA, 2015:6). There is no unifying 
legislation on freezing or seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crimes in Nigeria. 
However, the component of confiscation and seizure of ill-gotten assets exist in 
the establishments Act of various competent authorities and agencies in Nigeria. 
Consequently, agencies with weak legislation on confiscation in the country 





offenders within the scope of their establishments while agencies with strong law 
on confiscations account for higher numbers of confiscations and convictions in 
Nigeria (see Chapter 6). The introduction of a unifying and robust legislation for a 
Nigerian confiscation regime would prevent offenders from benefiting from the 
fruits of crime, which is the ultimate objective of FATF Recommendation 4 of 2012.   
 
5.3.3 Preventive Measures Requested by Financial Institutions to Combat 
Transaction Risks of OC Group Offenders 
FATF Recommendations 9-23 highlighted numerous preventive measures that 
need to be adopted by financial institutions, especially banks in curbing the 
transactional risks of the organised crime group and other serious related crimes 
that can result in money laundering. These will be explored one by one in this 
section.      
 
Financial Institutions Secrecy Law 
The illicit transactions of organised crime offenders would prevail under banking 
regimes which operate with banking secrecy (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). 
It is against this backdrop that transnational crime offenders operate and channel 
their financial transactions through off-shore banking located at safe haven 
countries of the world where banking secrecy is operated. Therefore, countries 
where encouraged by the FATF to abrogate banking secrecy regime and rather to 
embrace financial system integrity regime by complying with various obligations 
set-out by this recommendation in achieving jurisdiction that is not vulnerable to 
the proceeds of crime (FATF, 2013). The countries that are susceptible to banking 
secrecy are where organised criminals groups usually operate their illicit 
transactions (World Bank, 2009). They hide their illicit profits in those safe havens 
to avoid investigations, prosecutions and confiscations of their ill-gotten assets 
(EFCC Investigator1).  
 
Consequently, countries should ensure that financial institutions’ secrecy laws do 
not promote transactions and operations of organised crime (FATF, 2012: R9). In 
order to mitigate the risk of transactional flows of the OC offender originating from 
safe haven countries, the FATF Recommendation 19 required countries to apply 
enhanced due diligence measure to business relationships and transactions with 
natural and legal persons, and financial institutions from countries identified by 





internationally generated by FATF and the United Nations (The World Bank, 2009). 
Consequently, countries should ensure that the type of enhanced due diligence 
and countermeasures adopted to curb these risks are appropriate and adequate 
to ‘dry’ ill-gotten flows originating from safe havens.  
 
Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping 
The AML framework requires the reporting institutions, including FIs to know their 
customers and keep records of transactions consummated by them during their 
business relationships with banks or other reporting institutions. The FATF 
Recommendation 10 and 11 spelt out the required measures expected by the 
reporting institution for doing this. It is against this backdrop that countries were 
advised to prevent financial institutions (FIs) and designated non-financial 
businesses and professions (DNFBPs) from keeping anonymous accounts with 
fictitious identities (FATF, 2012:R10).  In achieving this, the financial institutions 
are compelled to undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures when (FATF, 
2012): carrying out designated transactions within the threshold of USD/EUR 
15,000.00 or applicable wire transfers as subjected in Recommendation 16 of 
FATF; establishing business relationships; conducting occasional transactions; 
there is suspicion of money laundering transactions; there is doubts about the 
veracity or adequacy in customer identification data of any existing customers. 
The CCD measures expected by financial institutions (including banks) are as 
follows (FATF, 2012:R10 page 14): 
 
- “Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using 
reliable, independent source documents, data or information. 
- Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to 
verify the identity of the beneficial owner, such that the financial 
institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For 
legal persons and arrangements this should include financial 
institutions understanding the ownership and control structure of the 
customer. 
- Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the 
purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. 
- Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and 
scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that 





consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their 
business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of 
funds”. 
 
Significant preventive measures require the financial institutions (FIs), including 
bank and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) to keep, 
"for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic and 
international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the 
competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of 
individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved, if 
any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity" 
(FATF, 2012:R11).   This recommendation expresses further that FIs “should be 
required to keep all records obtained through CDD measures (e.g. copies or 
records of official identification documents like passports, identity cards, driving 
licences or similar documents), account files and business correspondence, 
including the results of any analysis undertaken (e.g. inquiries to establish the 
background and purpose of complex, unusual large transactions), for at least five 
years after the business relationship is ended, or after the date of the occasional 
transaction” (FATF, 2012:R11). 
 
Recommendation 17 of the FATF also allows countries to permit the financial 
institutions and other reporting institutions to outsource their commitment of 
Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping to a competent third party, once 
certain criteria are met. However, the ultimate responsibilities of the CCD 
measures remain with the reporting institutions outsourcing to the third party. The 
below are the criteria set-up by FATF to achieve the reliance on third parties for 
Recommendations 10 and 12(FATF, 2012:R17): 
 
- “A financial institution relying upon a third party should immediately obtain 
the necessary information concerning elements (a)-(c) of the CDD 
measures set out in Recommendation 10. 
- Financial institutions should take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that 
copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to 
the CDD requirements will be made available from the third party upon 
request without delay. 
- The financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated, 





with, CDD and record-keeping requirements in line with Recommendations 
10 and 11. 
- When determining in which countries the third party that meets the 
conditions can be based, countries should have regard to information 
available on the level of country risk”. 
 
Political Exposed Persons (PEPs) 
Additionally, organised criminal groups associate with political exposed persons 
(PEPs) and OC offenders also participate in the political governance of the global 
space.  Chapter 2, 4 and 6 of this thesis reveal how the success of organised 
crime is linked to the collaboration of the politically exposed persons. Therefore, 
countries should ensure that financial institutions and designated non-financial 
businesses and professions (DNFBPs) have an appropriate risk-management 
framework to determine the customers or the beneficial owners that are political 
exposed persons (PEPs) (FATF, 2012:R12) from making financial institution 
vulnerable to the transaction of the OC offenders. The FIs and DNFBPs must take 
reasonable measures to determine their source of funds and conduct enhanced 
transactional monitoring of the PEPs dealings within their banks (GIABA, 2008). 
Furthermore, recommendation 12 posits that all continuing and new business 
relationships of the FIs with the PEPs require the approval of senior management 
of the banks before they are consummated. The significant of this clause put 
responsibility of monitoring and mitigation of transactions risk of this category of 
customers on the senior management team for effective control of transaction 
opportunities that avail themselves to the OC offenders in the financial institutions.  
 
High Risk Financial Services and Products Measures  
The sensitivity of certain services and products rendered by reporting institutions 
and the banks require close monitoring and countermeasure to prevent the 
vulnerability of reporting institutions to the organised crime and their criminal 
network. It is against this backdrop that the FATF recommendations 13 to 16 
highlighted certain compliance requirements for the financial institutions including 
banks to follow when conducting such services or products during their banking 
operation.  
 
First, the operation of international trade requires correspondent banking to settle 





group also operates transnational crime that involve settlement of financial 
obligations among criminal networks located in the global South and the global 
North. This was explained in the Chapter 1 of this thesis when exploring the 
characteristics of organised crime. It is in this vein that recommendation 13 of the 
FATF requires financial institutions to put stringent measures in place to counter 
the opportunity provided by correspondent banking to shield the illicit profit 
generated from the crime (FATF, 2012:R13). This recommendation requires the 
FIs to adopt more robust measures in addition to the normal customer due 
diligence when conducting cross-border correspondent banking and other similar 
financial services relationships. This is to prohibit the FIs from entering into, or 
continuing, a correspondent banking relationship with shell banks operating in the 
safe haven to drive ‘home’ the proceeds of organised crime from the off-shore 
countries to the offenders. These countermeasures are, to (FATF, 2012: R13, p16):  
 
- “gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to 
understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business and to 
determine from publicly available information the reputation of the 
institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has 
been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation 
or regulatory action; 
- assess the respondent institution’s  AML/CFT controls; 
- obtain approval from senior management before establishing new 
correspondent relationships; 
- clearly understand the respective responsibilities of each institution; 
and 
- be satisfied that the respondent bank has conducted CDD on the 
customers having direct access to accounts of the correspondent 
bank, and that it is able to provide relevant CDD information upon 
request to the correspondent bank, with respect to “payable-through 
accounts”. 
 
Second, countries should take measures to ensure that natural or legal persons 
that provide money or value transfer services (MVTS) are registered, licensed and 
regulated for effective monitoring of their operation within the countries’ AML 
regime (FATF, 2012:R13). It is against this background that transactions of OC 
offenders through MVTS are regulated and monitored. This measure also required 





prospective OC offenders. Countries should also have a sanction regime that is 
appropriate to penalize MVTS operators that allow their system to be susceptible 
to the organised crime offender and other related serious crime. In Nigeria for 
instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria compels the Western Union and Money 
Gram money services operators to register with CBN.  Additionally, the operation 
of MVTS is regulated to domicile within the financial institutions operation in the 
country (FRN, 2013). This provides additional control since AML transactions are 
better regulated through the financial institutions. 
 
Furthermore, Recommendations 24 and 25 also posits that countries should 
ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the beneficial 
ownership and control of legal persons and express trusts, including information 
on the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries, that can be obtained or accessed in a 
timely fashion by competent authorities. This is to guarantee countries to prevent 
the misuse of legal person or legal arrangements for money laundering and other 
related serious crime (FATF, 2012:R24 & 25).   
 
Third, Recommendation 16 of the FATF’s AML framework requires the FIs to 
establish the information on the identity of originator and the beneficial ownerships 
of wire transfer transactions and other related messages throughout the payment 
chain when conducting wire transfer transactions (FATF, 2012). This is because 
transactions of OC group constitute a complex 'web' of illicit transfers of money 
and value. The method of illicit transfers and the money flows of the OC offender 
will be extensively explored in the Chapter 6 of this thesis. Monitoring the identity 
of the transactions originator and that of beneficial ownership of illicit flows 
increased the risk of committing organised crime and other serious crime, since 
identity of the beneficial ownership of proceeds of crime can be generated by the 
FIs and furnished to law-enforcement authority for appropriate investigation 
activities on confiscation and seizure of illicit assets originated from proceeds of 
crime (GIABA, 2015).  
 
Fourth, the advent of technologies for the operation of banking products and 
services provides transactions opportunities for the OC offenders when 
manipulating their illicit flows. Nowadays, offenders can open an account without 
his/her physical presence in any of the bank branches, using Internet and 
computer electronically from homes or offices to subscribe to an electronic 





proceeds of crime to move faster using Non-face-to-face customer based 
accounts (FRN, 2013). Therefore, the principle of know you customer (KYC) will 
require enhanced customer due diligence for this category of customers' operating 
using such banking services or products (FATF, 2012:R15; FRN, 2013). 
Consequent to the fact that money moves faster using technologies, the FATF 
Recommendation 15 requires countries to ensure that their financial institutions 
and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) identify and 
assess the illicit financial flow and transaction risks that may be associated to: 
"development of new products and new business practices, including new delivery 
mechanism; and the use of new or developing technologies for both new and per-
existing products" (FATF, 2012:R15). The financial institutions will be able to 
manage and mitigate the inherent risks that come with products and services 
associated with new technologies and this increases the risks of committing 
transnational crime within the global states.  
 
Internal Control Programme 
Deployment and implementation of a robust internal control system for the 
business operations of the reporting institutions limit the risk of money laundering 
and counter the success of organised crime transactions and businesses in the 
global states (FRN, 2013). It is in this vein that the FATF Recommendation 18 
requires reporting institutions  to implement an internal control system reflecting 
on the operation of their business activities at head office and branch offices 
located at home and abroad (2012:R18). The internal control system must include 
policies document and the commitment of the group company to comply with the 
AML regime of countries where it operates its business activities. The internal 
control framework of the group company should include the “policies and 
procedures for sharing information within the group for AML purposes" (FATF, 
2012:18). 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria, for instance, issued a guideline to all financial 
institutions and other financial institutions, requesting them to reflect their AML 
compliance requirements in the internal control systems of their companies in the 








Reporting Suspicious Transactions  
Before the introduction of AML regimes, suspicious transactions of OC offenders 
and other related offences were not properly coordinated and reported to the 
competent agency (NFIU Analyst 3).  
The introduction of the AML regimes necessitated the establishment of the 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), to receive, and analysis financial disclosure 
(Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Transaction Reports 
(STRs)) and to disseminate intelligence reports generated therein to competent 
authorities (NFIU Analyst 5). The sharing of intelligence reports of suspicious 
transactions assists the law enforcement agencies to follow the money trail of the 
OC offenders. This has increased the risk of losing ill-gotten assets and proceeds 
generated from OC activities to states confiscation, seizure and forfeiture in many 
countries (EFCC Investigator 2). 
 
Recommendation 23 of the FATF posits that Recommendations 18 to 20 shall 
apply to all designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), within 
the following categories (FATF, 2012):  
- “Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions 
when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction 
in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of 
Recommendation 22. Countries are strongly encouraged to extend 
the reporting requirement to the rest of the professional activities of 
accountants, including auditing. 
- Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones should be 
required to report suspicious transactions when they engage in any 
cash transaction with a customer equal to or above the applicable 
designated threshold. 
- Trust and company service providers should be required to report 
suspicious transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, 
they engage in a transaction in relation to the activities referred to in 







5.3.4 The Preventive Power and Responsibilities of Competent 
Authorities in Combating Transactions of OC offenders and 
Other Related Crimes 
 
This section focuses on the regulation and supervision framework required 
to monitor and control the reporting institutions obligatory to comply with the 
anti-money laundering regime in the global states. The powers and 
responsibilities of the law enforcement authorities will also be discussed.  
 
Regulation and Supervision 
The transactions of organised crime group will be secured in countries where the 
regulatory framework is weak (The World Bank, 2009; Walker & Unger, 2009; see 
also Chapter 6).  This act was further illustrated in the BCCI case text box 3.1 of 
Chapter 3 in this thesis. In that case, the organised criminal networks and their 
associates hijacked the control of the bank to perpetrate and secure the illicit 
movements of their proceeds of crime. It is against this backdrop that 
Recommendation 25 of FATF advised countries to have a robust legal and 
regulatory framework that can "prevent criminals or their associates from holding, 
or being the beneficial owner of, a significant or controlling interest, or holding a 
management function in, a financial institution. Countries should not approve the 
establishment, or continued operation, of shell banks" (FATF, 2012:R26).  
 
The recommendation advised further, that the AML framework should be 
incorporated into regulatory framework of prudential supervision of the financial 
institutions and other reporting institutions by their supervisory body (FATF, 2012). 
The supervisory responsibilities should also include licensing, registering, 
regulating, monitoring and ensuring compliance with national AML/CFT 
requirements of the reporting institutions to prevent their operations for being 
vulnerable to the activities of organised crime transactions and businesses. 
 
Furthermore, the Recommendations 27 and 28 of the FATF gives the supervisory 
bodies of the reporting institutions (RIs), including that of financial institutions (FIs) 
and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) the power to 
compel RIs or FIs to make available any information relevant to monitor the illicit 
transaction of OC group and other related serious crime for effective 
implementation of National AML regimes. Recommendation 35 also grants the 





proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or administrative, 
available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by Recommendations 6, 
and 8 to 23, that fails to comply with AML/CFT requirements. Sanctions should be 
applicable not only to financial institutions and DNFBPs, but also to their directors 
and senior management” (FATF, 2012:R35). The Central Bank of Nigeria also 
compels the financial institutions to publish such sanctions when applicable in their 
annual report for public knowledge (CBN Regulator 2). This put the status of such 
bank into reputational risk. Therefore, the sanction regime has a negative impact 
on the success of organised crime transactions and businesses.  
 
Law Enforcement Responsibilities and Powers 
For countries to increase the risks of transactions of OC group, FATF 
recommendation 29 required nations to establish Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
that serve as “a national centre for the receipt and analysis of: (a) suspicious 
transaction reports; and (b) other information relevant to money laundering, 
associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and for the dissemination of 
the results of that analysis”. The FIU is the national vocal point for the AML regime, 
where suspicious transaction reports of the organised criminal offenders and other 
related serious crime offenders are developed to provide an intelligence package 
for onward delivery to relevant law enforcement agencies responsible for curbing 
organised crime within global jurisdictions.  
 
For example in Nigeria, the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) is fully 
operational and collaborates with other law enforcement agencies to mitigate the 
transactions risk of OC group by sending them specific intelligence report related 
to their operations. These agencies are: (a) The Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), to fight financial flows of Advance Fee Fraud of cybercrime 
and other financial crime in the Country; Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), this agency is responsible for curbing drug trafficking organised crime 
business in Nigeria; and National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons 
and Other Related Matters, (NAPTIP), the agency in charge of mitigating the threat 
of traffic in persons in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, Recommendation 30 posits that relevant law enforcement agencies 
responsible for the investigation and the fight against organised crime illicit 





laundering, associated predicate offence and other related serious crime (FATF, 
2013:R30; World Bank, 2009). This responsibility should include: identifying, 
tracing, freezing and seizing of illicit assets subject to confiscation or is suspected 
of being proceeds of crime (FATF, 2012: R30). It is in this vein that national law 
enforcement agencies collaborate with “appropriate competent authorities in other 
countries” to share investigation intelligence on the transactions of OC group 
offenders (FATF, 2012). Additionally, recommendation 31 gives the law 
enforcement agencies and other competent authorities the power to compel 
reporting institutions (financial institutions, DNFBPs and other natural or legal 
persons) to produce documentation held in their custody “for the search of persons” 
(including organised crime offenders) “and premises, for taking witness 
statements, and for the seizure and obtaining of evidence” (FATF, 2012:R31). 
 
The transactions of organised crime groups require movement of cash from one 
jurisdiction to another. Therefore, Recommendation 32 advised countries to have 
appropriate measures in place capable of detecting physical cross-border cash 
couriers, including transporting of   currency and bearer negotiable instruments for 
effective currency declaration regime for the counties (FATF, 2012:R32). This 
recommendation puts the illicit cash and currencies of OC offender into 
confiscation risk, since the recommendation also request countries to demonstrate 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to deal with persons who make 
false declaration(s) or disclosure(s).  
 
5.3.5   International Cooperation Against the Illicit Transactions of 
Organised Crime Group 
In the pursuit to curb the vulnerability of organised crime transactions in the 
international arena, countries must cooperate on a global scale in fighting the 
crime. They will need to ratify and implement international standards and 
conventions to combat organised crime and money laundering (see Chapter 4). 
This will require administration of mutual legal assistance (MLA) among countries 
collaborating to combat the crime. The MLA framework should be able to assist in 
identifying, tracing, and confiscating illicit profits from organised crime businesses. 
The offenders that are on the ‘run’ must be extradited from one global state to 
another, to face the consequence of their criminality. The FATF recommendations 





cooperation when combating organised crime transactions on a global scale, this 
will be discussed in turn in this section. 
 
International Cooperation Instruments    
In the light to have a robust legal framework to confiscate proceeds generated 
from organised crime and other related serious crimes within the global States, 
first, the FATF Recommendation 36 encouraged countries to ratify and implement  
various international instruments and conventions to combat organised crime and 
money laundering (GIABA, 2012). These instruments and the conventions are 
basis of which countries cooperate to share investigation intelligences on the 
operation of organised crime networks within the global states (GIABA, 2013). The 
ratification and implementation of this conventions and instruments provide the 
platform of corporation for the ratifying countries dealing with money trail of 
organised crime offenders. The migration of organised crime revenue from one 
country to another becomes unsecured when offenders move money among 
ratifying countries. Chapter 4 of this thesis identifies ranges of predicate offenses 
that required international collaboration of competent agencies in curbing illicit flow 
of criminal revenue, including organised crime globally.   
 
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
Second, Recommendation 37 requires countries to engage in provisions of mutual 
legal assistance (MLA) in relation to the transactions of organised crime and 
money laundering (FATF, 2012:R37; World Bank and IMF, 2006; Commonwealth, 
2006). There should be adequate legal framework, such as treaties and 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) to achieve effective MLA among global 
countries to combat illicit transactions and vulnerabilities of organised crime group 
within global states (Schott, 2006; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). The 
thematic objective of Recommendation 37 is that countries should (FATF, 2012: 
R37):  
 
- “Not prohibit, or place unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions 
on, the provision of mutual legal assistance. 
- Ensure that they have clear and efficient processes for the timely 
prioritisation and execution of mutual legal assistance requests. 





official mechanism, for effective transmission and execution of 
requests. To monitor progress on requests, a case management 
system should be maintained. 
- Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the 
sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal 
matters. 
- Not refuse to execute a request for mutual legal assistance on the 
grounds that laws require financial institutions or DNFBPs to 
maintain secrecy or confidentiality (except where the relevant 
information that is sought is held in circumstances where legal 
professional privilege or legal professional secrecy applies). 
- Maintain the confidentiality of mutual legal assistance requests 
they receive and the information contained in them, subject to 
fundamental principles of domestic law, in order to protect the 
integrity of the investigation or inquiry. If the requested country 
cannot comply with the requirement of confidentiality, it should 
promptly inform the requesting country”. 
 
Mutual Legal Assistance: Freezing and Confiscation 
Third, Recommendation 38 of the FATF posits that countries should collaborate 
on achieving a coordinated regime for confiscation and freezing of proceeds of 
crime generated from organised crime and other related serious crimes. The 
recommendation specified that countries should put in place an institutional 
framework that can expedite actions on foreign requests and dissemination of 
intelligence report to identify, freeze, seize, and confiscate illicit assets of 
organised crime and other related crimes (FATF,2012:R38). The prospective 
competent agencies of a country must also have power to request for the same 
mutual assistance from their counterpart foreign law enforcement agencies 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).  
The cooperation among the international competent authorities put the ill-gotten 
assets of OC offenders to the risk of assets confiscation and forfeiture of their 
revenue to the law enforcement agencies in the countries where they operate, 
since the mutual legal assistance on freezing and confiscation of the FATF 
Recommendation 38 consolidates global confiscation of profits of crime from one 
country to another. This provides global states the opportunity to confiscate 





Extradition of the Organised Crime Offenders 
Finally, in combating the transactions of OC group, the offenders of crime must be 
made to serve punishment in the jurisdiction where crime is being committed 
whenever they are on the ‘run’, in order to avoid the pain and consequent of 
committing crime. It is against this backdrop, that the FATF Recommendation 39 
posits that countries should have a robust legal framework to extradite offenders 
from their country of harbour to the country where the crime is being committed. 
The extradition legal framework should be robust enough to prevent countries for 
becoming safe havens for offenders when they are being charge for money 
laundering and associated underlying predicate offences, including organised 
crime (FATF, 2012, World Bank, 2009). 
 
The risks of committing organised crime is increased when countries' extradition 
frameworks allow them to extradite their “own nationals, or, where a country does 
not do so solely on the grounds of nationality, that country should, at the request 
of the country seeking extradition, submit the case, without undue delay, to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution of the offences set forth in 
the request" (FATF, 2012:29). Additionally, extradition of offender provides global-
states the opportunity to charge money laundering and underlying predicate 
offences on a country base perspective, that is to say offender can be prosecuted 
for one offence in two countries or more. The concept of dual criminality further 
increased the transaction risks of OC offenders since they would be forced to face 
punishment of their crime at the place of harbour after returning home from jail 
term in the jurisdiction where crime is committed.    
 
      5.4   Critics of Anti-Money Laundering Context 
Tsingou (2005) postulated that the most frequently quoted estimated figure of money 
laundering account for 2 percent and percent of the global Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP); this was put to about $2 trillion by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
However, it is highly difficult to account for how much money is laundered in the 
globalisation of crime.  Afterwards, there are empirical and conceptual problems in 
measuring the proceeds of crime (Halliday, Levi and Reuter, 2014). John Walker 
suggests and concludes in his work, “modelling global money laundering flows” that 
parameters used for the calculation of money laundering at national, regional and global 






The total income from crime can only be attained after considering the spending and 
saving habits of the offenders during the investigation activities of the LEAs (Levi and 
Osofsky, 1995:4). It is important to note that the proceeds of crime confiscated by law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) are usually in deficit of the spending habits of the 
offenders. These habits are usually difficult to reconstruct and bring to book by law-
enforcement when crime is being detected.  Spending habits might include that of: 
luxury holidays; luxury goods and items; and luxury gifts, including movable and non-
movable assets that were acquired with the profit of crime but which are not held in the 
name of the offenders. The criminal justice system can only confiscate those illicit funds 
that were held in the name of the criminals or those that were traced to their associates 
in crime.  
 
There are always hidden assets somewhere and it is submitted that the search light of 
law enforcement will not be able to reach them.  Such hidden assets sometimes serve 
as saving grace for the offender to fall back on in the future after receiving determined 
punishment of the crime by the criminal justice system. Levi and Reuter rightly put it that 
the enjoyment of the “fruit” of organised crime groups often takes the form of “immediate 
consumption” and “future economic opportunities” (2006:289). These future economic 
opportunities are usually banked and secured in offshore banks located in the safe 
haven countries (The World Bank, 2009).   The parameters to determine the spending 
and saving habits records of the offender remains unknown to the competent authorities.  
The disparity of these two parameters formed the “dark side” of the global estimate for 
money laundering.    
 
Additional criticism that is worthy of mentioning is that of the risk based approach in 
managing the threats resulting from sensitive products, services and other transactions 
originated from the operation of the reporting institutions [financial institutions, other 
non-financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions 
(DNFBPs)].The anti-money laundering risk based approach is qualitative in nature as 
compared with most prudential risks (for example market, liquidity and credit risks) (The 
World Bank, 2009:6), which is quantitatively accommodated. This makes supervision of 
anti-money laundering compliance requirements difficult to achieve and poorly 
developed as compared to risk based prudential supervision (Halliday, Levi & Reuter, 
2014). For instance most reporting institutions can manage and accommodate certain 






It is submitted that there is no acceptable level of risks that can be tolerated under AML 
risks, since a low risk customer of the reporting institution can graduate to a very high 
risk customer at any point in time. This might be caused by a change in the nature of 
the customer’s profile or the nature of highly sensitive transactions consummated by the 
banks customers. A robust AML risk based approach is very expensive and it requires 
a very sound technical know-how to achieve this in a developing economy. The nature 
of high risk product and services offered by the banks compel and force the financial 
institutions to deploy very expensive tools and technologies where necessary. The 
consequential effect of this approach would then increase anti-money laundering 
compliance pressures among the reporting institutions [financial institutions, other non-
financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions 
(DNFBPs)] in Nigeria, when there is insufficient budget to deploy expensive tools and 
technologies. 
 
The Anti-money laundering legislation comes at a cost (Masciandro, 2007; Lopez-De-
Silanes, 2007). The cost can be further classified into three categories. Firstly, it was 
argued that honest people are having a harder time incurring cost to shield their assets 
from corrupt government officials that may use the legislation to hunt their wealth from 
them and from the criminal networks that may seek ransom through kidnapping (Rahn, 
2001). This creates additional criminal opportunities in the global states. Secondly, 
additional cost is required to increase the services of law enforcements and creation of 
competent agencies by the global states to combat “a new criminal industry to evade 
the new laws” (Rahn, 2001). Thirdly, the regime has negative impacts on the operations 
of the banks (Chong and Lopez-De-Silanes, 2007). Many banks have to redirect their 
operational cost to fulfill their anti- money laundering obligations in order to avoid 
reputational risks for transacting in ‘‘dirty’’ money (Chong and Lopez-De-Silanes, 2007). 
This shrinks the available funds for prudential and operational obligations of the banks 
and other reporting stakeholders.     
 
Furthermore, the recent work of Halliday, Levi & Reuter (2014) posits a constructive 
criticism on assessing assessments of regimes to control money laundering. Their work 
exposed fundamental lapses on the evaluation reports of the international standards 
setters [International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)] 
of anti-money laundering regimes. These are international institutions set-up to assess 
countries’ progress on their anti-money laundering regimes. The lapses argued by 






a) The focus of the standard setters is mainly on formal compliance and 
implementation of recommendations and standards. Little attention was given to 
programme and outcome effectiveness; 
b) The risk based mechanisms were poorly developed and do not form a 
substantive integral part of the anti-money laundering regime frameworks; 
c) There is absence of systematic qualitative or quantitative anti-money laundering 
data in most countries where the standards were domesticated, (this means the 
implemented of this anti-money laundering laws); 
d) There are evidences of substantial gaps in the assessment process set-up by  
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF);  
e) There are gaps in human capital development and the quality of employees 
engaged by the IMF and FATF for the role of country assessors in the 
assessment of countries’ AML regime;   
f) The countries were compelled to adopt the same recommendations and 
standards and were not given opportunity to proffer their own “creative 
alternatives” within their own circumstances, and; 
g) The failure on the part of standard setters to attempt and conduct costs and/or 
benefits analysis of the AML regime on countries and reporting entities where 
these regimes were domesticated is fundamental criticism. 
 
The overall conclusion of Halliday, Levi & Reuter (2014) was that, the standards setters 
should consider a more appropriate scientific alternative approach for producing 
effective programme and outcomes within the global anti-money laundering regimes. 
This would proffer solution for the major setback of empirical and conceptual problems 
in measuring the profits of crime. According to Halliday, Levi & Reuter (2014) the 
successful outcomes of the AML regimes will depend on how much of the criminals 
proceeds of organised crime groups were being traced, intercepted and confiscated 












 5.5   Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Transaction Validation Model: The 
Answer to Outcome Effectiveness of the AML Regimes 
The researcher explored the work of Ashby (1957) in proffering a scientific solution 
to measure the outcome effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) regimes 
among regional and global states. This AML Transaction Validation Model can be 
deployed to monitor illicit financial flows in any part of the world. In doing this, the 
concept of customer identification programme (CIP) will be explored using 
cybernetics framework. CIP also referred to as Know Your Customer (KYC) 
principle; KYC principle is the fundamental principle for identifying the offenders of 
money laundering and it also provides the documentary evidence used by law 
enforcement agencies when following the money trails of offenders for preventive 
and confiscation purposes.   
 
Ashby (1957), in "An introduction to Cybernetics", defines cybernetics as "the 
science of control and communication, in the animal and the machine”. A 
cybernetics framework can be applied to measure and control the flows of funds 
from the core baking application of the bank (machine) initiated by the individual 
customer of the bank or the prospective offender (‘animal’) of the crime money 
laundering. According to Ashby, cybernetics offers a framework of which all 
individual machines may be ordered to communicate and understood and it is 
linked to information theory. Ashby (1957) also posits that cybernetics provides 
the researcher with the ability to manipulate the machine by asking “what are all 
the possible behaviours that it can produce?” It is in this quest that the researcher 
explores all possible outcomes that can be produced using the core banking 
application machine of the banks and the telephone mobile electronics machine 
of the bank’s customers to proffer scientific solution to solve the problem of 














Figure 5.2: AML Transaction Validation Model Architecture  
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This research strives to provide a scientific solution to the problem of the principle 





sector and to achieve affective implementation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Regimes within the global states. It is in this view that this thesis suggests the 
possibility of scientific communication between the account holders (human being) 
and the core banking application (machine) of the bank, where customer 
identification documentations are maintained and financial transactions are 
consummated.  
 
The communication between the account holders’ electronics mobile phone and 
the core baking application machine of the financial institutions or other reporting 
institutions may provide the following compliance behaviours of the machines 
using cybernetics model of the “AML Transaction Validation Model” designed by 
this research, the possible behaviours expected by this model are: transaction and 
know your customer (KYC) validation; a financial tool to follow the money trail; and 
an anti-identity theft solution. The first behaviour or outcome expected by the AML 
Transaction model is that it will provide the regimes the ability to validate the 
legitimacy of all transactions consummated in the bank based on online and in real 
time using the telephone mobile number provided by the account holder when the 
accounts were opened or updated. The AML Transaction Validation Model would 
provide unique codes for all transactions at any time when transactions are 
initiated and consummated within banks and other reporting institutions before 
money or value can be moved out from the core application system where 
transactions are consummated. Furthermore, the Model will validate the identity 
of the customers before transactions can be initiated or consummated in the bank.   
 
Second, it will provide the mechanism to follow the money trail of the organised 
crime offenders. Since validation codes could be created using the AML 
Transaction Validation schema, to monitor the flows of the illicit funds of all 
transactions consummated in the banks and financial platform of other reporting 
institutions. This provides the law enforcement agencies and other competent 
authorities the ability to follow the money trail for confiscation and seizure purpose 
in online real time. The law enforcement agencies can also give instructions to the 
banks and other reporting entities not to validate any suspicious transaction 
initiated from their core baking application or from that of other financial institution 
transaction platform applications. 
 
Third, the AML Transaction Model will be able to minimise the problem of identity 





the account holders before any transaction can be authenticated. Consequently, 
the account information of any account holder would be useless to the cybercrime 
offenders if they do not have access to the mobile phone and/or have interaction 
with the real account holder whenever real transactions or ‘fraudulent’ transactions 
are to be consummated by the third party or the offender.     
 
The component of the suggested scientific AML Transaction Validation Model by 
this research will be described in five (5) stages of the workflow of this model, 
which are; the customer identification stage; the core banking application stage; 
the AML transaction validation schema;  the system generated validation codes, 
and;  transaction authentication stage. 
 
5.5.1 Customer Identification Stage: The Know Your Customer 
Components of the Model 
The first stage of this model is to understand and identify what constitutes the 
customer identification programme (CIP) of the reporting institutions of the AML 
regimes, and the bank in particular. The CIP rule requires reporting institution, 
including banks to maintain a certain identification programme for their customers 
as a fundamental basis of countries' AML regimes requirement (FATF, 2012). The 
CIP is the basis on which the banks and other reporting institutions (RIs) of the 
AML regimes use in verifying the identity and risk component of each customer 
who initiates a banking relationship and engages in other transaction dealings with 
the bank and relevant IRs. This proffers the reporting institutions the ability to 
understand the relevant risk associated with their customers’ transactions. The 
required information requested by the bank to open an account or to commence 
banking relationship with their customer may include following: the Name, Address, 
Date of birth, Social Security Number or Identification Number, Occupation of 
customers; the type of accounts; nature of the businesses; and the Nationality 
(FRN, 2013). 
In the banking institutions, the customer identification programme would include 
the minimum of the following procedure at any point in time as suggested by 
Securities Industry Association (SIA): 
 
- “the types of identifying information required by the customer; 
- the procedure to verifying the customers' identity;  





- the procedure to match customers' identify with the suspicious list of the 
country or UN watch list;  
- the procedure to notify the customers that their identity would be verified 
before their account can be operational; and 
- the procedure indicating the action required by the reporting institutions 
when it finds it difficult to verify their customers’ accounts”. 
 
Despite the existence of CIP within the operations of the RIs, there have been 
many instances where the CIP has failed to establish the true identity of the 
customer and/or offender wherever money laundering crime is being committed. 
Furthermore, many of the identifying information gathered during some cases of 
money laundering in Nigeria reviewed that fake identities were given by the 
offenders when opening their account in the banks for the purpose of committing 
crime (EFCC Investigator1). This made it difficult to follow the ‘dirty’ money of the 
offender during the investigation activities of the law enforcement agencies in 
Nigeria. 
 
It is against this background, that the AML Transaction Validation Model of this 
research suggests that mobile telephone numbers of customers should be made 
a mandatory requirement in the elements that constitute the customer 
identification programme of the RIs and the banking institution in particular. The 
telephone mobile number will serve as unique identifier for each customer, since 
two customers of the bank cannot claim the same mobile number.  
Furthermore, in developing countries, there is often no social security number or 
a unique national number for the citizen in many of those countries, this made it 
difficult to ascertain the identity of customers during the investigation of money 
laundering cases in Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 2). Additionally, in developed 
countries where social security numbers exist, the cybercrime offenders are 
frequently defrauding and stealing the identities and financial information of 
citizens in those countries to perpetrate crime (Rider, 2012)       
The significance of the mobile telephone numbers of the customers of the 
reporting institutions, including the banks, creates scientific compliance order in 
the workflow of this model for effective AML regimes within the global states. It 
forms the platform for the interaction between the core banking application 
machine (the electronic server system of the banks) and transactions validation 
concept by the customers using mobile telephones. In the work of Ashby (1957:28), 





“discrete machine”. The discrete machine is a machine that produced 
transformation as result of change in discrete jumps from its normal function. The 
discrete jump here is that this model adopts the mobile telephone number of the 
bank customers to act as a validation machine for all transactions initiated and 
consummated in the bank and other reporting institutions for the AML regimes. 
 
5.5.2   Core Banking Applications/Other Reporting Institutions Transaction 
Application Platform Stage 
The core banking application is the central processing unit of a bank that is 
supported by a group of bank branches where customers can access their bank 
accounts to conduct and consummate transactions from any of the member 
branch offices (Greer & Narter, 2012). Therefore, core banking stand for 
centralised online real-time business process of the banks. Greer & Narter posit 
that “the global core banking market looks mature, with a significant percentage of 
banks having replaced their legacy systems with more efficient and flexible core 
banking systems”. 
 
According to Axxiome (2011), a typical core banking application of a financial 
institution is illustrated in table 5.1. 
 
In the second stage of this mode, the mobile telephone number of the bank’s 
customers will be included in the customer data management platform of the core 
banking application to serve as a unique identifier for each customer. This will be 
situated in the customer’s account domain also refers to as the traditional 
customer information file (CIF) (Scott, 2008). This unique identifier will interact with 
other components of the core banking application to ascertain the legitimacy of 
bank’s customers whenever transaction is being initiated and consummated in the 













Table 5.1: Core Banking Components  
I – Banking Application Architecture 
Platform 
Underlying technical foundation for all systems and applications. 
Represents the basis for a service oriented architecture used 
across the integrated platform. 
II – Customer Data Management Central system for business partner management serving multiple 
banking applications. 
III – Frontend Interface between users and backend systems. Presents data stored 
and calculated in the back-end in a well-arranged business supporting 
way. 
IV – Customer Relationship 
Management 
System to manage customer and sales prospect interactions from a 
sales or marketing perspective by providing technologies to automate 
and organize business processes. 
V – Analytical Banking Bank controlling system containing technical solutions for analytical 
processes in fields like risk management, BASEL II, IFRS or 
profitability analysis. 
VI – Transactional Banking Transactional banking covers the processing of operational banking 
transactions managed by account managing systems. These are 
responsible to support the complete lifecycle of accounts or contracts. 
VII – Enterprise Banking Enterprise applications for all industries to support common business 
processes, such as quality management, human resources or financial 
accounting. 
VIII – Business Intelligence A BI system supports business decision processes by providing client 
specific historical, current, or predictive views on business operations. 
IX – Transaction Broker A transaction broker connects the banking system to the outside world, 
mainly focusing on payment transaction flows. 
X – Teller Application Teller applications provide user interface solutions for tellers to support 
customer transactions like payment transfers, deposits and 
withdrawals, foreign exchange cash transactions etc. 
XI – Further Applications Further bank applications outside the banking application platform 
Source: Axxiome (2011)  
 
The banks will need to update their legacy data (legacy data is referred to as the 
historical data before the implementation or deployment of a model) to ensure all 
customer information files are up to date in order to achieve the effectiveness of 
this model. Customers whose telephone mobile numbers are not included in the 
customer data management platform will not be able to authenticate their 
transactions going forwards, because the rule engine of the server architecture will 
not recognise them whenever they initiate transactions using AML Transaction 







5.5.3   AML Transaction Validation Schema 
The significance of the AML Transaction Validation Model is that it will be designed 
with the AML Transaction Validation Schema and the model can be domesticated 
globally. In the workflow of this Model, at this stage, the Validation Schema creates 
the regulation and compliance order within the core bank application components. 
The schema will be a short code computer program language that will be written 
by a computer programmer to communicate with the core banking application 
server and the telephone mobile phone of customer on online real-time whenever 
transactions is indicated by the customer of the bank. These short codes will 
require the collaboration of the mobile telephone service providers that host the 
mobile numbers of the individual customers’ of the banks in their 
telecommunication database. 
 
Having written the schema, it will be deployed to sit on the core banking application 
server of the banks to screen the customer data management platform by verifying 
the mobile number of the customer in the core banking data base. It will then send 
a signal to the Business Intelligence (BI) platform of the core bank application to 
validate customer’s transactions that come with unique telephone mobile number 
identifiers and it will decline transactions that lack the unique identifier as designed 
in the engine rule of the server in the stage two of this model.   
 
5.5.4   System Generated Validation Codes 
The fourth stage of this model is the process whereby the schema generates 
codes automatically and sends them to the mobile numbers of the genuine 
customer of the bank during every transactions consummated by legitimate 
customers. The validation schema will prevent the identity theft offenders using 
the stolen financial information of bank customers, since the validation codes will 
only be sent to the rightful owner of the account at all times when transactions are 












5.5.5   Transaction Authentication by the Account Holders 
At the fifth stage of the workflow of the model, customers will be asked by front 
officers of the bank or any other persons that they have bank related financial 
interaction with to provide this authenticated code using any channels of financial 
transaction when consummated financial dealings. For instance, the customers 
will have to provide the validation codes using automated cash machine (ATM), 
during telephone banking, during internet banking, during relationship banking and 
other channels that banking transactions may be consummated or when bank 
instruments such as debit and credit cards are to be used to procure services and 
to make third party payments. The account holders that provide transactional 
codes will be the only persons who have the value for those transactions.  
 
5.6  Some Limitations for the implementation of the AML Transaction 
Validation Model 
The implementation plan for this model is subject to future deployment in Nigeria 
and other relevant developing and transitional economies in West Africa States 
(see Chapter 9). Nevertheless, many scientific models of this nature come with 
one problem or the other. The AML transaction validator will require an online real 
time business processing network. All applications using internet connections are 
bound to face network failure when data are overloaded in a very slow networking 
system. This may slow down the processes of financial transactions of a particular 
reporting institution, including banks when internet systems are weak. Therefore, 
the model requires fast and effective internet capacity for it to function optimally. 
Additionally, the AML Transaction validation model would be designed using 
mobile phone application system. Also, many mobile phone communication 
service providers encounter communication networks failure in many villages, 
towns and cities of global jurisdictions due to inadequate capacity of their 
networking system as compared with the total number of their service users. The 
loss of a mobile phone may also prevent the service users to consummate (initiate) 
financial transaction since this mobile application system is designed to be the 
gate-way of their financial transactions with reporting institutions and financial 
institutions in general.       
 
Finally, epileptic supply of electricity power in many developing countries hamper 





countries. Therefore, the model would only function well with availability of an 
uninterrupted power supply. 
Notwithstanding the enumerated limitations identified with this model, the 
implementation strategies for future deployment of this model would submit 
solutions or/and appropriate mitigations to manage these limitations.  
 
5.7   Conclusion  
The conceptual framework of this thesis elaborate the connectivity between 
organised crime and money laundering. The rational choice theory adopted in this 
chapter explored how the organised crime offenders in Nigeria may adapt ways of 
crime in order to create social-economic order in the in the Global South (in 
Nigeria). The lack of social and economic opportunities in Nigeria, coupled with 
absence of good governance and the rule of law and the availability of 
opportunities to profit from criminal activity in the Global North (i.e. in European 
states) fuels the illicit order of the Nigerian organised crime offenders. The 
organised crime ‘business’ opportunities decision modelling in  Nigeria was 
explored using the concept of Value-Access-Transaction (VAT) to explain the 
routine activities of the offenders in the global arena of crime.  
 
Furthermore, the anti-money laundering framework explores the possibility of 
increasing the transactional risks of organised crime in Nigeria. Out of the 40 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the framework 
evaluates relevant recommendations that are applicable to the fight against 
organised crime financial flows. The implementation of these recommendations 
has been the focus of numerous criticisms from academic scholars (Halliday, Levi 
& Reuter, 2014). Therefore, ratification and compliance to these recommendations 
in Nigeria bears witness to the various impediments and vulnerabilities of the 
reporting institutions in Chapter 7. Consequently, the anti-money laundering 
framework is perceived as threatening the development of Third World countries, 
because most of these recommendations do not fit in to the cash based and 
parallel economies of developing jurisdictions. Chapter 7 of this thesis further 
enumerates the various impediments to the success of anti-money laundering 
efforts in Nigeria. Winning the war against the proceeds of crime will require a 
more scientific approach if it to be effective (Halliday, Levi & Reuter, 2014). It is 





Validation Model: a scientific cybernetics approach to help minimise the pressures 
imposed by anti-money laundering measures for developing economies.   
 
Chapter 6 
The Perspective of Organised Crime Financial Flows: The 
Roles of Various Agencies in Nigeria  
The organised crime (OC) illicit flows from drugs to trafficking in human beings 
and other valuables; including proceeds of advance fee fraud (AFF) in Nigeria and 
West Africa is becoming increasingly unrestricted (GIABA, 2010:11). By focussing 
primarily on this background, this chapter will aim to analyse the specific 
techniques and mechanisms of money laundering, organised crime transactions, 
and businesses within West Africa, particularly Nigeria. In order to understand the 
perspective of organised crime financial flows; this chapter will discuss the money 
laundering typological studies (‘typological studies’ are the way in which organised 
criminal proceeds are being laundered) of the OC group in Nigeria. This will 
include drug trafficking and human trafficking and will be finalised with money 
laundering patterns of the AFF offenders. This chapter will evaluate the roles of 
competent agencies in curbing the challenges attached to financial flows from 
organised crime in Nigeria.  
 
6.1 Illicit Financial Flows of Organised Crime Businesses and Transactions  
According to GIABA (2010a) the annual income generated from drug trafficking is 
estimated in billions of US dollars; these have to be redistributed and shared 
among the OC actors that are profiting in the globalisation of crime. The typology 
studies sponsored by GIABA in the West African region revealed how the illicit 
profits generated from drug trafficking business on a global scale were shared 
amongst transnational criminal offenders from the Global North and their 
counterparts from the West African Criminal Network (WACN). The study will 
thereon evaluate case studies of trafficking in human beings contained in the 
Report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2011, “Money Laundering Risks 
Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants”, and this will 










6.1.1 The Money Laundering Techniques and Case Studies of Drug 
Trafficking Offenders 
The case studies of money laundering techniques employed by drug 
trafficking offenders in this thesis explores the typology reports given to the 
researcher while conducting a fieldwork project at the GIABA Secretariat in 
Senegal. The studies also revealed several techniques of money laundering 
adopted by the OC group in West Africa generally, and within Nigeria in 
particular. The techniques adopted by the offender which leads to the 
laundering of their proceeds of crime from the global North to the Global 
South include:  
- the misuse of financial institutions; the misuse of cash transactions and 
cash couriers to ‘drive home’ the proceeds of drug trafficking;  
- the misuse of front companies to shield the criminally derived  revenues;  
- the use of complex series of transactions which combines cash smuggling, 
gatekeepers, real estate, casino, high value currency accumulation and 
other stores of values and other agents of illicit flows; 
-  misuse of multiple jurisdictions to conceal profits of crime in safe havens; 
-  and abuse of remittances and trade systems for transfers of revenues and 
settlements of associates in crime. All these techniques will be illustrated 
in turn using a typological case study approach.  
 
In Chapter 4, the thesis demonstrated how criminals take advantage of the lack of 
a robust and effective of criminal justice system to commit crimes. Additionally, the 
Case study 6.1 provides evidence as to how criminals profit from the weak legal 
framework in the jurisdictions where they operate and move proceeds of crime, 
including foreign currency from one country to another. The money laundering 
techniques adopted in this case by the offender was the engagement of the 
services of cash couriers, and setting up an informal and unregulated artefacts 
venture that are frequently sighted in tourist zones across the globe, including 
Europe. The unregulated artefacts serve as the ‘container’ where illegal goods of 
illicit drug are being concealed from transit country in West African states such as, 









Case Study 6.1: Laundering the Profits of Drug Trafficking through High 
Cash Turnover Businesses 
Mr S is a business tycoon from country B. He started off as a small African artefacts vendor. He 
travelled to Europe with a few art pieces for sale. He came back home after a year with suitcases 
full of foreign currency. As there is no regulation or limit on inbound cash into country B, Mr S 
managed, on interrogation, to prove that he was legitimately selling African art products. Law 
enforcement officials could not establish any infraction and so he was not arrested. He 
immediately used the proceeds to purchase real estate property and established a second-hand 
car dealership, making bulk cash payments for these high value purchases, thus changing his 
business profile. He rents out his estates and sells his cars, from which he is able to make a 
legitimate income. Mr S, who attests to having made profits from the sale of the African artefacts 
in Europe, is well respected and considered a hard-working man in his home town. He is also, 
however, suspected of dealing in narcotic drugs and is under police surveillance.  
Source: GIABA, 2007 
 
The proceeds generated in Europe were used to import cars from Europe to West 
African states generally and in particular, Nigeria. The imported goods would be 
sold at a price substantially below the market value, in the quest to recoup the 
proceeds of crime. The competition provided by organised criminal groups in 
contrast with that from legitimate importers also creates displacement within the 
global economy. Consequently, the profit of legitimate investments in the 
automobile business is drained with unhealthy competition of OC actors operating 
within the international trade arena and the OC offenders maximise such illicit 
revenue by reinvesting it into real estate venture in order to integrate unlawful 
















Case Study 6.2: Laundering Drug Trafficking Proceeds through Cash 
Couriers and Front Companies 
An individual who is a citizen of a West African country operated a drug trafficking “ring” (networks) 
since 2002 and laundered money across many jurisdictions. Most of the network members resided 
abroad, mainly in Western Europe, and had residence permits in their host countries. Together with 
the ring leader, they recruited people from the West African country to deliver drugs to them from 
where they distribute it in their country of residence and other parts of Western Europe. In 2006, one 
of the couriers was arrested for possession of 2.054 kilograms of cocaine concealed inside a suitcase 
at the international Airport of the West African country on his third trip to Europe. Investigation 
revealed that the money realized from sales of drugs was sent back through cash couriers and 
thereafter exchanged into local currency and deposited in bank accounts or used to acquire land, 
construct buildings or purchase vehicles in cash. The properties bought were sold shortly afterwards 
and the money realised deposited in bank accounts. The deposited money was later withdrawn to 
purchase real estate. In several transactions involving significant volumes of drug profits, the group 
members performed small transactions below reporting threshold to avoid detection and deposited 
the money in several accounts. Some of the accounts were for fictitious companies. The group 
members were found to be partners in several companies, along with other third parties and the 
companies had no activities in their registered line of business. Their head offices were fictitious.  
Source: GIABA, 2010 
 
The above case study illustrates typical characteristics of organised crime as 
discussed within Chapter 2 of this thesis. The offenders in this case operate as 
West African Criminal Networks with transnational dimension of cell networks 
(OCTA, 2010). They operate within a specialised network of criminals in multiple 
jurisdictions from the global South through the global North. One cell network 
recruits drug couriers in West Africa to traffic drugs to Western Europe. The other 
cell network group operates in Europe with residence permits to distribute the illicit 
product in the underground drug market there. A classic example of a similar case 
within the UK involved two Nigerian born offenders with dual citizenships, John 
Obidegwu (British citizen) and Ike Johnson (German citizen) who were both 
sentenced at Croydon Crown Court for eight years and were charged with money 
laundering offences (GIABA, 2010). They were further convicted with 24 years 
sentence for drug trafficking offences, to run concurrently, for being linked to 
laundering millions of pounds of illicit drug proceeds in the UK (Mynewsdesk, 
2015). 
 
The transnational offenders adopted many schemes of money laundering to 





of origin in Nigeria. They used a cash courier to smuggle the profits from their 
crime to their country of origin contrary to recommendation 32 of the FATF, 2012 
(which has already been extensively discussed in Chapter 5). The offenders were 
aware that the financial institutions had an obligatory duty to perform customer 
due diligence on transactions within the threshold of USD/EUR 15,000.00 or 
applicable wire transfer in local currency and duty of financial institutions to report 
transactions suspected of having links to criminal activities.  Thus, they conducted 
their financial transactions to circumvent threshold reporting and performed 
multiple smaller transactions that were less than the suggested threshold of FATF, 
transferring the proceeds into several fictitious accounts in their home country and 
abroad, leaving little or no trace for investigation activities of competent agencies 
in the global states (World Bank, 2009). The proceeds of their crimes were 
integrated into real estate investments and revenues generated from these real 
estate investments were then integrated back into the legitimate economy. “The 
drug traffickers will go to any bank where they do not have an account to purchase 
a bank draft for payment of landed property or luxury goods and neither title nor 
identification document is requested or retained by the bank which consummated 
these kinds of transactions” (NDLEA Investigator 1). This makes it difficult to trace 
illicit assets during the investigation activities of competent authorities. Additionally, 
in Case study 6.2, the criminal networks use their ill-gotten funds to acquire share 
equity in the quest to have principal control over several companies at the country 
of origin. This act shields their criminal activities away from them and a more 


















Case Study 6.3: Laundering the Proceeds of Drug Trafficking Through the 
Misuse of the Trade System and Use of Front Companies 
Two criminal organizations, one based in a West African country and the other in Western Europe 
worked with each other to facilitate the smuggling of drugs. The West African group was responsible for 
packaging and exporting the drugs while the one in Europe was responsible for the sale of the drugs. 
The proceeds was subsequently shared and laundered through over invoicing and under invoicing. The 
drug is usually shipped through empty freight containers used to import food products. In 2007, at the 
sea Port of the West African country where the local group was based, about 508.7 kgs of cocaine was 
discovered concealed in a false ceiling of a freight container destined to Europe. The company is owned 
and managed by the local ring leader of the trafficking group and his son. Following investigation, 
documents recovered indicated that two empty containers were transported back under the same 
circumstances, at least five times. A number of their bank accounts were uncovered and their respective 
financial transaction histories and balances obtained. A number of movable and immovable properties 
acquired were traced. The assets were seized and bank accounts temporarily frozen. Following the 
auditing of their Company’s accounts from 2004 – 2007, several flaws were discovered, principally the 
lack of essential supporting documentation regarding several customs clearance of imported goods. 
The amounts recorded in respect of purchases for the financial years 2004 to 2006 were higher than 
the estimated values based on Customs documents. Similarly, total transfers made to accounts abroad 
along with debts of the firm to suppliers in financial years 2004 and 2005, were below purchase invoices 
obtained from the Customs for these years, that is, there was deficit of transfers. In contrast, in fiscal 
year 2006, it was found that total transfers and liabilities to suppliers exceeded purchases by about 
USD251, 013.47. These facts indicated that there was manipulation of the Company’s financial results 
and the respective supporting documents, as well as financial year accounting justifications submitted 
to the Finance Office. This was used to conceal and launder the proceeds of drug trafficking.  
Source: GIABA, 2010 
 
In many instances, legitimate companies manipulate taxable income and move 
their operational headquarters to low tax jurisdictions (Li and Balachandran, 1996). 
Their affiliated companies operated from high tax jurisdictions where most of the 
company’s profits were being generated and maximized the companies’ profits by 
filing tax returns and laundering evaded tax from the high tax jurisdictions in low 
tax jurisdictions (Li and Balachandran, 1996; Fisman and Wei, 2001; Swenson, 
2001; Tomohara, 2004, FATF, 2006). In the same vein, the criminal organisations 
also engaged in trade based money laundering in order to conceal the proceeds 
of crime from competent authorities (The World Bank, 2009).  
The trade based pattern of money laundering is commonly used to launder the 
illicit financial flows of drug trafficking in Nigeria (NFIU Analyst 3). This is the 
situation whereby the trade system is used to manipulate, shield and share the 





criminal syndicates (NFIU Analyst 3). The procurement and importation of 
valuable items from the consuming countries to Nigeria is usually common in the 
quest to integrate profits of crime.  
The pattern for the integration of ill-gotten funds originating from drug trafficking 
was noticed at the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) which showed that 
proceeds from the drugs sold in Europe were usually brought back to the country 
by OC group in Nigeria and reinvested into real estate, stocks and engagement in 
trading such as automobiles and electronic businesses (NFIU Analyst 3).  In doing 
this, the offenders will abuse financial institutions through the use of payment 
systems such as, wire transfers, open export, and the import letters of credit in 
banks to conduct international trade (FATF, 2006). The offenders will launder 
these proceeds through front or shell companies (Schott, 2006; World Bank, 2009; 
FATF, 2012).  
 
Other trade based techniques to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking also 
includes (FATF, 2006):  
- over-and under invoicing of goods and services;  
- multiple invoicing of goods and services;  
- over-and under shipments of goods and services;  
- and falsification of goods and services description.  
 
Case study 6.3 demonstrated how the OC offenders misrepresent the importation of 
fictitious food products by exporting empty freight containers which concealed cocaine 
in the imported food consignments from the source country where cocaine is cultivated. 
The cocaine is further trafficked to illicit drug markets in Europe where proceeds of 
crime are generated at a larger scale (NDLEA, 2010). This abuse negates the objective 
of international trade, since the international trade system is exposed to manipulation 
and exploitation by organised crime networks (Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG, 2012)). The profits from the drug dealing are then channelled back 
to the OC actors through wire transfers by misusing financial institutions and 
compromising international financial systems. The evidence of this is provided in Case 
study 6.3, where the investigation revealed deficits in international transfers to the 
partners abroad by the WACN. The transfers were in excess of the purchase invoice 








Case Study 6.4: Abuse of the Remittance and Trade Systems to Conceal 
and Launder Proceeds of Drug Trafficking 
A drug trafficking organisation based in the United States whose members were from West Africa 
was involved in the smuggling of cocaine into the US from which they raised their proceeds in cash. 
The group arranged with an auto dealer, also based in the US and also happened to come from the 
same West African country with them to transfer the illicit proceeds to their home country by 
exchanging the money at a discounted rate. The drug traffickers arranged for the purchase of a stake 
in a reputable information technology firm operating in their home country. The auto dealer paid for 
the stake in the information technology in local currency from his bank account at home. The auto 
dealer then used the cash he exchanged to purchase expensive second hand vehicles and other 
expensive goods which he ships to his home country. A clearing company clears the vehicles and 
the goods which are then sold in an auto shop and the proceeds deposited into his account. This 
eliminates the risks of and need for physical movement of the proceeds by the traffickers back to 
their country.  
Source: GIABA, 2010a 
 
According to the APG typology report on trade based money laundering (TBML), 
the distinguishing factors for TBML are as follows (2012): Firstly, expansion of 
global trade provided opportunities for transnational criminals to dilute their illicit 
funds with the legitimate financial flows in the international trade markets. 
Therefore, the offenders have the opportunity to use the proceeds of crime to buy 
valuable assets from the consuming market and integrate those illicit assets into 
their countries of origin (GIABA Expert 1). TBML allows all unlawful assets to be 
linked to the trading activities of the offenders. This is a method adopted by the 
criminals to disassociate the crime from the illicit assets. In other words, making it 
difficult for the LEAs to follow the money trail associated to the crime. Secondly, 
competition in cross border trade provide opportunities for the organised criminal 
offenders to take advantage of differences in legal systems and the international 
competitors. This is due to the fact that many jurisdictions of the world are 
introducing free trade zones (FTZ), with less stringent anti-money laundering 
regulation to encourage international investors (APG, 2012).  
Thirdly, the AML regulation is more advanced in the financial sector as compared 
with that of trade sector. Fourthly, the exposure of trade to international legal 
tender and currencies which are affected by fluctuations in the value of the US 
Dollar, Pound Sterling and other international legal tender, provide organised 
crime groups the opportunity to even compete against financial sector foreign 





foreign currencies to international traders at informal foreign exchange parallel 
markets where stringent regulations do not apply.     
  Case Study 6.5: Laundering the Proceeds of Crime through Complex 
Methods of the Gate Keepers (Lawyers and Chartered Accountants), High 
Value Currency Accumulation and other Stores of Value 
Following an enquiry received from the USA in 2008, in relation to an ongoing drug trafficking 
investigation, authorities of a West African country successfully traced the kingpin, who was under 
watch before the request came. Following a search in his house, about 5.5 kilograms of Cocaine 
was found in his bedroom and the sum of $74,800.00 (seventy four thousand eight hundred US 
dollars) in cash was recovered along with some documents related to his assets. Investigations 
revealed that the cash is usually smuggled into the country through human couriers. Afterwards, 
lawyers and real estate agents were used to purchase landed properties. Currency 
exchangers/bureau de change operators were mainly used for the payments of the purchases. The 
kingpin had several travel documents bearing different names.  
Source: GIABA, 2010a 
 
Recommendation 37 of the FATF, as discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis 
suggests the need for international collaboration of nations and competent 
authorities in combating money laundering and organised crime transactions. The 
lack of cross-border cooperation allows criminals to maximise the illicit profit. The 
confiscation of illicit products and assets of crime will be made difficult when 
countries and competent authorities fail to cooperate amongst themselves. The 
Case study 6.5 provides a typical example of the effectiveness and benefits of 
international collaboration as advocated by Recommendation 37 of the FATF. 
Tracing illicit assets of organised crime would be very difficult in the circumstance 
where offenders assumed multiple identities (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006; 
The World Bank, 2009; FATF, 2012). Foreign law enforcement agencies have to 
co-operate with the competent national authorities in the country where the 
offender is operating from. Recommendation 10 of the FATF compelled the 
financial institutions (FIs) and designated non-financial business and professions 
(DNFIBPs), including lawyers and accountants, to conduct customer due diligence 
on their customers before going into a business relationship of any kind in all 
jurisdictions (FATF, 2012). However the lack of national identities in Nigeria for 
instance, enables the OC offenders there to be imaginative and daring, since 
offenders can acquire multiple identities to disguise their criminal behaviours when 
committing crime. Ineffective identification systems puts the offenders a step 
ahead of the law enforcement agencies, since they have to go to great lengthy 





offender during the investigation and asset tracing. The success highlighted in 
Case study 6.5 can only be attributed to both national and international 
collaboration of competent authorities.             
 
6.1.2 The Basic Money Laundering Techniques and Case Studies of  
Traffickers in Human Beings  
Human trafficking is the third largest business of organised crime groups that 
generate illicit financial flows in billions of dollars, after drug and arms trafficking 
(UNODC, 2010). It is also perhaps the oldest type of organised crime business 
activity which originated from the abolition of the slave trade (see Chapter 2). It is 
against this backdrop that this thesis evaluates the phenomenon of this crime in 
Chapter 2 and 3. Understanding the nature of this crime is crucial to the evaluation 
of the threat associated with the movement of profit of the crime. In this section, 
the thesis presents some selected cases of human trafficking illustrated in the 
FATF report, “Money Laundering Risk Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings 
and Smuggling of Migrants” and investigates some of the techniques and methods 
adopted by the OC offenders who profit in human trafficking on a global scale 
(FATF, 2011). Most of the case studies illustrated here have not been generated 
from West Africa or Nigeria but are cases originating from the destination 
countries, where victims from West African and Nigeria in particular were trafficked 
to and exploited by the offenders.  
 
The major techniques and methods of money laundering adopted for laundering 
the proceeds of trafficking in human beings in these cases include: the use of the 
hawala payment system, this is informal alternative ways of transferring funds from 
one jurisdiction to another; the misuse of money service businesses (MSBs) such 
as, Western Union Money and MoneyGram transfer; the misuse of cash 
transactions and cash couriers; and finally the misuse of cash intensive 










Case Study 6.6: Trafficking for sexual exploitation – Hawala system – 
Nigerian "Madam" – cash courier (FATF, 2011) 
 
Two Nigerian citizens were indicted for money laundering among other things. From 2006 to 2008, 
they handled EUR 1,263,000 stemmed from the proceeds of criminal acts.  
They operated a hawala business. They received the money in cash from various locations in Oslo. 
The following day, the money could be picked up in Nigeria. The system was based on advance 
payment and trust and customers were required to pay a transaction fee of 10%. They used Euros 
in their money transactions.  
One of the defendants, living in Denmark, picked up the money in Oslo every four or six weeks (a 
maximum of EUR 20,000 at a time) and transported it to Nigeria (cash courier). Most of the Nigerian 
prostitution organisation used this system to send money.  
A large part of this money represented repayment of debts. In addition, money was sent to the 
families of the prostitutes in contravention of the ban imposed by the “Madam” (is refer to as the 
‘Nigerian’ woman leader of human trafficking network) and the criminals behind.  
In court, it was found that all the prostitutes who used this hawala network were the victims of 
trafficking.  
The evidence produced included seized lists of money transfers. The convicted people were linked 
to the accounts through fingerprints and the fact that prostitutes recognised them in photographs.  
The principle of the hawala system unfortunately means no particular indicator for reporting entities 
but this money laundering technique and the issue of the Nigerian “Madams”, which is a typical trend 
in the trafficking for sexual purposes which can be found in several countries, deserved to be 
illustrated. 
Source: FATF, 2011 
 
The illicit financing of human trafficking can be analysed from three important 
points of view. These are (GIABA Expert 1): the method by which funds are raised, 
moved, and are utilised.  
 
First, the offender analysed how much can be raised in committing a crime. This 
is illustrated in Chapter 5 using VAT model. The offenders raise money by giving 
the victims away for human labour and exploitation through prostitution. Often, the 
victims have to pay themselves out of their debt bondage (NAPTIP Investigator 2). 
Continuing to work for their masters, a substantial part of their earnings from the 
human labour or sexual exploitations is used to repay their debt bondage (see 
Chapter 3). The debt bondage are being repaid back by the victims as money that 
has been spent on them during their transportation and relocation from source 
country, the country of origin of the victim and to destination countries, the 










Case Study 6.7: Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation – Use of Money    
Remitters and Bank accounts - Investments in real estate 
 
The investigation was focused on a criminal group that operated in different areas of Spain 
trafficking women from Eastern European Countries. The organised group was detected by two 
different sources, the police investigation and the FIU information.  
 
The police investigation was focused on a group of people that were members of a criminal 
organised group dedicated to smuggling and trafficking women. The organised group was the 
owner of several “night clubs” in different cities of Spain where women were exploited. Part of the 
money obtained through that illegal activity was sent abroad through money remittance companies 
in order to pay the debt of each woman.  
The basic characteristics of the operations carried out through money remitters were the following:  
 
 There were sent small amounts of money.  
 The money was sent by some women exploited to their countries.  
 Recipients in the countries of destination were the same.  
 Some senders and recipients of the transfers were included in FIU databases.  
 
At the same time, the FIU was making the analysis of some information related to suspicious 
transaction reports referring to members of the same organised group. It was detected that several 
bank accounts of non-resident persons with different passports were opened in banks in Spain. It 
was also discovered that the holder of those bank accounts was the same person. The basic 
movements of those accounts were:  
 
 High number of deposits of cash in small amounts (below identification requirements) is 
made in different regions of Spain.  
 Transfers of those amounts of money to Eastern European countries.  
 Some operations had the same recipients.  
 
Also, there was previous information in FIU related to some of the investigated members of the 
organisation that allegedly bought winning lottery tickets with cash to the real winners. There was 
information related to money transfers transactions too.  
During the police investigation it was detected that front companies were also created, some of 
them with no real activity. Some properties were bought under the name of those companies and 
payments were made in cash.  
It is also important to mention that cooperation with authorities of the countries of origin of women 
exploited was very useful and a joint police operation was conducted with those countries. The 
tracking of the funds help arrest the members of the organisation in the countries of origin and the 
confiscation of properties and money obtained from that illegal activity. 
Source: FATF, 2011 
  
Second, the movement of the funds is done through non-disclosure transfers 
(Case study 6.6). This occurred when the individual agrees to settle debt without 
using any financial instruments or financial institutions during their transactions 






Case Study 6.8: Facilitation of Irregular Immigration - Use of Cash-Intensive 
Businesses 
A UK Police Force conducted an investigation into the large scale facilitation of illegal 
immigrants into mainland Europe. The illegal immigrants were predominantly Turkish and were 
smuggled into the UK by lorry as well as motor vehicle, trains and light aircrafts.  
The fee charged per immigrant was believed to be in the region of GBP 3,500 for a channel 
crossing and up to 14,500 EUR from Turkey across Europe. This money would cover the 
transport cost, the cost of the documentation, which is needed in the UK, although this 
documentation was usually false. The money would also cover the cost of accommodation on 
arrival in the UK. It is estimated that over 20,000 immigrants were smuggled into the UK by this 
group of individuals.  
In 2005, 5 subjects were arrested in the UK and charged with offences of conspiracy to facilitate 
a breach of immigration law and money laundering (ML). In 2006, the subjects were sentenced 
to lengthy prison sentences and they later received confiscation orders totalling over GBP 
1,260,000. 
In this case, the following ML methodologies were used by the subjects:  
Use of legitimate cash generating businesses  
Kebab shops, takeaway outlets and a snooker hall were used to launder criminal funds. The 
money generated through these company accounts was in excess of the funds generated by 
comparable businesses. These businesses operated under the umbrella of Limited Companies 
that were on paper controlled by family members and associates of the subjects. Every few 
years a new Limited Company was created and new company officials were appointed giving 
the impression of a new business, however the core business (kebab shop/takeaway business) 
would continue to operate as before at the same premises. In the latter part of the operation, 
properties were purchased in the name of these Limited Companies.  
Use of cash  
A large proportion of the funds generated by the operation were by way of cash and therefore 
not traceable. Assets (particularly the business interest in kebab shops and takeaway outlets) 
were also purchased using cash. This method made it difficult to prove that criminal funds were 
laundered through the business accounts as the subjects of the criminality appeared not to be 
directly involved in the businesses. It was also difficult to apportion beneficial interest in 
company assets.  
Use of multiple accounts and credit cards  
Use of multiple bank accounts at various financial institutions with the effect that turnover was 
diluted so as not to draw attention to scale of funds from criminality. In this case, information 
provided to banks about individual earnings or turnover funds for businesses were exaggerated. 
Funds were channelled (layered) through various personal, business and family/associate 
accounts to conceal the source.  
Use of Money Service Businesses  
Funds were regularly transmitted abroad to Europe and Turkey through money service 
businesses using the subject’s names, variations of names, alias identities, family members, 
associates and multiple addresses.  
Funds abroad  
Purchase of properties abroad in subject’s and family member’s names. Transfer of funds 
abroad to family members. 





The use of cash couriers and the abuse of the trade systems are also applied by 
the human-trafficking offenders to launder their illicit funds. This was elucidated in 
Case studies 6.6 and 6.8. Third, the utilisation of funds is usually in the form of 
personal investments, mostly in real estate properties (NFIU analysis 3). The 
investment in properties is highly attractive to the criminals, because in the West 
African region and Nigeria in particular, there is an absence of a database which 
traces or links individual identities to the landed properties and other assets 
acquired with proceeds of crime (EFCC Investigator 1; UNIODC Expert; NCA 
Expert).   
 
Profiting in human trafficking is not like the other organised crimes where the 
Nigerian offenders do not have to live abroad before benefiting from their victims 
when collaborating with their co-transnational offenders in the global North (mostly 
in European states). The phenomenon of human trafficking implies that Nigeria is 
a source country where the traffickers get their victims recruited very cheaply for 
sexual exploitation in Europe (NAPTIP Investigator 1). Exploitation of the victim 
abroad generates more financial flows in Europe in comparison to the operation 
of the recruiters in Nigeria that frequently received transfers of funds through 
hawala as operational funds from the main trafficker, the ‘Madam’ (the woman 
leader of human trafficking network) who operated from Europe (NAPTIP 
Investigator 1).  
 
The identification of illicit financial flows is difficult to ascertain during recruitment 
stage in Nigeria (NAPTIP Investigator 2). The techniques of transportation of the 
victims of human trafficking from Nigeria, the source country, are well understood 
by the competent authorities in Nigeria (NAPTIP Investigator 1; NAPTIP 
Investigator 2). These techniques were also discussed in the Chapter 3. 
Notwithstanding this, the modalities and methods for the laundering of proceeds 
of funds generated from human trafficking exist at destination countries where 
victims are de-humanised and exploited in Europe (FATF, 2011).  
 
Consequently, breaching this gap will require effective collaboration from the 
source country i.e. Nigeria, with that of destination countries located in the 
developed countries, and European regions in particular. The case study 6.6 
shows how the Nigerian Madam operating from Norway maximized the illicit profits 





Nigerian victims when ordering them to perform prostitution tasks in European 
States’ such as Norway. 
 
The techniques used to conceal the proceeds of crime by the offenders in this 
case involved the hawala network of payments transfer and bulk cash courier from 
Norway to Nigeria. This payment and transfer system is preferred to avoid 
suspicion and reporting of their illicit transactions at destination countries when 
depositing funds through financial institutions.  
 
The human traffickers engage in the operation of cash intensive businesses such 
as restaurants as well as food-takeaway shops (Case study 6.8). The significance 
of doing this is to dilute the small denomination of currency obtained from their 
criminal activities, with that which is paid by the restaurant customers in a quest to 
launder the proceeds of crime (FATF, 2011). 
 
It was revealed in Case study 6.8, that the proceeds of crime were being diluted 
with legitimate earnings from kebab shops, takeaway outlets and a snooker hall. 
In the same vein, the use of money service businesses (MSBs) is usually 
employed whereby small amounts of money are being structured on multiple 
transactions to form a large pool of fund which “snow balls” into a single account 
by the offenders (NFIU Financial Analyst 2). Additionally, the practice whereby 
people with different accounts send money to targeted accounts is commonly 
adopted by the human traffickers in Nigeria (NFIU Analyst 2). According to the 
Chief Compliance Officer 1, dormant accounts in Nigerian banks were sometimes 
reactivated to help shield these proceeds of crime from the investigators. These 
financial flows are usually traced to families and associates during the 
investigation activities of the competent authorities (NFIU Analyst 2; Case Study 
6.8).  
 
6.1.3 Basic Money Laundering Techniques and Case Studies of Advance 
Fee Fraud Offenders (AFF) 
This section examines two case studies of the Nigerian advance fee fraud 
offenders. The ‘old’ generation and the ‘new’ generation and each of these will be 
discussed in turn. The analyses of these cases differentiate the mechanisms of 
proceeds of crime generated by the AFF offenders in Nigeria in comparison with 





AFF transnational crime phenomenon into two types first, the ‘419’ (the old 
generation offender) and second, ‘Yahoo-Yahoo’ (the new generation offender). 
The 419 phenomenon derives its name from the section 419 of the Nigerian 
criminal code - the first legislation to criminalise the act of obtaining by false 
pretence in Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 1).  
 
However, the contemporary modern day system of Information Communication 
and Technology (IC&T) has updated all the role play of old generation AFF crime 
highlighted within Chapter 3 to the ‘Yahoo-Yahoo’ AFF transnational crime in 
Nigeria the early 2000’s (EFCC Investigator 1). The name Yahoo-Yahoo is derived 
from the yahoo internet email platform, which is one of the oldest email platforms 
where the new generation AFF offenders first commenced the victimisation of 
internet users in the globalisation of crime (EFCC Investigator 2). In this type of 
AFF transnational crime, a single offender can complete the circle of the crime 
(see Case Study 6.10).  
 
Nonetheless, both generations of offenders profit from deals of false pretence. The 
success of offenders in the generation of their proceeds of crime is facilitated by 
their victims’ interest to ‘reap from where they do not sow’ (profiting without 
investment). Many victims succumb to the tricks of AFF offenders, thus facilitating 
illegal businesses in Nigeria or taking part in the sharing of corruption money from 
Nigeria (Zook, 2007). That is why the characteristic of this crime is so different 
from other organised crime which involves selling illicit commodities or providing 
illegal services before profit from the proceeds of crime is made.   
The AFF offenders obtain proceeds of crime from their victims when dealing in the 
trade of ‘greed’ (Blommaert & Omoniyi, 2006). However, the new generation AFF 
offenders are now going cyber by stealing identities of the victims over the internet 













Case Study 6.9: Using a Complex Web of Shell Companies, Multiple 
Jurisdictions, Frontmen and Wire Transfers to Launder Proceeds of Bank 
Fraud by Old Generation AFF Offenders  
 
A certain Chief N of country X in West Africa presented himself to Bank B in Latin America as a 
legitimate businessman seeking an offshore bank account to transfer outstanding payments that 
were due to a company for contracts executed in country X. Bank B was promised a percentage of 
the total sum for its services once the transaction was successfully concluded. Bank B bought into 
the proposal and thereafter made initial payments to Chief N for the purpose of documentation and 
processing of the payment to Bank N. However, what started off as a simple and straightforward 
transaction became very complex, transcending the initial proposal into other carefully orchestrated 
business proposals with tempting offers running into millions of dollars. At the end, Bank B was 
conned into making remittances totalling US$200 million through several third parties (for the ultimate 
benefit of Chief N) in return for nothing. A significant portion of the proceeds of this crime was used 
to purchase real estate in country X and in Europe. It was a classic case of an advance fee fraud 
(a.k.a. 419). The crime was committed between 1995 and 1998. More interesting to the present 
study, however, is the process leading to the laundering of the criminal proceeds. At the initial stage 
of transaction, Chief N instructed Bank B to remit funds in favour of appointed local banks in country 
X. Thereafter, he instructed the local banks to raise separate drafts in favour of real estate agents 
and vendors to purchase and/or develop real estate for himself and for legal entities in which he held 
undisclosed controlling interests via nominees. Because of certain drawbacks, Chief N bypassed the 
local banks and opted to use an Asian merchant, Mr A, based in Country X on the recommendations 
of the local banks he had previously used. Consequently, Chief N would instruct Bank B to make 
remittances in favour of Mr A, who maintained offshore bank accounts in Hong Kong and Switzerland 
for the primary purpose of aiding the money laundering designs of Chief N. Bank B complied and 
made several remittances totalling US$120 million. For each remittance to the offshore accounts, Mr 
A would provide country X’s local currency equivalent, after which Chief N would further instruct Mr 
A to make remittances directly in favour of third-party vendors of real estate and other assets. In 
order to meet the local currency requirements of Chief N, Mr A continued to source and maintain a 
ready pool of individuals and other entities with the ability to provide the local currency in exchange 
for the equivalent in hard currency, which was often remitted to offshore destinations on the 
instructions of the individuals and entities. The payments in the local currency frequently took the 
form of bank drafts. Chief N would then take these drafts to the vendors and acquire assets in his 
name and in the names of companies he had established. In many cases there was no direct link 
between the funds taken from Bank B, including the intermediary banks, and Chief N. This way, 
Chief N successfully isolated himself from the proceeds of the crime and indeed laundered the 
proceeds without detection. The link only became apparent after the funds were traced to Mr A’s 
accounts and Mr A was arrested and required to explain the transactions. For properties purchased 
in Europe, Chief N opened a Swiss offshore bank account and instructed Mr A to remit funds directly 
to that account, which Chief N subsequently used to purchase the real estate. 
The transactions involved several reputable FIs and DFNIs, individuals, legitimate and front 
companies, cutting across several countries and gulping a whopping sum of nearly US$200 million 
at the expense of Bank B. So far, three individuals and five companies have been convicted in a 
single suit. None of those convicted was a financial institution. Predicate offence: fraud (419)  
Mechanism: solicitation of advance fee for fraudulent contract  
Technique: misuse of financial institution, taking advantage of multiple jurisdictions, use of offshore 
country, use of shell companies and misuse of real estate sector.  
Source: (Nigeria cited in GIABA, 2008) 
 
Case study 6.9 revealed how dangerous and organised the old generation AFF 
offenders in Nigeria are. They operate with all the characteristics of organised 
crime as described in Chapter 2. The complex illicit financial flows in this case 





in the late 1990's (Basel Institute on Governance, 2009). In this case, an offshore 
country (the Cayman Island) was used to hold the proceeds of cash balance 
falsification in a fraud of “breath-taking audacity” by the head of the international 
division of Banco Noroeste, who was then defrauded by the Nigerian '419' 
fraudsters (Basel Institute on Governance, 2009). It was suggested that the 
proceeds of these criminal activities amounted to USD242.5 million including 
interest and costs which was laundered across jurisdictions such as Switzerland, 
UK, the United States (US), Hong Kong, Singapore and within Nigeria in particular 
(Case study 6.9; Basel Institute on Governance, 2009).  
 
SWIFT transfers through financial institutions were used with multiplicity of 
fictitious accounts and multiple jurisdictions by the Nigerian AFF offenders (Case 
study 6.9). The proceeds of crime were often used to purchase valuable real estate 
in Europe, America and Nigeria using frontmen and shell companies to conceal 
the origin of the ill-gotten funds.   
 
Case Study 6.10: AFF Identity Theft – Misuse of Financial Institution to 
Transfer Fraudulent Funds and purchase of Luxurious Goods 
One of the recent cases of the EFCC on AFF posits that a Nigerian undergraduate international student 
in Malaysia specialised in sending malicious software to victims’ email addresses to conduct phishing 
using different international bank brand names. He was arrested in December, 2012. Three laptops 
were recovered from him containing about 2,000 email addresses. All these email addresses have their 
individual passwords to each of them. He was able to use his phishing techniques to acquire the 
passwords of over 2,000 victims via the internet. Also, wire transfer instructions were sent from those 
compromised email accounts to the banks. Once he opens the account and sees financial information 
(such as statement of account or notification of transactions) from the victims’ banks via their emails, 
he would write back to the bank using the victim’s email account and give instructions to the bank to 
transfer money from victims’ account to another dedicated account. The banks relied on those email 
instructions because they believed that the email originated from their customers.  He was charged and 
convicted in court to 18 years imprisonment in Nigeria in 2013.  One of the cars that were seized from 
him was bought at N18m Naira (USD 112,500).  
Source: EFCC Investigator 4 
 
Unlike the old generation organised AFF offenders who had structured business 
networks, the new generation AFF offender operates through a ‘one-man business’ 
policy, where the offender may not require collaboration of other offenders (EFCC 
Investigator 1). The success of the new generation is attributed to global 
development in the use of information communication and technology (see also 





government letters from the laptop or smart phone. These fake unsolicited emails 
can also be sent out from the same laptop or smart phone to various recipients 
using email harvester, this is a soft-ware to steal e-mail identities over the internet 
(Att-Asamoah, 2009).  
The offender can communicate with victims using Skype, email, Yahoo messenger, 
Facebook, Twitter and other social media, using a laptop in one room without 
engaging any other criminal partners (EFCC Investigator 1). The offender can 
have the money wired from one jurisdiction to another, to circumvent stringent anti-
money laundering laws and move the money to where banking law regulations are 
lax, particularly in respect to anti-money laundering. The global standards on 
money laundering have changed and the standards have now become very high 
between 1990 and 2013 (EFCC Investigator 1). Account opening and movement 
of funds are now globally monitored by designated competent authorities (FATF, 
2012). However, the young offender in Nigeria highlighted in Case study 6.10 may 
not bother to open bank accounts in the country to facilitate the perpetration of the 
crime through the receipt of foreign currencies from their victims through global 
South and global North following identity theft or trade in ‘greed’ (Zook, 2007).  
 
The older generation offenders solely depend on financial institutions in profiting 
from their proceeds of crimes (EFCC Investigator 1). Western Union and other 
alternative money transfers are the common methods via which the proceeds of 
crime are received by the new generation offenders (EFCC Investigator 4). In the 
1990’s the uses of these channels were significantly low and payment of foreign 
currencies to Nigeria were done through direct bank transfers. 
Today, international money transfers now work electronically, i.e. via ‘the 
electronic cash’, where money does not move physically (EFCC Investigator 1).  
The victims provide the offender the codes and the control number which enables 
the offender to walk into any international money transfer agent’s office in order to 
pick the proceeds of crime (EFCC Investigator 1). According to the EFCC 
Investigator 1, “will the offender use his real name and address to collect this 
money? The answer is No”. Therefore the offender is not required to have a 
structured OC enterprise as compared to the old generation AFF offenders in order 
to launder the proceeds of crime within the global jurisdictions (EFCC Investigator 
1). The Scammer meticulously can create 500 identities with different names and 
corresponding addresses to and would create his own fake identification 
documents to support those fictitious names and addresses (EFCC Investigator 





proceeds of crime from the operators of about 4,000 international money transfer 
agents in Nigeria, mostly Western Union and MoneyGram (EFCC Investigator 4).  
 
6.2   The Overview of the Money Laundering “Red Flag” Indicators Used by 
the Organised Crime Offenders in the Reviewed Case Studies  
Following the analysis of 10 case studies involving the laundering of proceeds of 
crime originating from drug trafficking, human trafficking, and advance fee fraud 
(AFF) in this chapter a number of red flag indicators of money laundering activities 
have been identified. These red flag indicators are considered to be helpful in 
eliminating the illicit financial flows of organised crime in West Africa and Nigeria 
in particular. These red flag indicators are categorised into general and specific 
money laundering indicators depending on the nature of the crime. The general 
indicators cut across all three (3) types of transnational crime while the specific 
indicators are peculiar to the laundering of the proceeds of crime by a certain OC 
group in the country.    
 
6.2.1 The General Red Flag indicators 
The general red flag money laundering indicators that can help prevent the illicit 
financial flows of the organised crime highlighted in this thesis are further classified 
into categories in this section. They range from indicators of: displacement of legal 
framework; misuse of cash transactions; misuse of financial institutions; misuse of 
money service businesses (MSBs); misuse of agents, intermediary third party and 
associates; illicit investment in real estate, and misuse of trade based transactions. 
See Appendix B for the list of general money laundering indicators of the OC 
groups in Nigeria.  
 
6.2.2 Differences in Red Flag Indicators: Drug Trafficking, Trafficking in 
Human Beings and Advance Fee Fraud Cybercrime 
 
Having highlighted the general red flag indicators of illicit financial flows of specific 
organised crime in this chapter, there appears to be a peculiar difference in the 
way the proceeds of crime are redistributed to the offenders from the jurisdictions 
where the crime is committed to the country of origin where the funds are utilised 






Specifically, the drug traffickers use more trade based money laundering than 
human traffickers and AFF offenders. This is because the drug traffickers deal in 
illegal commodities such as narcotics (UNODC, 2010).  
These illegal commodities are mixed with legal goods in the ‘name’ of international 
trade as imported goods from source countries where narcotics drugs are 
cultivated for instance, in Bolivia (NDLEA Investigator 2). The offenders in the 
transit country i.e. Nigeria can then send empty containers to source countries 
where the illicit commodity will be concealed amongst legal goods originating from 
high risk jurisdiction where narcotics are cultivated (Case study 6.3). Thereafter, 
the drugs are carried in the baggage and stomach of drug couriers from Nigeria 
as a transit country to destination countries in European States where the drugs 
are sold for higher value (NDLEA Investigator 1). The profits generated in Europe 
are used to procure valuable commodities there which are then shipped back to 
the transit country where the goods are sold at a discount (Case study 6.4). 
Consequently, the proceeds from crime are redistributed to OC networks with the 
use of over and under invoicing. The trade based money laundering terms that 
provide offenders in Nigeria the opportunity to transfer funds to suppliers of illicit 
commodity in excess of purchases and liabilities (NDLEA Investigator 1; Case 
study 6.3). Drug traffickers in Nigeria depend mainly on the redistribution of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking business to their counterpart networks in the 
globalisation of crime. This is achieved by abusing gaps in the international trade 
systems that exist in developing countries where informal trade system thrives.      
 
Unlike the drug trafficking networks where illicit proceeds are redistributed among 
the network’s actors and senders through illicit wire transfer when sharing the 
proceeds of crime. The traffickers in human beings maximise the illicit proceeds 
using non-financial institutions. The Madam in Europe will receive smaller 
denominations of currencies from different people from different regions with 
common addresses to the same beneficiary at destination countries where victims 
were exploited. Therefore, the bulk of the larger denomination of cash is 
transferred back home by the trafficking master using alternative remittance 
systems (FATF, 2011). Furthermore, when this transaction is routed through 
financial institutions the sender of the funds at the destination country is the same 
as the recipient of the transfer at country of origin, for instance, in the case of 
Nigeria (FATF, 2011). This happens when the Madam, the ring leader of the 
trafficking business at the destination country, repatriates her proceeds of crime 





Additionally, transfer of funds from destination countries by the victims to their 
families abroad is also peculiar to trafficking in human beings as compared with 
other identified organised crime such as, drug trafficking and advance fee fraud 
(AFF). Their victims abroad do not usually have relatives to transfer up-keeping 
allowance to Nigeria. In human trafficking, victims usually transfer small amounts 
of funds to their relatives at country of origin while large sums are remitted to the 
criminal group (FATF, 2011). This is one of the reasons why human trafficking 
thrives in West Africa and Nigeria in particular. Therefore, other vulnerable families 
may be enticed to give their children away for exchange of foreign currencies 
originating from the victims’ share following her weekly contribution to their 
overseas Madam located in the European country (Elabor-Idemuda, 2003).    
 
Furthermore, major jurisdictions where organised crime occurs are classified as 
high risk jurisdictions (FATF, 2012). Therefore, there is a close monitoring of 
transactions from those countries because major illicit flows of organised crime 
are channelled through high risk countries and offshore countries. On the contrary, 
the proceeds of advance fee fraud involves a unique transfer of funds coming from 
all parts of the world. The proceeds of the crime is determined by the number of 
identities that can be stolen using information technology software or the number 
of victims that can be deceived with the trick of the old generation AFF offender in 
a ‘sale of greed’. This means that AFF proceeds of crime attracts more jurisdictions 
than other identified organised crime.  
 
Additionally, other organised crime identified within this thesis invests in “illegal 
commodities” that are resold at illegal markets. For instance, drug traffickers invest 
in illicit narcotics while the human traffickers invest in the vulnerable girls and 
children from West African countries, particularly Nigeria. Thus, illicit commodities 
are offered to the beneficiaries of those services within the underground illicit 
global markets located in the Global North and particularly within Europe. On the 
contrary, the AFF actors only engage in false pretences or the direct theft of a 
victim’s financial information without their knowledge. This implies that the 
proceeds of AFF transnational crime are maximised through the level of ‘greed’ of 
potential victims or the success of phishing software used in the identity theft of 
potential victims (Case studies 6.9 & 6.10). Consequently, there is financial flow 
from their victims who are located globally, to criminal perpetrators without 





drugs and human labour, as well as prostitution services offered by drug trafficking 
traffickers and human traffickers.              
 
Case study 6.8 demonstrated that proceeds of crime were being diluted with 
legitimate earnings from kebab shops, takeaway outlets and a snooker hall. 
Similarly, the services of money service businesses (MSBs) were often engaged 
through which small amounts of money are used in a series of multiple 
transactions to form a large pool of funds which then eventually amalgamate into 
a single account belonging to the offenders (NFIU Analyst 2). Additionally, the use 
of people with different accounts sending monies to targeted accounts is 
commonly adopted by human traffickers in Nigeria (NFIU Financial Analyst 2).  
According to the Chief Compliance Officer 1, dormant accounts in Nigerian banks 
were sometimes reactivated to help shield these proceeds of crime away from the 
investigators. The linkages established as a result of these financial flows are 
usually traced to families and associates during the investigation activities of the 
competent authorities (NFIU Analyst 2, 2013; Case Study 6.8).  
 
6.3   The Roles of Specialised Competent Authorities in Curbing 
Organised Crime in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, various agencies are responsible for the fight against organised crime 
and money laundering and have their respective mandates enshrined in different 
legislative Act and Instruments. This section will focus on the roles of competent 
authorities (CAs) that are the main and recognised agencies in Nigeria and are at 
the fore-front in the fight against drug trafficking, human trafficking and advance 
fee fraud (AFF). These agencies are: National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA), The National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other 
related matters (NAPTIP), and; The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC).  
 
6.3.1 The Role of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) 
The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) started operations in 1990 
and were given the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of Decree 48 of 1989, 
now known as CAP N30 LFN 2004 (NDLEA, 2011). This Act mandates the agency 
with the role of controlling illicit drug cultivation, abuse, possession, manufacturing, 
production, trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and chemical 





The NDLEA controls the inflow of illicit drug trafficking from source countries where 
drugs are cultivated and smuggled into Nigeria as a transit country (NDLEA, 2010). 
It is no longer a peculiar phenomenon when drug traffickers import drugs from high 
risk jurisdictions and trafficking it to consuming markets at destination countries 
located in the global North, mostly in European states and America (NDLEA 
Investigator 2, 2013).  The law enforcement operations of the agencies forced the 
traffickers in Nigeria to seek other alternative routes along vast land and porous 
borders between some West African countries in an attempt to sustain and 
reposition their trafficking activities (NDLEA, 2011).  
 
Additionally, the contemporary cultivation of cannabis is of major concern in 
Nigeria (GIABA, 2010; Chapter 3). Table 6.1 below reveals that cannabis accounts 
for the highest number of drug seizures in Nigeria from 2004 to 2011. This was 
largely attributed to the fact that, the distribution of locally produced cannabis from 
Nigeria is often exported through porous borders within Nigeria to neighbouring 
countries (NDLEA, 2008). 
 
Table 6.1: Interdicted Drugs in Nigeria 2002-2011 
Year Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Others Total Male Female 
2002 506,846.09 35.35 55.62 791 507,728.06 2,549 108 
2003 535,593.75 134.74 87.58 937.41 536,753.48 2,316 174 
2004 68,310.07 124.47 90.94 233.83 68,759.31 3,382 318 
2005 125,989 395.91 70.42 88.72 126543.65 3,181 292 
2006 192,368.30 14,435.88 33.09 515.57 207,352.84 5,883 440 
2007 210,262.90 393.678 120.638 699.735 211,476.00 5,891 477 
2008 335,535.34 365.4904 11.6054 530.4033 336,442.84 7,584 315 
2009 114,700.71 392.05 104.71 712.77 115,910.24 6,700 342 
2010 174,661.59 706.433 202.08 2,550.622 178,120.73 6,296 492 
2011 191,847.91 410.81 39.752 2,985.447 195,283.9 8,072 567 
Total 2,456,115.66 17,394.81 816.44 10,045.51 2,484,371.05 51,854 3,525 
 
Source: NDLEA 2011 
 
The agency designed a National Drug Control Master Plan in 2000, to help control 
and mitigate the risk of importation of bulk trafficking of illicit drugs from source 
countries to Nigeria (NDLEA, 2008-2011). The objective of this master plan was 





bulk of narcotic drugs are often transported by sea using trade based money 
laundering (Case study 6.3).  Also, the master plan was intended to strengthen 
the existing strategy for combating the outflow of about 80 percent cocaine and 
heroin trafficked through Nigeria’s airports where most illicit drugs consumed in 
European states are being smuggled through (NDLEA, 2008-2011). 
                       
The evidence of the success of the master plan is shown in table 6.1, where the 
agency recorded the highest incidence of interdiction of illicit drugs in 2008. The 
number of cases of seizure of illicit drugs jumped from 211,476.00 in 2007 to 
336,442.84 in 2008. This confirms that effective crime management has 
correlation with the attitudes of the offender towards crime in any country (Van 
Dijk, 2008; Levi, 2013). 
 
Nonetheless, the information on traffic incidents of the offenders in Nigeria were 
not included in the NDLEA analysed statictics. Also, the number of cases of drug 
traffickers prosecuted by the NDLEA in Table 6.2 is incommensurate with the 
recorded high number of cases of incidents of interdicted illicit drugs recorded in 
Table 6.1. According to Van Dijk (2008), the analysis of global trends in crime is 
problematic due to a lack of data integrity of the official statistics of the Interpol 
and other competent authorities responsible for crime control and preventions in 
many countries. In the UK, the British Crime Survey severally revealed that about 
half of the crimes committed in the UK are unreported in the police record 
(Kershaw et al., 2001). Van Dijk also postulated that “in some countries, traffic 
incidents are included, and in others, they are not or only partially included” (Van 
Dijk, 2008:17). Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of criminal 
justice systems in combating crime when using official statistics alone in many 
jurisdictions. See also Chapter 8 on “Collaboration against Organised Crime Illicit 
Financial Flows in Nigeria: A call for Data and Intelligence Reports Assurance” for 
better understanding on the limitations and constraints of governmental statistics 
in criminological study.   
 
In addition, the offender may conduct further research and apply a much improved 
strategy to circumvent the efforts of law enforcement agencies by exploring other 
methods of committing crime. This was discussed in Chapter 5 when exploring the 
rational choice theory and anti-money laundering regime using the VAT model. 









Table 6.2: Prosecution of Drug Traffickers in Nigeria (2000-2011) 
 
Year Cases Won Lost 
2000 1,626 1,624 2 
2001 1,172 1,172 0 
2002 870 870 0 
2003 817 817 0 
2004 853 853 0 
2005 779 779 0 
2006 1,363 1,363 0 
2007 1,508 1,459 49 
2008 1,720 1,712 8 
2009 1,506 1,497 9 
2010 1,526 1,509 17 
2011 1,501 1,491 10 
Total 13,615 13,522 93 
                                         Source: NDLEA, 2012 
 
This resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of drug seizures during 2009-
2011. The OC offenders are often overwhelmed by the stringent laws applied via 
law enforcement strategies between these periods and aimed at reducing the risk 
of commission of the crime and will always seek a formidable alternative method 
where the offenders cannot be arrested when transmitting the illicit drugs to 














Table 6.3: Reported seizures, arrests and convictions by 12 West African   
Countries (2008-2009) 
 
                                  Source: GIABA, 2010 
  
The number of convicted drug traffickers in Nigeria also increased within this 
period. The convicted offenders increased from 1,459 in 2007 to 1,712 in 2008. 
There was also a drastic reduction in the conviction rate in 2009. The number of 
convictions fell from 1,712 in 2008 to 1,497 in 2009, and also from 1,509 in 2010 
to 1,491 in 2011 as a result of counter-measure strategies of the drug traffickers 
in Nigeria.   
  
The enforcement strategies of the agency also impacted on the overall initiatives 
employed in combating drug trafficking in West Africa. The agency was at the 
forefront of the analysed 12 countries’ money laundering typology report on drug 
trafficking businesses in the West African Region (GIABA, 2010a). The Agency 
accounted for 79.70 percent of the total conviction records of the analysed 
countries according to the GIABA report. This is a remarkable success that is 
 Country  Cannabis Cocaine Heroin Arrests Convictions Convictions 
(%) 
Benin 2,365.674 498.603 4.411 438   
Burkina 
Faso 
39,442.000 95.602 0.770 1198 1072 12.56 
Cape 
Verde  
1,632.968 964.861 0.850    
Guinea 
Bissau 
2.500 648.000     
Gambia 3,402.000 91.700 7.000 1400   
Ghana 40,912.595 1,261.750 4.376 256 126 1.47 
Liberia 41,255.750 2,092.800 89.700 813 18 0.21 
Mali 29,986.000 226.900  189 54 0.63 
Nigeria 978,854.250 15,983.008 340.470 31045 6800 79.70 
Senegal 24,787.809 2,723.683 1.331    
Sierra 
Leone 
50,565.956 753.376  894 461 5.40 
Togo 3,396.724 520.817 52.843 957   





worth mentioning within this period. Additionally, Nigeria is the country in West 
Africa that has the longest jail terms for drug traffickers according to this report 
(Appendix C). 
 
Notwithstanding the operational successes of the NDLEA in Nigeria, the drug 
trafficking business still thrives in the country. Levi and Maguire (2004) have 
argued that it is not self-evident that successful destruction of organised crime 
groups and/or convicting their leaders will reduce overall levels of criminal 
activities in the global states.  In Nigeria, the deficit in capable governance and 
lack of social welfare for Nigerian citizens is said to have accounted for this to a 
larger extent (NDLEA Investigator 2).  
 
    6.3.2 The Role of National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and 
Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) in Nigeria 
The National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related 
Matters (NAPTIP) was established on 8 August 2003 by the Federal Government 
of Nigeria to help drive the country’s obligation and compliance requirements 
under Article 5 of the Palermo protocol with the aim of combating trafficking in 
persons whilst fulfilling the objectives of the United Nations Transnational 
Organised Crime (TOC) Convention (NAPTIP, 2010). The definition of trafficking 
in persons as suggested by Article 3a of the protocol is provided in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis.  
However, Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration 
Act, 2003 as amended designates a number of functions for the agency in Nigeria. 
This is highlighted in the text box 6.1.    
 
It is against this backdrop that the NAPTIP developed the 4P’s strategy to help 
drive its core mandate provided under the Act. They are:  Prevention; Prosecution; 
Protection; and Partnership. This thesis will use data collected from the NAPTIP 
during the fieldwork in Nigeria to analyse the operational efficiency of the agency 
in dealing with its roles. The prevention and prosecution strategy will only be 









Text Box 6.1: The Function of NAPTIP 
a. To coordinate all laws on trafficking in persons and related offences; 
b. To adopt measures to increase the effectiveness of eradication of trafficking in persons; 
c. To adopt witness protection measures; 
d. To enhance effectiveness of law enforcement agents to suppress traffic in persons; 
e. To establish proper communication channels, conduct research and work on improving 
international cooperation in the suppression of traffic in persons; by land, sea and air; 
f. To reinforce and supplement measures in bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions on 
traffic in persons; 
g. To work in collaboration with other agencies or bodies that may ensure elimination and 
prevention of the root causes of the problem of traffic in any person; 
h. To strengthen and enhance effective legal means for international cooperation in criminal 
matters for suppressing the international activities of traffic in person; 
i. To strengthen cooperation between the Attorney-General of the Federation, Nigeria Police, 
Nigeria Immigration Services, Nigeria Customs Services, Nigeria Prison Services, Welfare 
Officials and all other agencies in the eradication of traffic in person; 
j. To take charge, supervise, control and coordinate the rehabilitation of trafficked persons, and; 
k. To investigate and prosecute traffickers. 
Source: Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration 
Act, 2003 
 
Firstly, the prevention strategy aims to promote an awareness and understanding 
of the threat of trafficking in human beings (THBs) poses to the general public and 
institutional stakeholders in Nigeria.  
The agency achieved this through the use of Information, Education and 
Communication (IEC) aids, advocacy, publicity, seminars, conferences and 
workshops (NAPTI, 2013). The objective of this strategy is to prevent potential 
victims from being trafficked by the offenders of THBs when adequate awareness 














Table 6.4: Age Distribution of Rescued Victims in Nigeria (2012 and 2013) 
Age range   2013  %  2012  %  Variance % 
0 - 17 years  
 
591   61.3   381   50.9   +10.4  
18 - 27 years  308   32.0   334   44.6   -12.6  
28 year  & 
above  
65   6.7   34   4.5   +2.2  
Total 964   100.0   749   100.0     0.0  
 
  Source: NATIP Interview Data, 2013 
 
The table 6.4 indicates an increase in the number of rescued victims between ages 
of 0 – 17 years in 2013. It is evidence that the ages of the victims are of great 
significance to the offenders of human trafficking when determining the illicit 
market value of trafficked victims (see also VAT Model in Chapter 5). Therefore 
the attractiveness of this age group is a reflection in the variance of +10.4 percent 
in 2013, when the number of rescued victims increased from 381 in 2012 to 591 
in 2013.  
If the threat of THBs is increasing among children and girls who have been 
trafficked for child labour and sexual exploitation in/out of Nigeria, then the 
prevention strategy of the agency ought to increase proportionally to help counter 
the menace of this threat amongst young Nigerians.  
 
Nonetheless, awareness creation at Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in the 
rural areas where girls and children are often recruited cheaply and trafficked both 
in and out of the country is recorded by the agency (NAPTIP Investigator 1). 
Likewise, students of secondary schools and tertiary institutions are not left out in 
the campaign against human trafficking in Nigeria. Furthermore, for the prevention 
strategy to work effectively, lawyers and other professionals that are involved in 
the investigation and prosecution of cases of human trafficking in Nigeria required 
effective collaboration from the agency’s operatives. This will provide them with 
the required knowledge of new trends employed human traffickers. NAPTIP has 
limited number of staff and less capacity to drive the menace of human trafficking 
in Nigeria (NAPTIP Investigator 1 & 2). Therefore, NAPTIP has to educate other 
law enforcement agencies in Nigeria on the new trends and patterns of human 
trafficking. This will increase collaboration efforts in the fight against the scourge 





Secondly, the prosecution strategy of the agency needs to be enhanced to attain 
a robust conviction regime for the country in fulfilment of her international 
obligation in the fight against human trafficking. The total number of convicted 
human traffickers in Nigeria over a period of ten years from 2004 to 2014 accounts 
for 258 convicted offenders.    
 




         Source: NAPTIP, 2015   
 
It can be observed that the number of rescued victims for the two years i.e. 2012 
and 2013 totalled 1,713 victims (964 and 749) within that period as illustrated in 
table 6.4. However, only 25 and 46 traffickers were convicted in 2012 and 2013 
respectively. In the same vein, the total number of suspected traffickers in 2012 
and 2013 were 134 and 293 respectively (NAPTIP, 2013). The analyses of these 
two tables suggests that Nigeria has a robust rescue regime while her conviction 
regime for human trafficking is in deficit. This is an indication that human trafficking 
criminal networks thrives in Nigeria more than drug trafficking OC type. In Table 
5.4, the agency responsible for the fight against drug trafficking in Nigeria 
convicted 1,509 drug traffickers in 2010 and 1,491 in 2011. This is an indication 
that NDLEA has a better conviction regime in comparison with NAPTIP when 
evaluating the operational successes of the agencies responsible for curbing the 
financial flows of OC groups in Nigeria.    
 
The challenges of the ineffective conviction regime of the NAPTIP is associated 
with the following reasons (NAPTIP Investigator 1 & 2): low commitment and lack 
of political will in the states and local government areas where victims are 

























Abuja 1 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 - 1 3 18 
Lagos -    - - - 5 7 1 6 10 15 7 51 
Kano - - - - 5 3 12 11 5 12 16 57 
Uyo - - 1 - 1 3 2 - 4     6 1 17 
Benin - - - 3 - 3 7 22 2 7 4 48 
Sokoto - - - - 13 10 4 8 1 3   39 
Enugu - - - 2 2 - 2 - 2 2 4 14 
Maidugur
i 
- - - - - - 1 3 1 -   5 
Makurdi - - - - - - - - - - 3 3 





Textbox 3.1 in Chapter 3) makes victims reluctant to testify against their traffickers 
in court; inadequate understanding of the phenomenon of human trafficking by 
legal practitioners and by the judges who preside over human trafficking cases in 
Nigeria, and the slow pace of the judicial process which is a characteristic of the 
Nigerian criminal justice system.  
 
Thirdly, the protection of the victims must be taken seriously in a country where a 
weak conviction regime exists (NAPTI, 2012). This will prevent victims from being 
re-trafficked back when deported from destination countries in the Global North (in 
European states) and Global South (in Nigeria) with a robust law to rescue victims 
from their offenders after prosecution and conviction. Therefore, victims have to 
be rehabilitated and integrated back into the system. The thematic scope for 
victims’ protection in Nigeria is enshrined in the following: reception, identification, 
sheltering, counselling, family tracing, return/repatriation, integration, 
empowerment and the follow up monitoring and disengagement after proper 
integration (NAPTIP, 2012). According to NAPTIP, out of 749 and 964 victims 
rescued in 2012 and 2013 respectively, the agency identified a total number of 
651 and 820 as Nigerians (see Appendix D on rescued victims of human trafficking 
in Nigeria, 2012-2013). The victims rescued by NAPTIP cuts across the 36 states 
of Nigeria as witnessed in the data of rescued victims of human trafficking, by 
states of origin in the country. In all, a total of 7,529 victims of human trafficking 
were recorded to have been rescued and rehabilitated by NAPTIP in 2013 since 
its inception (NAPTIP Data Analysis, 2013).  
 
These victims were counselled in the Counselling Centres of the Agency in order 
to understand the circumstances behind their vulnerabilities which exposed them 
to the risk of trafficking (NAPTIP, 2011). This is because in the process of the 
counselling reports being produced by Centres, the agency could develop a robust 
strategic plan for victims’ empowerment and integration within society as well as 
a possible reunion of the victims with their families.        
 
Fourthly, the agency adopted national and international partnerships, collaboration 
and cooperation as a strategy to better achieve its mandates in Nigeria as a 
leading agency in the fight against human trafficking. The results and successes 
of this strategy will be reflected in Chapter 8, where this thesis discusses the 





competent authorities responsible for the fight against organised crime and its illicit 
financial flows in Nigeria.    
 
6.3.3 The Role of Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) In 
the Fight against Advance Fee Fraud in Nigeria 
The Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) is the institution 
responsible for curbing the threat of Advance Fee Fraud in Nigeria. Before the 
establishment of the Commission Nigeria had been perceived as a high risk 
jurisdiction, because of the activities of Nigerian AFF offenders in the perpetration 
of crime globally (EFCC, Investigator 1). Legitimate Nigerian businessmen have 
been deprived of the opportunities to participate in simple e-commerce 
transactions that exist in the global trade (EFCC Investigator 1).  Payments 
instruments emanating from Nigerian financial institutions were not recognised 
and acceptable by many jurisdictions for international trade during this time (EFCC 
Investigator 1). The IP addresses, (the Internet protocol by which data is sent from 
one computer to another over the Internet) emanating from Nigeria were 
blacklisted by many e-commerce platforms including e-bay and JCPenney (EFCC 
Investigator 1).    
 
It is against this backdrop, that the Commission is empowered to combat the 
menace of AFF in Nigeria through its Act of establishment together with the 
Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Offences Related Act, 2006.   
In the quest to exercise this mandate effectively, the Commission adopted the 
combination strategies to combat the threats of AFF in Nigeria; these are (EFCC 
Investigator 1): intelligence gathering; enforcement; disruption, and prevention 
and engagement with stakeholders. 
 
Intelligence Gathering 
The Commission engaged confidential informants to gather information of the AFF 
offenders and the various locations from which illicit routine activities were 
conducted. It also achieved intelligence gathering through anonymous information 
reporting via its official website (Abubakar, 2009). Similarly, mail courier 
companies, cybercafés, money services businesses (MSBs), such as MoneyGram 
and Western Union money transfer and banks were approached routinely to make 
available transactions reports of the identified offenders (EFCC Investigator 4). 





utilised by the Commission to provide proactive intelligence for the Commission 
(Abubakar, 2009).   
 
Enforcement 
The enforcement activity of the Commission includes prosecution, conviction and 
the confiscation of the ill-gotten assets from the offenders. The Commission’s 
conviction record stands at 117 in 2013 and 126 in 2014. The list of the convicted 
offenders in 2013 and 2014 has been included in the Appendix E of this thesis. 
The Commission also established specialised Units to enhance the enforcement 
of anti-card fraud, postal investigation and copyright and cybercrime strategies in 
Nigeria (Abubakar, 2009). These Units conducted numerous operational raids on 
the areas identified where the activities of the AFF offenders in Nigeria were 
rampant, and these operations yielded results for the Commission (EFCC 
Investigator 4). For instance, in 2005, the Commission conducted “Operation Stop 
Payment” in Oluwole, Lagos, where most of the counterfeit cheques that were sent 
abroad from Nigeria are chromed (EFCC Investigator 4). Through this operation, 
the Commission confiscated many counterfeit cheques destined for US and 
Europe worth 55 billion Naira or $27, 638,191.00 (EFCC Investigator 4). The 
Commission also conducted operation “Cyber-storm” in 2008, when it found-out 
that most of the communication equipment used by the Nigerian AFF offenders 
originated from the cybercafé. This operation resulted in the arrest of 136 AFF 
suspects in Nigeria, across 23 cities and 163 cybercafé outlets (EFCC, 
Investigator 4).      
 
The Table 6.6 shows the value of currencies forfeited on interim and final order to 
the EFCC from January 2003 to March 2013. The grand total of these illicit 
proceeds of crime stand at $3,499,760,572.00. For the calculation of this figure 












Table 6.6: Amount of Currencies Value Recovered by EFCC from January 
2003 – March 2013 
YEAR NAIRA DOLLARS EURO POUNDS RIYALS 
2003 974,783,213.06 185,360.00  - - - 
2004 21,018,557,263.28 416,020.00 7,350.00 37,000.00 - 
2005 71,053,996,008.60 9,718,051.98 12,050.00 6,990.00 - 
2006 8,199,908,189.03 32,288,125.00 32,007,350.00 17,060.00 - 
2007 41,478,054,319.70 81,180,462.60 11,310.00 484,945.00 - 
2008 44,542,822,622.30 3,192,531.00 2,000.00 5,500.00 - 
2009 255,404,401,841.19 10,414,446.93 8,600.00 78,115.00 - 
2010 10,559,513,355.91 1,534,277.00 45.00 21,500.00 - 
2011 11,117,460,717.88 168,068,974.75 21,620.00 561,844.00 - 
2012 27,844,769,688.19 72,863,112.37 33,585.40 32,020.00 350,000.00 
2013 5,287,891,074.13 4,276,235.00 2,600.00 8,000.00 - 
Total 497,482,158,293.27 321,137,596.63 32,106,510.40 1,252,974.00 350,000.00 
Source: Interview data from EFCC, 2013 
 
Thus making illicit proceeds of crime forfeited to one agency (the EFCC) in Nigeria 
to be higher than the estimated official GDP of a country i.e.  
Liberia that was put at 2.015 billion in 2015 by the US Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), in its website (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2195.html). Liberia is also Nigeria’s counterpart member-state of 
the West African nations. If this fund is judiciously re-invested into Nigerian 
economy, criminal activities may not be seeing as a fashionable ways of creating 
social and economic order in Nigeria. 
 
Destruction of Criminal Business Model 
The Commission has commenced projects with the aim of addressing the issue of 
crime following the conduct of in-depth threat assessment of the AFF menace in 
Nigeria and these projects are working effectively (EFCC Investigator 1). The 
Commission has Information Communication and Technology (ICT) capability to 
disrupt the criminal business model activities of the Nigerian AFF offenders without 
their knowledge (EFCC Investigator 1). According to EFCC Investigator 1, the 
Commission usually monitors the e-commerce transactions of the Nigerian AFF 
offenders over the Internet (2013). Often, when an offender procures merchandise 
with stolen cards and identities, the Commission will intercept these goods and 





also has the technology to detect, intercept and retrieve the counterfeit cheques 
and other financial instruments emanating from the AFF offenders in Nigeria and 
return them to their victims abroad without the offenders' knowledge (EFCC 
Investigator 4). 
 
Prevention and Engagement with Stakeholders 
The Commission has sustained the impact of its preventive measure through print 
and the use of electronic media to educate young Nigerians on the threat and 
consequence of AFF to the offenders, and the nation in particular (Abubakar, 
2009). Additionally, the Commission has dedicated a whole Unit to drive home its 
preventive strategy (EFCC Investigator 4). The Unit visits universities and tertiary 
institutions in Nigeria to educate young Nigerians on the dangers and the threat 
emanating from the activities of AFF in Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 4). Workshops 
and conferences on AFF and Cybercrime were held in Nigeria in 2007 and 2010 
respectively (EFCC Investigator 4). Furthermore, the EFCC is collaborating 
effectively with relevant stakeholders and competent authorities in Nigeria and 
internationally in order to find an effective and lasting solution to the menace of 
AFF in Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 4).  
 
6.4    Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a number of case studies on how organised crime 
financial flows are concealed and manipulated from destinations of crime (in 
Europe) to the origin where the offenders live or originated from (in West Africa an 
Nigeria in particular). The explored case studies analysed are both typological 
case studies of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and that of the Inter-
Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). 
The Chapter revealed specific techniques and mechanisms adopted by organised 
crime offenders when laundering the proceeds of crime originated from the Global 
North (in European states, including the United Kingdom) and the Global South (in 
West Africa and Nigeria in particular).  
 
There appear to be some general indicators on how the proceeds of drug 
trafficking, human trafficking and advance fee fraud are concealed and 
manipulated across the four corners of the globe. In this vein, some of these 





trafficker criminal group uses trade-based money laundering than other organised 
crime groups, therefore; the proceeds of crime are re-distributed to the criminal 
group using trade-based mechanism and money transfer. The receivers and 
senders of profits originated from drug trafficking are usually different beneficiaries 
at different jurisdictions.  Whereas in human trafficking, the indicator suggests that 
the ring leader of the group in Europe, at the destination country where victims 
were exploited through debt bondage received smaller denominations of foreign 
currencies from their victims and transferred it back to their national origin using 
cash courier and alternative remittance to channel the proceeds to their bank 
accounts. Therefore, in human trafficking the receiver and senders of the proceeds 
tend to be the same at different jurisdictions.  Additionally, in advance fee fraud, 
proceeds of crime can be generated through all jurisdictions. Unlike that of drug 
trafficking and human trafficking that received larger shares of proceeds of these 
crimes from the global North in Europe and United States, the AFF illicit proceeds 




























































Impediments Affecting the Curbing of Illicit Financial Flows 
from Organised Crime in Developing Economy: Policy 
Implications  
The impediments affecting the fight against money laundering and organised 
crime financial flows vary from one country to another. Its impact may be 
comparatively less in developed economies where more sophisticated instruments, 
such as regulations, treaties and best practices exist to curb the financial flows 
from serious crime. However, the impediments that militate against curbing the 
proceeds of organised crime in developing economies are overwhelming. The 
analyses of expert interviews conducted in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and the 
Gambia revealed numerous challenges and shortcomings that impede the 
success in the fight against organised crime financial flows in West Africa and 
Nigeria in particularly.  This will be fully discussed in turn in this chapter. There is 
also a discussion within this chapter on the policy implications as a result of these 
analyses and its impact on the developing economic circumstances.  
 
7.1   Analysis of Impediments   
The analyses of expert interviews revealed numerous impediments that militate 
the fighting of illicit financial flows of organised crime in Nigeria. These challenges, 
which also affect developing economies in general, have been classified into four 
categories in this thesis. These categorizations are informed by the expert 
interviews conducted in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and the Gambia and are: 
Political impediments; Operational and Social impediments; Economical 
impediments; and Legal impediments. Each of these categorisations will be 
discussed extensively in this section. 
 
7.1.1  Political Impediments  
The political impediments against the success of curbing the financial flows of 
organised crime are divided into two. First, ‘blindfolded’ capable guardian and 
political corruption, and; second, politicising the operational autonomy of the 







‘Blindfolded’ Capable Guardian and Political Corruption 
In most developed and developing economies where the fight against criminal 
proceeds recorded a successful outcome, there is also a strong correlation to good 
governance and political will that is free of political corruption (World Bank and 
IMF, 2008). The capable guardian in this thesis refers to the political leadership of 
a country. In Nigeria, the capable guardian (the government) is expected to commit 
their will towards curbing the financial flows of organised crime.  
 
According to Felson and Clarke (1998:4) in Police Research Series Paper 98, titled 
“Opportunity Makes the Thief”, it is suggested that a routine activity approach to 
crime determines the success of any criminal opportunity. The authors considered 
three core concepts upon which crime opportunities can occur. They are: a likely 
offender, a suitable target/victim, and the role of capable guardian against crime. 
Following the occurrence of a deficit within the capable guardian and suitable 
target/victim, the rational actor, the offender takes a suitable decision based on 
the crime opportunities available within the environment they operate. 
Consequently, a robust political will and good governance is presumed to exist on 
the part of a capable guardian of whom there is an expectation of mediation and 
prevention of criminal opportunities in Nigeria. One of the greatest challenges 
recognised by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in 
West Africa (hereinafter, GIABA) within the West African region is the inability of 
countries to make improvements due to a lack of political will to fight transnational 
organised criminal activities among some member states and in some instances 
less political will is observed (GIABA Expert 1). Therefore, the absence of political 
will in the fight against crime is a major constraint that constitutes a weak link in 
the fight against illicit flows from organised crime in Nigeria.  
According to National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) investigator 2, “the 
Political Exposed Persons (PEPs) who are expected to be role models in Nigerian 
society are often the most criminal minded in the country. This makes the culture 
of crime in Nigeria a ‘pleasure’ and the punishment of crime (the pain) less 
fashionable, due to the involvement of PEPs in all sorts of crimes in Nigeria”. For 
instance in 2010, the Edo State House of Assembly aspirant in Nigeria was 
arrested by NDLEA for attempting to export 2.120kg of cocaine concealed in his 
stomach at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport (MMIA) Lagos when 





between capable guardian and the organised crime offenders, where legal actors 
are committing organised crime (Nikos Passas, 2003).   
 
In the same vein, former president Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria granted Late 
Alamieyeseigha, a notorious money launderer and ex-governor of Bayelsa State 
a presidential pardon in 2013 (BBC 13 March, 2013). The former president was 
his deputy governor during a period of political theft of the revenue belonging to 
the people of Bayelsa, (one of the richest oil states in Nigeria) when 
Alamieyeseigha was governor and resulted in residents of that state wider living 
in poverty (BBC 13 March, 2013). Alamieyeseigha jumped bail from London in 
December 2005 for allegations of money laundering and the concealment of the 
proceeds of corruption in the United Kingdom (BBC 13 March, 2013). Furthermore, 
£3.2 million was found in cash and bank accounts in the UK and he owned real 
estate worth £10 million pounds in London (BBC 13 March, 2013). He "forged 
documents" and "dressed as a woman" to escape the UK (BBC 13 March, 2013). 
He pleaded guilty in Nigeria and was jailed for 2 years in 2007 (BBC 13 March, 
2013).  
 
Consequently, if the political leadership of a country are corrupt and profiting from 
crime, they would naturally turn a blind eye to the criminal acts of other criminal 
offenders to maximise and legitimise their illicit enrichment generated from 
revenue due to the government as it was in the case of Alamieyeseigha who was 
granted presidential pardon by former president Goodluck Jonathan.  
The prevalence of corruption within the African region and Nigeria in particular, 
can accelerate the disintegration of institutional frameworks combating crime and 
hinders the effectiveness of the establishments with the mandate to carry out the 
various processes under these frameworks. This can affect the ability to monitor 
criminal activities within the region (GIABA Expert 1).  
 
Table 7.1:   Years Comparison of Reports and Renditions from the 
Reporting Entities 
RENDITION/REPORT TYPE  2010  2011  2012  
Total CTRs  14,137,163  7,958,616  4,776,597  
Total STRs  4,150  3,824  1,590  
Cases Developed  1,067  86  270  





Table 7.1 shows a drastic reduction in the statistics of currency transaction reports 
(CTRs) transmitted to the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) by the 
reporting entities. For instance the figure stands at 14,137,163 CTRs before the 
amendment of the anti-money laundering law in 2010 and reduced to 7,958,616 
CRTs in 2011, the year of the amendment and further decreased to 4,776,597 in 
2012. It is submitted that such displacement within a legal framework may be a 
deliberate attempt to launder the proceeds of political corruption within this era. 
This provides opportunities for other organised crime offenders to shield their illicit 
proceeds when the capable guardian has misplaced priorities. 
 
It is against this background, that the required legislation, instruments, policies and 
resources to fight criminal organisations are compromised in many corrupt 
developing economies. The consequential effect of this will translate to lax laws 
and weak institutional frameworks (GIABA, 2015).  
 
For instance, the compromised amendment of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) 
Act (ML(P)A, 2004 effected in ML(P)A 2011 by the Nigerian law makers evidences 
shortcomings in the international threshold reporting requirement of the FATF for 
currency transaction reports (CTRs) of corporate entities in Nigeria (GIABA, 2012). 
The Nigerian government increased the reporting threshold value from USD 
15,000 to USD 43,000 (GIABA, 2012). The implication of this is that illicit financial 
transactions that are below USD 43,000 can be easily laundered due to legislation 
displacement within this period. This may facilitate the laundering of illicit proceeds 
by individuals within the criminal network for the purposes of illicit enrichment 
through corruption and organised crime activities in Nigeria.   
 
Politicising the Operational Autonomy of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 
Nigeria 
It was submitted that the establishment of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit 
(NFIU) was done in hurry, in an attempt to remove Nigeria from the naming and 
shaming list of the Financial Action Task Force which labelled countries as Non-
Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCTs) (Ribadu, 2010). Nigeria was named 
and shamed on the FATF blacklist in 2001, 2002 and 2005 consecutively (Unger 
and Ferwerda, 2008). The United States of America (USA) Treasury also issued 
an advisory warning to all financial institutions in the US to take extra care and 





(Ribadu, 2010:6) Following the blacklist of Nigeria in the FATF NCCTs list and the 
US Treasury Advisory Warning, International trades and other international 
investments became very problematic in the country (Ribadu, 2010). After all, 
since 1999, the anti-money laundering instrument “has been a formal process for 
imposing economic sanctions on countries that do not play their part, by slowing 
down their international transactions and making it almost impossible for their 
banks to clear funds through other countries” (Levi and Reuter, 2006). Therefore, 
blacklisting of countries for not complying with international recommendations and 
standards achieves the objective of coercing jurisdictions into cooperation (Pieth, 
2006).  
 
It is against this backdrop that the Nigerian government established the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003 and the Act which established 
the EFCC i.e. (EFCC (Establishment) Act, 2004) designated EFCC as a Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Nigeria (Section 1(2) (c) of the ECFF Act). In 2004 the 
EFCC management established the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) as 
a specialised unit of the Commission to operate as a FIU for the country. As a 
result of the existence of a fully operational FIU in the country, the Nigerian FIU 
team worked tirelessly to remove Nigeria from the labelling list of the FATF (NFIU 
Analyst 3). In 2006, the FATF de-listed Nigeria from its NCCTs naming and 
shaming list (Unger and Ferwerda, 2008). Consequently, in March, 2007, the NIFU 
was admitted into the elite group of FIU by Egmont Group. Therefore with the 
Egmont Group status FIU, Nigeria cooperates with other counterpart FIUs in the 
world in the global to fight against the illicit criminal funds of organised criminals.  
 
However, the operational autonomy of the NFIU as a specialised Unit had been 
questionable under the establishment of the EFCC (GIABA, 2012).  GIABA, the 
regional standard setter for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism (AML/CFT) had argued in the mutual evaluations of Nigeria, that the 
NFIU’s existence de facto and not de jure (GIABA, 2012). That is to say NFIU 
existed in fact but not in law.  Since only establishments that operate in law are 
given funding support through the Federal Government annual budget in Nigeria, 
however, the FIU has been operating with the envelope budget (a sub-budget of 
the main budget) from the EFCC since its establishment.  The NFIU does not have 
a budget of its own and it cannot initiate and embark on strategic projects without 
the approval of the EFCC (NDLEA Investigator 1). It is against this backdrop that 





because of its de jure circumstances and they prefer to go through the EFCC 
whenever there is a need to deal with NFIU (NDLEA Investigator 2). According to 
NDLEA investigator 1, the NFIU cannot function well if it lacks the required control 
over its budget as well as the operational autonomy to serve and support other 
counterpart LEAs with the required intelligence report to counter the illicit financial 
flow of organised crime in Nigeria.  
 
It is as a result of the GIABA’s observation that the NFIU exists de facto and not 
de jure, which compelled the Nigerian Senate to approve the bill in order to create 
the Financial Intelligence Agency in 2014 (This Days Live, 2014). The cardinal 
objective of the bill was to grant the Nigerian FIU, the required operational 
autonomy for it to become an independent institution to drive transparency and 
effective management of financial intelligence in Nigeria (Daily Independent, 2013). 
According to ‘This Days Live’ (2014), the new bill separates the NFU from the 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC). Furthermore, the new 
autonomous FIU will now be domiciled in the Federal Ministry of Finance (This 
Days Live, 2014).  
Consequent to the enactment of a new act to establish an autonomous FIU in 
Nigeria, it is not clear whether there will be an amendment to the EFCC 
establishment Act that designated the Commission as the FIU for the country; in 
order to relinquish it of this special role. Additionally, there is no robust transition 
strategy for the new FIU under the Ministry of Finance with regards to the migration 
of the existing resources at the current FIU under the EFCC. The current FIU in 
Nigeria is an elite member of the Egmont Group (NFIU Analyst 3). It has a robust 
analysis tool called goAML, which was deployed by the UNODC under the 
European Union technical assistance to counter organised crime and money 
laundering in Nigeria (EFCC, 2013). It also has information, technology and 
communication (ICT) hardware procured by EFCC, where its legacy data is being 
warehoused (NFIU Analyst 4). Additionally, 80 per cent of the NFIU staff were 
exposed to international training for combating money laundering under the 
sponsorship of supranational institutions regarded as standard setters i.e. (The 
World Bank, IMF, UN, Egmont Group, other elite FIUs, FATF and the GIABA) for 
money laundering and organised crime.   
 
Further discussions with the NFIU Analyst 6 suggest that the current staff of the 
existing FIU have to reapply for another role in the new FIU, subject to availability.  





legacy data of the existing FIU. The EFCC may not let its ICT infrastructure go if 
the new law is not clear about transition strategy for the resources of the old FIU 
to the new FIU. As a result, Nigeria may also lose its membership status of the 
elite FIU, since the new FIU will have to start the application process all over again 
if it lost the pioneer and strategic staff of the existing FIU who collaborate with the 
network of the global FIUs to government bureaucracy. This is very strategic for 
the country, many autonomous FIUs of the world struggle to become members of 
the Egmont Group and their applications are frequently declined.   
 
Furthermore, the bureaucratic tendencies that exist within the Federal Ministry of 
Finance will further hinder the effective operational capacity of the new FIU when 
being situated under the Ministry. After all, the bureaucratic tendencies of the 
Ministry of Finance contributed to the reasons why Nigeria was blacklisted in the 
first instance. According to Ribadu (2010), “further missives from the FATF 
seeking to organise a fact-finding trip were ignored. That ‘Kafkaesque’ tale is the 
reason why Nigeria landed on the wrong side of the FATF and faced serious 
repercussions — without the country’s leadership even being aware of it”. Thus, it 
will only be rational to place the operation of the Nigeria FIU under the law 
enforcement agency in order to achieve its objectives as developing countries 
(Ribadu, 2010). In addition, the unfortunate circumstance of political corruption 
and lack of a political will to fight crime in Nigeria will only become worse if the FIU 
is situated under a Ministry that is full of politics and bureaucratic tendencies.     
 
7.1.2   Operational and Social Impediments 
There is no doubt that the fight against organised crime and illicit financial flows 
started in developed countries where sophisticated environments exist (Bassiouni, 
1990). Therefore, implementation instruments to tackle the threat of organised 
crime and illicit financial flows are benchmarks and best practices that originated 
from developed countries, where global standard setters are situated. For instance, 
the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank 
are situated in the United States of America while the FATF is situated in France.  
However, developing countries with less sophisticated environments are 
compelled to follow recommendations and standards that have originated from 
those developed environments (FATF, 2012). It is against this backdrop, that the 
instruments and recommendations designed to curb organised crime and money 





rather than global initiatives to combat crime and indeed profits originating from 
crime. African Development Bank (ADB) (2007) posits that implementation of 
comprehensive anti-money laundering policies in developing countries comes with 
some unique challenges. Therefore, developing countries are domesticating 
(applying stringent standards in their countries) anti-money laundering 
recommendations on face value, since they are not allowed to take any initiative 
of their own. Instead they are compelled to ensure total compliance with 
sophisticated anti-money laundering recommendations that originated from 
developed countries. It is in this vein that Halliday, Levi & Reuter (2014) posit that 
countries are not allowed to address issues of money laundering to suit their 
national circumstances. Thus making the ratification of these recommendations 
and standards to be implemented on ‘face-value’ rather than to localise them to 
meet countries AML regimes challenges. This creates deficits in the fight against 
proceeds of crime in many developing countries, including, Nigeria.  
 
The following operational and social impediments are attributed to the 
weaknesses in the fight against the proceeds of crime in Nigeria: customer due 
diligence bottlenecks; the consequence of customer due diligence on financial 
inclusion and social justice; law enforcement operating environment and its 
complications in Nigeria; Reporting Entities’ Compliance Officers versus Law 
Enforcement Agencies in Nigeria; and organised crime offenders in Nigeria are 
recidivists.  
 
Customer Due Diligence Bottlenecks  
Implementing comprehensive Customer Due Diligence (CDD) is challenging in 
Nigeria. FATF recommendation 10 requires reporting institutions to use reliable 
sources of information to ascertain the identity and verification of their customers 
when conducting transactions in the course of doing business with any customer 
in Nigeria (FATF, 2012). It is against this backdrop: that financial institutions (FIs) 
and designate non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are compelled 
to conduct customer identification of their customers before conducting or 
consummating any customer relationships with them in the cause of doing 
business (see also Chapter 5). However, the application of CDD in Nigeria is 
impeded by the following factors: lack of unique customer identification; lack of 






Lack of unique customer identification for Nigeria Citizens: 
It is submitted that recommendation 10 is not effective in Nigeria because the 
principle of know your customer (KYC) can only be effective in countries where 
there are unique identifiers for citizens, such as National Identity Numbers and 
Social Security Numbers as it is applicable in developed countries where the AML 
standards originate from. There is no central database in Nigeria where the 
biometric information of citizens is being maintained for a social development 
(NFIU Analyst 1; EFCC Investigator 1; NDLEA Investigator 1; NAPTIP Investigator 
1; SCUM Regulator 1; Chief Compliance Officer 1).  
Consequently, the OC offenders in Nigeria take advantage of this deficit to shield 
the proceeds of crime, since they are aware that there is no social framework to 
identify the Nigerian population. One of the cases analysed in this thesis, illustrates 
how one OC offender acquired multiple identities with different names and 
addresses in order to perfect the illicit trading in drug trafficking (GIABA, 2010). 
The expert interviews conducted at the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission and Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit also revealed that one 
offender of organised crime in Nigeria was apprehended with 300 international 
passports with different names and addresses (EFCC Investigator 1, NFIU Analyst 
3). This further supports the argument of Levi that offenders of organised crime 
engaged in modest money laundering techniques and they do not find it difficult to 
bypass the criminal justice system because very little is known about how 
problematic it is to launder the proceeds of serious crime in social environments 
(Levi, 2013). See also Chapter 6 the typological case studies and techniques of 
money laundering schemes.    
 
Proliferation of Identification Documents in Nigeria: 
Consequent to the requirement of acceptable identification documents for account 
opening purpose in Nigeria, a proliferation of identification documents is rife in the 
country (NFIU Analyst 3). In Nigeria, three means of identifications are popularly 
accepted by the banks when opening accounts for their customers. They are: 
international passports; driver’s licences and national identity cards (FRN, 2010). 
These identification means are only chosen for account opening purposes and not 
for identification in the real sense. After all, about 56.3 million bankable adults, 
representing 64.1 percent of the adult population in Nigeria are financially 
excluded while only 28.6 million people, representing 32.5 percent of the adult 





discussed under “Environmental Consequence of Customer Due Diligence on 
Financial Inclusion” in this chapter. 
 
The cost of acquiring these identification documents is on average £80 or higher 
depending on the urgency for these documents (Daily Trust, 2014).  The driver’s 
licence is meant for qualified drivers whilst international passport are acquired 
when travelling abroad. The requirement for verifiable identities for AML regime 
purposes could make these two means of identification vulnerable to exploitation 
since many people could procure them for account opening purpose alone and 
not for driving and travelling purposes, which are the original objectives of these 
identification documents.  
 
Lack of Robust Addressing System: 
Furthermore, the addressing systems in the West African region are not organised 
(UNODC Expert). In Nigeria, there is no postcode addressing system; therefore 
customers’ locations are described with a landmark such as market place, hospital, 
town-hall, church and mosque (NDELEA Investigator 1). Consequently, the 
absence of a robust addressing system increased the cost of banking in Nigeria 
(Chief Compliance Officer 1). The banks in Nigeria have to conduct physical 
visitation of their customers before certain accounts could be operational (Chief 
Compliance Officer 2). This means that banks have to budget for customer 
visitations in order to reduce the risk of verification and identification problems, this 
has a cost implication on the anti-money laundering (AML) regime and further 
burden is mounted on the reporting institutions (Chief Compliance Officer 1). In 
the UK and the US, physical visitation of individual customers is not necessary 
since there is an existence of a robust address system and databases to validate 
and verify customer identity and location at every point in time. Nigeria, on the 
contrary has a problematic addressing system which makes address verification 
very difficult for the purpose of know-your-customer (KYC) (Chief Compliance 
Officer 1). Houses are not serially numbered in Nigeria, therefore locating an 
offender during investigation activities and money laundering cases presents a 








The Consequence of Customer Due Diligence (CDD): Pressure on Financial 
Inclusion and Social Justice 
The anti-money laundering pressure in the rural areas debars financial inclusion 
in Nigeria (CBN Regulator 2). Financial inclusion has been defined as ease of 
access to formal financial systems by the member of the economy (Kama and 
Adigun, 2013).  If the objective of financial inclusion is to provide the people in the 
economy, including the poor, disabled, rural and other excluded populations with 
easy and quality financial services (Kama and Adigun, 2013), then CDD regulation 
in developing economies should be made suitable, to attract those members of 
the economy that are excluded from accessing formal financial products and 
services. According to African Development (2014), about 56.3 million adults, 
representing 64.1 percent of the adult population in Nigeria are financially 
excluded whilst only 28.6 million people, representing 32.5 percent of the adult 
population operate bank accounts. These categories of people have to be 
encouraged to patronise financial institutions.   
 
For instance, the minimum account opening balance for a savings account is 
below £10 in Nigeria (First Bank, 2015)  while the cost of opening an account could 
be higher than £80 when procuring identification documents such as international 
passport or drivers licence in the country for CDD purpose (Daily Trust, 2014). 
Therefore, those who are in the rural areas, poor, or those that are excluded from 
the financial institutions, would be further excluded socially if these mandatory 
identification documents continued to be the only accepted means of identification 
for account opening purposes for bank customers. Consequently, potentially 
excluded bankable adults may be totally discouraged from benefiting from the 
products and services offered by the financial institutions, if they do not have 
money to obtain an international passport or drivers licence for account opening 
documentation purposes.  
The prerequisite for Nigerians to provide specific means of identification before an 
account can be opened to gain access to the financial institutions impedes social 
justice. After all, the local communities in Nigeria have a way of identifying 
themselves for community development without the use of these identified and 
mandated unique identity requirements accepted by the FATF for conducting 







Lack of a Robust Land Registry 
The land registries in West African jurisdictions in general and Nigeria in particular 
are not organised and updated enough to reveal evidence of use of the proceeds 
of crime by organised crime offenders (UNODC Expert). Therefore, the offenders 
will buy unregistered properties that are difficult to identify, trace and confiscate by 
the competent authorities when conducting investigative activities on those assets. 
However, in Europe properties are listed and well documented to make the LEAs 
there able to follow the money trail and assets of criminal activities during their 
investigation in developed countries (NCA Expert). Furthermore, the lack of 
databases to monitor the land title registry record of asset owners and the 
unavailability of a robust land registry makes the tracing of illicit landed properties 
very difficult in Nigeria and the West African region as a whole (NCA Expert; 
UNODC Expert). 
 
Law Enforcement Operating Environment and its Complications in Nigeria   
The Nigerian law-enforcement operating environments are characterised by many 
complications. Firstly, law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in Nigeria are under-
funded and there are little incentives and operational funds available to them to 
fight crime (NCA Expert). In the UK, LEAs are given a certain percentage of 
forfeiture and confiscated assets of the proceeds of crime, this makes most of the 
competent agencies curbing organised crime and its crime proceeds, financially 
independent in the UK (NCA Expert). Furthermore, there are poorly paid 
government (including law-enforcement agencies) officials who can be corrupted 
in the fight against organised crime financial flows in the region due to poor 
motivation and compensation management by many competent agencies in West 
African states (GIABA, Expert 1). According to NCA Expert, most LEAs in Nigeria 
are under-funded. Little incentives and operational funds are available for them to 
fight the crime. In the UK LEAs get certain percentage of the proceeds from 
forfeiture assets (NCA Expert). Therefore, they can leverage on revenue 
generated through this medium to support their operations when the government 
budget for the LEAs is reduced.  
 
Secondly, the Nigerian LEAs operational environments lack some sort of 
specialised training to function well in their roles (NFIU Analyst 5). The dynamics 
of organised crime and proceeds of crime management requires competent 





equipped with specialised training that available in developed countries (NDLEA 
Investigator 2). In the same vein, operational weakness is observed in the onsite 
inspections and examinations conducted by the reporting entities regulators (NFIU 
Analyst 5). The NFIU Analyst suggests that most supervisory and regulatory 
agencies in Nigeria usually focus on the prudential elements of the reporting 
entities during their review. This makes the review on the AML component suffer, 
due to insufficient knowledge and specialised training on how to conduct the 
required AML review in Nigeria (NFIU Analyst 5). Consequently, NFIU conducts 
targeted and onsite risk-based AML reviews on some reporting entities jointly with 
their institutional regulators (CBN Regulator 2).   
Thirdly, the turnaround time for intelligence sharing to curb organised crime 
proceeds of crime in Nigeria is a huge concern. The EFCC Investigator 2 argued 
that most of the time when a reactive intelligence report (IR) is requested from the 
NFIU by the Commission, the NFIU’s response to this request comes late, thereby 
making the shared intelligence outdated. This implies that the investigator might 
have to use another means of getting the same intelligence request from the NFIU. 
This makes investigator miles ahead of the NFIU in intelligence gathering in 
Nigeria owing to the fact that, the investigators are usually beyond the stage in 
which this information is needed (Investigator 2).  Furthermore, the NFIU Analyst 
2 suggests that poor data integrity at the NFIU is attributed to delay in turnaround 
time of the NFIU IRs. Going forward, if the NFIU receives quality reports from the 
reporting institutions, the quality of its proactive and reactive IRs will improve in 
Nigeria (NFIU Investigator 2). Additionally, there are issues surrounding the under-
reporting of the transactions consummated within the reporting institutions. This 
slows down the pace of the NFIU during analysis of its intelligence reports, since 
it has to continually revert to the reporting institutions to mend this gap when 
reactive IRs are requested (NFIU Analyst, 5, emphasis added).  
 
Fourthly, the combination of all operational complications affecting the competent 
agencies fighting organised crime and money laundering in Nigeria resulted in 
inter-agency rivalry amongst LEAs in the country (NFIU Analyst 6). This impedes 
effective cooperation of the LEAs when collaborating locally and internationally to 
trace the proceeds of serious crime. According to NFIU Analyst 6, it is erroneously 
believed that agencies with higher operational successes will attract more 
supranational funding from foreign counterparts who provide counterpart funding 
to support intelligence needed to curb organised crime and money laundering in a 





gathering and dissemination of intelligence reports by the NFIU amongst the 
relevant agencies in Nigeria and beyond.       
 
Reporting Entities’ Compliance Officers versus Law Enforcement Agencies in 
Nigeria 
A fundamental problem worth mentioning is that of bitterness faced by many 
compliance officers within reporting institutions and banks in particular when 
performing their anti-money laundering roles in Nigeria (Chief Compliance Officer 
1). There appears to be a serious social problem in the way some of the LEAs 
officers deal with compliance officers of reporting entities with the former treating 
the latter with suspicion during the process of gathering developing intelligence in 
Nigeria.  According to Chief Compliance Officer 2, the compliance officers from 
the reporting institutions are sometimes treated like common criminals. This 
happens when the law enforcement agencies are not getting results from the 
banks for their investigative activities and intelligence gathering. They usually 
believe that the banks are not with them but rather with the offenders. Furthermore, 
the LEAs are not making available relevant information that can help the reporting 
institutions and bank deal with new trends and patterns of the laundering activities 
of organised criminals in Nigeria (Chief Compliance Officer 2). In the UK there is 
a robust relationship between the law-enforcement agencies and the reporting 
institutions responsible for anti-money laundering obligation (NCA Expert). 
 
Organised Crime Offenders in Nigeria are Recidivists  
According to EFCC Investigator 1, the organised crime offenders in Nigeria are 
recidivists, as they never stop committing crime. There are many cases of 
offenders being arrested, tried, jailed and convicted for their crime but they still 
continue their criminal activity even in prison. Many also travel to neighbouring 
West African Countries to extend and perfect their syndicate. A typical classic 
example is that of an offender convicted by the Commission and jailed in Lagos. 
After being sent to Kirikiri prison, he began posting newspaper adverts from the 
prison, and with these adverts he was able to defraud victims of millions of Naira 
right from his prison cell (EFCC Investigator 1).  The Commission trailed him to 
the prison and discovered that he was operating bank accounts had access to 
mobile phones. In fact the Commission recovered five (5) mobile telephone sets 
from him in prison.  It is important to say that prison itself is a connected territory 





criminals (EFCC Investigator 1). Additionally, the Commission investigated the 
case of an AFF offender who took USD 9 million from a Nigerian victim when he 
was in prison. Most Nigerian AFF offenders will never mend their ways after 
receiving punishment from their crime (EFCC Investigator 1).   
 
In Levi and Osofsky (1995), the anecdotal evidence on repeat offenders also 
posits that “the offenders appear to get smart about hiding their assets once they 
have been deprived of them”. Therefore, it is difficult to put organised crime 
offenders out of business after being convicted for their crime.  After all, many 
offenders can still secure illicit commodities (drugs) in credit from the wholesalers 
after being convicted for drug trafficking to start a new business (Levi and Osofsky, 
1995). The majority of convicted drug trafficking offenders in Nigeria are drug 
couriers and a few dealers (NDLEA investigator). Many of the wholesalers and 
producers of narcotic drugs operated from high risk jurisdictions where illicit 
commodities are cultivated; bringing them to justice may have a significant impact 
on the commission of the crime. The ‘reciprocity’ relationship that exists between 
the legal and illegal actors in the source countries where drugs are cultivated will 
not clamp down on the illicit production of drugs from supply countries (Passas, 
2003). Consequently, the destruction of supply market networks will be the best 
way to reduce the growing frequency of second time offenders. The scarcity in the 
production of illicit products may force the supply end to restrict supplies to 
offenders who can make instant payments for the procurement of narcotic drugs. 
The law enforcement authorities can then concentrate their resources to combat 
individual offenders that can make payments for those illicit commodities. The 
destruction of illicit supply markets will be a better strategy to curb the menace of 
repeat offenders for drug trafficking business to be specific.      
 
        7.1.3  Economical Impediments 
The interviews revealed that the following economic challenges affect the effective 
implementation of crime proceeds management in Nigeria. These are: Cash Base 
and Parallel Economy, which includes the use of the hawala system of payments, 
activities of unregulated bureaux de change and under-regulated designated non-
financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs); free cross-border movement of 
people and goods within the West African Region, and; Relationship Banking 






Cash Base and Parallel Economy 
Cash based economy prevails in Nigeria as well as other developing economy 
where cash transactions are the norm of doing business (GIABA, 2007). The 
reasons for cash based economies within the West African states are attributed to 
high levels of illiterate people, large growth of cash oriented businesses, 
unregulated informal and parallel sectors, unrealistic bank interests and 
inadequate formal payment systems in the rural areas or lack of confidence in their 
use (GIABA, 2007). In the same vein, alternative value transfer and remittance 
systems played a major role in the success of many African economies (ADB, 
2007).  Consequently, legitimate business-people profit from a parallel economy 
when doing their business’ whilst criminals exploit the vulnerability of a cash based 
economy to commit their crime (UNODC Expert; GIABA Expert 1). According to 
the UNODC Expert, the cash based economies within the West African Region 
facilitate integration of criminal funds very quickly. In Europe, financial transactions 
are largely consummated through financial institutions (FIs) (UNODC Expert). 
 
Free Cross Border Movement of People, Goods and Cash within West African 
Region  
The porous borders coupled with free movement of people across the West 
African region allow easy passage of illicit cash (GIABA, Investigator 1). It is not 
the principle of liberty of movement of the people that impede the fight against 
organised crime and its financial flows but the absence of a monitoring role by any 
of the countries around these border crossings (UNODC Expert). There should be 
relative monitoring of peoples’ inflow and outflow around the border crossings 
(UNODC Expert). This will prevent the activities of cash couriers that are operating 
along these porous borders, moving proceeds of crime from one country to 
another. This makes cash easily available to the criminal. This cash is often used 
to buy property in Nigeria (NDLEA investigator, 1).  
 
Relationship Banking versus Financial Integrity  
According to the African Development Bank (2007), financial institutions in most 
African countries are relatively small and struggle to compete with the profitability 
statuses of their counterparts in developed countries that have greater access to 
international markets.  Therefore, in order to achieve higher profitability status 





to the banker to scout for bank deposits to increase the profitability and liquidity 
ratio of the bank (Chief Compliance Officer 1 & 2). The abuse of this practice 
attracts the illicit inflow of criminal proceeds into the financial institution. 
Additionally, the practice of relationship banking makes most of the Nigerian banks 
vulnerable to the illicit proceeds of organised crime offenders in Nigeria. According 
to the NCA Expert, one of the impediments against the success of curbing criminal 
money in Nigeria is the practice of relationship banking, where account officers’ 
tip-off their customers during investigation activities of the LEAs.  
 
In the manipulation of the illicit financial flows, sometimes money are wired directly 
by the organised criminal groups to the account of their account officers, who then 
later structure the illicit flows using in-house account of the bank (GFIC Analyst). 
The EFCC Investigator 2 also revealed how a relationship officer to a bank 
customer assisted the money laundering customer in Nigeria, shield their 
proceeds of crime, (See text box 7.1 below for details). This obstructs the money 
trails and provides security for the business of OC offenders within the West 
African region. 
 
Text Box 7.1: Illicit Act of a Crooked Relationship Officer in Nigeria 
 
The offenders often called their account officers, also known as relationship officers, to come and pick 
the illicit fund in their home. Most of the time a bullion van could be used to pick cash worth 
$3,000,000.00 from the offender’s home.  
-The account officers would then open an account for the offender with these proceeds of crime. The 
advantageous aspect of it, is that the mandate card that is expected to be completed by the bank 
customer is actually completed by the accounting officers on their behalf.   
-The accounting officers also assist in the structuring of the withdrawal of these funds into minimal 
amounts to avoid being flagged as STRs threshold reporting. 
-They also operate this account for the procurement of illicit commodities on behalf of their customers. 
  
EFCC Investigator 2 
 
The enumerated act in the text box 7.1 summarises the illegal roles of accounting 
officers when abusing their positions and the integrity of financial institutions in 







7.1.4 Legal Impediment 
The legal impediments against the fight on transnational crime range from 
jurisdictional legal displacements when criminals relocate their criminal activities 
to jurisdictions with weaker laws and regulations. It also results in the 
unpreparedness of the global states in the management of the illicit confiscated 
assets of organised crime. The overall legal impediment is the ineffectiveness of 
the criminal justice system to combat crime.   
 
Jurisdictional Legal Displacement 
The ratification of international instruments demands that transnational crime 
should be dealt with in any State that has jurisdiction using the general principles, 
procedures and punishment in line with the ratified conventions, treaties and 
recommendations (Boister, 2003).  
Notwithstanding the existence of the FATF’s 40 recommendations and other 
relevant Conventions mentioned in Chapter 4 to curb money laundering and 
transnational crime, there still appear to be variations in the jurisdictional laws for 
combating organised crime proceeds in a global context.  
This work in contrary to the principle of legality and the consequential effect of this 
is the legal displacement in the global states. Consequently, legal displacement is 
an impediment in the fight to combat transnational crime in Nigeria. According to 
Teichma (2004), a jurisdiction with lax laws attract recidivists who are shopping for 
new jurisdictions of harbour for the continuity of crime. The offenders will relocate 
from the jurisdiction with stringent laws where effective regulations and sanction 
regime exist to a weaker law regime jurisdiction. This is referred to as crime 
displacement in the country of new harbour. For instance, when the United States 
of America’s illicit drug market became extremely difficult for the drug traffickers 
from Latin America to penetrate and operate, the offenders relocated their criminal 
activities to European states using Nigeria as a transit country, in the quest to 
maximise illicit profit (UNODC, 2010). The rationale for legal displacement is 
determined by the rational choice theory discussed in Chapter 5, where offenders 
consider the risks associated with crime based on two parameters.  
First, the ‘pain’ (punishment upon being caught) or the ‘gain’ (the expected 
proceeds of crime when not being caught). According to one of the interviews 
conducted at EFCC, it argues that the greatest challenge on the fight to combat 





further impedes effective collaboration of the LEAs against organised crime and 
money laundering (EFCC Investigator 1). 
 
Impediment of Asset Recovery Management and Confiscation Act  
According to the GIABA (2014), Nigeria has not fully complied with the FATF 
Recommendation 3 on confiscation and provisional measures to combat the illicit 
assets and proceeds of OC offenders in the country. The absence of this law 
impedes the effective confiscation and management of criminal proceeds in 
Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 2). Consequently, confiscation of organised crime 
proceeds in Nigeria is extremely difficult because each law enforcement agency 
confiscates according to the provision contained in their Acts of establishment. 
Most of these Acts of establishment are not comprehensive enough to combat the 
illicit proceeds of serious crime in Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 3, GIABA, 2012). 
Furthermore, the management of assets under the control of the LEA in Nigeria is 
ineffective, since many of the LEAs in Nigeria do not have the capacity to manage 
those assets confiscated by them specifically assets under interim forfeiture 
(EFCC Investigator 3). The assets taken-over under interim forfeiture can go back 
to the offender upon being exonerated by the court of law from the crime in 
question or the assets may remain with the LEAs after the offender is convicted of 
a crime. The absence of enabling laws that authorise LEAs in Nigeria to dispose 
of assets that may lose value due to depreciation, when being taken over under 
interim forfeiture mechanisms account for global displacement of criminal 
proceeds.  Comparatively, in the UK, the LEAs can sell the assets and put the 
money in a dedicated account before a case is concluded in court (NCA Expert). 
Therefore, money can be forfeited or given back to a suspect upon the conclusion 
of the case as determined by the court of law (NCA Expert). The absence of this 
assets recovery and confiscation management legislation grant organised crime 
offenders the opportunity to secure a restraining order from the Nigerian courts to 
stop law enforcement agencies in the country from the taking-over and 
management of their illicit assets during investigation and prosecution of their 
offences (EFCC Investigator 3). For instance, “in the case of Akingbola v EFCC, 
the High court in Nigeria restrained the EFCC from taking over the assets of the 








Ineffective Criminal Justice System  
According to GIABA Expert 2, ineffective criminal justice in some African states 
within the West African region impedes the fight against organised crime. The law 
makers in certain instances will amend existing good laws thus compromising their 
impact in an attempt to shield their criminal activities (see Political Impediments: 
Blindfolded Capable Guardian and Political Corruption).  
 
The law enforcement agencies in Nigeria are underfunded (NCA Expert). 
Therefore, the poorly paid officers can be corrupted and compromised by 
organised crime offenders during their investigation activities (GIABA Expert 1). 
Furthermore, the investigations recorded by the LEAs are of low quality due to 
scarce resources (GIABA Expert 1). This hinders the effectiveness of the LEAs 
within the West African region. In the same vein, low level competence in the 
detection and tracing of illicit assets belonging to offenders of organised crime is 
associated with developing countries (GIABA, Expert 1). Lately, organised criminal 
groups are getting more sophisticated than the LEAs and their assets are easily 
shielded away from the latter’s investigations and confiscations activities (Levi, 
2013).    
  
Additionally, some lawyers act as agents of concealment of all illegal proceeds. 
For instance, organised crime offenders usually have a robust plan for hiding the 
profits generated from crime using lawyers and corporate nominees (Levi and 
Osofsky, 1995), but the question is what is the role of Nigerian lawyers in the fight 
against criminal proceeds? Are they legal actors or illegal actors? Most lawyers in 
Nigeria do not have specialised practices, they engage in portfolio management, 
act as commission agents, operate clients’ accounts to launder illicit proceeds 
generated from criminal activities, engage in buying and selling of landed 
properties with criminal funds and promoting shell companies (SCUML Regulator, 
2). Some Nigerian lawyers threatened to take competent authorities to court, 
insisting that they will not comply with the anti-money laundering reporting 
requirements, obligating them to expose hiding transactions of their unlawful 
clients (SCUML regulator, 2). The reactions of some of the Nigerian lawyers 
toward their anti-money laundering obligations and compliance requirements in 
the country amounts to an acquiescence of the ‘symbiotic’ collaboration of both 
legal and illegal actors in the commissioning of organised crime in Nigeria (Passas, 





reporting requirements for the legal practitioners (Campbell & Campbell, 2015b). 
They also abided with the implementation of the consent regime for the country by 
refrain from undertaking suspicious transaction “until consent to proceed has been 
provided by National Crime Agency (NCA)” of the UK (Campbell & Campbell, 
2015a).  
 
Lastly, weak judiciary processes are the norm in the Nigerian courts of law, where 
many court cases remain pending in court. With regards to backlog of offenders 
awaiting trial in the court, it may take over six to seven years before some cases 
are concluded within the Nigeria courts (NDLEA Investigator, 2).  
 
7.2   Policy Implications 
The foregoing strategic points need to be addressed before overcoming the 
numerous impediments facing the fight against organised crime and its illicit 
proceeds in Nigeria. Having analysed the challenges exposed during the expert 
interviews, there are questions requiring the attention of the standards setters, 
implementing countries, competent authorities and the private sector (reporting 
intuitions). The concept of cost benefit in the fight against organised crime 
proceeds is of significance and needs to be addressed by both national and 
international actors. See also Levi and Halliday (2013) and Passas (2003). The 
thematic questions are: What is going to be the benefit to potential bank customers 
who have to spend 80 pounds to open an account which requires a minimum of 
10 pounds as opening balance? What is the cost of compliance with anti-money 
laundering obligations of the reporting institutions that have to dedicate part of their 
running cost to conduct customer’s visitations due to lack of a robust address 
system and databases? What resources are provided by the national government 
for the competent agencies to combat the crime? If these questions are addressed 
by the anti-money laundering actors, then the “wall” against successful seizure of 
proceeds of serious crime may begin to be surmounted. If the measures for 
remedy are more costly than the problem at hand, it will amount to ‘collateral 
damage’ in the long run (Passas, 2003). For instance, in Nigeria, there is already 
clear evidence of ‘collateral damage’ in terms of social justice as result of financial 
exclusion of many bankable adults within the country who do not possess unique 
identities for account opening documentation and customer due diligence as 
required by the FATF Recommendation 10. Failure to comply with FATF 





could be much worse than ‘collateral damage’ when a country is financially 
excluded from the global financial system due to FATF blacklisting when a country 
is added to the “bad-book” set by supranational standard setters.  
  
In addition, “faulty policies and Western government mistakes affecting mostly 
Third World countries (including Nigeria) have generated such sentiments, which 
may neutralize law-abiding values and principles held by people who feel justified 
to selectively target victims” (Passas, 2003). Addressing policy implications may 
reduce the impediments on the availability of social opportunities that exist in 
Nigeria and it may curtail the higher frequency recorded in the existing evidence 
of second time offenders in that nation. According to Nikos Passas (2003), 
“Nigerian people, for example, are worse off now than before the discovery of oil 
in their soil. Transnational corporations have exploited the environment and 
resources of the country and taken advantage of its corrupt regime. Nigeria 
subsequently became fertile ground for the recruitment of members in criminal 
organisations given the anti-Western feeling. We ‘stick it to the Americans’, is the 
kind of self-justifying argument that may make some ordinary people do 
extraordinary things”. Therefore, political leadership in Nigeria must have their 
eyes open and stand on their feet to provide social benefits and economic 
opportunities for the citizens and embrace good governance. In addition, winning 
the war against serious crime in Nigeria should include the provision of adequate 
resources to competent agencies to help fight organised crime and illicit financial 
flows.   
 
The analysis of impediments revealed that transported recommendations and 
instruments to curb proceeds of crime should be flexible enough to accommodate 
the peculiar circumstances of developing countries. There are great political and 
socio-legal implications when countries are not allowed to fashion out their own 
anti-money laundering regime in accordance with their specific economic 
background. Therefore, localising the regimes of anti-money laundering in 
developing countries where cash based economies prevail will require such 
jurisdictions to buy into compliance than to be compelled to ratify 
recommendations that are not comparable to their economy (Halliday, Levi & 
Reuter, 2014). It has been extensively discussed by standard setters that cash 
based economies are susceptible to the successful implementation of the regimes 
of money laundering (GIABA, 2007). Therefore, developing jurisdictions that are 





sophisticated economy even though there is no enabling capacity to support the 
emerging order of the ‘Western Economy’. This further creates a cultural deficit 
whilst citizens are forced to consummate transactions against their norms. After 
all, the developing countries perceive the cash based economy as strength rather 
than weakness and cash transactions are the norm and not the exception (African 
Development Bank, 2007). The contemporary fact is that the standard setters have 
failed to provide a scientific mechanism to measure the efficiency and success of 
implemented programmes of regimes of money laundering (Halliday, Levi & 
Reuter, 2014). The foregoing analysis affirmed the argument of Passas that the 
implication of monetary policies and controls of supranational and international 
organisations of the West narrowed the gaps in economy of the Third World 
countries, leaving them with preserved asymmetric growth and development 
(2003). To disprove the notion that instruments and policies to combat serious 
crime and money laundering are precedent to crippling economic development of 
developing countries in the favour of the West, the Third World countries should 
be allowed to take their own initiatives in combating crime and money laundering 
in their jurisdictions.        
 
The collaboration against crime has serious implications for tackling the identified 
challenges confronting the governance and impact of crime in a developing 
economy and Nigeria in particular. Though there exists collaboration efforts 
among the numerous actors creating orders in the control of crime in Nigeria, the 
West Africa region and the global North (EFCC Investigator 1), the inter-agency 
rivalry which is rife within the Nigeria criminal justice system need to be addressed. 
The law enforcement agencies need to see the private sector as a partner in 
progress (Levi & Osofsky, 1995). In the same vein effective collaboration is 
expected from the civil societies. According to Levi and Osofsky (1995), their role 
is inevitable in the evaluation of policy implications to fight crime in any society. 
The gaps that exist in the prosecutions of cases in Nigerian courts have to be 
addressed (NDLEA Investigator 2). The courts should expedite actions on the 
hearing of serious crime. If this war is to be won, the symbiotic relationship that 
impedes the success of war against crime must be eradicated to the barest 
minimal amongst the developing countries (Passas, 2003). Furthermore the 
limitation to symbiotic relationships between legal and illegal actors will enhance 






In addition, increasing the risk of commission of organised crime in one country 
has negative impacts in other jurisdictions. Offenders may ‘transport’ criminal 
activities to weaker states within the regional wider jurisdiction. This has serious 
implications for policies. The regional actors have to collaborate together by 
building mechanisms around the governance of crime. There should be focus on 
increasing the cost of crime in order to make it less attractive within the region. 
This can also be complemented with a robust mechanism and database to label 
criminal offenders from one jurisdiction to another (EFCC Investigator 1).  This 
effective cooperation will monitor the criminal offender who is on the run from the 
labelling state to a new state when displacing crime in a global context.    
 
Finally, there appears to be problematic statistics and empirical studies in the 
global governance of crime (Passas, 2003; Van Dijk, 2008; Halliday, Levi & Reuter, 
2014). This problem is more visible within developing economies because capable 
guardians that are ‘criminal sympathisers’ and offenders themselves and as a 
result do not make funds available for research and development in the Third 
World countries.  This has major implications in designing robust policies to curb 
organised crime and money laundering in developing countries. Therefore winning 
the war against the impediments of success in the fight against organised crime 
and money laundering in Nigeria requires a critical analysis of the afore-mentioned 
policy implications. These impediments make up the ‘dark side’ against the war on 
organised crime in developing economies.      
 
7.3   Conclusion    
This chapter analysed the impediments facing the success of the anti-money 
laundering regime in developing economies in general and Nigeria in particular. 
These impediments were categorised into four areas. First, the political 
impediments explored capable guardian, political will and the operational 
autonomy of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the focal agency on anti- money 
laundering in Nigeria to determine the progress of the Nigerian implementation of 
the regime against money laundering. The paramount impediment in this category 
revealed that the capable guardians are ‘blindfolded’ to crime due to inter-
dependency between the state actors (The political exposed persons (PEPs)) and 
organised crime offenders in Nigeria. The state actors shield the proceeds of 
corruption while organised crime offenders gain leverage on the lack of political 





their income from crime. The operational and social impediments are the second 
category. They revealed the existence of environmental deficits caused by the 
implantation of the anti-money laundering framework in the country. Furthermore, 
the economical impediments analysed the economical norms of conducting 
business in Nigeria and developing economies. The vulnerabilities of these norms 
are the pockets of impediments recorded in this category. The final impediments 
explored the gaps within the legal framework and criminal justice in Nigeria.  
 
Having considered policy implications in this chapter, Chapter 8 will address/look 
at the Impact of the Anti-Money Laundering Data and the Intelligence Reports to 































Collaboration against Organised Crime Illicit Financial 
Flows in Nigeria: A call for Data and Intelligence Reports 
Assurance  
Further to the arguments presented in Chapter 7 that the impediments militating 
against the fight on organised crime (hereinafter, OC) financial flows is a great 
concern in Nigeria, Edward and Gill (2006) posit that the negative impacts of the 
transnational organised crime (hereinafter, TOC) threats is becoming extremely 
difficult to measure due to lack of data integrity from a global perspective. This 
chapter thus evaluates the integrity and structure of the Anti-Money laundering 
(hereinafter, AML) statutory data used in Nigeria to combat the proceeds of 
organised crime. Also an evaluation of how the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit 
(hereinafter, NFIU) collaborates with other competent authorities (CAs) in curbing 
the proceeds of organised crime groups (hereinafter, OCGs) in Nigeria using these 
statutory reports and intelligence sharing of the NFIU will be conducted. There will 
also be a further examination of the various gaps in the quality assurance of the 
weekly transmitted reports provided by the reporting institutions to the NFIU. The 
success factors, if any, on these statutory AML data [Suspicious Transaction 
Reports (STRs), Currencies Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Currencies 
Declaration Reports (CDRs)] will be appraised. Thereafter, this chapter will 
evaluate critical factors impeding the quality of the disseminated intelligence 
reports by the NFIU to the competent agencies responsible for the fight against 
organised crime scourge in Nigeria. To achieve this, there will be a comparison of 
the number of the intelligence reports the NFIU disseminated to specialised LEAs 
combating specific organised crime types (drug-trafficking, human trafficking and 
advance fee fraud) as explored earlier in this thesis. The benchmarks will focus on 
the proportion of the disseminated intelligence reports vis-a-vis the number of 
statutory reports submitted by the reporting institutions to the NFIU. The chapter 
will evaluate, if any, the link between the disseminated intelligence of the NFIU 
with the conviction cases established by the specialised agencies discussed in 
Chapter 6.   
This chapter will also peer-review the NFIU AML data with that of the Ghana 
Financial Intelligence Centre (hereinafter, GFIC) using the NFIU 2013 Progress 
report, and a range of other qualitative and quantitative data collected during 





that some suggestion on how to achieve AML data integrity and quality assurance 
in Nigeria will be put forward in this chapter.  
 
8.1 The Role of the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) in Curbing 
Organised Crime Financial Flows  
The NFIU is “the central national agency in Nigeria, responsible for the receipt and 
analysis of financial disclosure (Currency Transaction Reports and Suspicious 
Transaction Reports) and dissemination of intelligence generated there-from, to 
competent authorities in order to counter money laundering and terrorism 
financing” (NFIU, 2013:6). Therefore, it coordinates the receipt, analysis and 
dissemination of intelligence reports to combat organised crime illicit financial 
flows and other related serious crime in Nigeria. In a nutshell, the Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs) are the providers of financial intelligence reports to the 
criminal justice system of any country in their respective quests to combat the illicit 
financial flows of organised crime and other related serious crime in that 
jurisdiction. 
 
8.1.1   The Powers of the NFIU 
In Nigeria, the NFIU derives its powers from the “Money Laundering (Prohibition) 
Act  (MLPA) 2011 as amended in 2012, the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 
as amended in 2013 and the Economic & Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
establishment Act, 2004” (NFIU, 2013:8).  
 
These powers are (NFIU, 2013:8):  
 
- “The receipt of Suspicious Transaction Reports (hereinafter, STRs) from 
reporting entities or made voluntarily by any persons pursuant to Section 
6 of the MLPA 2011 as amended;  
- The receipt of STRs relating to terrorism financing from reporting entities 
within 72 hours pursuant to Section 14 of the PTA 2011 as amended;  
- The receipt of reports involving the transfer to or from a foreign country of 
funds or securities exceeding US$10,000.00 or naira equivalent pursuant 
to Section 2 of the MLPA 2011 as amended;  
- The receipt of declarations made to the Nigerian Customs, also known as 
Currency Declarations (hereinafter, CDRs), pursuant to the Foreign 





- The receipt of Currency Transaction Reports (hereafter, CTRs) made by 
reporting entities pursuant to Section 10 of the MLPA 2011 as amended, 
and;  
- The inspection of reporting entities to ensure compliance with the various 
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) 
obligations”.  
    
Consequently, for the FIUs to function well in any country, they have to collaborate 
with other institutional stakeholders responsible for the implementation of the AML 
regime of that country. In Nigeria, the NFIU is the bridge and intermediary between 
the providers of financial flows statutory reports and the users of the intelligence 
products developed there-from in the information given by the reporter of statutory 
reports (Figure 8.1). Therefore, the NFIU collaborates with the Reporting 
Institutions (RIs), which include: the Financial Institutions (FIs), Designated Non-
Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs), the Nigerian Customs and any 
other financial risk sector as identified in the country.  
 
Figure 8.1: FIU, the Financial Intelligence Reports Intermediary 
 
                     Source: The World Bank, 2009 
 
The national users of the NFIU Intelligent Reports (IRs) include (NFIU, 2013): Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Police, Drug Squad, Customs and other specialist LEA); 
Judiciary Institutes and Public Prosecutors; Policy Makers; Tax Authorities 
Legislators, Regulatory Bodies; Anti-Corruption Agency and any other relevant 
competent authority (hereinafter, CA) for the country’s AML regime. Chapter 6 also 
discussed the roles of competent authorities that are the focal agencies in Nigeria 
in the fight against the three specific organised crime − drug trafficking, trafficking 





8.2 Data Collaboration between the NFIU and the Reporting Institutions  
In Nigeria, the following reporting institutions are required by the Money 
Laundering (Prohibition) Act (MLPA), 2011 (as amended) to submit weekly reports 
to the NFIU for the implementation of the Nigerian AML regime. They are: the 
Financial Institutions (FIs), (the structure of the FIs in Nigeria is illustrated in Figure 
8.3); the Designated Non-Financial Institutions (DNFIs), like casinos, dealers in 
jewellery, cars and luxury goods, chartered/professional accountants, audit firms, 
tax consultants, clearing and settlement companies, legal practitioners, 
supermarkets, hotel and hospitality industries, estate surveyors and valuers, 
dealers in precious stones and metals, trust and company service providers, pool 
betting, lottery, non-government organizations and non-profit organizations; and 
the Nigerian Customs. 
 
According to NFIU Analyst 5 and Ibekaku (2012), the roles of the reporting 
institutions under the Nigeria AML regime, are to: (i) appointment of Chief 
Compliance Officers; (ii) understand the regulatory and legal AML regime in 
Nigeria and globally; (iii) identification of customers and beneficial owners of 
accounts or investments; (iv) development and recording of all transaction records 
as stipulated in the laws. The FIs should ensure that records are kept properly, the 
financial transaction records of their customers must be kept for a period of five 
years after severance of the transactions; (v) ensure that they do not engage in 
any relationship with shell companies; (vi) develop central information collation 
system or setting up of mini-FIUs on all transactions conducted by customers in 
order to systematically identify red flags that may be reported to the NFIU (See 
also Chapter 6); (vii) verify customers’ profile and documentation of any suspicious 
or unusual transactions or trends in customers’ profile and implementation of 
effective customer identification programme within their institutions; (viii) train all 
staff (both front office and back office) and ensure effective supervision and 
compliance by applying a risk-based approach; (ix) understand and apply 
appropriate risk management systems in appropriate cases and as provided by 
legislation, to conduct risk assessments of their products, location of transactions 
and customers, and they are also expected to classify their customers according 
to risk categories (low, medium and high risk customers), and; (x) identify 
suspicious transactions and report all suspicious transactions to the NFIU in a 
prompt and timely manner in order to aid the combat of financial crimes, control 





terrorists (without exception) based on the definition of the offence of money 
laundering under Section 15 of the MLP Act, 2011 (as amended), (Annex 1). 
 
Having identified the main AML roles of the reporting institutions in Nigeria, this 
chapter will appraise how the NFIU collaborates with the reporting institutions 
when performing its first core function of receiving statutory reports from the 
reporting institutions. The level of collaboration attained by the NFIU to improve 
data integrity and the structure of the statutory reports submitted by the reporting 
institutions to NFIU will also be examined. It is against this backdrop that the peer-
review collaboration strategy will be formulated for the NFIU at the latter part of 
this chapter to enhance the quality assurance of the AML data used in Nigeria to 
counter organised crime financial flows.  
 
   8.2.1 The Data Integrity of the Statutory Reports in Nigeria 
The quality of any intelligence reports disseminated by the NFIU to the law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) and other competent authorities (CAs) to counter 
the illicit financial flows of OCGs will greatly depend on the integrity and validity of 
the data reported by the reporting institution to the NFIU. Gregory (2006) also 
elucidates the need for CAs to have a robust system in place for testing quality 
assurance of any data reported to combat OCGs threats. Gregory further 
illustrates how the deficit in the reliability and validity of the data submitted in 1997-
1999 for UK’s Organised Crime Notification Scheme (OCNS) to National Criminal 
intelligence Service (NCIS), now refer to as National Crime Agency (NCA) affected 
the quality of the disseminated intelligence shared there-from in the UK between 
that period. Therefore, Nigeria is unlikely to ever be the only country that will 
encounter the impediment of data integrity in combating crime.  
 
With respect to Nigeria, Table 8.1 shows the number of Currency Transaction 
Reports (CTRs) and Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) submitted to the 
NFIU in 2012. Nigeria continues to become CTRs regime-country with a total 
number of 4,776,597 CTRs accounted for in 2012. This significant figure continued 
to overwhelm the capacity of the inadequate NFIU Analysts in Nigeria (NFIU 
Analyst 2), although it is much less when compared to 14,137,163 and 7,958,616 
CTRs submitted to NFIU in 2010 and 2011 respectively (NFIU, 2013). The reason 
for the drastic fluctuation in these figures was traced to an amendment of the AML 





Act 2004 in 2011 where the reporting threshold was reviewed upwards from N5 
million to N10 million for body corporates and N1 million to N5 million for 
individuals” by the legislators (NFIU, 2013). A debatable analysis for upward 
review of the CTRs threshold was submitted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, where a 
discussion on the manipulative acts of the ‘blindfolded capable guardians’ in 
Nigeria was put forward. 
 
Table 8.1: Reports and Rendition from Reporting Institution in 2012 
Reports Received Number 
Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) 4,776,597 
Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) 2,828  
   Source: NFIU (2013); GIABA (2013) 
 
Additionally, the quality of these reports is very problematic for the Analysts at the 
NFIU to make any logical deductions from the CTRs and STRs figures reported to 
the NFIU even with the application of sophisticated analytical tools designed and 
deployed by the UNODC to help analyse these statutory reports (NFIU Analyst 2). 
Therefore, most of these statutory reports are just like loaded ‘garbage’ boarding, 
stressing and stretching the capacity of the NFIU database on a daily basis. As 
submitted by Gregory (2006:84), the competent authorities should “have their own 
collection, monitoring and validation system” in place to check the quality of data 
they acquired for the investigation of the OCGs threats. The NFIU also has its own 
analytical and validity system funded by the European Union under the 9th 
European Development Fund that provides technical support for the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the parent organisation of the NFIU 
and the Nigerian Judiciary. In 2006, the validating system of the NFIU was part of 
the deliverable products of € 24.7 million EU/UNODC joint project and technical 
assistance for the Nigerian AML regime (https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/Index.php/eu-
unodc-project). 
One of the key components of this project provided the NFIU with an analytical 
tool to help analyse and disseminate its intelligence reports in Nigeria.  
 
It is against this backdrop that the UNODC developed and deployed a validation 
schema (schema is a programming language that interprets data) along-side with 
the UNODC goAML analytical software from 2006 to 2010, for the NFIU. The 





used to validate the CTRs and STRs submitted by the reporting institutions, 
particularly, the financial institutions through the goAML platform, when submitting 
their weekly AML statutory reports electronically in Nigeria.  
 
The function of the validation schema is to compare the submitted statutory reports 
with the system rule-based and parameters set in the schema (NFIU Analyst 3). 
The reports (CTRs and STRs) are submitted weekly by reporting institutions 
electronically through goAML portal and are validated with the XML schema before 
being accepted into the NFIU data base for its analyses. Notwithstanding this, 
some of the reporting institutions still submit hard-copies of weekly statutory 
reports to the NFIU for in adherence with compliance requirements with the 
Nigerian AML regime, where they cannot afford the cost of deploying ICT 
infrastructure suitable for goAML reporting format. The XML Schema scores the 
reporting institutions, in particular the banks in percentage (%) terms based upon 
the validation of their weekly statutory reports at the NFIU (Researcher personal 
experience at the NFIU, 2004-2011).  
The researcher worked at the NFIU between 2004 to 2011 at the Compliance and 
Enforcement Unit. During this period, the researcher had the priviledge to suggest 
to the former NFIU Director the importance of creating a Compliance Help Desk, 
where all AML statutory reports of the NFIU are checked for quality assurance and 
validation. This suggestion was implemented and the compliance Help Desk is 
operational till date. The researcher’s experience at the NFIU during this period 
also revealed that some of these reports could not be validated whenever they 
were being submitted, due to lack of data integrity and the inconformity of these 
reports with the NFIU reporting format. At some point, some of these reports were 
also submitted late at the Compliance Help Desk of the NFIU. The implications for 
late submission of reports give the OCGs the opportunity to launder the illicit 
proceeds of crime before reports are transmitted to the NFIU database for analysis. 
Therefore, the offenders might have moved or structured the funds in or/and out 
of the bank as at the time the late reports reach the NFIU database. 
 
The NFIU Analyst 5 also affirmed that in some cases the reasons why suspicions 
of these reports may arise are not often made clear by the reporting institutions to 
the NFIU. The reporting institutions are sometimes reluctant to report quality data 
emanating from the transactions of their valued customers, including that of the 
Political Exposed Persons (PEPs). “Beneficial ownerships (BOs) of funds are 





(2005) rightly asked, “in what respect does this reporting count as success”, if 
these statutory reports are lacking data integrity? This defeats the objective behind 
statutory reporting to help follow, monitor and combat the ‘dirty’ money originating 
from all serious crime in Nigeria.  
 
Staying in control of data assurance required the NFIU to channel its limited 
resources to conduct targeted and joint on-site risk-based AML review of many 
reporting institutions in Nigeria (NFIU Analyst 5).  This NFIU periodically embarked 
on joint on-site examination of the reporting institutions with their governmental 
supervisory institutions to conduct AML Compliance Examinations of the reporting 
institutions in Nigeria (NFIU Analyst 5). For instance, the NFIU conducted several 
joint examinations of the reporting institutions with their supervisory bodies such 
as the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the National Insurance Commission 
(NAICOM), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Special Control 
Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML). During this examination, one of the 
tasks of the NFIU Compliance Analysts was to conduct transactions testing on the 
weekly statutory reports submitted by the reporting institutions to the NFIU during 
the period under review (NFIU Analyst 5).  The objective of this task was to test 
the viability of data submitted by the reporting institutions to combat illicit financial 
flows in Nigeria. It is through this on-site examination of the reporting institutions 
that many unreported suspicious transaction reports are escalated by the 
compliance analyst of the NFIU. 
 
In addition, the fundamental objective of the criminal justice actors is to prevent 
crimes within the global states, which is in contrast to the objective of the private-
sector actors, (including the Financial Institutions (FIs) and the Designated Non-
Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) that submit the majority of the 
AML reports are profit maximisation.  Critically, the loyalty of the private reporting 
institutions is likely to be towards their valued customers who bring profitable 
businesses to their institutions as compared to the responsibilities they have 
towards the criminal justice system in the jurisdictions they operate in. In Chapter 
5, it was observed how FATF Recommendation 13 compelled member states to 
abrogate financial institutions secrecy law, the practice of relationship banking in 
some West African countries, including Nigeria defeats this abrogation of banking 
secrecy required under the FATF Recommendation 13 in developing economies 
(NCA Expert). In some cases, the ‘crime facilitator’, i.e. the crooked bankers open 





originating from serious crime in the quest to legitimatise profit from the crime 
(EFCC Investigator 2).  
 
Furthermore, OCGs members also participate in the ownership of financial 
institutions. In the case of BCCI in Chapter 4, the thesis revealed how OC 
offenders used financial institutions to launder proceeds of crime by owning a bank. 
In the BCCI case, manipulated AML data that lacked integrity were also submitted 
to the competent authorities in the UK during this era. The commonality of profit 
maximisation between the OCGs and some of the private sector reporting 
institutions in Nigeria may not be a far-fetched reason as to why the banks 
experienced the highest suspicious transaction reports (STRs) in Figure 8.2 of the 
NFIU 2013 progress report. Besides, most of these reports were manipulated and 
misrepresented to secure the identity of the OCG offenders who conduct such 
transactions. Therefore, the higher the suspicious transactions reports submitted 
to the NFIU; the fewer the intelligence reports generated from these sub-standard 
STRs to convict OC offenders in Nigeria (see Table 8.8). 
 
The fundamental argument submitted here, is that the integrity of the report from 
which the ‘reporting institutions’ acting as an agent of crime, ‘crime facilitators’ 
and/or ‘clandestine service providers’ of the OCGs social network cannot be 
different from that of an act of ‘chasing a shadow’, even when those data validates 
in the analytical tools of the NFIU. They will never count as valid data. This is 
consequent to the fact that financial institutions who are the ‘facilitators’ and/or ad 
hoc members of the criminal networks in Nigeria will only send the NFIU garbage 
AML data, that are fictitiously manipulated to conceal the identity of their so-called 
‘valued’ customers operating in all sorts of illicit transactions within the global state.  
 
8.2.2 The Data Structure for Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Statutory      
Report in Nigeria 
From a criminology point of view, the data to combat crime must be well-structured 
and collected in a systematic way (Van Dijk, 2008; Edwards and Gill, 2006; 
Burnham, 2006). Looking at the structure of the suspicious transaction reports 
collected by the NFIU in 2012, it can be concluded that the data therein are not 
well structured and systematic enough to cover the designated reporting 
institutions that are obligated and compelled under the Nigerian AML reporting 






In Figure 8.2, the banks account for a total number of 1,590 CTRs, the capital 
markets, 309 CTRs and the Special Control Unit against Money Laundering 
(SCUML) accounts for 73 CTRs during the period under review. SCUML is the 
governmental supervisory body in Nigeria that regulates the activities of the 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Profession (DNFBPs). 
 
Figure 8.2: Statistics of Suspicious Transaction Report by Reporting 
Institution in 2012 
                              
Source: NFIU, 2013 
 
In addition, the CTRs recorded for SCUML in 2012 by the NFIU in Figure 8.2 does 
not correlate with the unpublished statistics of the SCUML given to the researcher 
during the interview in Nigeria. In that year, SCUML records accounted for 692 
STRs as against the 73 STRs reported by the NFIU in 2013. The breakdown of 
the SCUML STRs in 2012 is as follows: Hospitality Businesses, 21 STRs; 
Automobiles Dealers, 87 STRs, Estate Surveyors, 50 STRs; Accounting Firms, 
534 STRs (SCUML Regulator 1). The discrepancy in these two statistics revealed 
a deficit of unrecorded 619 STRs which is the difference between the 692 STRs 
of SCUML and the 73 STRs of the NFIU for the DNFBPs sector.    
 
Moreover, notwithstanding the highest number of 1,590 STRs accounted for by 
the banks in Figure 8.2, this Figure did not represent the true breakdown of the 
STRs for banking institutions in that year but only categorised all the STRs in this 
category as banks. This creates another discrepancy in determining accurate 
STRs reported to monitor the illicit transactions of OCGs by banking industry for 






Figure 8.3:  Structure of Nigeria’s Financial Institutions  
 
 Source: GIABA (2008) 
 
Furthermore, the structure of the financial institutions in Nigeria is categorised into 
four (4) broad structures in the Figure 8.3, with each of the category being 
subdivided into various sub-institutions (GIABA, 2008).  The first category is the 
Insurance Sector, which is further divided into three sub-categories (General 
insurance, Reinsurance and Life insurance). The insurance sector is regulated by 
the Nigerian Insurance Commission. The second category is the Banking Sector, 
which is regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. The financial/banking sector is made up of specialised 
Financial Institutions, Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs), Development Banks, 
Banks (Universal bank, Community bank, Bureau De Change and Microfinance 
bank) , Discount Houses, Financial Companies and Infrastructure Providers. The 
third category is the Pension Funds Management that is regulated by National 
Pension Commission. The sub-institutions under this category are Pension Fund 
Administrators and Pension Fund Custodians. Furthermore, the Capital Markets 
is made up of Issuing Houses, Stock Brokers, Portfolio Managers and Investment 
Advisers Trustees and they are regulated by Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Additionally, a structured AML data is expected to account for what each 
category of the capital market has accounted for in 2012 and the total number of 
the 309 CTRs recorded for capital market in Nigeria is not a clear representation 






Having set out the structure of FIs in Figure 8.3, it can be deduced that the NFIU 
data structure is not robust enough and did not wholly capture holistically the illicit 
transactions emanating from the structure of the financial institutions in Nigeria. 
The banks and capital markets are the only compliant reporting institutions under 
this structure (Figure 8.3). Furthermore, there is no evidence of compliance to 
statutory reporting under the AML regime by the Nigerian Insurance Sector and 
Pension Funds Management Institutions in Figure 8.2, since the figure did not 
account for numbers of STRs recorded by these sectors. Hence, OCGs and other 
related serious criminal networks may take advantage of these under-reporting 
gaps to launder their illicit financial flows in Nigeria by exploring under-regulated 
uncompliant sectors. 
 
   Table 8.2: NFIU Statutory Reports in 2007   
 
  Source: GIABA (2008) 
 
A well-structured data to capture OCGs illicit financial flows is illustrated in Table 
8.2 which provide an insight into the AML statutory reports of Nigeria in that year. 
In Table 8.1, the information that can be deduced is very vague. It only provides 
evidence that the CTRs were 4,776,597 and STRs were 2,828 in 2012. The 
breakdown of the reporting institutions which account for these figures were not 
given, and as a result, strategic analysis for combating crime will be difficult using 
table 8.1. On the contrary, Table 8.2 which provides the statutory reports submitted 
by the NFIU for the Nigeria-GIABA Mutual Evaluation Report of 2008 is better 
structured as compared. This data represents the majority of the private sector 





figure of 41 STRs in the 3rd quarter, the Designated Non-Financial Institutions 
accounted for 3 STRs while other reporting institutions accounted for 0 STRs in 
the 3rd quarter. In the same year, the insurance sector accounted for 0 statutory 
reports during the period under review.  
With respect to table 8.2, the NFIU is able to appraise the compliance performance 
of the reporting institutions on sectorial bases. Collaboration efforts of the NFIU 
can be enhanced to nurture those reporting institutions which are not fully 
complying with Nigerian AML regime. Peer-review processes can also be applied 
to evaluate reporting institutions by benchmarking them sector by sector. 
Additionally, cross-benchmarking can also be applied to speed up the compliance 
requirements for a sector that is lagging behind.     
 
Furthermore, Figures 8.2 and 8.3 revealed that the Nigerian banks are over-
regulated as compared to other reporting institutions in Nigeria. Therefore the 
NFIU may channel its resources to other reporting institutions that are not currently 
implementing Nigerian AML regime. Consequently, effective peer-review 
collaborations among the Nigerian AML institutional stakeholders will bridge the 
gaps observed in the current AML data structure within the NFIU.  
 
Also, further collaboration will compel the NFIU and SCUML to work together avoid 
future discrepancies and inconsistences in the number of STRs reported or 
escalated from the DNFBPs reporting institutions. When the institutional 
stakeholders do not collaborate effectively with each other, information and data 
to combat crime may be misrepresented and may negatively impact the 
measurement of national and international organised crime threats. 
 
Of importance for strategic policing is that the criminal offenders also have access 
to official publications in the global states where they operate. Therefore, they may 
concentrate the laundering of their ill-gotten funds through the under-regulated 
reporting institution within the States (GIABA, 2015).  Hence, the NFIU needs to 
bring the under-reported institutions to compliance in order to prevent the threats 
of institutional non-compliance and statutory reporting displacement in the 
country’s AML regime. This may require the NFIU to increase its cooperation with 
other regulators and to create AML compliance awareness within the reporting 
institutions, in particular the under-regulated ones (GIABA, 2008). This will 





bring it on par with their other counterparts in order to combat the illicit financial 
flows of the OCGs through the suspicious transaction reports (STRs) data.  
 
 8.2.3 The Data Structure for Currencies Declaration Reports  
When the objectives of a reporting institution and that of the Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) are the same, better results and data integrity may be achieved. 
Evidence of this is manifested in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 which show Currencies 
Declaration Reports (CDRs). The reporting institution that reports CDRs to NFIU 
is the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS). Both Institutions are government agencies. 
The NCS is mandated to control and manage the administration of Customs and 
Excise laws in Nigeria, which include (GIABA, 2013): supervision of import and 
export regimes in Nigeria; regulation of sea and airport to restrict the movement of 
illegal goods in and out of Nigeria. Thus whereas the NFIU combats the illicit 
financial flows of organised crime, the NCS’s role involves combating the illegal 
movement of organised crime commodities and the prevention of illicit cross-
border currency movement. 
 
    Table 8.3: Currencies Declaration Report in Nigeria in 2012 
Continents Value of Currency in 








Source: GIABA, 2013; NFIU, 2013 (Value of originally funds consisted of all type 
of currencies but have been converted to US Dollars) 
 
The information in Table 8.3 is critical to national policy and international crime 
management. For instance, Asia received more than 70 percent (Author’s own 
calculation) and $7,903,924,386 of the currencies outflow from Nigeria in 2012, 





the same year. The NFIU may initiate peer-review collaboration with their 
counterpart international FIUs located in Asia and Europe by signing an agreement 
on how to share intelligence generated from the movement of these currencies. 
This intelligence gathering may heighten the need for an action plan to counter the 
cross-border currencies smuggling originating from the proceeds of organised 
crime activities in Nigeria to Asia and Europe.  
   
According to (NFIU Analyst 3), the NFIU has peer-reviewed its CDRs intelligence 
with their counterpart international FIUs in United States of America and the 
Netherlands in Europe. The findings from this strategic intelligence sharing 
revealed that some of the Nigerian travellers to the Netherlands and the United 
States under-declare their currencies in Nigeria when embarking on a journey to 
these two countries, and they declare a higher amount of currencies when arriving 
in the United States and the Netherlands. Additionally, the analysis of the peer-
reviewed CDRs shared amongst Nigeria, the US and the Netherlands also 
revealed that some of the offender travellers do not declare any currency in Nigeria 
but they declared high volume of currencies on arriving to these destination 
countries in the global North where stringent CDR regulation exist  (NFIU Analyst 
6). 
 
This is an indication that criminal minded travellers will circumvent the currency 
declaration regime by under-declaring or failing to declare currencies in a 
particular country with lax currencies enforcement law and cash based economy 
due to ineffective checking mechanisms that could detect hidden currencies in 
their travelling luggage. Additionally, when currencies are detected, within a cash 
based economy, such amounts may pass through unchallenged, thus making the 
offender less suspicious to law-enforcement activities in the country concerned. 
However, when landing on a journey to a country with an effective currencies 
declaration regime coupled with electronic and cashless business environments, 
they tend to declare the true amount of their under-declared currencies from 
Nigeria.   
 
Additionally, the OCGs in Nigeria tend to be recidivist (see Chapter 7). Therefore 
many of the OC offenders have relocated to Asia and parts of the West African 
region looking for countries with lax laws to continue their crime after being 
prosecuted and convicted for their crimes in Nigeria (EFCC Investigator 1). In that 





new trend of the currencies out flow from Nigeria to Asia to establish if there is any 
existing relationship between the recidivists organised crime offenders and the 
new pattern of currencies out flows to Asia. Additionally, the standard setters may 
also evaluate the existence of the weak links or the lax law of AML regime in Asia, 
and to what extent this could impact on the repositioning of the organised crime 
illicit financial flows from the global States and Nigeria particularly to Asia. This 
may suggest a new trend and pattern for the international law-enforcement 
agencies to monitor and control nationally and globally.  
 
Of particular importance to the global economy is that the Nigeria Trade and 
Commerce Ministry may use this well-structured data to analyse international 
trade performance of Nigeria. Thus, from the trade perspective, the data may be 
evaluated to examine the reasons for the concentration of currencies outflow from 
Nigeria to Asia. The Ministry can also ascertain if there is any linkage of these 
financial flows to any existing international trading opportunities between Nigeria 
and Asia. The Ministry can therefore also evaluate the reason for the sudden 
change in the new patterns of trades from Nigeria to Europe. It was previously 
believed that the concentration of trading activities in West Africa including Nigeria 
was targeted towards Europe due to colonial ties. 
 
Table 8.4: Currencies Declaration Report in Nigeria per Month in 2010-2012 
                  





The African continent may also rely on this data to evaluate if there are any deficits 
within the business integration strategies of the African Nations. Europe may also 
strategise policies for better collaboration to attract more legitimate financial flows 
from Nigeria. On the contrary, America may also wonder why it is in number 3 
position in the league, since it is presumed to be the largest economy in the world.   
 
Additionally, the Table 8.4 shows that there was a yearly increment in the outflows 
of currencies out of the Nigeria economy from 2010 to 2012. It is submitted that a 
study of the incremental patterns within this period will enable Nigeria to counter 
those currencies that originated from proceeds of crime. Therefore, it is necessary 
for the NFIU to collaborate with other relevant agencies in Nigeria and 
internationally with the sole aim of working together to build strategies to combat 
illicit trans-border currencies movement from Nigeria.  
 
Table 8.5: Value of Seizure and Forfeiture in 2012 
Month Seizures ($) Forfeiture ($) 
September 9,301,884 652,120 




Total 13,766,347 1,520,410 
Source: NFIU, 2013 
 
Furthermore, the strategic importance of this data for the purpose of criminal 
justice is that the total trans-border currencies seized from the criminal networks 
in 2012 amounted to $13,233,982, and the amount recovered upon conviction, 
was $1,520,410 in that same year according to the Nigerian currencies declaration 
regime (GIABA, 2013). The percentage of forfeited currencies seized in 2012 was 
just 11.05 percent (Author’s own calculation). This is a very low percentage for any 
effective criminal justice jurisdiction. A country with lax laws on cross-border 
movement of funds will be vulnerable to illicit proceeds of OCGs. For instance, if 
a very small amount of the illicit flows is forfeited after prosecution, the offenders 
will continue to use this medium. In this instance, the offenders keep 89.95 percent 
of the illicit profits to themselves and forfeit 11.05 percent to the state.  Consequent 
to this ‘low risk high gain’, the Nigerian assets forfeiture regime will require a robust 





(GIABA, 2015). This will put Nigeria in the same league as with countries where 
all undeclared currencies are forfeited to the States.   
 
8.3 The AML Intelligence Sharing of the NFIU with the Relevant Competent    
Authorities (CAs) in Nigeria 
The previous sections evaluated the integrity and structure of the STRs and CTRs 
as well as AML data collaboration between the NFIU and the reporting institutions. 
However, this section explores how the NFIU collaborates its intelligence reports 
(hereinafter, IRs), (i.e. the end products of the analyses of the STRs and the CTRs 
data submitted by the reporting institutions in Nigeria) with relevant Competent 
Authorities (CAs) and the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in Nigeria. The list 
of the collaborated CAs and LEAs that the NFIU shared its intelligence reports with 
in Nigeria is included in Appendix G (GIABA, 2008). 
 
The NFIU is a member of the Egmont Group, i.e. the group of the elite FIUs in the 
world (NFIU Analyst 1). In Chapter 4, the author explained the role of the Egmont 
Group in the fight against illicit financial flow of organised crime groups. Critically, 
collaboration of IRs at the NFIU is based on the Egmont Group principle of the 
third party rule (NFIU Analyst 1). According to the NFIU Analyst 1, the third party 
rule means that before the request and spontaneous IRs of the Egmont Group 
members can be used for any investigation by the third party, an official consent 
is required by the users of the IRs.  
 
The NFIU 2013 Progress report, classified these intelligence reports into two 
categories, they are: Proactive and the Reactive Intelligence reports. Proactive 
analytics look at the probability of an event happening before it actually occurs 
while reactive analysis deals with data after the occurrence of the event (CIO 
Computerworld, 2014).  
 
Therefore, proactive intelligence is the intelligence products developed and shared 
by the NFIU with the CAs and LEAs prior to the request for that intelligence. The 
proactive intelligence reports of the NFIU are developed based on trends and 
patterns of illicit financial flows generated from the submitted STRs by reporting 
institutions to the NFIU (NFIU Analyst 3). For instance, if the NFIU identifies a 
financial flow relating to drug-trafficking networks, the NFIU can send this 





to commence investigation on the activity of the criminal networks without the initial 
request of the CAs. Whereas reactive intelligence is the usual intelligence request 
sent to the NFIU by the competent authorities during an investigation of ongoing 
cases.      
 
Table 8.6: Disseminated Proactive and Reactive Intelligence Cases of the 
NFIU 2009-2012 






















 Pro. Re. Pro. Re. Pro. Re.  Pro. Re.  
EFCC 20 8 35 37 57 23 32 74 
ICPC 1 0 2 4 0 6 9 17 
NSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 
NIA 0 1 0 3 0 0 1 3 
DSS 0 3 0 4 7 10 7 27 
NDLEA 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 5 
FIRS 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 10 
DIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
NPF 2 0 3 0 1 3 0 3 
CCB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
NAPTIP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
TOTAL 23 12 40 48 65 48 58 154 
Source: NFIU, 2013 
 
Table 8.6 shows how the NFIU disseminates its proactive and reactive intelligence 
reports within the competent authorities and law-enforcement agencies in Nigeria.  
 
For the purpose of analyses in this chapter, the focus of the investigation will 
mainly examine how the NFIU disseminates and collaborates its IRs with the 
specialised law-enforcement agencies responsible for combating the threats of the 
three specific OCGs evaluated in this thesis. They are: The National Agency for 





Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA); and The Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC).   
 
Table 8.7: Intelligence Disseminated by the NFIU to EFCC, NAPTIP and 
NDLEA in 2009 to 2012 
Agency No of NFIU Intelligence Disseminated / Per Year Total % 
 2009 2010 2011 2012  
EFCC 28 72 80 106 286 94.70 
NAPTIP 0 0 0 8 8 2.65 
NDLEA 0 0 2 6 8 2.65 
Total 28 72 82 120 302 100 
Source: Author’s own calculation from Table 8.6. 
 
Table 8.7 reveals how disproportionate the intelligence reports shared by the NFIU 
to 3 specialised agencies fighting the problems of organised crime financial flows 
in Nigeria. Out of the 302 intelligence information reports shared within 2009 to 
2012, EFCC received 94.70 percent while NAPTIP and NDLEA received 
insignificant amounts of 2.65 percent respectively. The establishment of the NFIU 
as a special Unit within the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), 
may be one of the reasons why the EFCC enjoyed more privilege than any other 
specialised agency in the sharing of the AML intelligence reports in Table 8.7. The 
lack of operational autonomy of the NFIU was said to limit its operational efficiency 
in Nigeria (CBN Regulator 2).  
If the NFIU was autonomous, resources of the NFIU could be allocated 
proportionately to deal with AML intelligence sharing in Nigeria across all board to 
support the investigation activities of the competent authorities.  














Table 8.8: Convictions by Agencies/Disseminated Intelligence by the NFIU in 
2009 to 2012 
Year Convictions by Agencies Disseminated Intelligences by NFIU   
 NAPTIP NDLEA NAPTIP NDLEA 
2009 28 1,497 0 0 
2010 31 1,509 0 0 
2011 51 1,491 0 2 
2012 25 1,718 8 6 
Total 135 6,215 8 8 
 
Source: Author’s analysis from Table 6.2 and 6.5 in Chapter 6; Table 8.6 and; 
Daily Signpost of 12 May, 2015 in Nigeria.  
 
In Table 8.8, the author uses two major tables from Chapter 6, (i.e. Tables 6.2 and 
6.5) where the author analyses the roles and strategies of specialised competent 
authorities (CAs) fighting the types of organised crime evaluated in this thesis. In 
Table 8.6, data relating to how the NFIU collaborates its intelligence nationally to 
support the investigative activities of the CAs fighting organised crime and other 
related serious crime in Nigeria.  However, in Table 8.8, the author combined the 
yearly conviction rates for the two key agencies fighting human trafficking and 
drug-trafficking in Nigeria using Table 6.2 and 6.5 in Chapter 6 and comparing it 
with the number of intelligence reports disseminated by the NFIU to these two 
agencies from 2009 to 2012.  
 
The finding from Table 8.8 revealed that from 2009 to 2012, the National Agency 
for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and other related matters (NAPTIP) accounted 
for 135 convictions and within the same period the NFIU shared only 8 proactive 
intelligence with NAPTIP in 2012. Furthermore NAPTIP also accounts for the least 
conviction in 2012, the first-year ever in which the NFIU shared its intelligence with 
the agency. Critical impact analysis will expect the NAPTIP to account for more 
convictions in 2012 after enjoying the benefit of the collaborated intelligence from 
the NFIU. However, instead of an increase in convictions of the agency as a result, 
there was a decrease in conviction rates from 51 convictions in 2011 to 25 
convictions in 2012. Thus, the collaboration of intelligence by the NFIU with 
NAPTIP in 2012 had no significant impact in combating illicit financial flows of 






Similarly, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the agency 
curbing the threats of drug-trafficking in Nigeria accounted for 6,215 convictions 
from 2009 to 2012 (Table 8.8). Additionally, in 2011 the NFIU collaborated 2 
reactive intelligences with the agency in 2011 and 6 intelligences were shared by 
the NFIU with NDLEA in 2012 to curb the menace of drug trafficking in Nigeria. 
What is the correlation between 8 intelligence reports of the NFIU shared with the 
NDLEA and 6,215 convictions of Agency from 2009 to 2012? The AML Mutual 
evaluation report by GIABA on Nigeria in 2007 suggested that the NDLEA also 
has powers to collect AML statutory reports from the banks to support the 
investigation of drug-trafficker in Nigeria (GIABA, 2008). Therefore, the success of 
combating the financing of drug-traffickers in Nigeria is only limited to the manually 
and internally generated intelligence reports of the Agency (NDLEA Investigator 
1). 
 
Information on the convictions of Advance Fee Fraud (AFF) offenders in Nigeria 
provided by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) from 2009 
to 2012 was not included in Table 8.8 because the relevant data was not available 
to the author during the interview conducted at the Commission in 2013. 
Nevertheless, the EFCC Investigator 2 suggests that, “intelligence reports given 
by NFIU to the Commission on request are mostly outdated when they arrived. 
That is why the investigators are usually ahead of the NFIU in the intelligence 
gathering. Whenever the intelligence requests are sent to the NFIU by the 
Commission, it takes the NFIU a longer time before these requests are attended 
to, and by the time NFIU disseminates its intelligence, the investigators would have 
usually gone beyond the stage in which this information is needed” (EFCC 
Investigator 2).    
 
In summary, from the data analysed in this section, it is suggested that the 
collaborated AML intelligence reports used to fight the illicit financial flows of 
organised crime groups in Nigeria had no significant impact on the conviction 
records accounted for by the competent agencies (CAs) responsible for the fight 
against organised crime (OC) illicit financial flows in Nigeria within the reviewed 
periods (see also GIABA 2013). Additionally, the NFIU activity report of 2012 did 
not provide evidence that linked these intelligence reports with forfeited assets of 
the convicted OC offenders in Nigeria in that same year. According to the GIABA 
Secretariat’s Analysis on Nigeria, the “lack of capacity of the FIU to receive and 





training of personnel from LEA, the FIU, the Central Bank and prosecutors on the 
application of freezing and confiscation measures obstruct success of combating 
proceeds of crime in Nigeria” (GIABA, 2013:9-10). That is why the Nigerian AML 
regime still struggles to link the records of disseminated intelligence to the records 
of freezing, seizing and confiscation of proceeds of crime at various specialised 
agencies in the country. 
 
Additionally, the deficit obstructing the success against the data to fight organised 
crime in Nigeria can be attributed to the problem of data integrity and data structure 
discussed in the earlier part of this chapter. Furthermore Chapter 7 of this thesis 
also disused detailed overall impediments against illicit financial flows of the OCGs 
in Nigeria. These impediments ought to be addressed and subsequently removed 
before the NFIU’s operations can be strengthened through the adherence and 
application of effective data integrity for combating illicit financial flows of 
organised crime and other related serious crime in Nigeria. Similarly, operational 
autonomy of the NFIU from its parent agency is important to fast-track availability 
and allocation of resources to combat OCGs’ illicit financial flows in Nigeria.   
 
8.4   Peer-Reviewing the NFIU Statutory Reporting Regime with that of their 
other Counterpart Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in the Region  
This section evaluates the AML statutory reporting of the Republic of Ghana and 
compares it with that of Nigeria to analyse how Nigeria has performed when 
ranking her with other counterpart Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in the West 
Africa region using the results obtained from the submitted AML statutory reports 
in these two countries. The Ghanaian AML statutory data will be discussed using 
the 2012 Annual Report of the Financial Intelligence Centre in Ghana.     
 
8.4.1 Comparison of the AML Statutory Data of the Financial Intelligence 
Centre, Ghana and that of the NFIU    
According to the 2012 Annual Report of the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), 
Ghana, the total number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) increased from 
137 to 375 in 2011 and 2012 respectively. In the same report, the number of 
disseminated intelligence increased from 57 to 254 in Table 8.9.         
 
Table 8.9 shows the comparative analysis of the AML data reported by the 





Units. The Table indicates that the Nigeria FIU accounts for a higher number of 
STR, i.e. 3,824 and 2,828 STRs in 2011 and 2012 respectively. While its 
counterpart FIU in Ghana recorded 137 and 375 STRs within the same period. 
 
Table 8.9: Comparison Table of the STRs Filed and Intelligence 
Disseminated by the NFIU and FIC in 2011-2012 


















NFIU 3,824 113 2.95 2,828 212 7.49 + 4.54 
FIC 137 57 41.60 375 254 67.73 + 26.13 
      Author’s analysis from NFIU, 2013; FIC, 2012; GIABA, 2013  
 
Notwithstanding the higher number of CTRs recorded by the NFIU in 2011 and 
2012, in Table 8.9, the number of the intelligence reports disseminated by the 
Nigeria FIU is not sufficient enough to combat the proceeds of organised crime 
within the period under review. A reasonable percentage of intelligence reports 
expected to be disseminated by the NFIU to competent authorities in Nigeria to 
combat the proceeds of OCGs should not be less than 50 percent, looking at the 
number of the STRs reported by the reporting institution in Nigeria in 2011 and 
2012. However, the NFIU only managed to disseminate 2.95 percent and 7.49 
percent of the reported suspicious transactions reports under its control in 2011 
and 2012 respectively. This further affirms that such statistics are due to lack of 
data integrity and the existence of impediments to fight against OCGs financial 
flows in Nigeria (Chapter 7).         
 
A comparison of the AML data used in Ghana and Nigeria in 2011 and 2012 should 
not only dwell on the fact that Ghana FIU accounted for fewer STRs within this 
period but also the percentage of intelligence disseminated to combat illicit 
financial flows in Ghana was above average considering the number of the STRs 
reported to the Ghana FIC within this period. In 2011 and 2012, Ghana’s FIU 
disseminated 41.60 percent and 67.73 percent of the intelligence reports obtained 
from the 512 STRs of its reporting institutions during the review periods. This 
number is less than a quarter of the STRs reported to NFIU in 2011 alone. The 
success behind the higher performance of Ghana’s FIC as compared with the 
NFIU was traced to the operational autonomy of the Ghana FIU in January 2010 






Table 8.10: Anti-Money Laundering Cases – Nigerian Nationals Offenders in 
Ghana 





























2 ML & AFF 8,527.57    
3 ML & AFF 11,700.00    








5 ML & AFF 26,400.00    














7 ML & AFF  10,000.00   
8 ML & AFF  16,500.00       
9 ML & AFF 25,000.00     
10 ML & AFF 14,138.16    








12 ML & AFF 413,582.19     








14 ML & AFF      4,300.00 
15 ML & AFF 131,921.00     
16 ML & AFF 32,000.00    
17 ML & AFF 3982.00    
18 ML & AFF 9,917.28    
19 ML & AFF   65,430.00  
20 Grand Total 809,088.68 20,000.00 78,409.65 4,300.00 
Source: Interview Data from Financial Intelligence Centre, Ghana and Economic 






Ghana’s FIU also has the power to freeze the accounts of suspected organised 
crime groups in the country and collaborates with Economic and Organised Crime 
Office (EOCO) in Ghana to freeze the proceeds of their crime (GFIC Analyst). 
Additionally, from the 254 intelligence reports disseminated to the competent 
authorities in Ghana in 2012, the Ghana FIU recorded confiscations of illicit assets 
obtained through criminal activities during the period under review. These assets 
ranged from 1 BMW saloon car, 2 houses located in Accra and cash totalling 
$2.70m and €76,000.00 (GFIC, 2012).  
 
According to the GFIC Analyst, the most frequently noticed offenders from whom 
assets were seized in Ghana were citizens from Nigeria, Lebanon, Liberia, China, 
India and Ivory Coast. Table 8.10 shows data of money laundering cases and 
confiscated amounts belonging to Nigerian Nationals in Ghana, which was 
disseminated by the Ghana FIU to the Economic and Organised Crime Office in 
the country. The Nigerian AFF organised crime offenders established shell 
companies under falsified documents in Ghana (GFIC Analyst). Illicit funds are 
frequently wired into these faceless companies using fake documents and they 
operate this account while spending 95 percent of their time in Nigeria and 
spending weekends in Ghana to perfect the crime (GFIC Analyst). The findings 
from 19 cases provided by Ghana FIC and EOCO to the author during the Ghana 
fieldwork revealed that the Nigeria AFF offenders accounted for illicit flows of 
currencies amounting to US$809,088.68, €20,000.00, £4,300 and GH¢78,409.65 
as shown in Table 8.10.  
 
The medium that attracts these illicit money transfers are mostly the Nigerian 
indigenous banks operating their branches in Ghana (GFIC Analyst) and the 
Regional banks that have their branches in all West African States, including 
Nigeria. According to GFIC Analyst, these are banks with weak anti-money 
laundering compliance culture”. Afterwards, the Nigerian banks operating in 
Ghana used a strategy of zero balance account opening to attract account holders 
in Ghana (GFIC Analyst). Therefore the offenders may open numerous accounts 
in those banks in the anticipation to launder proceeds of crime (GFIC Analyst). 
 
In summary, even though the FIU of Ghana had accounted for very small STRs of 
375 in the comparative Table 8.9 as compared to the Nigeria FIU that recorded 
2,828 in 2012, the Ghana FIC was able to disseminate its intelligence report 





organised crime in Ghana. The Centre also disseminated a higher number of 
intelligence reports totalling 254 from the 377 STRs reported in 2012 as compared 
with the Nigeria FIU who shared only 212 intelligence reports from the total of 
2,828 STRs received from the reporting institutions in 2012.  Additionally, the 
Centre was able to monitor and control the illicit flows of the Nigerian AFF 
offenders who operate in Ghana on a ‘weekend-basis’ while trying to conceal their 
nationality for their targets who are aware of the schemes of the AFF offenders 
from Nigeria. The secret behind this success is the operational autonomy that 
consolidated the data collaboration of the Centre with Economic and Organised 
Crime Office (EOCO) and other relevant AML institutional stakeholders in Ghana 
(GFIC Analyst).      
   
  8.5   Some Recommendations for Future Consideration: Enhancing AML 
Data Intelligence in Nigeria  
This chapter has evaluated and presented some problems facing the quality 
assurance of the AML statutory data used in Nigeria to counter the illicit financial 
flows of the organised crime groups (OCGs) and other related serious crime. The 
lack of quality assurance of the Nigerian AML statutory data further impedes a 
successful outcome on the ‘war’ against organised crime financial flows as follows: 
the majority of the AML data reported by the reporting institutions to the NFIU were 
of sub-standard quality; quality AML reports were not timely reported; the internal  
structures of the reporting institutions were not fully compliant and well regulated, 
leading to under-reporting of qualified AML data; and the intelligence disseminated 
from this data did not impart on the number of forfeited assets as well as the 
convictions record of the OC offenders in Nigeria. Nonetheless, the commitment 
to support the law enforcement agencies and other competent authorities, as well 
as the users of the AML intelligence remains the priority of the NFIU for the 
fulfilment of the Nigeria’s global requirements of combating illicit proceeds 
originating from criminal activities. In order to achieve this objective, a multi-
strategy approach to improve the Nigerian AML regime would be necessary. A 
number of recommendations have been proposed by the author for future 
consideration in Nigeria and other global jurisdictions that have similar problems 
of data quality assurance within their AML regimes and these will be discussed in 







8.5.1  Continuous Public Engagement 
The introduction and implementation of the AML regime in Nigeria is tinged with 
social justice impediments (see Chapter 7).  
However, the difficulty to fully implement the international standards and 
recommendations of AML regime in the developing economy is not a new fact in 
academic literature (see also Halliday, Levi and Reuter, 2013). The international 
standards setters have not develop standards that are suitable to the 
circumstances of developing economies. Notwithstanding this, these international 
standard setters have imposed their standards and recommendations on Third 
World countries and have imposed sanctions when these developing countries fail 
to implement them to the letter (Passas, 2003), hence, often resulting in economic 
hardship and setbacks in the development economic of Third World countries (see 
Chapter 7 for more details).     
 
Therefore, developing countries, including Nigeria, will have to positively and 
constantly engage the community on the need to ‘buy-into’ the successes of the 
implementation of these international standards and recommendations and the 
benefits such successes will bring into their communities. According to CBN 
Regulator 1, the numbers of challenges preventing the objectives of the AML 
regime in Nigeria from being effectively realised are associated with the lack of in-
depth education of the general public. The general public is not fully aware of the 
importance of what their local law enforcement agencies are doing. Therefore, 
until appropriate messages are conveyed to the general public, all efforts to 
combat organised crime and criminal proceeds will still be in the ‘dark’. The only 
way to overcome this is to communicate this message in diverse ways. This will 
include embarking on effective information dissemination to increase public 
awareness of these standards and recommendations in Nigeria. The awareness 
will achieve two things. Firstly, the general public will get to know what their local 
law enforcement agencies are doing and secondly, they can also help to achieve 
the objectives of these international standards by suggesting possible ways of 
achieving them in the local context.  “The changing of public attitudes – whether 
they take the form of positive support or merely acceptance because no alternative 








8.5.2  The Need for Private Sector Engagement  
In Nigeria, there exists a private sector AML compliance initiative forum called the 
Committee of Chief Compliance Officers of Banks in Nigeria (CCCOBIN) that 
provides a level-playing ground for the financial institutions to discuss their AML 
compliance requirements with the LEAs and other competent authorities in the 
country (Chief Compliance Officer 1). Strengthening the objectives of this platform 
will require robust legislations to provide the chief compliance officers (CCOs) of 
the reporting institutions with the necessary legal mandate to function well as 
required by law. The CCO’s fear of losing their jobs further limited the objectives 
of this private forum from being materialised. This is because the AML compliance 
officers in Nigeria cannot act independently of their employer when revealing 
sensitive transactions occurring within their reporting institutions (Chief 
Compliance Officer 2). Hence, the enactment of legislation by the Government of 
Nigeria will embolden the CCOs in their compliance of the AML requirements and 
their specific roles in facilitating compliance should be explicitly stated in such 
legislation in Nigeria. 
 
The CCCOBIN is also alarmed and very concerned by the "frequent deliberate 
absence of the NFIU at the CCCOBIN meetings" (Chief Compliance Officer 2). 
Sometimes, sensitive issues at the forum were escalated by the NFIU to the 
Banks' Management leading to some CCOs losing their jobs (Chief Compliance 
Officer 2). The recommendation suggested for the benefit of private sectors 
engagements forum is the need for a more 'carrot' led motivational approach 
instead of the 'stick' approach. This implies that sustaining a continuity in the role 
and effectiveness of informal private sector engagements will require an 
application of moral sanctions rather than legislative sanctions in the global states. 
This is what Levi and Maguire referred to as “evaluating moral climate”, a required 
reduction and prevention strategy to assess the level of impact on desired 
outcomes in the fight against organised crime group’s illicit activities globally 
(2004:406).    
 
Additionally, the enhancement of the AML data assurance highlights the need for 
terms such as ‘dispersal of governance’ and ‘responsibilisation’ in Nigeria 
(Garland, 1996, 2001; Rose, 2000; Levi and Maguire, 2004). In the UK the major 
private sectors are taking the lead in regulations and compliance initiatives within 





the NFIU to begin encouraging the private sector, such as self-regulatory bodies 
for taking the initiative in the AML compliance enforcement process. For instance, 
in the UK, the self-regulatory bodies “find it easier to impose preventive measures” 
on the operational activities of their members (Levi & Maguire, 2004:404).  The 
NFIU will have to bring the Banker’s Committee in Nigeria on board to overhaul 
the practice of banking and finance in Nigeria. This will require the Committee to 
evaluate and monitor conducts considered unprofessional in the sector for the 
NFIU and thereby enable the NFIU to properly understand the areas that constitute 
high risk for Nigerian AML regime within the banking sector. Effective application 
of this information will speed up adherence of the compliance requirements within 
the banking, finance industry and other reporting institutions. Also, the Association 
of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) have to be constantly engaged by the NFIU to 
encourage the growth of an integrity and compliance culture within the registered 
membership of the Professional Accountants through the adherence to the 
reporting requirement obligations and submission of the suspicious transactions 
of potential organised criminal group customers when acting on their behalf as 
gate-keepers for high risk transactions. Additionally, the assistance of the Estate 
Agents and Surveyors will be required by the NFIU for the purpose of intelligence 
gathering on the hidden assets of the organised crime groups in Nigeria. Likewise, 
continuous deliberations and meetings with the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) 
can assist the AML regime by strengthening the cooperation of lawyers in the 
reporting of suspicious activities of their clients when the public interest is at stake.  
 
The ‘dispersal of governance’ and ‘responsibilisation’ may require the NFIU to 
appoint collaborators to facilitate the fight against illicit flow of organised crime 
within the financial and non-financial institutions in Nigeria. For instance, in the 
case of Senegal in 2011, the 28 collaborators were appointed by CENTIF Senegal 
to help coordinate the banks and financial institutions. Also an additional 17 
collaborators were appointed within the Insurance Companies and 1 collaborator 
was appointed by the Senegal FIU within the Casinos business operators. This 
strategic approach is working well for the Senegal FIU in achieving effective 
outcomes for the AML regime of that country (CENTIF Senegal 2011). The scope 
of the Nigerian AML regime should be wider than that of Senegal due to the larger 
population and economy of Nigeria in comparison and the relatively high statistics 
of the offenders there. Hence, adaptation of sectorial collaborators will facilitate 





8.5.3  Strengthening Public Sector Collaborations 
The analysis of this chapter revealed the need to strengthen cooperation amongst 
the public sector AML collaborators in Nigeria. For effective AML collaboration to 
take place in any country of the world, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of that 
country, (the focal point of the AML regime) requires operational autonomy (IMF 
and World Bank, 2004). The operational and financial autonomy of the FIU will 
determine the level of effectiveness in outcomes for the regime of anti-money 
laundering in any global State (CBN Regulator 2 and NDLEA Investigator 1). The 
lack of operational and financial autonomy of the NFIU impedes the quality of AML 
data and intelligence gathered in Nigeria as shown in Tables 8.8 and 8.9 of this 
chapter. This may limit effective allocation of the FIU resources to strategic areas 
of the country’s AML regime, if the FIU is dependent on the release of funds from 
its parent or domicile organisation before strategic decisions are made.  
In Nigeria, the NFIU does not have enough resources, and it has to depend on the 
zero budget allocation from its domiciled organisation, the EFCC (NDLEA 
Investigator 2 and CBN Regulator 2). Therefore, the deficit of the zero budget 
allocation of the NFIU limits its effective allocation of resources to AML strategic 
areas in Nigeria. This equally affects the quality of AML data and intelligence 
reports disseminated by the NFIU to counter organised crime and the illicit wealth 
of the OCGs in Nigeria. Consequently, to bridge the gaps militating against 
effective outcomes of the Nigerian AML regime, requires the existence of an 
operational and autonomous FIU in the country. 
 
The synergy adopted by Senegal AML regime in coordinating its frameworks was 
facilitated by the appointed FIU correspondents in various state departments 
(CENTIF, 2011). These public sector correspondents worked closely with CENTIF 
(the Senegal FIU) to improve the AML data and intelligence sharing of CENTIF 
Senegal amongst the competent authorities thus ‘drying out’ the proceeds of 
organised crime in that country (CENTIF Analyst). The CENTIF platform also has 
a review Commission where cases of money laundering of OC offenders are 
submitted to. Therefore, it is easy for the Commission to refer intelligence cases 
to the judicial authorities for prosecution. Hence, through this process, cases of 
illicit wealth gain of OCGs are coordinated and accounted for in Senegal. For 
example, in 2011, 10 convictions were recorded from the 17 cases passed on to 






The collaboration between the NFIU and the Federal Inland Revenue Services 
(FIRS) is also important to discover the ‘under-reported and unreported’ illicit funds 
of OCGs through the enforcement of a tax administration regime in Nigeria (Levi 
& Maguire, 2004:414, emphasis added). This may necessitate the secondment of 
actionable public agencies to work together in the NFIU periodically to develop 
robust AML intelligence products in Nigeria. It is also necessary for the NFIU to 
collaborate with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to ensure that periodic 
guidelines to counter illicit financial flows which are circulated within the financial 
institutions are up-to-date. Furthermore, rules of engagement to deal with 
intelligence reports to counter these illicit financial flows when they penetrate 
should be clear enough to assist competent authorities in countering them (CBN 
Regulator 1). Positive rules of engagement between CBN and Special Control Unit 
against Money Laundering (SCUML) enable the CBN to issue circulars inviting 
Nigerian banks not to open an account for any designated non-financial 
businesses and professions (DNFBPs) that had not registered with SCUML. This 
synergy creates another account opening documentation requirement for DNFBPs 
operating within the Nigerian AML regime. “This has opened up a wider window to 
register, monitor and regulate the activities of the unregistered underground 
DNFBPs operators in Nigeria” (SCUML Regulator 1). This is what Levi and 
Maguire described as regulatory strategies of local authorities, to disrupt the 
‘businesses’ of organised crime within the global jurisdictions (2004). 
 
More of these collaborative initiatives are expected amongst the competent 
authorities responsible for the implementation of the Nigeria AML regime. In 
particular, the insurance sector reporting institutions will require a robust action 
plan between NFIU and the National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) to 
comprehend and eliminate the deficit in the under-reporting within this sector. A 
task force committee can be constituted to evaluate the AML reporting modalities 
of the insurance sector. This will bring the sector up-to-speed with counterpart 
financial institutions that are complying with the requirements of the Nigerian AML 
regime. As a result, a likely attempt by the offenders to conceal their ill-gotten 









8.5.4 The Compatibility of the NFIU Database with that of the Reporting 
Institutions and other Competent Authorities 
There is no doubt that most of the designated reporting institutions do not currently 
comply with the Nigerian AML reporting requirements (Figure 8.2 and Table 8.2). 
After all, the definition of the reporting institutions is too broad and difficult to cover 
(FATF, 2013; GIABA, 2008). Also, the long list of the AML reporting institutions is 
constantly updated within the global States upon the directives of the international 
standard setters. Hence, the NFIU will require effective collaboration from the 
private and public sector regulators (by working with them) to ensure full reporting 
compliance of all designated reporting institutions obligated to the Nigeria AML 
regime. The NFIU may have to work closely with the AML regulators to design a 
more comparable reporting questionnaire format for the reporting institutions on 
specific sectorial based circumstances. The compatibility of these reports with the 
NFIU database is worthy of mention, as the NFIU ICT Unit and the Compliance 
Unit can champion this cause by working with various AML reporting institutions 
in Nigeria to develop their reporting database to suit the NFIU database 
specification. This project will require availability of resources at the NFIU. The 
NFIU is currently under-funded and lacks financial autonomy (NDLEA Investigator 
2). Therefore, financial and operational autonomy of the NFIU will fast-track the 
success of this project.                
 
Furthermore, a future consideration for the NFIU on data reliability and 
acceptability of the disseminated AML intelligence reports in Nigeria will require 
the NFIU to share its database with competent authorities and other law 
enforcement agencies in Nigeria to collaborate their intelligence with the NFIU in 
countering organised crime financial flows in Nigeria. The sharing of the NFIU 
database with the competent authorities and LEAs in Nigeria will enable the NFIU 
build a systematic reporting regime that will enhance the robustness of 
disseminated intelligence reports to combat organised crime illicit enrichment in 
Nigeria. The current capacity at the NFIU does not suggest any existence of 
systematic reports from the private and public sectors in Nigeria. In Senegal, the 
strength of their AML data and intelligence reports is based on systematic 
reporting (CENTIF Senegal Analyst).        
 
Additionally, the lack of compatibility of the AML databases will cause distortion in 





jurisdiction. It was revealed in this chapter how the SCUML accounts for higher 
number of STRs for the designated non-financial businesses and professions 
(DNFBPs) as compared with that of the NFIU in the Figure 8.2. Looking to the 
future, the NFIU will need to have seamless access to the database of the SCUML 
if the Unit is granted power to escalate or receive STRs generated from the 
DNFBPs in the country. This will help the NFIU to preserve its status as the central 
national agency for AML statutory reports in Nigeria. 
 
8.5.5 Development of the AML Intelligence Performance Indicators and 
Targets  
An additional thought for consideration for the purpose of improving the quality of 
the intelligence reports (IRs) of the NFIU suggests the need to conduct intelligence 
report needs assessment of the users of the AML intelligence packages in Nigeria. 
This project can be achieved by designing a comprehensive IRs questionnaire that 
adequately captures the expectations of users of the quality intelligence reports. 
This questionnaire, when designed appropriately can impact positively on three 
things: Firstly the NFIU will have a better understanding of the specific 
expectations of a particular LEA or CA from the NFIU intelligence reports. 
Secondly, the questionnaire can help the NFIU to build specific indicators that will 
inform the quality of the collaborated IRs in Nigeria. Finally, these indicators can 
help set targets for the intelligence reports of the NFIU.  
Thus, it will provide the analyst at the NFIU with an accurate picture of the 
businesses and IR needs of the AML users. This task can be coordinated by the 
AML correspondents and relevant designated AML collaborators in Nigeria. 
Tasking the AML IR indicators on agency specific circumstances will achieve 
maximum impact in achieving an effective AML regime in Nigeria.  One of the 
important tasks to be conducted by the NFIU may require an in-house peer review 
meeting at the NFIU. This peer review meeting can be held periodically at the 
NFIU or elsewhere to evaluate any intelligence product that needs to be 
disseminated to the LEAs or other competent authorities before being transmitted 
out of the NFIU. This procedure will give the NFIU the opportunity to critically 
assess with the view to improve any inherent weaknesses of the IR before it is 
sent out to their users.      
 
Finally, improving the quality assurance of the NFIU AML intelligence reports will 





in Nigeria. At the moment, all the IRs sent out by the NFIU are accompanied with 
a feedback form that determines quality assurance issues, including the outcome 
of the IRs resulting in conviction and/or the size of the forfeited proceeds of crime 
(NFIU Analyst 3). Nonetheless, to track the efficiency of the NFIU IRs may require 
a process that goes beyond internal evaluation of the feedback questionnaires that 
are not currently available for external evaluators. Consequently, in the future, 
monthly meetings may be arranged between the leadership of the NFIU and the 
AML correspondents from the user agencies and other AML collaborators as 
suggested previously in this chapter. The objectives of the meeting will be to 
evaluate and diagnose the correlation between the NFIU AML intelligence reports 
































The Collection of Contribution to Knowledge  
This chapter will summarise the major reflections of this thesis, it will offer some 
discussion on possible limitations of this study and it will also suggest future 
opportunities for academic research.  The chapter will also present the collection 
of findings from the preceding chapters and will discuss the final assessment of 
the central thesis in general. 
 
9.1   Limitations of Study and Scope for Future Research 
This research has explored the dynamics of organised crime and its illicit financial 
flows in the global South (Nigeria and West Africa) through and/or from the global 
North (the UK and Europe). Thus, the thesis has stimulated other issues of interest 
in the quest to achieve its set-out objectives. Particularly, following the National 
Crime Agency in the UK collaboration with the researcher during the fieldwork 
project in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and the Gambia. Nonetheless, the fieldwork 
exercise involved a relatively small group of participants who were chosen from 
pool of national, regional and international anti-money laundering (hereinafter, 
AML) professionals and other competent experts (including law enforcers) 
responsible for curbing organised crime threats and illicit financial flows in the 
global South and the global North. Engaging in discussions with a range of AML 
experts and professionals was hugely beneficial. The fieldwork did not explore the 
possibility of conducting interviews with the general public. The analysis of both 
public opinion on anti-money laundering regime and combination of the general 
threats of organised crime to the wider society would be particularly relevant when 
exploring the awareness, role, attitude and reaction of the general public towards 
the implementations of standards to curb illicit financial flows of organised crime 
groups in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter 7 analysed several impediments that “militate” against the successful 
implementation of the AML regime in Nigeria. Of particular importance within the 
Nigerian AML regime is the impediment which infringes on the right of general 
public i.e. (the impediment on social justice and financial inclusion in Nigeria). 
Therefore seeking the views of members of the general public would have 





of AML standards and possible conditions from the perspective of the general 
public and the level of acceptance of such standards within Nigeria.      
Additionally, it has not been possible to conduct a comparative analysis of the AML 
regimes in the global North i.e. (the UK and the European States) with that of the 
global South i.e. (Nigeria and West Africa States). The thesis has however 
compared the AML statutory data of Nigeria with that of Ghana in Chapter 8. It 
may be illuminating to discover the effectiveness and success of the different 
regimes of anti-money laundering in Europe in comparison to that in the West 
African states. The perspectives of the case studies on money laundering as 
analysed in Chapter 6 revealed that a higher percentage of the proceeds of 
organised crime groups from the global South (Nigeria and West Africa) are mostly 
generated from Europe.  
 
The findings of the impediments affecting the successful fight against organised 
crime’s illicit financial flows in developing countries and Nigeria, importantly, also 
open up  further future research prospects in developing economies. Firstly, the 
political and social scientists can ascertain the political and social impediments 
against a successful anti-money laundering regime in developing countries.  
Secondly, the economists can also evaluate the impact of economical 
impediments of the regimes of AML on developing economies. Thirdly, the 
existence of legal impediments also provide an academic research avenue in 
criminal justice studies.       
 
Finally, this thesis submits a new Anti-money Laundering Transaction 
Validation Model in Chapter 5 to help improve the regimes of AML within 
developing economies. This Model does not include the implementation strategy 
which may be undertaken within the developing countries because of the limited 
funding and the scope of this research project.  The modality of the implementation 
plan for this Model may be the subject of future academic research. The invention 
of this Model could lead to a new body of academic subject or discipline and it may 
be called ‘Social and Criminal Justice Informatics Study’. 









9.2   Primary Research Findings  
The principal research findings that contribute to knowledge in this study revealed 
the dynamics of global transnational organised crime and the phenomena of 
organised crime in Nigeria. The phenomenon and dynamism of the organised 
crime threats and illicit financial flows globally and Nigeria particularly have led to 
the findings on the regime against money laundering. The findings group 
organised crime and illicit financial flows together by exploring the rational choice 
theory and anti-money laundering framework as the twin conceptual frameworks 
for the thesis. These two conceptual frameworks demonstrate the perspectives of 
organised crime financial flows and the roles of the actionable agencies towards 
the curbing this menace of organised crime in Nigeria. The findings concluded by 
considering the impediments that militate against efforts combat organised crime 
financial flows in Nigeria.       
 
9.2.1   Dynamics of Global Transnational Organised Crime 
Chapter 2 reflected on organised crime concepts, characteristics and types. It is 
in this chapter the definitions of organised crime are placed into two broad 
categories i.e. the social science and institutional definitions. The social science 
definitions revealed that organised crime concept derived its name from the 
organisational theory/model, the first model under which the organised crime 
groups (hereinafter, OCGs) were operated by Mafia syndicates. This model 
adapted social structure, leadership and combination of functional specialisations 
in order of hierarchy and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities. Later, 
the model of organised crime groups moved from an organisational model to 
‘patron-client’ model. The model that allows flexibility of operation as compared to 
complex hierarchical structure that discouraged ease in change of leaderships 
whenever a particular leader of the group is incapacitated, in order to keep the 
criminal businesses functioning as an ongoing concern. The fundamental pillar of 
this model is associated with loyalty and trust by the ‘client’ (the follower in crime) 
to their group leader the ‘patron’ and in return the ‘clients’ are compensated with 
protection from their leader. The last categorisation of the social science definitions 
explored the concept of organised crime objectives and these objectives are 
achieved through the interaction of social networks and systems. The social 
networks interaction of the organised crime groups comprises the connectivity 
between the criminal actors and the state actors. It was revealed how the 





social systems could facilitate the business objectives of organised crime groups 
and the maximisation of illicit proceeds within the global jurisdictions. 
 
The institutional definitions of organised crime are specified by the supranational 
and national institutions combating and assessing the organised crime threats 
within the global communities. Therefore, the wordings of their definitions usually 
revolve around complex criminal activities, perpetrated by groups of people. The 
assessment of OCGs threats is undertaken by virtue of the negative impact of 
organised and other related serious crime on national and global developments. 
The use of intimidation, violence, corruption or other means to profit from crime 
were also explored by global organised crime threats assessors.   
 
The activities and businesses of organised crime are conducted illegally within the 
global jurisdictions. Therefore, the illegal actors required dynamic strategies to 
convey illegal goods and services from/through the global South to global North 
or vice-versa. These strategies are the characteristics of organised criminal 
operations in the globalisation of crime. The first characteristic of organised crime 
is revealed through the international dimension of its operation. The global 
interconnectedness of people and jurisdictions offers a unique opportunity for the 
organised crime offenders to move illegal good and services to illegal global 
markets where services of the organised crime groups are required. The 
availability of global illicit economy and markets provide competitive advantage 
and higher value for the proceeds of organised crime when the offenders in the 
global South channel the supplies of their illicit ‘products’ of crime to the rich 
jurisdictions located in the global North for profit maximisation by competing with 
the OC groups in the global North.  The consequential effect of the global illicit 
economy which originated from organised crime activities has been the subjection 
of many countries within the world to serious threats that militate good governance 
and national developments in developing countries.  
 
Another characteristic of organised crime groups involves the adoption of a 
structure and networks strategy approach for achieving a criminal business model. 
The traditional organised crime groups adopted a structural approach that is not 
flexible and soon became less profitable due to law enforcement clamp-down in 
the global states. Thus, organised crime groups change their strategy from 
structural approach to loose and fluid networks which allowed the possibility of 





globalisation of crime. Hence, organised crime groups explored the social and 
system networks opportunities to expand their strategies by engaging crime 
facilitators (such as law enforcers, politicians, bankers, lawyers, accountants, 
estate valuers, entrepreneurs and other relevant private and state actors) who 
provided a specialised role in the complex ‘web’ of organised crime transactions. 
The abuse of social networks and systems of organised crime group is extended 
to the use of legitimate business structures to conceal the profits originated from 
the criminal activities by diluting them with profits of legitimate businesses. The 
final category of organised crime characteristics adopted the strategies of counter-
measures, violence and corruption to secure profit maximisation and continuity of 
organised criminal businesses.  
 
Although, the ‘commodities’ of organised crime businesses are countless as a 
result of the globalisation of crime, this chapter revealed four categories of global 
illicit transnational organised crime ‘goods and services’. The ‘services’ derived 
from human trafficking is the first. The next category submitted all forms of 
trafficking in illicit goods like, narcotic drugs, counterfeit commodities and illicit 
trafficking in human organs, as well as all types of illicit trading in goods, like 
abusing environmental resources, such as (timber, wildlife and fish; including 
minerals, like gold and diamonds), the illicit trading in cultural resources and arm. 
The final category explored the cybercrime related organised criminal networks. 
The estimated market value of organised crime businesses appeared very difficult 
to ascertain due to exaggerated official figures originating from the supranational 
institutes curbing and monitoring the threats associated with organised crime 
concepts. However, this study submitted that a total figure of $720 billion 
approximately accrued to transnational organised crime on a yearly basis using a 
range of evidences cited in Chapter 2.  
 
In summary, the concept of organised crime appeared to be very problematic as 
a result of the evolution of its models for the attainment of the criminal associations’ 
objectives in the global jurisdictions. The first model (organisational model) is 
becoming less-popular, whereas more loosely and fluid networks that commit 
serious transnational crime are more common. The loose and fluid networks avoid 
and abandon the organisational and ‘patron-client’ models that exposed the 
structure, hierarchy and leadership of the criminal groups to the enforcement 
activities of the national and global criminal justice system. Consequently, the 





by the crime facilitators alongside the advantageous schemes of organised crime 
that exist in the social networks and systems of the jurisdictions where they 
operate. Notwithstanding the broader dynamics of the global transnational 
organised crime, the official estimated market value of what constitutes illicit global 
transnational flows are not accurate and often exaggerated. These estimates do 
not include the illicit enrichment accumulated to the state actors operating in the 
social networks and systems of organised crime groups.          
       
9.2.2   Phenomenon of Organised Crime in Nigeria 
Chapter 3 continued the discussion on the history and contemporary challenges 
of organised crime in Nigeria in relation to the dynamics of global transnational 
organised crime discussed in Chapter 2. The history of organised crime in Nigeria 
was traced back to post-slave trades in the 1870s after the abolition and 
subsequent criminalisation of trade in human beings along the West African 
Atlantic coast by Europe and the United States. Even though the slavery of African 
people was banned, the illicit demands of slavery skyrocketed in Europe and 
America to meet the demand of the Industrial Revolution that was characterised 
with cheap labour in the 1800s. Therefore the smuggling of human beings by the 
African suppliers and their counterpart offenders in Europe subsidised Industrial 
Revolutions in the 1800 century. This made human trafficking the oldest organised 
crime in Nigeria.  
 
The historical phenomenon of organised crime in Nigeria changed course into a 
sphere of drug trafficking when West African students studying in Europe and 
North America were deprived of their study grants from their respective 
governments through political corruption. Some international students from West 
Africa served as drug couriers for the criminal Networks to move drugs from the 
region to Europe and North America in order to make money for their unpaid study 
grants. This episode revealed that the US government documented the smuggling 
of heroine via Nigeria and Ghana in 1952.  Later, the organised crime offenders in 
Nigeria started advance fee fraud (AFF) during the Second Republic of 1979-1983 
using fraud to exploit proceeds of crime from their victims, mostly the victims of 
their own greed located in the global North and the global South.  
 
The dynamics of AFF was further developed into two generations, the first and 





from trade in ‘greed’ originated from high traffic of victims in the global South and 
global North, mostly in Europe and United State. On the other hand, the new 
generation AFF offenders explored information communication and technology 
(ICT) to steal identity information of their victims across the World. The second 
generation offenders use cybercrime and have adopted phishing, the technique 
aimed to profit from illicit channels and opportunities provided by the global internet. 
Notwithstanding the high traffic of the AFF victims located in the global North, the 
largest AFF crime on earth committed by Nigerian offenders was a South on South 
run (i.e. AFF crime of ‘Nigerian’ offender from the South on a victim bank in Brazil 
located in the global South) that recorded illicit proceeds of US$242 million from a 
fraud committed on a bank called Banco Noroeste, Sao Paolo in Brazil. The full 
details of this case was further analysed in Case study 6.9 of Chapter 6.  
 
The historical development of organised crime in Nigeria has evolved to a great 
extent, nevertheless, little is known about the roles and the criminal business 
model of the Nigerian transnational crime offenders in the academic discourse.  
Therefore, the study explored these gaps using figures, tables and flow chats to 
demonstrate the roles and the schemes of the Nigerian actors in the globalisation 
of crime. Of particular significance, were Figures 3.2, 3.5 and 3.9 which 
established these facts. Figure 3.2 analysed the scheme of trafficking in persons 
for commercial sex exploitation in Europe and the supply of victims originating 
from Nigeria to meet the demand for sex-workers in destination countries. The less 
privileged victims with low socio-economic status were often trafficked to 
destination countries located in Europe. Next, Figure 3.5 revealed the structure of 
the illicit supply and demand markets of narcotic drugs from/through the global 
South and to the global North where the ‘consumers’ bought illicit drugs with higher 
foreign currencies as compared to the existing local price of narcotic drugs in the 
street markets of Nigeria. The last is Figure 3.9 that showed the typical lifecycle of 
the second generation AFF offenders in Nigeria. These Figures are derived from 
the researcher and contribution to the phenomenon of organised crime in Nigeria.            
 
9.2.3   The Regime against Illicit Financial Flows  
Chapter 4 considered the definitions and context of money laundering and the 
regime against illicit financial flows. These definitions are explored using 
institutional and scholarly discourse on the term money laundering. The 





Conventions. Following this, in 1990, Article 1 (c) of the Council of Europe 
Convention gave a more elucidated definition for its member states. Further 
definitions are that of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
definition. These institutional definitions illustrated the term money laundering 
using the words ─ participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit, 
aiding, abetting, facilitating, counselling, commission, knowledge, intent, 
concealment or disguise to explain the goal and the process by which a person or 
large number of criminal networks manipulate illegally obtained proceeds 
originated from crime to appear like revenues from legitimate source.  
 
On the other hand, the scholarly definitions added that the term money laundering 
involves shielding away illicit earnings originated from both “unlawful” and “lawful” 
activities. The organised crime groups engage in money laundering in order to 
conceal illicit financial flows that originated from unlawful criminal activities. Thus 
“legitimate business owner” use money laundering to disguise lawful business 
earnings originated from higher tax jurisdictions, such as UK and the US where 
most of their business incomes where generated.  Notwithstanding this, 
accountability for such profits are made in tax and annual reports of their 
‘mushroom’ head-offices located in tax haven countries, such as Bahamas and 
Cayman Islands to conceal tax returns originating from their profitable branches 
located in the UK or the US (Chapter 6).          
 
The money laundering stages documented three stages; Placement, Layering and 
Integration. In the first stage, the placement, earnings from the illicit activities are 
placed in the legitimate economy to conceal their illegal source via physical cash 
infiltration into financial institutions (FIs), and designated non-financial institutions 
businesses and professions (DNFIBPs) or abusing the porous transnational 
borders with illicit carriage of currencies. This makes ill-gotten revenues 
“legitimatised” at destination countries where crime did not occur. This contributed 
to the vulnerabilities of financial and non-financial systems and the global 
transnational borders within international communities. The next stage, layering, 
use ‘transaction intensity and speed’ to manipulate ill-gotten funds and earnings 
into  complex and difficult layers of transactions to further conceal the money trails 
of the illicit/licit  revenues from the investigation activities of the global criminal 
justice system. This is the most complex stage of money laundering that make the 





stage is integration, and at this stage, proceeds of organised crime are fully 
integrated into the legitimate economy. The integration of illicit fund is the process 
of which ‘dirty’ money is washed clean to appear as if it originated from legal 
transactions. The study also revealed ‘Hybrid’ process, the process that occurred 
independently in one or combination of two stages.  
 
The magnitude of the global problem of money laundering is uncovered within the 
‘attractiveness index’ which characterised the vulnerabilities of the global illicit 
activities within the international communities. It explained that many countries 
operated weak anti-money laundering regimes in order to secure illicit enrichment 
of their state actors. Therefore, many jurisdictions in developing countries with 
weak laws are susceptible to organised crime activities as compared to countries 
with stringent laws in the developed countries. It is against this backdrop that the 
per capital index attractiveness submitted that ‘dirty’ money from the Third World 
countries are attracted by richer and developed countries of the global North 
(Table 4.1). That explained the continuity of lack of developments in many 
developing economies where funds meant for development in the global South 
were looted via high level political, public and private sector corruption that is 
facilitated by the global internets, cultural distance, language, colonial links and 
international trades. The lack of political will to fight organised and serious crime 
is contributing to the greatest attractiveness index that explained the magnitude of 
money laundering challenges within developing countries.  
 
Money laundering in the 1980s became fashionable when the organised criminal 
groups dealing in drug trafficking were re-investing the proceeds generated from 
their illicit trade activities back into the governance of many global jurisdictions, 
including the United States. This study demonstrated how the Mafias hijacked the 
control of many major industries in the United States in Chapter 4. The lack of 
legislation to criminalise the proceeds originated from illicit drug trading activities 
made this act very popular during this era. Therefore, the ‘war’ on illicit drug 
trafficking started in 1988 when the United Nations convened in Vienna to hold a 
meeting for the adoption of a Convention that criminalised illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances. This made the Vienna Convention the first 
initiative to combat the profits from illicit drug trading activities globally. The 
criminalisation of illicit drug trading witnessed displacements from drug trafficking 
to other serious criminal activities which Vienna Convention did not cover during 





other serious crime during this era. The displacement of the Vienna Convention 
gave ‘birth’ to a new Convention called the Palermo Convention in 2000. This 
Convention requested all member states of the United Nations to implement a 
local law in their countries that would criminalise a range of underlying serious 
crimes and offences linked to money laundering. Later, the Council of Europe 
Convention on money laundering introduced European Money Laundering 
Directives within European countries. The Commonwealth Nations were also 
apprised of the Commonwealth Strategies against Money Laundering by its 
Secretariat in order to help combat illicit financial flows originating from all sorts of 
serious and organised crime within its member states.   
 
The global standard setters and specialised institutions in combating money 
laundering revealed the roles of supranational institutions in the fight against the 
illicit financial flows which originated from organised and other related serious 
crimes. The frontier global standard setter on money laundering is the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) whose mandate is to set, improve and promote 
standards to ‘dry-out’ illicit revenues generated from all categories of crime within 
the global jurisdictions. The FATF Regional-Style Bodies (FSRBs) collaborate with 
the FATF to implement and supervise FATF Recommendations and Standards 
within their regions. Other supranational institutions engaged in the fight against 
the ‘fruit’ from organised crime groups businesses include; the United Nations, the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The Egmont Group is the 
association of the global elite Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) which 
collaborates through the sharing of financial intelligence generated from the 
submitted and analysed suspicious transactions reports on serious and organised 
crime activities within the global states. The international private sector 
collaborator on standards setting to combat the menace of money laundering 
within the banking institutions is the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and 
Supervisory Practices.  
 
Therefore, the definition and context of money laundering cannot be thoroughly 
explored by the global standard setters if they fail to expand on what constitutes 
the ‘lawful activities’ on the term “money laundering”. Currently, only unlawful 
activities define money laundering. This again forms the dark side on the global 
estimate of illicit money flows that was put at US$2.0 trillion annually by the global 
standards setters. Nonetheless, half of this fund (estimated at US$500 to 800 





economies transmitted to the major international banking centres in the global 
North of developed economies. Hence, organised crime groups explored and 
profited from various ‘attractiveness indices’ and displacement that occurred in the 
international initiatives and legal instruments to combat illicit financial flows within 
the regimes against money laundering. Notwithstanding the three stages of money 
laundering, a ‘Hybrid’ process is preferred by the OCGs to launder the proceeds 
of crime, the stage where laundering process occurred distinctly in one stage or 
simultaneously when two stages overlapped.             
   
9.2.4   Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks of Study 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the theoretical and conceptual framework that links 
organised crime and money laundering together. These theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks are; the rational choice theory and anti-money laundering 
framework.  
 
The rational choice theory clearly illustrated how organised crime groups in the 
global South created an ‘illicit economic order’ to fill the gap arising from a lack of 
legitimate social-economic opportunities witnessed in Third World countries, such 
as Nigeria. The lack of good governance in Nigeria and the availability of crime 
opportunities in the global North/South is the modality of illicit economic order of 
the organised crime groups in Nigeria. It demonstrated further, the business 
opportunity decision modelling of a crime, using three concepts: Value, 
Accessability and Transaction (VAT) to explore the decision-making processes of 
the rational crime offenders in Nigeria (Figure 5.1). The first concept, Value, 
considered using a comparative analysis of the gains, benefits or proceeds derived 
from crime vis-a-vis the cost of being caught and seizure of illicit goods and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime. The second concept, Accessability, analysed 
how offenders manage the risks of the illicit market and commodities. These 
required the offenders to engage in routine activities of locating a new route, new 
market, new customers and securing access to information communication and 
technology to guarantee continuity of the organised crime businesses. The final 
phase of the decision-making process of the organised crime offender is the 
Transaction stage. At this phase, the offenders conducted illicit businesses after a 
careful evaluation of the value of the crime and successful access to the targets 






The anti-money laundering framework is employed in this study to evaluate the 
risk of committing organised crime and how to combat their illicit transactions 
within the global states.  
Therefore, 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
explained the various steps required by global states to counter the illicit profits 
originating from organised crime and other related serious crime. Notwithstanding 
this, the anti-money laundering framework comes with numerous theoretical and 
implementation challenges. For instance, it is very problematic to account for how 
much money is laundered annually due to empirical and conceptual problems 
revealed in Chapter 4.  Again, the parameters used to measure money laundering 
at national, regional and global level do not include the laundered proceeds which 
originated from lawful activities, such as failing to pay taxes on legitimate business 
dealing and evading taxes. Also, the proceeds of crime accrued to the state actors 
associated to the organised crime systems and social networks are completely 
excluded in this parameter. On the other hand, the total income from crime often 
does not include the analysis of the spending and saving habits of the criminal 
offenders during the law enforcement investigation activities.   
 
Additionally, the regime of anti-money laundering is not cost-effective and the 
standard setters have also failed to come up with cost benefit analysis of the 
regimes of money laundering within the global jurisdictions. The attention of the 
standard setters has mainly concentrated on formal compliance with the 
implementation of instruments and standards and less attention was given to 
successful outcomes of the programmes of the regimes against money laundering. 
See also Levi and Halliday (2013). Hence, the anti-money laundering (AML) 
pressure is heavy on developing and transitional economies that have been 
compelled to adopt the same recommendations and standards as their 
counterparts from developed and sophisticated economies of the global North.  
 
Consequently, overcoming AML pressures and challenges within developing 
economies has led to the invention of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Transaction 
Validation Model within this research paper, which amounts to a cybernetics 
scientific solution to measure the outcome’s effectiveness of the regimes of money 
laundering in the global jurisdictions and transitional economies in particular.  
 
In summary, the rational choice theory of a crime explicated the rationale behind 





concepts explain the business opportunities decision modelling of the organised 
crime offenders in Nigeria while exploring crime opportunities as an ‘alternative’ to 
the scarce and limited legitimate social-economic opportunities in Third World 
countries and Nigeria in particular. The anti-money laundering framework 
initiatives and recommendations revealed the standards to combat illicit financial 
flows emanating from transactions of organised crime businesses. 
Notwithstanding the existence of these standards, the implementation of these 
recommendations (soft-law) witnessed many criticisms, therefore limiting the 
scope of achieving effectiveness of the anti-money laundering regimes within the 
global states and more importantly transitional economies. It is in the light of these 
criticisms, that this research paper suggested Anti-Money Laundering (AML) 
Transaction Validation Model as a scientific model to help monitor the transactions 
of organised crime offenders in the global jurisdictions and developing economies 
importantly.           
            
9.2.5 Perspective of Concealment of Organised Crime Financial Flows 
Chapter 6 examined a number of case studies which illustrated how organised 
crime financial flows are conducted in a complex ‘web’ of transactions within the 
global jurisdictions, West Africa and Nigeria. The case studies focused on the illicit 
financial flows that are generated from drug trafficking, human trafficking and 
advance fee fraud (AFF).  In all, 10 typological case studies were explored to 
reveal the nature of organised crime financial flows in Nigeria and West Africa. 
The typology study of money laundering means the methods and classifications 
of how illicit financial flows are being concealed by the offenders. These typology 
studies emanated from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and that of the 
Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (GIABA). The findings of the case studies revealed some general indicators, 
specific techniques and mechanisms used by organised crime offenders in Nigeria 
and West Africa when legitimising the proceeds of crime through/from the global 
North and the global South.  
 
The general red flag indicators revealed by the case studies are: displacement of 
legal framework; misuse of cash transactions; misuse of financial institutions; 
misuse of money service businesses (MSBs); misuse of agents, intermediary third 







Also, some certain indicators were specific to the operation of each type of 
organised crime businesses in Nigeria. For instance, the drug traffickers used 
trade-based money laundering techniques more than human traffickers and 
advance fee fraud (AFF) cyber offenders. This method is preferred as it provides 
cover for commodities of illicit trading. Whilst the drug trafficker used more trade-
based money laundering techniques, the traffickers in human beings explored 
informal and alternative payment systems through non-financial institutions, such 
as hawala payment systems. Even though drug traffickers and human traffickers 
often invested in different types of illicit commodities, the locations of their illicit 
commodities are tagged as high risk jurisdictions within the global communities. 
The AFF cybercriminals do not need to invest in any illicit commodities in the 
globalisation of crime but they rather exploit the greed of a potential victim or used 
ICT software to steal the identity or the financial information of a potential victim 
that are located through the global web. Therefore, the illicit financial flows of AFF 
cybercriminals attract both low and high-risk jurisdictions without offering any illicit 
goods or services in return to their victims in the globalisation of crime.   
 
The performance statistics of the specialised agencies combating the criminal 
business model of organised crime in Nigeria, revealed that many successes were 
recorded in the convictions rate of drug traffickers by the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) as a result of its robust National Drug Control 
Master Plan. Also, the National Agency for Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and 
Other Related Matters (NAPTIP) embarked on a community awareness 
programme to prevent potential victims in Nigeria from being trafficked by the 
offenders in human trafficking. Additionally, the combination of strategies 
(intelligence gathering, enforcement, destruction of criminal business model, 
prevention and engagement with Stakeholders) employed by Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) helped to achieve confiscation of monetary 
currencies totalling US$ 3,499,760,572.00 from 2003 to March 2013 in Nigeria 
(See Table 6.7). This was higher than the estimated GDP of Liberia in 2014.  
 
Nevertheless, the complexities of organised crime financial flows overwhelmed the 
competent authorities combating the criminal business model in Nigeria. The 
successes of the counter-measures and local initiatives to combat the criminal 
business model and its financial flows in Nigeria are not indicative that organised 





always seek better strategies that are not yet known to the law enforcement 
agencies to circumvent criminal justice systems in any global jurisdictions. The 
lack of good governance and social welfare system for Nigerian citizens accounted 
for this to a larger degree.    
            
9.2.6 Impediments Affecting the Success of Anti-Money Laundering Regime 
in Developing Economy 
Chapter 7 investigated the impediments militating success of anti-money 
laundering regimes in developing economies and Nigeria in particular. The 
findings of these impediments are classified into four broader categories. The first 
category is the political impediments, it was argued that the lack of political will 
and good governance to combat crime in Nigeria made the regime of anti-money 
laundering vulnerable to the organised crime groups operating in Nigeria. The 
political leaders in Nigeria ‘blindfold’ their eyes to crime to maximize illicit 
enrichment from corruption, thereby giving cover for all other serious crime in 
Nigeria. In the same vein, refusing to grant operational autonomy to the Nigerian 
Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) by the political leaders militate against the 
success of anti-money laundering in Nigeria. 
 
The second obstruction to a successful AML regime explored the operational and 
social impediments that stand in the way of a successful anti-money laundering 
regime in Nigeria. The operational deficit in the fight against illicit flows of 
organised crime witnessed customer due diligence bottlenecks. Thus, the lack of 
unique customer identification, a robust addressing systems and effective land 
registry framework to identify and locate organised crime offenders and their ill-
gotten assets provide cover for criminal networks’ identities and their illicit assets 
following the commission of crime in Nigeria. In order to achieve a robust 
identification system in Nigeria, the regulators and the reporting institutions agreed 
to use international passports, driving licence and National ID card as means of 
conducting transactions in financial institutions (FIs) and non-financial institutions 
in Nigeria. Therefore, customers without these required means of identifications 
were excluded from opening bank accounts in Nigeria before 2015. This 
accounted for proliferation of identification documents in Nigeria which the 
organised crime offenders took advantage and profited from, while the common 






Additionally, the law enforcement’s operational environments experienced 
numerous challenges in Nigeria. Also, the law enforcement agencies in Nigeria 
were sometimes not in accord with the compliance officers of the reporting 
institutions that coordinate the mandatory report of suspicious transactions used 
to monitor illicit financial flows of organised crime and other related serious crime 
within global jurisdictions and Nigeria particularly. Another impediment revealed 
that organised crime offenders in Nigeria were recidivist. Therefore, criminal 
networks will always continue their crime after serving jail terms following 
convictions for their offences. One of the secrets behind their recidivism is the 
greater opportunities that seemingly exist in social network of organised crime 
system. After all, offenders would get smarter on how to structure their proceeds 
of crime after being deprived of them. They can also use their social network 
frameworks to procure illicit commodities (i.e. drugs) in credit from their producers 
or from the network actors located in the producing countries. This social network 
framework of OCGs provides ‘goodwill asset’ (the invisible and intangible asset 
that cannot be confiscated by the global states from offenders) to continue criminal 
activity after serving jail terms for their numerous offences.    
 
The next impediments were grouped under economic impediments. The third 
impediment illustrated how the cash-based and parallel economies of the 
developing countries further jeopardized the success of the anti-money laundering 
regime in Nigeria. This is not to say that cash based and parallel economy is an 
illicit practice in developing economies. On the contrary the vulnerability of this 
system of economy enable organised crime groups to further shield away illicit 
proceeds of all crime from the global criminal justice system. 
 Also, the free cross-border movement of people, goods and cash in most 
developing economies of the West African regime facilitates the illicit movement 
of the organised crime commodities and proceeds of crime. Additionally, the 
struggle to achieve high liquidity ratio (the financial ratio that determines a bank 
ability to pay off its short-term debt obligations) by many banks in developing 
economies, including Nigeria resulted in the practice of relationship banking and 
the use of account officers to attract high profitability and liquidity ratio. Therefore 
in the absence of a legitimate source of liquidity ratio, the relationship/account 
officers operating within the organised crime social networks may bring in illicit 
funds from the criminal networks to legitimise them in the financial systems of 






The fourth impediment uncovered the deficits in the legal systems within the global 
states. The displacement in jurisdictional laws revealed how reoffenders from a 
country with stringent laws to curb organised crime and financial flows will relocate 
to a jurisdiction with lax and weak laws in the global states. Also, the ineffective 
criminal justice systems in most developing economies, including Nigeria 
represent the greater legal impediment facing the fight against organised criminal 
groups and money laundering in developing economies.        
 
It will be outside the remits of this thesis to discuss the strategic impediments 
facing the success of willing ‘war’ on organised crime financial flows within 
developing economies without making efforts in proffering potential solutions. 
Therefore, possible policy implications are submitted in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
Thus, the impediments jeopardising the success against organised crime and 
other related serious crime financial flows in developing economies have a 
devastating effect. Consequently, the research paper offered some policy 
suggestions to help mitigate these impediments in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the dynamics and the phenomena of organised crime business 
model are conducted with ingenious strategies within the global states. Therefore, 
staying in control of the menace and the threats originating from the organised 
criminal activities would require periodic review of the global initiatives, standards 
and strategies deployed by the standard setters to combat organised crime and 
its financial flows in developing and evolving economies.    
 
9.2.7 The collaboration Impact of the Anti-Money Laundering Data and 
Intelligence Reports to Combat Proceeds of Organised Crime Groups 
in Nigeria  
Chapter 8 scrutinised anti-money laundering (AML) data and intelligence reports 
shared by the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) to combat the illicit profits 
of organised crime in Nigeria. In this chapter, the role of the NFIU in curbing 
organised crime financial flows was examined. The study illustrated with Figure 
8.1, how the NFIU fulfilled its intermediary role between the reporting institutions 
of the Nigeria AML regime and the users of the intelligence reports developed from 
the Currency Transactions Reports (CTRs), the Suspicious Transaction Reports 






The study further likened the impediment militating against the successful AML 
regime in Nigeria to the lack of robust statutory AML data assurance. The thematic 
findings of Chapter 8 revealed that the quality of intelligence reports disseminated 
by the NFIU was greatly affected by the poor quality of the AML statutory data 
reported by the reporting institutions in Nigeria.  The lack of quality assurance of 
the AML data in Nigeria has a direct link to the political, social, economic and legal 
impediments discussed in Chapter 7.  For instance, a report from a reporting 
institution that excluded key customer identification requirements will not be 
validated in the NFIU analytical solution that generates the intelligence reports for 
the specialised agencies curbing organised crime in Nigeria. Also, the reporting 
institutions collaborating with organised crime networks often failed to report 
transactions of their suspicious customers to NFIU as a result of similarity in the 
objective of profit maximization that exists within both legitimate and illegitimate 
organisations. Therefore, the NFIU has to conduct on-site examinations at the 
head-offices of the reporting institutions, in order to sample weekly transactions 
emanating from the reporting entities to discover unreported suspicious 
transactions that were not reported by those institutions in enhancing meaningful 
intelligence reports for onward transmission to the competent authorities (CAs) in 
Nigeria.  
 
Additionally, the data structure of the Nigeria AML statutory data is very deficient 
as not all the required reporting institutions listed under the Nigerian AML regime 
contribute to it. At the moment, the Nigerian banks are over-regulated and little 
successes on the money trails and intelligence reports of the organised crime 
groups in Nigeria were accounted for through the substandard STRs generated 
by the banks to the NFIU. The insurance institutions, other financial institutions 
and designated non-financial institutions in Nigeria are currently under-regulated. 
Therefore, the criminal transactions in Nigeria may likely be displaced into these 
under-regulated reporting institutions.    
 
The research paper also revealed that the statutory AML data from the private 
reporting institutions (financial institution and non-financial institutions) to the NFIU 
had accounted for a less significant success of the Nigeria AML regime in fighting 
illicit financial flows generated from organised crime groups in Nigeria. On the 
other hand, the statutory AML data submitted by the Nigerian Customs Service, 
the currencies declaration reports (CDRs) to the NFIU had generated significant 





in Europe. The findings of the strategic analysis of CDRs from Nigeria to these two 
countries revealed that some Nigerian travellers under-declared currencies when 
embarking to these countries and declared higher amounts of currencies in their 
possession when landing in these destination countries. This is an indication that 
offender would take advantage of lax law in any jurisdiction to circumvent the 
currencies declaration regime of that country.   
 
Of particular importance, the CDRs’ analyses suggested a new trend of currency 
flows from Nigeria to Asia and China attracted higher currencies inflows from 
Nigeria than any European state. This new trend required Nigeria to embark on a 
strategic approach to monitor the legitimacy of these inflows out of Nigeria to China. 
Two strategic benefits are available to Nigeria with respect to the analysis of CDRs 
outflows from Nigeria. Firstly, Nigeria can use the strategic intelligence of CDRs 
to lobby for international trade advantages within the global communities. 
Secondly, Nigeria can sign a memorandum of understanding with China and other 
related countries of the world in order to help combat illicit proceeds of crime 
evidenced by these outflows of CDRs from Nigeria.         
 
Notwithstanding the international collaboration of the strategic intelligence of the 
Nigerian CDRs with US and Netherlands, Chapter 8 revealed that the proactive 
and reactive intelligence disseminated by the NFIU locally among the national 
AML collaborators were disproportionate and dissuasive to curb illicit financial 
flows originating from organised crime activities in Nigeria (Tables 8.7 and 8.8).  
 
This study also went further to compare the AML statutory data of Nigeria with that 
of Ghana, the findings suggested that the Ghana AML statutory data is more 
robust than that of Nigeria. The evidence of these findings is illustrated in Table 
8.9 where the Ghana Financial Intelligence Centre (GFIC) disseminated 254 
intelligence reports from its limited amount of AML statutory reports of 375 in 2012 
whilst the Nigeria FIU accounted for limited number of 212 intelligence reports 
generated from its larger pull of 2,828 AML statutory reports in the same year. 
Additionally, the disseminated intelligence reports of the GFIC were linked to 
convictions and confiscations of the offenders and their properties in Ghana but 
the Nigerian FIU failed to link its disseminated intelligence to convictions and 
confiscations of the organised crime groups and their illicit assets in Nigeria in 






Therefore, the lack of integrity assurance of the statutory AML data and 
disseminated intelligence by the NFIU to the competent authorities and agencies 
combating organised crime and illicit financial flows in Nigeria, limited the impact 
of the anti-money laundering regime in the country. The integrity of the anti-money 
laundering statutory reports in Nigeria is ‘over-shadowed’ by numerous 
impediments highlighted in Chapter 7 of this thesis. This called for some thoughts 
on the future effectiveness of the Nigeria AML regime in general.  Thus in order to 
enhance the integrity of intelligence reports required to combat illicit flows of all 
sorts in Nigeria, this chapter suggested some possible recommendations as the 
thoughts for future, in addition to policy implication submitted in Chapter 7.     
 
9.3   Conclusion on Central Thesis 
The term ‘organised crime’ (OC) derives its definition from one of the models of 
crime first operated by Mafia syndicates, ‘the organisational theory’, as the 
dynamics and characteristics of organised crime concepts evolved during the era 
of globalisation of crime. This model was very structured and hierarchical in nature 
and did not provide protection for the criminal associations that were profiting from 
illicit trading in commodities, human trafficking and ‘greed’ or deception within the 
global states. This era demonstrated the structure and operation of organised 
crime groups (OCGs) to the global criminal justice systems for their prosecutions. 
Consequently, OCGs abandoned the organisational model and explored the social 
networks and systems of criminal associations. Furthermore, the social networks 
and systems of crime provided the contemporary cover to the organised criminal 
groups by operating as loose and fluid criminal networks to shield and maximise 
illicit profits of crime while interacting with the crime facilitators to fill the gaps that 
exist in the organisations of crime. These systems enhanced the symbiotic 
relationship between the criminal actors and private/public states actors. Thus, the 
contemporary changes in organised crime resulted in a conceptualisation problem 
in criminology and created a dilemma in the measurement of organised crime 
threats. Therefore, it must be questioned whether the global estimates and 
parameters which measure organised crime threats and money laundering, 
accurately account for the illicit enrichment gained by the state actors from their 
symbiotic relationship with organised crime social networks and systems.    
 
Organised crime in Nigeria has its historical origins in the post-slave trades during 





traders and their associates in Europe to support the Industrial Revolution of the 
19th century. So, the first organised crime in Nigeria was the trading of human 
beings which continued after the ban of slavery in Africa by Europe and United 
States. The second wave of organised crime in Nigeria was the drug trafficking 
from West Africa and Nigeria to the global North (i.e. Europe and United States) 
that was recorded in the US in 1952.  The final and perhaps the most prominent 
organised crime phenomenon in Nigeria is the advance fee fraud (AFF) 
cybercrime related which became prominent during the second Republic of 1979-
1983.  
 
The contemporary successes in the trading of organised crime commodities from 
West Africa, and Nigeria in particular, could be traced to Europe where most West 
African states attained their political independences from. Hence, the supplies of 
illicit commodities from Nigeria were linked to the illicit markets located in the 
global North in Europe where higher prices of those commodities exist as 
compared with that of local street markets located in Nigeria. The conduct of OCGs 
transactions and criminal activities present huge global challenges which inhibit 
national, regional and global developments.  
 
A string of global initiatives, standards and recommendations were introduced in 
order to counter organised crime threats and money laundering globally 
particularly with Nigeria being one of the focal points. Notwithstanding this, the 
consideration of the criminal business model and illustrations of illicit supply and 
demand markets of organised crime commodities and transactions helped to 
comprehend the complex roles and the schemes of the ‘Nigerian’ offenders in the 
globalisation of crime from/through the global South to the global North. Likewise, 
the nature of illicit financial flows of organised crime in Nigeria illustrated relevant 
indicators and red flags to help monitor complex transactions of the OC offenders 
within the global jurisdictions. Thus the impediments and risks associated with the 
implementations of the anti-money laundering regimes in developing and 
transitional economies, such as Nigeria are overwhelming. These impediments 
are associated with political, social, economic and legal imbalances with respect 
to developing countries and impacts negatively on the quality of the anti-money 
laundering statutory data and the integrity of intelligence reports to counter illicit 






It is evident that no single initiative or recommendation will offer an entire solution 
to combat the illicit financial flows that originate from organised criminal activities 
in developing economies and Nigeria in particular. The roles and strategies of 
competent authorities in Nigeria illustrated that the successes of the local 
initiatives and strategies to counter organised criminal activities in the country are 
not self-evident that organised crime threats are reducing. Each initiative always 
comes with its own limitations even though they offer potential benefits to counter 
organised crime and money laundering. However, organised crime offenders will 
always take advantage of these limitations to continue crimes and displace the 
priority of criminal justice systems to ensure justice and equity in the global states. 
Therefore, the combination of strategies will require the global standard setters to 
encourage implementing countries to take initiatives suitable to their own 
circumstances in combating crime rather than compelling ratifications of 
international initiatives and recommendations (soft laws). After all there is no 
known existing cost benefit analysis by the standard setters on the regimes of 
money laundering existing in developing and transitional economies.  
 
The combination of control and strategies submitted in this thesis revealed policy 
implications, and some thoughts on a future and scientific model (Anti Money 
Laundering Transaction Validation Model) to combat organised crime financial 
flows in developing and transitional economies like Nigeria.  
 
Finally, there exist a number of International Conventions, Initiatives and 
Recommendations to combat organised crime and money laundering in 
developing countries in general and Nigeria in particular.  
Nonetheless, these international instruments (soft-laws) are not very compatible 
to combat illicit proceeds of organised crime in developing countries due to the 
impediments discussed in the implementations of these standards and initiatives. 
This means that organised crime and its financial flows cannot be combated 
effectively by international, regional and national initiatives and instruments alone. 
The implementation strategy to combat crime may require a new body of 
knowledge, i.e.  ‘Social and Criminal Justice Informatics Study’, a scientific and 















































Appendix A  
 
Sample Interview Questions and Research Instruments 
 
- What challenges are currently faced by your agency due to changes in the nature 
of organised criminal offenders’ operations in Nigeria?   
- What new methods are adopted by your agency to tackle these challenges?  
- How does you agency collaborate with other agencies in the fight against the 
organised crime group’s offenders? 
- What international collaboration do you experience in your agency while curbing 
organised crime problems in Nigeria? 
- What are the remarkable successes achieved by your agency in the fight against 
organised crime offenders in Nigeria? 
- What is the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in curbing illicit financial 
flows in the country? 
- Which agencies are involved in the control of the illicit financial flows that are 
attached to drug trafficking, Advance Fee fraud (AFF) also known as Internet fraud 
in many countries?  
- What trends of illicit financial flows are observed in recent times?  
- What financial methods are used, in these emerging trends and how are they 
monitored? 
-  Who are the main actors frequently identified as behind the smuggling of 
currencies and other valuables within Nigeria’s borders? 
- Which currency declaration (this is a method of declaring currencies and cash at 
airport or other points of entry to any country) regime is available to flag the illicit 
cash movement of the OC offenders through Nigerian borders? 
- How is the declaration form administered within Nigerian borders?  
- How are the intelligence information gathered from the currency declaration 
reports of the organised crime offenders shared amongst other law enforcement 





























The List of General Red Flag indicators of Organised Crime Groups in 
Nigeria 
Displacement in Legal Framework or Law Related  
  
i. Explores weak legal framework to launder proceeds of crime causing 
displacement in the system; 
ii. Conducting Transactions  to evade regulation;  
iii. Explores the Informal sector, which include; the informal remittance system 
of payment, ‘black’ market currencies operation (informal currency 
exchange) and acquisition of valuable assets through informal and 
unregulated sectors.  
  
Misuse of Cash Transactions  
 
i. Cross border bulk cash movement are preferred to the transfer of funds 
through financial institutions;  
ii. Cash revenues from cash intensive businesses are diluted with proceeds 
of crime; 
iii. Unjustified large volumes of cash turnover as compared with the industry 
standard;  
iv. Large volumes of cash exchange operations;  
v. Inconsistent use of cash as a store for value currency while preferring 
foreign currencies against the local currency;  
vi. Customer preferring to conduct transactions with cash instead of non-cash 
instruments, to achieve anonymity and ambiguity when tracing the money 
trail; 
vii. Unjustified use of cash to acquire valuable real estate and other luxury 








Misuse of Transactions through Financial Institutions  
 
i. Opening of bank accounts using documentation containing fictitious names 
and addresses; 
ii. Agents of the beneficial owners of funds make false claims of loss of 
account opening documents of their principal (real beneficial owners) ;  
iii. Conducting transactions in banks using multiple accounts with different 
names and multiple identities; 
iv. Transactions involving large volumes of cash are carried out in banks but 
do not match the expected financial income of the account owners when 
their business profiles are taken into consideration;  
v. Multiple transactions involving payments and withdrawals of funds are 
structured below the regulatory threshold, preventing the transactions from 
qualifying for currency transaction reports (CTRs) or suspicious transaction 
reports (STRs);   
vi. Change in a customer’s business profile and practice; 
vii. Unjustified large cash deposits which is inconsistent with the business 
profile of the customer;  
viii. Deposits of large cash or transfers followed by domestic wire transfers or 
further cash withdrawals;    
ix. Transactions involving bank draft for the purchase of valuable properties 
and assets; 
x. Transfer activities involving funds are inconsistent with the line of business 
of the account holders; 
xi. Transfers of funds to fictitious accounts and high risk jurisdictions;  
xii. Transfers of proceeds of crime through third party bank accounts; 
xiii. Electronic fund transfers received from abroad may be requested to be 
transferred to beneficiaries’ accounts in another jurisdiction. 
 
Misuse of Transactions through Money Service Businesses (MSBs)  
 
i. Transmission of funds through MSBs using fictitious names and addresses; 
ii. Multiple transfers of funds to associates and family members using MSBs; 
iii. Small funds sent with high frequency to unconnected recipients; 





v. Transfers of funds to high risk jurisdictions;  
vi. Transfers of repetitive funds below the threshold; 
vii. Transfer of funds from different regions to the same persons, and; 
viii. Transfer of funds from the sender to the recipient with the same name 
(same beneficiaries).     
 
Abuse of Transaction through Agents, Intermediary third party and Associates  
 
i. The use of cash couriers for payments and repatriation of proceeds of 
crime to the country of origin; 
ii. Associates are used to launder the proceeds of crime within the financial 
institutions, MSBs and real estate sector when conducting cash 
transactions; 
iii. Intermediary third parties and agents are used as vehicles to launder 
proceeds of crime through investments in valuable assets; 
iv. The use of vulnerable trafficked persons to conduct transactions, and; 
v. Using an unqualified minor to open an account. 
 
Illicit Investment in Real Estate  
 
i. Purchase of properties in a family member’s name; 
ii. Purchase of properties using bank draft as against personal cheques 
and/or direct transfers of fund from personal accounts; 
iii. Use of bulk cash payment for acquisition of real estate and properties;  
iv. Preferring to buy landed property with foreign currencies as against the 
local currency; and 
v. Buying of real estate under the cover of the lawyers or other professionals 











Abuse of Trade Based Transactions  
 
i. Transfers of funds abroad in excess of the required financial obligation for 
international trade; 
ii. Unjustified discrepancies on the trade invoice with description in the value 
of goods on the bill of lading;  
iii. High discrepancy noticed between the description of the commodity on bill 
of lading and the actual goods shipped; 
iv. Shipment of commodity to/or from a high risk jurisdiction for money 
laundering purposes; 
v. Trans-shipments of goods through one or more jurisdictions without 
justifiable economic reasons;  
vi. The size of the shipment appears unjustifiable with industry standard for a 
particular exporter or importer’s business activities; 
vii. Shipment of commodity that lack economic sense, for instance, 
transportation of false ceiling empty container concealed with cocaine  
back to the ‘exporter’;    
viii. Misrepresentation of the quality and/or type of commodities imported or 
exported; 
ix. Packaging appears unjustifiable with the commodity in relation to shipment 
standards; 
x. The shipped commodity lacks consistency with the exporter or importer’s 
normal business activities; 
xi. The use of front or shell companies for international trade; 
xii. Transactions with repeated amendments or with high frequency extension 
of letter of credit;    
xiii. The method of payment appears unjustifiable compared to the risk 













Appendix C  
Highest possible punishment available for drug trafficking offences 






















Data of Rescued victims of human trafficking by states of origin in Nigeria 
2012-2013 































































































Calculation of Amount of Currencies Value Recovered by EFCC from 
January 2003 – March 2013 
This figure is arrived at using currencies conversion rates of 5 March 2015 as a 
basis of calculations. Though the proportion that came from AFF related crime is 
unknown, the entire amount of the currencies recovery is categorised under 
proceeds of crime originated from financial crime.  
 
A. Dollas − $321,137,596.63 X $1    = $321,137,596.63 
B. Naira − N497,482,158,293.27 X $0.0063   =  $3,134,137,597.00  
C. Euro −  €32,106,510.40 X $1.322    =  $42,444,806.70  
D. Pounds −  £1,252,974.00 X $1.554    =  $1,947,121.60  
E. Riyals −  R350,000.00 X $0.2667)              =  $93,450.00  
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